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ABSTRACT 
In late 1877 Thomas Edison cobbled together a crude mechanism of metal and wood he 
called the “phonograph,” a device capable of mechanically reproducing sounds as varied as 
speech and birdsong. The scientific community and the general public hailed Edison’s invention 
as a wonder of the age and speculated endlessly on the practical applications to which it would 
soon be put. But as Edison and his financial backers discovered, making money from sound 
recording was no easy task.  
“Vox Machinae” draws on business records, newspapers, trade journals and 
advertisements to detail the first five decades of the business of sound recording. It begins with 
the technology’s origins as a staged spectacle in the 1870s before detailing its application to 
office work in the 1880s and 1890s. Following an examination of the nickel-in-slot phonograph 
parlors of the 1890s it explores the technology’s evolution as a form of “home entertainment” in 
the twentieth century. “Vox Machinae” argues, first, that each of these business models was an 
historical artifact produced by a give-and-take between phonograph entrepreneurs, the public and 
sometimes-intransigent material things. The story of twentieth century music is not only one of 
race, class, gender, taste, capitalism and consumption. It is also one of motors, batteries and 
hand-cranks and it involves production and distribution no less than consumption and meaning-
making. Secondly, this dissertation argues that the search for a profitable business model also 
enlisted phonograph entrepreneurs and the public in a project of determining exactly what kind 
!ix
of things phonographs and recorded sounds were. Did the phonograph represent a “talking 
machine” in the European and American tradition of the speaking automaton? Was it a “sound 
writer,” inscribing spoken messages on sheets of foil and then reading these scripts aloud? Or did 
one’s phonographs and records serve as frictionless conduits, channeling the actual singing, 
playing, preaching, and joking of distant (or even deceased) subjects? Sound recording 
technology was not a stable entity to be packaged and sold to the public. Rather it represented an 
ontologically-fluid cluster of material, cultural and social relations requiring that those who 
wished to sell it must first determine what it was.  
“Vox Machinae” complicates the existing historiography of recorded sound in two ways. 
First, it draws insights from Science, Technology and Society as well as the “new materialism” to 
show how the materiality of sound recording technology shaped its commercial evolution. 
Rather than a blank slate on which to project commercial ambitions, the phonograph presented 
would-be entrepreneurs with a tightly entangled set of commercial, material, social and cultural 
“problems” to solve. Secondly, it seeks to bring together the nuance of recent cultural histories 
with an older interpretive rubric—that of the “culture industry.” In so doing, it lays bare the tight 
relationship between production and consumption, without succumbing to the totalizing, 
historically “flat” conception of the recording industry offered by Theodor Adorno and other 
mass culture critics.  
!x
INTRODUCTION 
If she grew bored with the Liberty Bell and Independence Hall a visitor to Philadelphia’s 
historic city center in 1919 might have walked a few blocks, caught a ferry across the Delaware 
River to Camden, New Jersey, and there, right at the water’s edge, seen something remarkable—
the industrial plant of the Victor Talking Machine Company of Camden, New Jersey. It was a 
sprawling complex of buildings, comprising 1,663,552 square feet of floor space and around a 
dozen-and-a-half buildings of various sizes. Its lumber yards—sixteen acres worth—were 
stacked twenty to fifty feet high with wood of various kinds which disappeared into the 
complex’s buildings at a rate of over 36 million feet a year. Ships plying the Delaware River 
delivered coal to a depot right at the water’s edge. From there it was lifted by a crane onto a 
conveyor belt and elevated to storage bins at the top of the complex’s power plant which yearly 
consumed 55,000 tons of the black, sooty fuel.   1
If our bored tourist found her curiosity piqued by these sights (and if she “knew 
someone,”) she might arrange a tour of the plant’s interior, beginning with Building 2, the 
executive offices. Her tour guide would almost certainly want to tarry in the building’s marble 
lobby, its wainscoted boardrooms, or perhaps one of its lavishly outfitted executive offices. 
These spaces were built, in part, for public consumption and projected Victor’s aspirations as a 
 Frederick O. Barnum, III. His Master’s Voice In America. Ninety Years of Communications Pioneering 1
and Progress: Victor Talking Machine Company, Radio Corporation of America, General Electric 
Company (Boston: General Electric Co, 1991), 51-53, 75.
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serious arbiter of taste. But Building 2 is also an ideal place to begin a serious examination of the 
factory’s operations, and soon our bored tourist arrives at the Order Department. There, 
distributor’s orders for talking machines, records, spare parts and other sundries are received, 
compiled and turned into quarterly production plans for the factory. The creation of these work 
schedules are, in themselves, substantial achievements in the realm of industrial planning, 
because during the height of Victor’s success in the years after World War I, orders always 
outstripped production. Scarcity of plant space, time, labor and the competing priorities of 
profitability and good will among the trade (distributors complained incessantly over the failure 
of the company to fill orders) made planning a monumental task.  
Having generated production schedules, the Order Department parsed them out into work 
orders which are sent along to the company’s various departments—such as the cabinet plant. 
Proceeding to Building 17 our visitor finds workers transforming miles of wood from Victor’s 
lumber yards into cabinets for the company’s trademark “Victrola” and other, less luxurious, 
models of talking machine. Sawing, hammering, gluing planing, turning, carving, finishing, 
veneering and dozens of other operations take place there that would—in nearly all other 
factories—constitute a total industrial process. In this plant, it is just one of many and when the 
cabinets reach the top floor they are passed via conveyor belts across the 4th street bridge to 
Building 1. In Building 18, a fabrication process every bit as involved as the cabinet assembly 
had been churning out hinges, turntables, motors, brackets and other kinds of hardware. These 
materials too are passed across 4th street via a bridge to Building 1 where the wood and metal 
effluent of the two plants are brought together to produce finished phonographs.  They are 
assembled, inspected for sound operation and placed back on conveyors bound for the packing 
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section. There, they are lowered into crates before being sealed shut by an automatic nailing 
machine and sent down the “lowerator” to the first floor of Building 1—the shipping 
department.  2
The manufacture of phonograph records was itself an undertaking that could (and in 
many places, did) occupy a company’s attentions completely. In 1919 Victor ran a studio in New 
York City, but a great deal of its recording was conducted on the seventh floor of Building 15. 
Beginning in 1918, the company also made recordings in Building 22—an impressive structure 
which in a previous life had been Camden’s Trinity Church. For a single singer or 
instrumentalist, the process was simple enough. He or she stood before a recording phonograph 
and waited for the engineer to finish preparing the apparatus. In these, the pre-electric years of 
recording, no microphones aided in the capture of whispers or low notes, so when given the 
signal to begin singing or playing is given, the performer worked strenuously to project every 
note into the apparatus’ upturned horn. At the same time, especially high or loud tones are likely 
to cause distortion in the recording. It was necessary, then, for performers to rush back and forth, 
distancing themselves from the apparatus when singing loud or high notes and quickly returning 
to the horn for low or quiet ones. For ensemble records, such as those produced by the Victor 
orchestra, a kind of primitive balancing was achieved by arranging instrumentalists around the 
horn according to their relative volumes—violins and other strings up front, brass and percussion 
in the back. The engineer gives the signal and the band launches into a three-minute rendition of 
“Stars and Stripes Forever,” or “After You’ve Gone.” 
 B. L. Aldridge, The Victor Talking Machine Company, ed. Frederic Bayh (Published online by the David 2
Sarnoff Library, www.davidsarnoff.org), 71-84. Barnum, His Master’s Voice, 54, 59.
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All of this labor, however, produced only a single wax record. This soft wax original was 
then subjected to several rounds of electroplating to produce hard copper matrices—“negative” 
versions of the record which could be used to stamp out thousands or even millions of copies in 
another medium. To see where this medium originated, our visitor would proceed to Building 13. 
Built in 1914 to house the record materials manufacturing operation, it was constructed on piles 
right at the water’s edge where, Victor’s engineers hoped, breezes coming off the Delaware 
would disperse the excessive heat generated by the process. Here a mixture of shellac and other 
materials was heated and mechanically kneaded until it was pliable and uniform, and was then 
fed out in small square pieces which were taken to the record stamping room where they are 
again heated and then stamped with the original matrix containing sonic information captured in 
the company’s studios. The overflow is trimmed from the (now round) pieces of shellac and, 
after inspection, they are packaged and sent to the shipping department.  3
In the shipping department, workers compile distributor’s orders, gathering the necessary 
number and models of talking machines and record selections before pushing it all out onto the 
loading dock to be put on railroad cars. During the busy season leading up to Christmas they fill 
ten such cars twice a day. An electric switch engine (the company’s own) pulled them across 
Delaware Avenue to the station of the Pennsylvania Railroad where they are sent out across the 
country to company distributors.  4
At this point, the continent-spanning machine that was the Victor Company became 
difficult to discern, spreading out across the North American continent and beyond like an 
 “Barnum, His Master’s Voice, 51-53, 75, 80-82. “The Carefully Guarded Secret of How Phonograph 3
Records Are Made,” The Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 1922, 2. Alexander H. Kolbe, “How 
Phonograph Records are Made,” Popular Mechanics, February 1922, 581-582.
Aldridge, The Victor Talking Machine Company, 71-84. Barnum, His Master’s Voice, 76-77.4
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increasingly fine network of commercial capillaries. If she has not had her fill of talking 
machines, our visitor might return to the offices in Building 2 to interrogate the distribution 
manager as to where all of these records and phonographs were going. In 1919, he would have 
informed her, Victor’s wares filtered out to just over 100 distributors. Intermediary nodes in 
Victor’s sales network, the distributors fulfill several important roles in the business of making 
and selling mechanically-reproduced sound. First and foremost, they are channels for the large 
amount of Victor merchandise pouring from the plant at Camden, and they must have the 
facilities to handle that flow. Most would have owned warehouses with their own railroad “spur,” 
so that merchandise could be transferred directly from rail car to loading dock. Some of them, 
like Wanamaker’s of Philadelphia were involved in general retail but most were distributors (and 
often retailers) of pianos and other musical instruments such as Lyon & Healy of Chicago and 
Sherman, Clay & Company of San Francisco.  5
Just below the distributors in this Great Commodity Chain of Being, were 6,000 licensed 
Victor dealers whose wares are delivered from the distributors’ warehouse via horse and wagon 
or, by 1919, truck. Dealers’ primary point of contact in the Victor network were the distributors 
and Victor exerted constant pressure on distributors to discipline their subordinates. Distributors, 
for example, were charged with vetting potential dealers and ensuring their adherence to 
company policy, including inventory quotas and pricing guidelines. But Victor also aimed to 
influence its dealers directly. Through the house organ, the Voice of the Victor, the company 
inculcated its dealers into the cult of enthusiastic selling and, beginning in 1919, hosted a free 
two-week course in “practical salesmanship” in Camden for the benefit of dealers, distributors 
 Victor Talking Machine Company, “List of Victor Wholesalers, February 1, 1919” RCA Victor Camden/5
Frederick O. Barnum III collection. Box 9, Folder 22: Distributor Lists 1907-1945.
!5
and their employees. To make sure the lessons were taking, twenty to thirty men employed as 
part of Victor’s “traveling staff” fanned out from Camden on the nation’s railroads to serve as 
“Ambassadors of Trade.” Their principle job was to maintain connections with (and keep tabs 
on) local dealers.  
Victor’s system of manufacturing, distribution and sales—outlined here in the most 
cursory of terms—was phenomenally effective at achieving its designed aims. In the six year 
run-up to 1918 the company had sold 2.5 million instruments and 127 million records. But Victor 
was, in turn, only one (admittedly large) part of an entire industry—one which experienced 
phenomenal growth in these years. In 1919, 166 American companies were engaged in the 
business of manufacture and sale of phonographs and phonograph records. That same year the 
industry produced a total of 2,226,000 phonographs and 106,997,000 records, which—together 
with spare parts and other merchandise—represented a production value of  $158,548,000. The 
Depression beginning in 1920 suppressed sales of phonographs and records in the next few years 
and by the end of 1921 fewer than 100 manufacturers of phonographs and related articles 
remained in the field. These hard times, however, fell disproportionately on marginal producers 
and Victor, Columbia, Brunswick and Edison’s National Phonograph Company continued along. 
Ninety percent of the industry’s 1921 output belonged to these four firms and a half-dozen 
others. That same year, an estimated 500 distributors (or “jobbers”) and 22,000 local dealers 
worked to place manufacturers’ phonographs and records before the general public.  6
 Barnum, His Master’s Voice, 90. “Talking Machine Industry Grows,” Los Angeles Times, June 6, 1921, 6
pg. 15. G.D. Crain Jr. Crain’s Market Data Book and Directory of Class, Trade and Technical 
Publications (Chicago: G.D. Crain, Jr., 1922), 403-404. The estimate of 6000 dealers comes from B.A. 
Aldridge who reports a figure of 6,043 Victor deals as of March 31, 1916. Aldridge, The Victor Talking 
Machine Company, 71-84. Voice of the Victor, January 1908, 2. Voice of the Victor, November, 1912, 7.
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Due to this massive outflow of material by Victor and other manufacturers, the 
consumption of phonographs and phonograph records became commonplace in the years after 
World War One, even if class-stratified. Of the 100 working class families surveyed by Robert 
and Helen Lynd in Muncie, Indiana, at least twenty-three owned phonographs, but more socio-
economically diverse surveys revealed higher rates of phonograph ownership. A study published 
in 1926 found that 34 percent of all the households surveyed in “small-town” Kansas owned 
phonographs, while a 1925 study of Zanesville Ohio found the technology in over half of the 
homes surveyed.    7
More difficult to assess in 1919, however, was the profundity of the new technology’s 
impact on American culture and society, but here we have an advantage over the bored tourist or 
even Victor’s number-crunchers. In recent years cultural historians have detailed the many 
linkages between sound recording and American life which formed in the post-war period and 
they have left little doubt about the matter: recorded sound influenced the habits and shaped the 
meaning-making processes of Americans in every walk of life. The middle class consumed 
recordings of Enrico Caruso and other exemplars of European “art music,” thereby taking part in 
the construction of a new middlebrow culture, while after 1921 African Americans found 
expression of their own middle class identity in the output of Black Swan Records, the first 
major black-owned recording company. Through recorded pop, country and blues, workers came 
to see themselves through categories of difference shaped profoundly by genres of recorded 
 Mary E. Hoffman, The Buying Habits of Small-Town Women, (Kansas City, New York, 1926), 73. 7
Robert Staughton Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, Middletown a Study in Contemporary American Culture 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929), 244.
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music, while immigrants found their experiences reflected and interpreted in recordings 
produced in English as well as Yiddish, Polish, Italian and other languages.   8
Vox Machinae 
This dissertation details the history of sound recording in the years 1877-1930, paying 
particular attention to the technology’s evolution as a commercial proposition culminating in the 
creation of the modern “recording industry.” It traces the various business models pursued by 
phonograph entrepreneurs in these years, positioning each as an historical artifact produced by a 
give-and-take between phonograph entrepreneurs, the public and sometimes-intransigent 
material things. The story of twentieth century music is not only one of race, class, gender, taste, 
 David Suisman, Selling Sounds: the Commercial Revolution In American Music (Cambridge: Harvard 8
University Press, 2009,) 204-239. Karl Hagstrom Miller, Segregating Sound: Inventing Folk And Pop 
Music In the Age of Jim Crow (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); William Howland Kenney, 
Recorded Music In American Life: the Phonograph And Popular Memory, 1890-1945 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 65-87. What most Americans could not have appreciated was that around the 
globe musical recordings were effecting similarly dramatic shifts in the ways people conceived of self and 
other. Between 1925 and 1930 an explosion of recording activity took place across the world as record 
companies turned their attentions to “hula, rumba, beguine, tango, jazz, samba, marabi, kroncog, tarab, 
charaab” and other vernacular styles of the colonial ports. Circulating within and between these outposts 
of European empire, recordings inverted colonial sonic hierarchies through syncopation, rough timbres 
and sometimes overtly political lyrics. By “decolonizing the ear” the recorded musics of the soon-to-be 
“third world” created the subjective preconditions for decolonization proper. Michael Denning, Noise 
Uprising: the Audiopolitics of a World Musical Revolution (London: Verso, 2015). Americans, too, looked 
to music in recorded and non-recorded formats to help them make sense of themselves in an imperial 
context, with songs like “Chinatown, My Chinatown,” for example, emphasizing the alienness of Asian-
American immigrants. The song, with its depictions of the supposedly opium-addled Chinese sections of 
American cities, ascribed social inferiority and dangerousness to these groups at the same time that it 
hinted at a longing for their carefree “dreamy” lifestyles. On the other hand, Hawaii and her people, 
annexed to the United States in 1898 required another reconfiguration of Americans’ mental maps. 
Starting as early as 1899, major recording firms acquired and sold records of Hawaiian traditional and 
hapa haole (“half-foreign” or “half-white”) music and by the mid 1910s, a craze for all things Hawaiian 
had gripped the mainland. The style and content of these musics were always up for negotiation and 
native Hawaiians pushed back against the reductive and exoticizing tendencies of tin-pan alley. All the 
same, by the end of the decade Americans had come to understand Hawaii as a place of racially “other” 
but non-threatening natives, the most striking and pervasive symbol of whom was the sexually available 
Hawaiian “sweetheart.” Through recordings of such music, American mainlanders came to view 
themselves and Hawaiians within a sonic framework that made sense of “self” and “other” in an imperial 
context. Charles Hiroshi Garrett, Struggling to Define a Nation: American Music And the Twentieth 
Century (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), 201. 
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capitalism and consumption. It is also one of motors, batteries and hand-cranks. It involves 
production and distribution no less than consumption and meaning-making and to understand 
sound recording and its effects it is necessary to step back and take the whole process in at the 
level of an industry—a “culture industry.” This dissertation departs from much of the existing 
literature on the history of sound recording, then, through its emphasis on the material (as well as 
the cultural) preconditions for the phonograph’s twentieth century influence.  
It argues, first, that the modern “recording industry” came about only after several other 
business models had been pursued, and that it was by no means the most obvious way to wring a 
profit from the phonograph. Secondly, it argues that each of these succeeding business models 
was tightly entangled with a distinct phonographic ontology, with the technology understood at 
different times as a talking machine, a sonic scribe, a sonic printing press and—eventually—as a 
transparent conduit for sonic events which happened elsewhere.  
There are a number of existing theoretical contexts into which the phonograph could be 
placed and one of the most ready-to-hand is “media.” The phonograph has certainly come to act 
as a form of media. "Vox Machinae," however, begins from a position of agnosticism regarding 
"media," because, as a category of analysis, the term actually smuggles in as presuppositions 
some of what this study sets out to explain. Media forms, everyone knows, come laden with 
complex patterns of human signification and intentionality. Media “mean” something in ways 
that other artifacts of human manufacture do not and they therefore “naturally” command our 
attention, even to the point of over-saturation and then inattention. Because of this supposedly 
inherent power, media technologies are readily able to implicate subjects in relationships, 
intellectual or affective, with subjects elsewhere. More pointedly, media mediate something. 
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Something must pass through a technology for it to be media. In the case of the phonograph, 
however, these assumptions were very often not characteristic of the way subjects initially 
perceived the technology.  Phonographs became media over time.  
On the other hand, the phonograph’s historical effects map very closely onto another 
general category of objects familiar to the historian of American culture—commodities.  If 
considered a commodity, the phonograph comes into focus as just one more instance in a long 
line of goods which American consumers have used to shape themselves and their worlds. 
Beginning no later than the late 17th century, the American colonial gentry had employed goods 
imported from London to distinguish themselves from the rabble. Large homes filled with 
expensive furniture, silverware and linens provided the visual markers of a genteel household 
and gave its occupants entry into polite society. In the eighteenth century self-fashioning took on 
an even more consumeristic gloss as the burgeoning middle class took up its call. The gentry had 
leavened its use of conspicuous accumulation with an emphasis on time-consuming personal 
refinement in speech, deed and manners. The busy bourgeoisie tended to settle for “polite” 
behavior and generally made up the difference with purchased goods. Colonial consumption, 
however, did not only serve as an invidious marker of class difference, but also allowed 
American elites and middling sorts to express a mediated form of national identity. In keeping up 
with the latest fashions out of London, colonials positioned themselves within a trans-Atlantic 
“empire of goods” thereby laying claim to Britishness. As tensions rose between the colonies and 
the mother country after 1765, consumption again played a pivotal role in crystallizing identity 
as colonials foreswore the importation, purchase or use of British-made goods. A shared ethos of 
self-sacrifice and modest living (reinforced by no small measure of surveillance and social 
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suasion) gave rise to a separate American public sphere and an identity separate from that of 
“British.”   9
For the most part, colonial proto-consumerism had remained the purview of the wealthy 
or well-born denizens of the coasts and rivers. In the Jacksonian Period, market relations sent 
their taproots deeper into the body-politic and further into the American hinterland, drawing the 
provincial middle classes and workers into the world of consumption. Lingering notions of 
republican virtue and self-sacrifice served as a brake on the excesses of the market revolution. 
By the time of the Civil War, however, Americans and their leaders had moved a long way down 
the road toward liberalism’s conflation of consumption and the public weal.  10
Americans’ economic lives were again transformed in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century when a new constellation of market relations coalesced in the United States and abroad. 
In the 1880s industrial processes facilitated massive increases in output allowing well-capitalized 
companies to produce cookies, crackers, soaps and other, more durable, household items such as 
furniture or home “appliances” in unprecedented numbers. These consumables quickly saturated 
local markets forcing producers into expanded national and international territories in which to 
offload their products. The resulting overlapping territories necessitated that producers 
differentiate their products, giving rise to trademarks and branding. At nearly the same time, the 
 Richard L Bushman, The Refinement of America: Persons, Houses, Cities (New York: Knopf, 1992). For 9
in-depth analysis of colonial consumption see Jennifer L. Anderson Mahogany: the Costs of Luxury in 
Early America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012); See also David Hancock, Oceans of Wine: 
Madeira And the Emergence of American Trade And Taste (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
Sidney Mintz investigates an even longer history of trans-Atlantic consumerism in his study of sugar 
consumption. See Sidney Mintz, Sweetness And Power: the Place of Sugar In Modern History (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1986); T. H. Breen, The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics 
Shaped American Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
 Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford 10
University Press, 1991); Joanna Cohen, Luxurious Citizens: The Politics of Consumption in Nineteenth-
Century America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).
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rise of nationally-distributed magazines, gave national brands a platform for advertising their 
superabundant goods to the American public. In the years around 1900 a burgeoning class of 
professional admen began filling the national magazines with eye-catching images and copy 
which transformed cutting-edge social-psychological theories into techniques of commercial 
persuasion.   11
In many ways the turn-of-the-twentieth-century “consumer revolution” carried on in 
intensified form patterns of subjectivity-building established in earlier decades. For example, the 
close relationship between consuming and national belonging established prior to the Revolution 
was taken up by admen as well as consumer advocacy groups who argued in ever more explicit 
terms for a conflation of consumption and citizenship. The idea was enshrined in federal policy 
and labor politics by mid-century. Consumption-based claims to Americanness also came 
entangled with the politics of class. In the late nineteenth century, women factory operatives 
were still denied the identity of “worker” as well as the institutions and modes of sociality 
traditionally claimed by the male working class. Consequently, they fashioned identities out of 
consumption. Store-bought hats, dresses and makeup marked these women as “Americans” 
distinct from their (often) Old World parents. But working women also used these articles to 
 Susan Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed: the Making of the Mass Market (New York: Pantheon Books, 11
1989); Richard M. Ohmann, Selling Culture: Magazines, Markets, And Class At the Turn of the Century 
(London: Verso, 1996); Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 
1920-1940 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Pamela Walker Laird, Advertising Progress: 
American Business And the Rise of Consumer Marketing (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1998); Stuart Ewen, Captains of Consciousness: Advertising And the Social Roots of the Consumer 
Culture (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976); T. J. Jackson Lears, Fables of Abundance: a Cultural History of 
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establish a class-based identity which asserted dignity in the face of middle class and elite 
condescension and which could even become the fodder for political mobilization. When 
working women demanded that bosses provide places to store their expensive hats or when they 
flung eggs at scabs and tore at their dresses, they illustrated the politicized nature of consumer 
goods.   12
Bicycles did much the same work of shoring up identity for their (initially) male and elite 
owners. The giant “high wheel” bicycles of the 1880s offered well-documented opportunities for 
self-injury, making them a favorite marker of masculinity for the nation’s reckless sons of 
privilege. By 1900, the safety bicycle allowed a wider and more “polite” swath of elite society to 
enjoy the pastime. These users, in turn, often employed their bicycles to shore up class-based 
identities, such as when New York’s fashionable set bicycled to the music of live orchestras at 
the exclusive Michaux Club. As bicycles spread through the middle and working classes after 
1900, they again reinforced old identities. Poles, Cubans, Germans, Italians, Japanese, Chinese, 
Norwegians and African Americans all took to the streets of major cities in ethnically or racially 
homogenous bicycling clubs.  13
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Chapter Outline 
Chapters 1, 2 and 3 cover the period before 1900, each focusing on one of the three 
marketing strategies employed by the early phonograph industry in the two decades prior to the 
technology’s mass diffusion into private homes. In this, the first half of the period under 
examination, industry personnel sought to situate the phonograph in a complex of meanings 
conducive to their own bottom line. At every turn, however, they found their ability to do so 
impeded by obstacles of distance, “agency costs,” and mechanical intransigence. Consequently, 
the results of the phonograph industry’s profit-making efforts in this period ranged from 
financially catastrophic to mediocre. At the same time, people did begin talking about the 
phonograph, and the range of things they said about the technology owed as much to the 
ostensibly irrelevant contexts of production and consumption as any ideal projected by 
manufacturers.  
Chapter 1, follows the phonograph in the years after its beginnings on Thomas Edison’s 
laboratory bench, as it circulated as an exhibition novelty. During this period the technology was 
framed by its handlers and audiences as a “talking machine” which mimicked—generally poorly
— the sonic events which took place around it. As a talking machine, the phonograph was 
understood as a descendant of a long line of automatons which had walked, talked and played 
chess on European and American stages for centuries, and was even afforded a certain degree of 
“agency” in written accounts. Importantly, the mechanical, sociological, and economic factors 
which reinforced the “talking machine” understanding of the phonograph were the very same set 
of parameters which doomed it’s profit-generating abilities.  
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After enthusiasm for the technology abated around 1879, it largely disappeared from 
public consciousness, but in the late eighties a reconfigured version of the phonograph stepped 
onto the platform of popular culture once more. In Chapter 2, we follow Edison and a new field 
of competitors represented by Alexander Graham Bell and his associates as they sought to 
capitalize on the phonograph’s potential as an aid for business dictation. In this period, another 
understanding of sound recording pushed to the forefront of phonographic discourse, 
emphasizing the scriptive nature of recording and playback. The idea of the phonograph as a 
“sound writer” had been implicit from Edison’s earliest public pronouncements on the future of 
the machine and even in the name he gave it. Rather than an autonomic mimic of trumpet solos 
and dog barks, subjects now understood the phonograph as the ideal amanuensis, capable of 
instantaneously transmuting spoken words into “text” in the form of dots and dashes on a wax 
cylinder. All one need do to have this script read aloud was to again place it in a phonograph and 
set it to going. The “sound writer” conception of recording fit well with text-centric 
understandings of information, and for that reason resonated with the scribbling classes for 
decades. But in the 1890s the technical limitations of the phonograph as a business tool pushed 
the industry away from that marketing strategy and as a result, other modes of selling, buying, 
and knowing recorded sound took root in American life.  
In the years just before the turn of the century, the phonograph industry shifted its efforts 
from business applications back toward the field of amusements, and Chapter 3 picks up the 
narrative at this juncture. Outfitting their talking machines with coin-in-slot attachments 
phonograph companies placed the devices in public places to dole out music, skits, comic 
routines, and even sermons for a nickel apiece to curiosity-seekers. To supply the nation’s 
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phonograph parlors with material there arose the world’s first “recording industry” and as it 
evolved from a sideline in Edison’s laboratory to a labor intensive industry with thousands of 
participants, the recording industry forced a reconsideration of the phonograph’s ontological 
status. Consequently, the quaint phonographic scribe represented by the “sound writer” evolved 
into a consideration of phonography as a kind of “publishing.” Subjects wrote of the process of 
recording sounds in terms emphasizing its continuity with the physical fabrication of the wax 
cylinder records or “phonograms,” a tendency encouraged by the industrialized nature of the 
undertaking. The men and women who sang or recited into the recording horn became known as 
“cylinder makers” and their craft was often thought of not as a kind of artistry or authorship 
(which, in many cases, was reserved for the composers and writers who had penned the original 
text of the recorded song) but as a cousin of printing. Like the printers before them, cylinder 
makers were valued for their skill at a a highly repetitive and time-consuming task in which was 
paramount the accurate multiplication of someone else’s text. As with the scriptive understanding 
of sound recording covered in Chapter 2, the emphasis on sound printing, militated against the 
identification of the recorded subject with the act of playback, though not entirely. By 1900, 
belief in the ontological identity of sonic “originals” and recorded “copies” had found a firm 
foothold in the minds of American consumers of recorded sound.  
In Chapters Four, Five, and Six, we shift to the fourth phase of the phonograph industry 
in which phonographic consumption moved from public “phonograph parlors” to the private 
home. In its earlier marketing efforts the phonograph industry wrestled—often unsuccessfully— 
with obstacles to profit. In the years around 1900, however, it pioneered a number of mechanical, 
financial, and legal technologies which allowed it to more masterfully control the flow of money 
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and signs on which its success depended. At the same time that the phonograph was evolving 
into one of the world’s first articles of mass consumption, it became necessary for the industry to 
assuage Progressive Era subjects’ anxieties regarding consumption, the market, and mechanism. 
The same industrial-commercial virtues which facilitated profit—efficiency, seamlessness, literal 
and figurative “quietness”—also facilitated the sleight-of-hand necessary to convince the world 
that the phonograph belonged in the respectable parlor. The less the anarchy of industrial 
capitalism was permitted to show itself in the ritual of purchasing and consuming sound, the 
more efficient were the industry’s operations and the more enthralled the consumer with his 
purchase. In both cases profit increased.  
Chapter Four narrates the founding and phenomenal expansion in the years after 1900 of 
the Victor Talking Machine Company, the company which, more than any other, capitalized on 
and reinforced the cultural logic of home phonograph consumption. It focuses primarily on the 
“selling” end of the business, emphasizing Victor’s efforts to control the distribution and sale of 
its products and argues that the company’s project forwarded a particular “commercial aesthetic” 
predicated on the occlusion of price, scarcity, and, especially, competition. On one hand, the 
move to “rationalize” operations represented an effort on the part of Victor to save money and 
maximize profits. If Victor dealers engaged in unnecessary competition amongst themselves, for 
example, they wasted time and resources which could be employed in increasing overall sales, 
not just shifting them from one dealer to another. But the move to tamp down competition also 
dovetailed with the Progressive Era sensibility which saw competition and price cutting as 
representative of the irrational, anarchic and anti-social dynamics of Gilded Age capitalism. Such 
market signifiers cast doubt on the phonograph’s value both by highlighting the mercenary 
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motivations of Victor and their dealers and by undermining the claims of artistic transcendence 
which Victor increasingly made for its products. In order to avoid these suspicious and unseemly 
associations, the company sought to rationalize its operations, making its national and 
international network of people, things and money operate seamlessly and quietly. 
Chapter Five follows the phonograph out of the dealership to the domestic parlor. Unlike 
most other commodities of its time the sale of a phonograph marked only the beginning of the 
purchaser’s relationship with his dealer, as the value of the technology lay not so much in the 
machine itself but in the constantly expanding universe of records manufactured to “play” on it. 
The successful placement of a phonograph in the home, then, was expected to redound to the 
ongoing benefit of the industry, but only if the human and material linkages facilitating the two 
way traffic in cash and shellac were maintained. If the phonograph broke down or reproduced 
unsatisfactorily, for example, consumers would likely lose interest in it and cease buying new 
records. With this in mind, dealers worked diligently to keep their customers’ talking machines in 
good order, disseminating information about phonographic maintenance, running repair shops 
and even sending mechanics door-to-door to service poorly performing units. But as with 
Victor’s efforts in controlling the semiotics of the salesroom, the material and human 
relationships enacted to perpetuate the sale of records had to be hidden from view in order to be 
most effective. The presence of the phonograph within the home, for example, represented a 
necessity in the project of selling a household phonograph records. The phonograph’s motor, 
turntable, and horn, however, squared poorly with the ethos of the middle class parlor as a sphere 
of refinement insulated from the tawdry commercial and mechanical logics of the public sphere. 
Consequently, it was feared, fastidious homemakers might put the phonograph in a spare room 
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where it could fall into disuse, and no longer encourage record purchases. In order to prevent the 
phonograph from becoming an obtrusive and annoying presence Columbia, Victor and Edison 
worked to conceal those facets of its existence which disrupted the ethos of the parlor. Unseemly 
mechanical bits were concealed behind polished hand-carved cabinetry. The whirring and 
clicking of phonographic motors and governors were ingeniously muffled or channeled away 
from the ear. Ugly and disorganized stacks of records were given homes in specially-
manufactured “record albums,” where, properly indexed and slid into a cabinet, they would not 
remind the user of the fortune he had spent on them.  
Chapter 6 builds on the previous two chapters, showing how the material and discursive 
transformations which the phonograph industry effected in the name of commercial viability 
contributed to an altogether new understanding of recorded sound which we have called “sonic 
modernity.” To satisfy the demands of operational efficiency as well the psychological needs of 
the day, phonograph manufacturers sought to rein in the bluster and noise of its own operations. 
In so doing, they not only created a profitable business model but also facilitated a semiotic 
sundering of the phonograph from the technological, economic and social contexts of its 
production. At the same time, new record-making processes opened up the field of recording to a 
new class of performers—famous or semi-famous virtuosi of the art music world. These “stars’” 
increasing centrality in promotional materials and public thinking tended to hide the rote labor of 
record manufacture.With the phonographic apparatus and the labor of recording largely 
occluded, recorded sound presented an interpretative puzzle. Who’s voice filled the parlor if not 
that of the now-eclipsed “talking machine?” This “agency gap,” however, suggested its own 
solution. With the disappearance of human and mechanical labor embodied in the phonograph 
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and its records, it now became possible to conceptualize the device as a frictionless conduit to 
the sonic labor of “recording stars,” unmediated by other human and non-human agents. Under 
these circumstances playback assumed an ontological identity with the “original” sounds created 
by the recording star in the studio.  
“Vox Machinae’s” six chapters set out to explore the material and discursive 
preconditions for much of the phenomena explored in the existing historiography— to ask “how” 
where others have asked “who?” “when?” “what?” “where?” and why?” In the conclusion “Vox 
Machinae” takes up a second and ancillary matter. Not only has the existing literature neglected 
to explain how the phonograph achieved its effects, I argue, but it has also failed to grasp the 
extent of its influence. Historians of recorded sound have demonstrated amply that phonographs 
and records have shaped the ways Americans and others map their imaginary worlds. In this 
regard, recorded sounds have behaved in the public sphere much like tea sets and cigarettes and 
bicycles. But recorded sound has not been just any other commodity, I argued, and the 
phonograph’s influence in American life and culture has often taken the form of a kind of “ur” 
commodity, giving semantic structure to and propelling the consumption of other articles—
clothing, books, magazines and cars. In the conclusion, I flesh out this point and attempt to 
theorize it within the broader framework of this dissertation.  
Terms 
The welter of terms appended to sound recording technologies in this period require some 
clarification. “Phonograph,” the term used most often in this text, was the proprietary name 
appended by Edison to the original apparatus which debuted in 1877. The device contrived in the 
early 1880s by Alexander Graham Bell and his associates was named the “graphophone.” The 
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newer apparatus differed significantly from the old tinfoil phonograph and its most conspicuous 
feature was its removable wax cylinder records. Finally, when in the 1890s Emile Berliner 
developed a third style of talking machine whose most conspicuous distinguishing feature was its 
flat disc records, he dubbed the device the “gramophone.” The design was the one very 
successfully capitalized on by the Victor Talking Machine Company and it became the archetype 
for all phonographs to follow. In the United States, the sound recording industry and its 
consumers eventually settled on “phonograph” as the generic term for all sound reproducing 
technologies. In Great Britain and in Europe “gramophone” served the role played by 
“phonograph” in the United States, evolving in common usage to embrace all sound recording 
technologies generically. Finally, the term “talking machine” arose shortly after Edison’s 
unveiling of the phonograph in 1877 and was also used as a catch-all designation for sound 
recording devices on both sides of the Atlantic.  
This dissertation follows American convention in referring to all of the sound 
reproducing technologies under examination as “phonographs” (note the lower-case ‘p’). Where 
necessary it employs “Graphophone” and “Gramophone” to denote the machines produced by 
the Columbia Graphophone Company and the Victor Talking Machine Company respectively. 
Finally, I have reserved use of the phrase “talking machine” to flag a specific conception of 
recorded sound which, though prevalent in the technology’s early years, soon disappeared from 
common usage.  
!21
CHAPTER I  
The Talking Machine 
Soon after purchasing the rights to exploit the phonograph in early 1878 the Edison 
Speaking Phonograph Company (ESPC) determined that the path to phonographic profit lay 
through public exhibition rather than mass production and sales, and set about wringing every 
possible dime from one of popular cultural’s oldest formal institutions— the stage. This 
commitment to the ancient art of staged spectacle, however did not constrain the ESPC, as one 
might expect, to pre-industrial business methods. Rather than mount the rostrum themselves, the 
company enlisted lecture agent and Lyceum impresario James Redpath to design a business 
strategy of industrial scope and ambitions. Within weeks, he had blocked the United States off 
into dozens of “territories” each with a single licensee holding a monopoly on phonographic 
exhibition.   1
 Because spectacle— rather than phonographs themselves— was the company’s primary stock-in-trade, 1
the ESPC were compelled to pursue a “spatial fix,” creating artificial scarcity of phonographic spectacle 
within separate geographic territories. This required that the company contractually obligate itself to 
restrict sales of phonographs, but it also meant asserting the company’s rights as holders of the Edison 
patents against patent-infringers. By producing a handful of machines— or even one— an infringer could 
do a great deal of damage to a spectacular commodity by flooding the market with imitations and driving 
its value down. Cheever likely had this in mind when he wrote that “interest in the thing will only last 
while it is a novelty and for that reason it seems best to start the thing at one and the same time in all parts 
of the country.” As sure as the sun’s path through the sky, eastern phonograph exhibitions (already 
underway, thanks to Johnson) would send knockoffs coursing westward across the fruited plain ahead of 
the ESPC’s own machines. The problem would be exacerbated by a phased opening of territories. Far 
better to establish simultaneously as many territories as possible and reap the royalties from districts not 
already plundered by peripatetic infringers. Uriah Hunt Painter Papers, Edison Speaking Phonograph 
Company Letterbooks, Treasurer’s Letterbox, (March-August, 1878) Cheever to Hubbard 3/20/1878
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In this chapter, I analyze the national operations of the ESPC, paying particular attention 
to the far-flung infrastructure of relationships built and maintained by the company in their 
pursuit of profit. From the standpoint of the company and its investors, this infrastructure was 
erected in order to sustain two types of “flows.” First, it was necessary for the ESPC to transmit 
to its agents in the field the necessary material and discursive equipment to entertain and 
enlighten audiences. This included the phonograph itself as well as its attendant paraphernalia, 
but it also included knowledge--tacit and otherwise--of phonographic practice and maintenance. 
When the infrastructure’s actors succeeded in placing phonographs and phonographic expertise 
before audiences, they became responsible for a second, even more important, “flow”: the return 
transmission of money. Money served as the lifeblood of the ESPC, funding its investment and 
expansion, but it was also the company’s raison d’être. Money drove these men to purchase the 
rights to the phonograph and incorporate a company to exploit it. It is for the sake of money that 
the ESPC projected its influence out of the Northeast and established relationships with parties 
from Maine to California. Money drove them to manufacture phonographs and ship them to 
exhibitors and it was for money that the company expended enormous amounts of time and 
energy trying to secure the cooperation of their dispersed agents.  
Because of the long distances involved and the sometimes subtle work set before it, the 
ESPC’s infrastructure regularly failed in both its assigned duties and these two species of 
infrastructure failure carried distinct implications for the history of sound recording. First, 
adequate phonographs and phonographic expertise very often did not reach their intended 
destinations out in the hinterland and audiences were imposed upon with every variety of 
exhibitionary malfeasance, from ear-piercing playback to bungling exhibitors. Consequently, 
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audiences had constantly to grapple with the semiotics of the phonographic mechanism itself and 
of the physicality and uncertainty of phonographic practice. The phonograph, owing to its own 
mechanical stubbornness as well as exhibitors’ regular failed attempts to bring the machine to 
heel was infused with the signs of agency. Rather than a device capable of “capturing” sonic 
events and “playing them back,”— a passive temporal portal through which passed sonic events
— the phonograph, for these audiences, remained very much a “talking machine”— a 
mechanically simplified version of the speaking automatons of the 18th and 19th centuries.  
Secondly, the ESPC found it difficult to maintain the necessary discipline to maintain the 
second crucial flow—the return transmission of money. On one hand, the disappointment of 
financial expectations grew directly out of the first set of failures. When phonograph exhibitors 
appeared clumsy or unknowledgeable; when the phonograph reproduced melodies "out of tune" 
or interlaced with piercing and scratching noise; when the spectacle failed to justify the 25¢ 
expenditure, audiences responded negatively. The standards for sound recording were, of course, 
historically contingent and themselves part of the economic and cultural negotiation which took 
place at early phonograph exhibitions. But the standard for "a good time" was not a tabula rasa 
on which the ESPC could chalk out their own financially-conducive designs. Audiences brought 
pre-existing expectations to bear on their understandings of the phonograph exhibition and these 
demonstrations could and did "fail." Their friends and neighbors would not likely make the same 
mistake they had. But even assuming the exhibition’s success, exhibitors and licensees could 
engage in behavior deleterious to the ESPC’s bottom line up to and including stealing the 
company’s share of proceeds. In many cases these faithless agents lived and worked in locations 
far removed from the ESPC’s headquarters in New York and these circumstances, taken together 
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with the company’s scarce manpower and capital, ensured that little could be done to control 
their behavior. The failure of the infrastructure to successfully conduct money back to the ESPC, 
spelled disaster for the company and ensured its place as a quickly-glossed footnote in the 
corporate history of recorded sound.  
The Edison Speaking Phonograph Company 
It fell in large measure to men other than Edison to commercialize the magic of sound 
recording—men like Edison’s friend and associate Edward Hibberd Johnson. Johnson and 
Edison’s association began sometime in late 1871 when the two were brought in as consultants 
for a cohort of New York investors attempting to perfect an automatic telegraph. Over the years, 
the two developed a familial easiness. Edison indulged Johnson’s scheming, regularly loaning 
him money for this or that investment or to tide him over until his ship (always just over the 
horizon) came in. Johnson served as an indefatigable supporter of the inventor and while none of 
his own grand designs seemed to pan out, Edison could count on him for his knowledge of 
matters mechanical and electric. For his part, Johnson seemed oblivious to the patron-client 
dynamic that had evolved between the pair and he never failed to frame Edison’s beneficences in 
the language of mutually-beneficial business transactions. Edison generally pretended not to 
notice. He did, however, keep a running tally of his outlays on Johnson’s behalf and occasionally 
groused about his improvidence.  
Edison biographers Dyer and Martin attributed to Johnson “intense activity, remarkable 
grasp of electrical principles, and unusual powers of exposition” a characterization about equally 
as fair as that of the employer who wrote that he had “no idea of legal liabilities nor much more 
executive management.” A photograph of him in his early thirties shows a mustached man in a 
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plaid jacket, buttoned to the top, with narrow shoulders, penetrating dark-colored eyes and 
severely parted hair. The image suggests a surplus of spirit bound up in an insubstantial frame; 
energy over matter; inspiration over perspiration. And, indeed, this is who Edward Hibberd 
Johnson was. It is fitting, then, that Johnson was the animating spirit behind the world’s first 
“recording company”— the Edison Speaking Phonograph Company.   2
Eighteen seventy-seven found Edward Hibberd Johnson exhibiting Edison’s telephone in 
the Mid-Atlantic and Midwest. In July he received a letter from Edison giving him to understand 
that the inventor was at work on a machine capable of “mechanically speaking the letters of the 
alphabet.” Johnson— perhaps uncharacteristically preoccupied with the task-at-hand— was only 
mildly impressed with this intelligence. By the fall it was clear that he was losing money on his 
exhibitions but Johnson had become convinced that the phonograph—together with new 
improvements Edison had made to the telephone—would allow him to command any price he 
might choose for his demonstrations. He resolved to gain control of the invention for himself. 
Ever short of cash, Johnson enlisted the help of his friend Uriah Hunt Painter in a scheme to 
acquire the patents from Edison, Johnson to supply the slick talk and Painter the money. Born 
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into a well-to-do Quaker family in 1837 Painter spent his early adulthood as a surveyor and 
telegraph lineman, before achieving notoriety as a war correspondent for Northern papers during 
the Civil War. Painter himself was no amateur at the arts of persuasion. By the late 1870s, he had 
made a reputation for himself as one of Washington’s most able lobbyists, a man whose profuse 
swearing and rude behavior aided in knocking down otherwise insuperable political obstacles. 
Johnson’s close relationship with Edison, however, made him an invaluable asset in the project 
of securing the phonograph. Together Johnson and Painter enlisted the help of Gardiner Greene 
Hubbard, a wealthy Boston lawyer and son of Massachusetts State Supreme Court judge Samuel 
Hubbard. Not incidentally, Hubbard was also the co-founder and president of the Bell Telephone 
Company and the father-in-law of Alexander Graham Bell whose early telephonic experiments 
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he had personally financed. Beyond his ample financial resources Hubbard’s reputation as a 
serious financier of technological innovation lent legitimacy to Painter and Johnson’s scheme.  3
On January 31, 1878 Edison and the Painter-Hubbard syndicate concluded an agreement, 
according to which Edison would be paid $10,000 on closing plus 20% of all future receipts. 
With the funds provided by this initial payment Edison would conduct further experiments to 
refine the phonographic concept. All improvements would convey to the syndicate, whose 
responsibility it would be to establish a company capitalized at $50,000. Less the payment to 
Edison, this left a war chest of $40,000 for manufacturing and other expenses. The Edison 
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Speaking Phonograph Company was incorporated on April 24 1878, and officially assumed the 
syndicate’s obligations a month after that.  4
In addition to Painter and Hubbard, the ESPC also borrowed capital from a small circle of 
investors drawn from the circles of telephone pioneers. Charles A. Cheever had founded the 
Telephone Company of New York in August the prior year and now hoped to diversify his 
investments in late nineteenth century sound technology with shares in the ESPC. Born in 1852 
and paralyzed from the waist down since childhood he weighed only 70 pounds as an adult and 
had to be carried from place to place by a servant, but accounts of the man never failed to 
contrast the sorry state of his physical frame with the vigorousness of his mind and spirit. Indeed 
by his death in 1900, he had managed a remarkably active life, having amassed a fortune as a 
real estate developer and as president of several companies, and was an inventor with patents for 
telephones, fire engines, rock drills, and other electrical appliances. In establishing the Telephone 
Company of New York, Cheever had partnered with Hilborne Roosevelt, a noted manufacturer of 
musical organs who after studying the craft in Europe had opened a factory in New York in 1871. 
Two years Cheever’s senior, Roosevelt shared with his partner (in addition to a love of 
moneymaking) interests in tinkering and in music and had followed his friend into the 
phonograph endeavor as an investor. Finally, the circle included George L. Bradley, who had 
served as treasurer of the New England Telephone Company. Gardiner Greene Hubbard was that 
company's president.   5
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To help keep costs down, the Edison Speaking Phonograph Company shared office space 
with the Telephone Company of New York, though Johnson complained about this arrangement 
to Painter from the outset. It also took Johnson little time to arrive at a state of mutual antipathy 
with Charles Cheever, who had been installed as the company’s treasurer. When in their first 
week at the office together, Cheever opened a letter addressed to Johnson, the latter noted with 
skepticism the former’s claim that it was done by accident. In a letter to his friend Uriah Hunt 
Painter, Johnson gave his opinion of his officemate: 
He and I will get along all right— I begin to see through him already— I learned him in 5 
minutes talk with he and Hubbard. His weakness is to be considered fertile in ideas— I 
gave him some— which in talking to Hubbard he gave as his own— I’ve nailed him. I’ll 
keep him supplied with them and allow him to appropriate them— getting my 
compensation in some direction of more moment.  
While intra-office intrigue evolved between the ESPC’s employees, the company’s clock ticked. 
Rent and other bills piled up whether or not the company made money, so it was imperative that 
the company determine a business strategy quickly.   6
Unfortunately, it remained unclear as to how the company should proceed in exploiting 
their control of the phonograph. Edison himself had suggested production of 500 miniature 
models of the phonograph to be sold to the public, while Johnson favored the staging of 
phonograph exhibitions. Cheever thought both schemes might be pursued profitably but Hubbard 
thought little of the exhibition idea as he believed exhibitions would sate public curiosity before 
the company could get a standard model on the market. Meanwhile, an excited public put pen to 
paper in order to impress on the company their own investment in the new technology and their 
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letters (to Hubbard's chagrin,) revealed that they generally did not want phonographs for home 
use but for public exhibitions. The ESPC began taking pre-orders for the larger exhibition-style 
machines but it was also clear that the company would need more revenue than that generated by 
sales to exhibitors. Cheever hatched a scheme to capture for the company some of the revenue 
generated by the exhibitions themselves--a royalty plan. 
…the royalties or money for lectures being probably the only source of revenue which we 
may expect for the next few months our idea thereby is to give license to lecture 
including assignment of reasonable sized territory to such lecturer, he to pay for the same 
in addition to the price of the machine a royalty of 33% upon the gross receipts of such 
lectures or exhibitions, we giving him as an equivalent therefore the exclusive right in the 
territory which may be assigned to him.  
Cheever’s letter marks the first articulation of the business model that the company adopted a 
month and a week later. By the end of the month it appeared as though the various parties to the 
decision had reconciled themselves to Cheever’s idea.   7
James Redpath and the Exhibition Royalty Scheme  
In mid-April, a letter arrived at Menlo Park from famed lecture agent James Redpath who 
had recently seen the phonograph in action while in Washington D.C. Taken with the machine’s 
commercial prospects, he offered his services to the ESPC. Redpath’s entry into the fray settled 
the matter definitely in favor of a royalty scheme and within a couple weeks he was hired by the 
company to organize the sprawling trans-continental system of territories called for earlier by 
Cheever. He was a natural choice to head up the ESPC’s exhibition system. In 1868 he had 
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attended a lecture by Charles Dickens in his capacity as a reporter for the Boston Daily 
Advertiser, and in speaking with the author, was apprised of the disorganized state of lecture 
management on the east coast. He resolved to ameliorate this situation, and several weeks later 
established the Boston Lyceum Bureau.  
In an interview with The San Francisco Chronicle, lecturer and Maine Senator James G. 
Blaine succinctly described Redpath’s transformation of the lecture business. The paper reported 
that “although not a native-born citizen, [Blaine] often thought of Mr. Redpath as a typical New 
Englander, for he organized speech into a mercantile staple, a feat that he thought nobody but a 
natural Yankee could ever have even thought of, far less doing [sic].” Blaine’s assessment of 
Redpath’s innovations were quite accurate. Capitalizing on volume, Redpath’s Lyceum Bureau 
made guarantees that smaller operations (or individual lecturers) could not. If an act of man or 
God prevented a Redpath lecturer from making his appointed rounds, the Boston Lyceum Bureau 
provided a suitable replacement or re-scheduled the talk. Unreliable speakers were dropped from 
Redpath’s roster while house managers who wished not to be similarly blacklisted paid his 
speakers’ fees in full—no matter how low the audience turnout. In order to secure the services of 
a highly popular (and profitable) draw like Mark Twain or Henry Ward Beecher, Redpath often 
forced house managers to book an entire slate of lesser lights from his roster. By judiciously 
mixing his “products” Redpath wrung more profit from lower grade speakers, standardized 
offerings across time and space, and smoothed over fluctuations in his own revenue flow.  
By the mid 1870s Redpath’s bureau had experienced several years of straitened 
circumstances. The Panic of 1873 had taken its toll on the lyceum’s profits while every year the 
slow attrition of retirement removed more of Redpath’s biggest draws from the field. In October 
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of 1875, amidst his own battles with poor health and the trauma of a recent divorce, Redpath sold 
the bureau and moved away from Boston spending the next several years living between New 
York and Washington.  8
It was in this less-than-auspicious moment in James Redpath’s career that he commenced 
his work on behalf of the ESPC. That work consisted largely in establishing exhibition territories 
and leasing them to licensees, increasing the reach of the phonograph beyond the northeast 
corner of the country where it was already circulating. Within a month or two of moving into the 
ESPC's offices, he had blocked most of the continental United States off into a patchwork of 
exhibitionary fiefs and though the evidence is fragmentary, some general remarks can be made 
on the geography of these territories. The most densely populated areas of the country were 
sliced up finely, with several territories per state. New York had at least ten. Massachusetts at 
least five. Ohio was broken into no fewer than four territories and it appears that Pennsylvania 
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was split into a Pittsburg and a Philadelphia territory— the latter of which Johnson tried and 
failed to secure for his brother. In the South and Midwest the ESPC tended to allot exhibitors 
entire states which apparently was the case in Iowa, Indiana, Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama. 
Finally, some territories transcended state boundaries altogether. These included Eastern 
Maryland and Delware; Virginia and the Carolinas; and a particularly expansive tract 
encompassing Wyoming Territory, Nebraska, Utah, and Colorado.  
These territories, however, were only abstractions. The task of making money from the 
Edison patents could not be achieved by cartographical exercises alone but required the 
coordination of human labor and materials over the vast distances represented by the company’s 
maps. In most instances the number of personnel involved was minimal and included a sole 
license-holder who tramped around the territory giving demonstrations of the phonograph 
himself. In others, a rudimentary capitalistic division of labor evolved with one party providing 
startup capital and another serving as exhibitor. Such was the case in Kentucky where a “man 
named Choate” agreed to provide capital for a phonograph exhibition while his partner, Jules 
Guthridge, acted as exhibitor.   9
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In some cases, the long distances involved and the volume of business expected 
necessitated a more robust infrastructure. In important and distant markets like Chicago the 
ESPC found it necessary to portion out some share of the profits to a trustworthy soul who could 
ride herd over the largely anonymous personnel handling money for the company. To exploit the 
phonograph in Illinois, for instance, the ESPC relied on the local knowledge of George H. Bliss. 
After awarding the phonograph contract to the Painter-Hubbard syndicate over Bliss, Edison had 
conciliated his erstwhile associate by promising him some role in the business. Bliss returned to 
Chicago but could not put the phonograph matter out of mind, and continued to write letters to 
Edison reminding him of his promise. In March, Bliss accompanied Edison over to the offices of 
the ESPC where the latter personally requested that the company “do what you can for my friend 
Bliss…” Johnson, perhaps still feeling antagonistic toward his erstwhile competitor for the 
phonograph contract, obstinately dragged his feet on the matter, but Bliss persisted, eventually 
writing a letter to the company’s bankroller, Gardiner G. Hubbard. Soon afterward a meeting 
occurred between Bliss and Charles A. Cheever, ESPC company treasurer. Cheever— more 
hesitant to flout Edison’s wishes than the inventor’s close associate Johnson— vetted Bliss, 
finding that “he seems to be intelligent and smart, and apparently from his appearance would 
push things.” Still, he admitted in a letter of April 30 “I have no knowledge as to his 
responsibility excepting that Edison says he is all right.”  10
All things considered it was probably wise to make Bliss agent for Illinois. But there 
were obstacles yet to surmount in getting the Second City and its hinterland squared away for the 
 George Harrison Bliss to Thomas Alva Edison, February 27, 1878 (TAEM D7829Q); George Harrison 10
Bliss to Gardiner Greene Hubbard, April 1, 1878 (TAEM X012CA); George Harrison Bliss to Gardiner 
Greene Hubbard, April 18, 1878 (TAEM X012CB); Charles Augustus Cheever to Gardiner Greene 
Hubbard, April 30, 1878 (TAEM X154A2BF).
!35
phonograph business. The ESPC had received a number of applications for territories in Illinois, 
three of them from men associated with the powerful Western Union Company. Though Bliss 
was inclined to believe that “too many cooks spoil the broth” neither he nor the ESPC wished to 
antagonize the Western Union party, so negotiations began immediately to harmonize the 
interests of all. On May 7 the ESPC received a telegraph from Anson Stager, phonograph 
applicant and president of Western Union, reading “if Illinois awarded to Bliss and three 
instruments are sent forward at once it will be satisfactory to all.” The matter was settled. Bliss 
would serve as general agent for the state of Illinois, assigning exhibition territories and 
distributing phonographs to exhibitors under the authority of the ESPC. Most importantly, he 
would be responsible for collecting from exhibitors 30 percent of gross receipts to be remitted as 
royalty payments to the ESPC, keeping five percent for himself. Redpath, perhaps not trusting 
Edison’s estimation of Bliss could not help but pile on one more layer of bureaucracy, installing 
George Hathaway, an old associate from the lyceum business, as “general agent” for the 
midwest.   11
A friend of Edison’s, Ezra T. Gilliland, performed a similar role to Bliss (or Hathaway) in 
the Ohio territory. In California, on the other hand, the ESPC employed another method of 
reducing agency costs, one as old as the propensity to truck and barter itself—they hired family. 
There, Gardiner Hubbard’s brother, Samuel, was appointed general agent for the entire west 
coast. In the geographically-dispersed and impersonal world of late nineteenth century 
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capitalism, these fragile links of reputation and recommendation meant everything. Whenever 
possible, the ESPC employed the bonds of reputation, friendship, or blood to reinforce the 
precarious infrastructure of human relationships on which their commercial survival depended.  
Once territories were established and assigned to (hopefully) responsible parties, the 
latter were responsible for staging phonograph exhibitions across their territory, presided over by 
the licensee himself or a hired proxy. Generally these exhibitions began with a lecture on 
acoustic science followed by a round of "experiments"--real time demonstrations of the 
phonograph in operation, featuring the exhibitor operating the mechanism and serving as the 
recording subject. Turning the crank-handle of the cylinder, he yelled loudly and clearly into the 
phonograph’s upturned horn a readily-recognized bit of speech before resetting the machine, 
switching out a playing stylus for a recording stylus and again turning the machine’s handle. If 
he had effected all of this with sufficient care, the audience would be treated to a tinny, warbling
—and very quiet—phonographic version of “Mary Had a Little Lamb” or “Bingen on the 
Rhine.” Tickets to such a spectacle generally sold for twenty-five or fifty cents at the height of 
public interest in mid-1878 and it was the responsibility of exhibitors to remit to the ESPC a 
portion—usually 25 percent— of their take. Redpath agreed to 20 percent of the net proceeds 
from exhibitor remittances until October 1 when all territories were to be thrown open to 
competition and all exhibitors released from royalties payments.  12
Infrastructure Failure and Public Perceptions of Phonography  
As I have argued above, the operations of the ESPC relied on two types of flows. One 
was comprised of information and materials (namely, phonographs and their attendant 
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accoutrement) channeled away from company headquarters to the company’s licensees and 
exhibitors in the provinces, and the other of signs and materials (namely, money) channeled back 
to the company. In this section we detail the first of these flows, paying special attention to the 
problems confronted by the company in transmitting phonographs and phonographic expertise to 
their agents in the field. After this, we explore the multifarious ways in which these difficulties—
these “infrastructure failures”—inscribed themselves onto the nascent culture of sound 
recording.  
Machines and the Problem of Expertise  
The close relationship between the machine and the infrastructure in which it became 
embedded means that—while it is conventional to think of machines as concrete and bounded 
entities—the diffuse network of people, information, and technologies that facilitated its travels 
and exhibitory operations were no less a part of the phonographic assemblage than the mandrel, 
hand-crank or tympanum. Conversely, the machine itself represents just one (particularly 
concrete) aggregation of infrastructural components, continuous with the network of people and 
things in which it is embedded. Consequently the ability to fix these elements into given 
configurations and keep them fixed over long distances becomes just as important to the cultural 
work done by the phonograph industry as “who said what to whom and with what effect.” For 
the men of the phonograph industry, changing the way subjects thought about sound (even 
accidentally) required that they successfully produce phonographic apparatus in specific 
configurations and successfully get them across the country in working order. Therein lay the 
rub, because to cobble together and field even a handful of the persnickety devices proved a 
challenge for the ESPC and its suppliers.  
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Edison could produce phonographs at Menlo Park, of course, and the earliest machines 
launched into the world were the nine “Brady Model” phonographs whose construction he had 
personally overseen at his workshops. Edison, however, was not capable of manufacturing these 
devices in bulk. The vast majority of phonographs which found their way out into the world in 
1878, consequently, were not made at Menlo Park but started their lives in the workshops of 
small-batch manufacturers contracted by the ESPC.  
In early February Edward Johnson began looking for a machine shop to produce the 
company’s phonographs. At this early stage, however, the ESPC’s business model was still 
evolving and it appeared to all involved that a cheap and mass produced article would satisfy the 
company’s needs. Even if it meant foregoing economies of scale the company needed to put a 
product on the market, so Johnson resolved to get 50 of the little phonos made up as quickly as 
possible. His preferred manufacturer for this project, R. Hoe & Co., required ten days to produce 
an estimate. This was longer than Johnson wanted to wait, so on March 8 he “took the bull by the 
horns and closed a contract … with a smaller— but good— concern to make 25 [phonographs.] 
Deliverable in a fortnight—more perfect than Edison’s model. $10 each.” As it turned out, this 
other, smaller, concern was the workshop of Sigmund Bergmann, a former Edison employee and 
someone already well-connected to the cadre of men associated with the ESPC. By Monday 
March 18 it appeared that Bergman would finish the small phonos by the end of the week. 
Undoubtedly pleased with himself, Johnson numbered his unhatched poultry, bragging to 
Hubbard that these first 25 were already more-or-less sold. Hubbard, not yet sufficiently 
skeptical of Johnson’s sunny projections, suggested they should place an order for 100 more. No 
phonographs appeared that week. The following Thursday Johnson, unfazed, wrote to Painter 
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that they would arrive on Saturday and that he had personally set aside Machines No. 1 and 2 for 
him and Hubbard. No phonographs came, but on Tuesday the following week Hubbard informed 
Painter—undoubtedly based on the confident assurances of Johnson—that they would arrive 
within the next day.   13
Nearly a week later three poorly made phonographs arrived from Bergman’s workshop 
and had to be sent back for “adjustment.” Conveniently forgetting that he had turned to Bergman 
because he promised faster work than other workshops, Johnson wrote to a correspondent that “I 
could not induce my people to pay high price for good work; they prefer to pay lowest price and 
take risks.” Five days later, Johnson was in possession of at least some of the phonographs and 
was sufficiently satisfied with the progress Bergman had made to send them out into the world. 
On April 15 he shipped a small phonograph to Thomas A. Watson—famed assistant to Alexander 
Graham Bell and recipient of history’s first telephonic message: “Mr. Watson, come here. I want 
to see you!” Along with Phonograph #10, Johnson sent to Watson a conditional bill of sale 
stipulating—among many other things—that he was not to publicly exhibit his phonograph. 
Johnson might have saved his ink, because the machine proved to be a mechanical farce. One of 
Hubbard’s associates, having seen Watson’s phonograph in operation, advised him that selling 
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these articles would do more harm than good for the company. Edison’s chief lab assistant, 
Charles Batchelor, examined another of these phonographs in D.C. and was so appalled at its 
slipshod construction he fired off an angry letter to Bergman himself. In spite of these 
difficulties, the company forged ahead with the small phonos and on May 12 Johnson received a 
sample small phonograph from a Philadelphia manufacturing firm with a quote of $2.37.5 cents 
per unit. By this time, however, it was becoming clear that the short-term future of the 
phonograph lay in public exhibition, not mass production and sales. Johnson and the rest of the 
ESPC soon gave up on the small phono and only six are known to have made it into 
circulation.   14
By early March, the ESPC had already received three orders for the larger exhibition 
models and Johnson had gone so far as to solicit estimates for their manufacture. On March 8 he 
pressed the issue with Painter. Particularly worrisome was the fact that some of the parties 
interested in the exhibition model were college professors, and Johnson fretted that the 
company’s patents would not cover the construction of phonographs for educational purposes: 
“They will have them made elsewhere if we don’t make them” he fretted to one correspondent. 
Little progress was made toward getting the exhibition model made until Johnson received a bid 
on March 28 from the Hope Machine Works of East Newark New Jersey. The firm estimated that 
they could produce a machine along the lines specified for $15 apiece. Johnson, perhaps 
 Edison Speaking Phonograph Co. to Thomas Augustus Watson, April 9, 1878, (TAEM X012G1BG); 14
Edward Hibberd Johnson to Uriah Hunt Painter, March 8, 1878 (TAEM X154A2AT); Edward Hibberd 
Johnson to Thomas Alva Edison, April 10, 1878 (TAEM X154B1AQ); Edison Speaking Phonograph Co. 
to Thomas Augustus Watson, April 15, 1878 (TAEM X012G1BL); Edison Speaking Phonograph Co. to 
Thomas Augustus Watson -- Bills and Receipts, April 15, 1878 [Supplied year, month, and day] (TAEM 
X012G1BM); George Lothrop Bradley to Gardiner Greene Hubbard, April 19, 1878 (TAEM 
X012G1BN); Charles Batchelor to Bergmann & Co., April 20, 1878 (TAEM MBLB1267); Edward 
Hibberd Johnson to Uriah Hunt Painter, May 12, 1878 (TAEM X154B1AW); Rene Rondeau, Tinfoil 
Phonographs (Corte Madera: Rene Rondeau, 2001), 37.
!41
(uncharacteristically) wary of “taking the bull by the horns” without the advice and consent of 
his superiors conferred with Gardiner Greene Hubbard. The order was shortly thereafter placed. 
The large phonographs were similarly prone to production difficulties. The Hope Manufacturing 
Company were unable to produce in sufficient volume and by the middle of May the ESPC was 
already behind in filling orders for exhibition models. Johnson solicited a sample from the 
Philadelphia firm of Partrick & Carter and soon thereafter contracted with them to manufacture 
large phonographs. On May 28 a partial lot of phonographs arrived at the offices of the ESPC. 
Already buried in unfilled orders Cheever wrote brusquely to Partrick & Carter: “ Received only 
three machines yesterday. When will rest be done?”   15
Even as he penned these irritated lines, however, more trouble was brewing. When 
Johnson removed the three machines from their crates and placed them on his bench he 
discovered that they were poorly made. Johnson fired off his own letter to the manufacturers: 
“Machines fifty five, fifty seven and fifty eight [have one]-sixteenth inch lateral motion. 
Diaphragms too far [from] cylinder and upright arms imperfectly fitted. [I don’t] accept them.” 
Frustration with Patrick & Carter ramified outward throughout the country as exhibitor after 
 Edward Hibberd Johnson to Uriah Hunt Painter, March 8, 1878 (TAEM X154A2AT); Edward Hibberd 15
Johnson to Uriah Hunt Painter, March 28, 1878 (TAEM X012G1BD). The extant letters detailing the 
estimate proffered that day are unclear as to which firm was offering it. We infer that it was the Hope 
Machine Works for two reasons. First, there is no evidence that Johnson had received any bids on the 
large phonograph since that offered by Joseph Thomas Murray in early March. Secondly, Hope Machine 
Works was awarded the contract. Joseph Thomas Murray to Thomas Alva Edison, March 4, 1878 (TAEM 
D7830L); Rondeau, Tinfoil Phonographs, 44-45; Gardiner Greene Hubbard to Uriah Hunt Painter, April 
2, 1878 (TAEM X154A2BA). There are apparently no extant records of Johnson’s dealings with the Hope 
Company. Their bid is inferred from Hubbard’s letter to Painter. James Redpath to E.C. Bolles, May 15, 
1878, (TAEM X154B4AA); Partrick and Carter and James Patrick to Thomas Alva Edison, May 21, 1878 
(TAEM D7830ZAF); Charles Augustus Cheever to Partrick and Carter, May 29, 1878 (TAEM 
X154B2AX2).
!42
exhibitor received notices informing them they would have to wait a little longer for 
phonographs.  16
Despite the best efforts of the company and their suppliers, phonographs were eventually 
manufactured and delivered to the offices of the ESPC where they were sent out to customers. 
Not only was the phonograph (owing to its crude state of development) peculiarly susceptible to 
malfunction, but any breakdown in the long chain of labor and capital tasked with conveying it 
could exacerbate the machine’s tendency to disappoint. The farther from New York the 
phonograph traveled, the more likely it was to suffer such failures. In August of 1878, a reporter 
for the North-China Herald noted that a phonograph exhibited in Shanghai was “a very rough 
looking affair, and being but a trial working model, had suffered severely in appearance from 
alterations in design and modification of details.” Notwithstanding this jerry-rigged appearance, 
however, a close inspection of the machine revealed that it was not entirely artless in its 
construction. “The greatest possible care had been exercised where necessary, and in some parts 
the work was most highly and accurately finished.” Unfortunately, at some point in its voyage, 
the phonograph was failed by one of the dozens of persons entrusted with its safe-keeping and 
was dropped, leaving its cylinder “somewhat out of true parallel with its axis.” As a result “the 
effects from one-half the cylinder were much weaker than from the other.” The crippled state of 
the phonograph was demonstrated when after a short lecture on its mechanical principles, the 
exhibitor turned the machine’s crank reproducing a pre-recorded cock’s crow. The phonograph 
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“start[ed] off with a crow that would have done credit to the best rooster in China” but “as the 
other half of the cylinder came round,” the mechanical “Cock-a-doodle-dooooooo” degenerated 
into “the merest whine, which would have disgraced an asthmatic chicken.”   17
Similar shortcomings of the phonograph's material infrastructure undermined a 
demonstration by Peter Oeker in San Francisco. On June 11, he was scheduled to exhibit the 
phonograph at the city's YMCA, but was stymied in this endeavor by an “unavoidable 
derangement of the instrument…” A series of preliminary test-runs of the instrument (to which 
the Chronicle appended such descriptors as “whining,” “derisive,” “horrible,” “defective,” 
“diabolical,” “excruciating,” “demoniacal,”) evidently quite disturbed the few auditors who had 
shown up to the hall early, before it was discovered that the phonograph’s needle had been worn 
down through usage. Somewhat mystifyingly “the proprietor of the phonograph was not supplied 
with duplicates” and the show was postponed until the following day while Oeker tried to source 
a needle. Several metalworkers attempted to fabricate a replacement before one finally hit on a 
workable design and Oeker promised the public that he would hereafter “be assured that the 
needle is perfect and properly adjusted before admitting the inexperienced to his experiments.”  18
Once the ESCPC had manufactured a reliable phonograph and shipped it safely across 
the country, other, less concrete considerations might prevent exhibitionary success. Operating 
the phonograph was, by all accounts, surprisingly difficult and there seems to have been no 
replacement for first-hand observation and practice. This was embodied knowledge in the 
strictest sense. Written instructions could cheaply and easily pass through the same channels of 
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distribution as the phonograph itself, and indeed such instructions would have been the first step 
in preparing oneself for operating the machine. But ultimately, such preparation was insufficient. 
In his earliest letters to exhibitors Redpath insisted that the machine needed substantial practice 
in order to master its intricacies. When the Reverend E.C. Bolles of Salem, Massachusetts, wrote 
hoping to get his order rushed in time for a public exhibition, Redpath discouraged him from 
going on with the demonstration: “can you use one even if you had one? It needs 2 or 3 days 
practice.” Similarly, he instructed George W. Bagely of Richmond that “the machine will work. 
But— it is an art to put it up and get in good working order—and get good results from it. This 
can only be learned by actual practice.”  
In short order, however, Redpath determined that this sort of advice was inadequate. For 
the average person, monkeying around with the apparatus simply would not prepare them to 
operate it. What was needed for adequate phonographic training was face-to-face instruction with 
a party who could put the machine through its paces themselves and guide novice exhibitors 
through the pitfalls of obtaining the necessary embodied knowledge. Tennessee’s E.E. 
McCroskey was instructed that “it is absolutely necessary that someone should instruct you. The 
instrument cannot be successfully worked by anyone not familiar with the practical manipulation 
of it because the needle is apt to get out of adjustment.” Redpath directed him to Ezra T. 
Gilliland, Edison’s trusted associate and exhibitor for Cincinnati. Redpath enjoined Charles H. 
Fiske, exhibitor for Indiana to do the same. Indeed, the prescription “go to Cincinnati” became 
such common advice for new exhibitors that Redpath advised Gilliland to establish a $10 fee.   19
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Of course, that was advice more easily followed in the Northeast and Midwest. When E. 
Barnes of Mobile, Alabama, inquired after a phonograph, Redpath informed him that he would 
have to travel to Cincinnati or Washington, D.C., to find someone to teach him how to use it. 
Given that state of affairs, he would prefer not to take Barnes’ money for an article he would not 
be able to use. The Southerner, perhaps feeling patronized (Redpath’s notoriety as an abolitionist 
and John Brown’s biographer could not have helped matters,) wrote back assuring him that he 
would get along just fine as he was well-familiarized with modern technology. In his last letter 
on the subject, Redpath brushed aside Barnes’ pretense to knowledge warning him that “your 
experience in photography, added to the experience of the most expert telegraphic operator in the 
country, would not avail you one whit…” Fortunately, there was now a suitable phonograph 
instructor in New Orleans. Redpath dramatically implored Barnes to go to him: 
Your instrument will be forwarded, but I beg you, for your own sake, do not attempt to 
operate it till you go to New Orleans and receive instructions from Mr. Billings. You 
would not be able to run a week without getting into difficulties with it that would spoil 
your exhibition. I say this after knowing the experience of several very competent men, 
who having attempted to run it have failed after their previous instruction— even some 
who had operated it under Mr. Edison’s personal supervision. 
The greater the distances involved, the less likely an exhibitor was to have had the benefit of 
such instruction and the more likely he was to be ill-prepared for exhibition.   20
The phonograph, then, often found itself under the custodianship of men lacking the 
requisite expertise and— predictably enough— its luck was poorest in this regard on the west 
coast, far removed from Edison’s New Jersey workshop. What appears to have been the very first 
public exhibition in San Francisco occurred on May 3, 1878, and was recounted the next day in a 
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San Francisco Chronicle article uncharitably entitled “A Fraud: The Phonograph at the Grand 
Opera House.” That evening, an audience gathered at the Grand Opera House for a performance 
of The Corsair with the added enticement of “an exhibition of something called a 
‘phonograph…’” After the first act, actor Sol Smith Russell delivered “some of his specialties, 
throwing in two or three extra recitations to bring the audience into exuberant good humor” but 
when he finished and stepped off-stage, a clamor arose from the gallery gods who wanted more 
of the same. They likely felt vindicated when the curtain rose revealing the actor alone onstage, 
but they were sorely disappointed by what happened next. The rapport Russell had established 
with the audience—and especially the rowdy occupants of the rafter seats—drained away as he 
“read a long and exceedingly prosaic discourse on the phonograph.” The occasional interruption 
from the gallery notwithstanding, the audience politely suffered the lecture, but matters took a 
turn for the worse when the thespian began the phonographic demonstration. First, a recording 
said to be the voice of Denman Thompson was played for the audience and did, apparently, 
sound somewhat like the famed actor. A second recording— this one of Charles John Barton 
Hill, however, was “without the slightest resemblance to Mr. Hill’s voice” and at this point the 
audience became restless and the phonograph’s playback apparently even less convincing, 
“trembling as if in some fear of a shower of cabbages from the gallery.” Russell also began to 
look worried. A third recording purported to be the voice of Lawrence Barrett was evidently even 
less satisfactory and jeering exclamations erupted from the audience followed by a roar of 
“derisive laughter” which gripped the entire house. Russell—well aware of the excesses to which 
nineteenth century audiences would go in expressing their disapproval—brought the 
demonstration to a quick close. “General surprise was expressed that Mr. Russell should have 
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lent himself to the aid of such a transparent humbug,” the Chronicle reported, before declaring 
that the whole affair “had not a shadow of cleverness, either in the conception or in the 
execution.”   21
Russell’s demonstration precipitated one of the most negative responses of any 
phonograph audience of the period. It is difficult to say precisely why this exercise went so 
horribly wrong, but there are clues. The phonograph at this juncture was still a peculiarly finicky 
contrivance, and commentators noted time and again that wringing a convincing performance 
from it required a practiced hand. There is no evidence that Russell had ever worked with the 
machine before nor that he ever would again. Neither does it seem that Russell was particularly 
well-prepared for his foray into phonographic demonstration. The Chronicle noted that his 
prefatory lecture— the long and exceedingly prosaic one— had been read from “a manuscript 
after the manner of the professed lecturer,” placed on a music stand before him. A professional 
actor such as Russell would have had no difficulty in memorizing a lecture, given adequate time. 
Finally, if the Chronicle report is accurate, Russell almost surely doomed the demonstration 
before it even began, because he began by “thrust[ing] a piece of paper onto the cylinder.” The 
tinfoil recordings of the early phonograph were exceedingly difficult to place back on the 
machine once removed, as the tiny rows of indentations would have to be aligned perfectly with 
the equally finely-wrought spiraled groove of the cylinder. At very least, it was the kind of 
operation best left to seasoned hands.   22
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Strong circumstantial evidence points to Samuel Hubbard— holder of the phonograph 
exhibition license for the state of California— as the owner of the phonograph exhibited by 
Russell. Per his agreement with the Edison Speaking Phonograph Company Hubbard would have 
controlled all machines in the area, and an intermission demonstration of the device at a well-
attended drama would have been just the thing for drumming up interest in future exhibitions. 
Several weeks after the Grand Opera House debacle, a Chronicle reporter—apparently a 
different one—heard that a phonograph had arrived in the city and wanted to have a look at it. It 
had been purchased by a San Franciscan, but unfortunately, “it did not perform its automatic 
service so well as was expected,” and was taken to the California Electrical Works for repairs. If, 
as is very possible, the phonograph the Chronicle reporter found lying on the workshop floor was 
the same as that exhibited by Russell, an interesting picture beings to emerge. The phonograph’s 
owner— completely ignorant as to the machine’s operations— was flummoxed at its abysmal 
reception at the Grand Opera House. Frustrated, he takes the (decidedly non-electrical) apparatus 
to the California Electrical Works to have it “fixed” and there the Chronicle reporter finds it on 
May 22.  
Whatever the provenance of the machine at the Electrical Works, the reporter was curious 
as to its operations and prevailed upon the company’s electrician for a demonstration. The 
electrician agreed, but only after lodging the caveat that “as the entertainment was cheap the 
audience must not be critical.” A recitation of “Mary’s Little Lamb,” a whistled rendition of “St. 
Patrick’s Day” and an imitation of a street tough (“What d’yer soye?”) were committed to the 
machine by the electrician and played back for the benefit of his guests. The Chronicle reporter 
recounted initial disappointment as “Mary’s Little Lamb” began issuing from the phonograph: 
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“…none of the sonant utterances could be distinguished by any of the gentlemen gathered around 
the table, although the half-smothered whispering given forth could, by a reasonable stretch of 
the imagination, be recognized as the more heavily emphasized portions of the address originally 
delivered.” “‘St. Patrick’s Day’ by the machine,” however, “was almost perfect though 
considerably subdued in volume…” Similarly positive results were obtained as the machine 
repeated the electrician’s “What d’yer soye?” Playback was attempted again and by this time the 
electrician had apparently gotten a better grasp of the crank’s idiosyncrasies because even 
“Mary’s Little Lamb” sounded passable.   23
But the damage had been done. The non-expert handling of the machine by the electrician 
had lowered the reporter’s estimation of its worth and “the verdict of those present was that the 
gentleman owning the instrument had secured an amusing and expensive toy, of very little 
practical value.” But the reporter’s next comment gestures toward a peculiar geography at play in 
the phonograph’s popular reception: 
It is the general opinion of prominent electricians on this coast that the phonograph, in its 
present incomplete condition, falls immeasurably below what the writers on the Eastern 
journals would have the public believe. The unlicensed manner in which their 
imaginations have galloped over the field of possibilities has caused an impression that 
these wonderful attainments have already been made, whereas they have just been born in 
the brain of Edison and coined into appearance of fact by the pens of sensational writers. 
Californians had consistently been underwhelmed by the phonograph—at least vis a vis the 
enthusiastic receptions of their East Coast counterparts—and much of this difference can be 
attributed directly to the attenuated nature of the phonograph’s infrastructural support “out west.” 
An article later syndicated in the Chicago Tribune similarly hinted at a geographical component 
of the phonograph’s performance in California, suggesting “perhaps it is affected, like all voices 
 San Francisco Chronicle, May 23, 1878, 3.23
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new to the country, with violent influenza” and that “possibly it has an ear for the eternal fitness 
of things, and feels that in this soft land and sunny clime it should only furnish selections from 
the works of the Poet of the Sierras.”  24
In Chicago, the phonograph was similarly undermined by a failure of expertise. There the 
license-holder for the city, George H. Bliss, decided to serve as exhibitor himself with 
predictably mediocre results. On May 22 Bliss appeared at the First Methodist Episcopal Church, 
beginning his demonstration with a lecture on the phonograph’s operations before commencing 
his demonstrations. His first attempt at playback was a salutation to Mr. Phonograph which came 
back “weak, but… evidently there,” while a second recording— “All right! all right”— was 
repeated by the phonograph in a tone “faint and seemingly far off…” Bliss, perhaps beginning to 
regret not hiring an exhibitor, “explained that he was not an experienced hand at this kind of 
speech-making, and he might not do entire justice to the instrument.” He soldiered on, however, 
through the rest of his demonstration which included an unsuccessful attempt at phonographic 
stuttering; a mediocre round of “Hickory Dickory Dock;” and a rendition of “Yankee Doodle” 
that “was hardly successful, only a mere jumble of unrecognized sounds coming out of the 
funnel,” though “a second trial was happier in its results.”  25
The demonstrations in California and Illinois were both presided over by phonographers 
of—to say the least—questionable expertise. Sumner W. Bugbee, manager for San Francisco’s 
annual May Festival must have suspected there was more to the phonograph than its abysmal 
track record in the city would indicate. As of May 25, 1878, he “for some time past … [had] been 
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endeavoring to secure a phonograph for the purpose of giving a public exhibition of its 
wonderful performances at the first day of the Festival.” Fortunately, he had recently received 
word from Samuel Hubbard— holder of the exhibitor’s license for the state of California— that a 
phonograph would arrive from the East Coast in time for the opening of the festival. But Bugbee 
and Hubbard wished to avoid the disappointments of previous phonographic experiments in the 
city. The phonograph would be attended to by Mr. Paul Oeker, “a New York journalist who [had] 
devoted much study to the instrument,” and who was a “personal friend of Edison’s.” Oeker had 
been planning a trip west in order to cover a couple labor stories when Bugbee and Hubbard’s 
telegraph reached New York. Edison asked him to chaperone the instrument on its long train ride 
across the country and to serve as exhibitor for the San Francisco May Festival. Oeker’s 
agreement to the arrangement was likely greeted as good news by Bugbee and Hubbard, both of 
whom were intent on shoring up the tenuous and roundabout circuits of expertise linking east 
and west coasts and to insulate their investment from the ravages of travel.   26
Oeker arrived on the May 25 and two days later offered a demonstration of the 
phonograph for the press and a handful of guests. Under his practiced hand the device received 
and then played back, “in a voice even more distinctive than Oeker’s,” the first expertly recorded 
message in San Francisco history: “Good morning, Mr. Phonograph.” Without the faintest 
acknowledgement of its earlier denunciation of the technology the Chronicle allowed that “this 
first outburst proved [the phonograph] to be the pronounced success that it has almost universally 
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been alleged to be by all who have heard a complete instrument managed by one who understood 
its needs” (emphasis added.)  27
On the 28th— the first day of the May Festival—however, Mr. Bugbee informed the 
public that the phonograph would not, as had been promised, be exhibited that day. It is unclear 
what human or technological malfunction prevented the phonograph’s appearance on the 28th 
but Bugbee assured the public that it would make its appearance the following day. That it did, 
though the Chronicle reported that Oeker’s demonstrations were made “under nearly every 
conceivable disadvantage with which a phonograph may reasonably fear to have to contend.” 
The Festival’s main attraction was the performance of a giant chorus of several thousand 
members and phonograph performances were scheduled for before and after the chorus’s 
performance and during intermission. But the clamor of so many milling and chattering 
performers and attendees made it difficult for Oeker to satisfactorily exhibit the phonograph 
(which was regularly noted for its low volume.) The festival planners had had the pavilion’s 
floors thickly laid with sawdust in order to combat the din. Additionally a special room had been 
constructed for the phonograph exhibition at the southeast corner of the pavilion, both to insulate 
it from noise and to allow for the event to be ticketed separately from the Festival. Unfortunately, 
the “the imperfectly boarded compartment had about the same acoustic properties as attach to a 
frontiersman’s slab barn” and the noise outside interfered with Oeker’s work. Nonetheless, the 
newsman-cum-phonographer persevered, and put the phonograph through its usual paces causing 
the machine to repeat sentences and bits of cornet playing (“John Brown’s Body” and “Yankee 
Doodle.”) For reasons hard to discern from distance of the twenty-first century, the phonograph’s 
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“best hit” of the day came when Oeker made the phonograph issue an “extravagantly 
consumptive cough,” and say “Oh my! What a bad cough I have.” “The tone” of this comment, 
noted the Chronicle, “was as sepulchral as if the cough had already consigned Mr. Phonograph to 
the grave” and it “brought down the house as even Miss Drasdil’s “Il Tanti Palpiti” or the 
superhuman drummer in the Anvil Chorus failed to do.”  28
In reflecting on the success of the phonograph demonstration the Chronicle argued that 
Sumner Bugbee “proved himself yesterday… competent in the management of the most minute 
details…” The author, like Bugbee himself, recognized the ensemble nature of the undertaking in 
question and noted that the Festival manager had expertly pieced together the infrastructure 
necessary for a successful phonograph exhibition. Machine, exhibitor, and performance space, 
such as it was, had served their purposes. As we have seen this was no easy task on the West 
Coast, so far removed from the human and material resources necessary for the phonograph’s 
operations. But they might have withheld such praise, because despite having been led to believe 
that the phonograph would appear again on the final night of the festival, the Chronicle dryly 
noted on the June 1 that the phonograph had not been exhibited. It is impossible to say what went 
wrong here. Did Oeker, perhaps frustrated by the trying circumstances of the festival, call off the 
final day of performance? Had the phonograph broken down? There is no way to know by what 
chain of events San Francisco was deprived of Mr. Phonograph’s tubercular cough but it also 
does not matter. Failures of the infrastructure, be they human or mechanical, militated against the 
phonograph’s potential to transfix audiences and empty their pockets.   29
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Public Reaction 
In this section we turn to the experience of audiences, emphasizing in particular the ways 
in which the infrastructure and its effects entwined with other discursive influences to shape 
subjects’ perceptions of mechanically reproduced sound. Particularly when the infrastructure 
failed, the signs of human and mechanical labor were thrust forward and the illusion of sound 
recording as a passive conduit for autonomous sonic events was undermined. This tended to 
emphasize the autonomy of phonographic “playback,” suggesting that the phonograph was not 
practicing a kind of sonic “catch and release” but was rather speaking, mimicking, singing, 
sneezing and so forth. This was a “talking machine” and as such, the new technology came 
embedded in a set of discourses inherited from an older mechanical tradition; that of the 
“speaking automaton.”  
One of the first such “talking machines” was an invention of Hungarian tinkerer 
Wolfgang von Kempelen who by the early 1790s had contrived a primitive approximation of the 
human speaking apparatus consisting of a bellows, system of tubes and pipes and a musical 
instrument reed. Reportedly, it could speak a few phrases in French and Italian. When Americans 
were apprised of Edison’s 1877 invention of the “talking machine,” however, many would have 
been reminded of another, more recent, attempt at mechanical speech—that of Joseph Faber, 
born about 1800 in Freiburg, Germany. Faber worked as an astronomer until failing eyesight 
forced him to take up engineering, and after reading von Kempelen’s On the Mechanisms of 
Human Speech he began his own experiments with talking machines. By 1835, he had built a 
device which drew substantially on von Kempelen’s, but which surpassed it in most regards. 
First, Faber’s machine employed a series of variously-shaped tubes capable of producing the five 
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basic vowel sounds, an innovation which went far in solving a problem which long-bedeviled his 
predecessor. Most importantly, Faber’s design replaced the hinged box which served as a mouth 
assembly for Kempelen’s machine with a more anthropomorphic contrivance featuring an ivory 
tongue as well as a rubber palate, lower jaw, and cheeks. The entire apparatus was controlled by 
a keyboard with separate keys for each phoneme.  
Faber’s machine made its American debut in New York in early 1844 followed by an 
exhibition in Philadelphia. American audiences proved indifferent to the machine and Faber 
destroyed it in a fit of drunken rage, a decision which the inventor undoubtedly regretted in the 
cold gray light of morning. The hangover had hardly worn off, however, before he was 
replicating his life’s work and by the end of 1845 Faber was again exhibiting his speaking 
machine. The following year Faber headed to London where he was contracted to exhibit the 
device by no lesser a figure than P.T. Barnum. One audience member later described his evening 
with Faber and the speaking machine.  
I paid my shilling and was shown into a larger room, half filled with boxes and timber, 
and badly lighted with lamps. In the centre was a box on the table, looking like a rough 
piano without legs and having two keyboards. This was surmounted by a half-length 
weird figure, rather bigger than a full-grown man, with an automaton head and a face 
looking more mysteriously vacant than such faces usually look. Its mouth was large, and 
opened like the jaws of Gorgibuster in the pantomime, disclosing artificial gums, teeth 
and all the organs of speech. … One keyboard, touched by the Professor, produced words 
which, slowly and deliberately in a hoarse sepulchral voice came from the mouth of the 
figure, as if from the depths of a tomb. 
Faber and his talking machine— which Barnum had billed the Euphonia—eventually returned to 
the United States and toured there through the 1860s.  30
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The expectations for mechanical speech established by Faber’s machine as well as the 
phonograph’s disruption of those expectations was expressed by the Scientific American in 
December of 1878. The author claims almost exasperatedly that the phonograph seems to be an 
illusion or a trick of the mind before describing what one would expect a phonograph to look 
like: “We have heard other talking machines. The Faber apparatus for example is a large affair as 
big as a parlor organ. It has a key board, rubber larynx and lips, and an immense amount of 
ingenious mechanism which combines to produce something like articulation in a single 
monotonous organ note.” The phonograph, though, is comprised of “a few pieces of metal, set up 
roughly on an iron stand about a foot square, that talks in such a way, that, even if in its present 
imperfect form many words are not clearly distinguishable, there can be no doubt but that the 
inflections are those of nothing else than the human voice.”   31
The tendency to frame the phonograph in terms established by the Faber machine and 
other automata obtained even among industry insiders. An Edison-issued pamphlet issued the 
next year warned prospective audiences that sounds coming “from the iron tongue of the 
phonograph” suffer a diminution in volume and tone compared to the originals. The notion that 
the phonograph represented a mechanical mimic brings together the significations embedded in 
the machine’s simple construction as well as the influence of the attenuated infrastructure. The 
recurring failures of operators as well as that of their machines kept the physical apparatus at the 
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center of the phonographic spectacle, making impossible the occlusion of technological 
mediation at the center of later phonographic discourses.  32
If the phonograph was not bottling sound— if its utterances were not to be understood as 
the preservation of existing sounds— then perhaps it was somehow producing sounds on its own. 
Published accounts of the phonograph consistently emphasized this possibility, positioning the 
machine as a mechanical mimic. In April, the Washington Post related a phonograph’s “noisy, 
successful imitation of a barn-yard rooster calling upon his hens to cackle and scratch.” In May 
1878, the Boston Daily Globe allowed that “the phonograph repeats in a clear tone every word 
and sound recorded on the tinfoil sheet.” A writer for the New York Evening Post wrote of the 
phonograph that “any sound, no matter what, is faithfully reproduced. Laughing, whistling, 
coughing, singing, and ordinary speaking.” Later, phonographic fidelity will be assessed in terms 
of “sound quality,” but audiophiles of this generation showed great concern that the phonograph 
had not “missed” any of the human flourishes of the original performance and were consistently 
surprised when it did not. The Atlanta Constitution reported in December of 1877 that “the 
phonograph, each evening, is receiving and reproducing cornet solos from one of Atlanta’s 
young musicians which come forth with wonderful, accuracy, giving every sharped and flatted 
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note.” The only performance more difficult to reproduce than a perfect one, after all, is an 
imperfect one, and the phonograph’s ability to do so redounded to its reputation as an astute 
mimic. Some found incredible, for example, the story that a rendition of “God Saved the Queen” 
sung out of tune in the United States was reproduced note-for-flubbed-note by the machine upon 
arrival in Britain.   33
The same preoccupation with the phonograph’s mimetic acumen manifested when speech 
was recorded. In St. Louis a phonographic demonstration made “the crowd laugh and demand a 
repetition of the amusing scene,” which, a reporter recounted “[was] repeated without the 
variation of a vowel.” In Atlanta the following month “Prof. Wm. Henry Peck spoke a 
Shakspearian [sic] quotation into the phonograph,” laying on the nineteenth century orotundo, 
but “every sound of his voice was reproduced with perfect distinctness, even the catches that he 
purposely threw in, being duplicated.” A witness noted that the phonograph articulated the 
Professor’s rolled ‘r’s’ with a gusto which “would have made a Frenchman ashamed of himself.” 
Similarly, audiences never seemed to tire of hearing Edison’s invention discourse in foreign 
languages. A writer for the Constitution related details of an Atlanta exhibition in which the 
phonograph had been compelled to repeat phrases in “English, Irish, Latin, Greek, French, 
Spanish, Italian, Hebrew, Chinese, Indian and nigger.” He appeared chagrined that this only tied 
the record established in Marion but was confident that “a half dozen languages can doubtless be 
added to these” in future demonstrations. When Edison exhibited the phonograph before the 
Polytechnic Association of the American Institute in Washington D.C., it “proved its capacity as 
a linguist by repeating sentences spoken to it in English, Dutch, German, French, Spanish, and 
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the Hebrew” and further “imitated with marvelous fidelity the barking of dogs, crowing of cocks, 
etc.” A witness to the 1878 Paris Exhibition observed a phonograph exhibition but found it “very 
queer to hear it talking French.”  34
It may seem counterintuitive, then, that at the precise moment that the apparatus was 
pushed forward (thus sundering the connection between the human recorded subject and the 
mechanical playback) that discourse around the phenomenon evidenced a creeping 
anthropomorphism, but such was the case. At a private exhibition in January 1878, a reporter 
from the New York World “felt that the phonograph was prophetically mocking him” when it 
apparently refused to record his voice. Scientific American reported on an exhibition in February 
1878, where the phonograph "withstood the test triumphantly, and remained in modest silence 
while praises were lavished upon it." The following month, Harper’s Weekly weighed in on the 
matter, reporting that “the little instrument records the utterance of the human voice, and like a 
faithless confidante repeats every secret confided to it whenever requested to do so… With 
charming impartiality it will express itself in the divine strains of a lyric goddess, or use the 
startling vernacular of a street Arab.” Before a hostile San Francisco audience “it was observed 
that the instrument had a slight huskiness in the throat, and trembled as if in some fear of a 
shower of cabbages from the gallery.” ”One of Edison’s phonographs made an appearance before 
a large audience” in Chicago’s First Methodist Episcopal Church and “talked and sang itself 
hoarse,— or rather talked and sang until its little diaphragm became cracked.” A week later a St. 
Louis Post reporter observed at a phonograph demonstration that the machine “seems to place 
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itself in an attitude of attention” and that when the lecturer speaks into its funnel “the 
phonograph seems to comprehend and to hold itself in readiness.”  35
Similarly, accounts of phonograph exhibitions demonstrated a consistent and almost 
perplexing neglect of the phonograph’s human exhibitors and the act of recording. In February 
1878 the Detroit Free Press reported on an exhibition in New York: 
The phonograph has taken to lecturing. It gave an entertainment in New York a few 
evenings since and was frequently applauded. It is rather an imitator than original. It 
recited a somewhat antiquated narrative concerning Mary and her little lamb. The 
audience stood it like the latter. It laughed and said "Oh, dear! Oh, dear!" and then the 
audience laughed. It related the sorrowful tale of Jack and Jill and its tears were mingled 
with those of the audience. It finally said "good night, ladies," and that closed the 
performance."  
The account is wholly innocent of any mention of the phonograph’s human handler. The New 
York Times employed similar devices in parts of its reporting on Edison’s June 3 exhibition. As 
the audience settled into its seats, “on a platform beside the organ were placed two phonographs, 
one of which was made to utter” with no reported human mediation “an address of welcome to 
the assembled audience…” The other recited “Now is the Winter of our discontent made glorious 
summer,’ &c” also apparently of its own volition. After the bulk of the audience departed, a few 
individuals remained for a reception with Edison who characteristically closed the evening by 
“caus[ing] his machine to utter the plaintive howls of a dog, of which the imitation was perfect.” 
No mention of Edison’s howling— nor whether it was perfect. In April 1878, a Washington Post 
reporter did his best to avoid this mystifying language and to adhere to the accepted canons of 
dispassionate journalistic observation. His story on Edison’s demonstration before the Academy 
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of Sciences begins with careful description of both the recording and playback of phonograph 
messages by Charles S. Batchelor. Slowly, the account loses its moorings in narrative positivism, 
starting with an ambiguously attributed “successful imitation of a barn-yard rooster calling upon 
his hens to cackle and scratch.” The sense of carnivalesque builds in the reported events as by 
this time “the audience, scientists and non-scientists, had lost interest in molecules, vertebrae, 
batrachiae, constants, asymptotes and all other technical terminology in the profounder interest 
excited by the marvelous machine before them.” In parallel fashion our reporter renounces his 
commitment to detached observation announcing that the phonograph “bent to its work with a 
will, seemingly flattered by the attention which Mind paid to Matter.” The phonograph has 
achieved sentience and its first conscious act is to upstage its human handler. “It sang ‘Uncle 
Ned,’ reproducing the fine baritone voice of the operator, and stopping short as he did and for the 
same reason— want of tin foil. It coughed. It said in explanation that it had a bad cold, and it 
coughed again. It whistled a tune. It halloed.”  36
Even in more restrained accounts— ones which consistently include mention of human 
participants, for starters— subtle anthropomorphizing tendencies persist. Notably, in describing 
the phonograph, observers employed specialized verbs usually reserved for humans’ noise-
making activities—or at least those of living creatures. In March 1878, a Scientific American 
reporter observed as a phonograph handler “confided to the disk names, numbers, scraps of 
poetry, comic songs, and various other bits of information… Presently the phonograph began, in 
clear, distinct tones, to count, to call names, to describe its own peculiar talents, to give its own 
address, and finally to sing.” Advertising copy regularly had recourse to the same language. One 
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such ad enjoined readers “Don’t fail to hear it talk, laugh, and sing.” George H. Bliss, the Edison 
licensee for the state of Illinois assured one incredulous writer to the Tribune that he “has heard 
the phonograph talk, laugh, cough, whistle, and sing.” A phonograph exhibited in Indianapolis 
was said to have a “voice” though one “muffled and indistinct.” It “repeated selections from 
Mother Goose, sang a stave of ‘John Brown’s Body Lies A-Mouldering,’ and did some spelling, 
coughing and laughing.”  37
Infrastructure Failure and (Un)Profit 
When masterfully-built phonographs made it across the country in one piece, and when 
exhibitors knew their craft, the ESPC’s phonograph exhibitions very often succeeded in 
entertaining and edifying audiences audiences. Still the ESPC’s commercial viability relied on a 
second set of material and semiotic flows passing in the opposite direction, from the hinterlands 
to company offices in New York City. In this section we turn to this second “flow;” that of 
money and information. Just as long distances made difficult the transmission of phonographs 
and phonographic expertise to agents, these same long distances stretched thin the human 
relationships on which depended the return flow of revenue. Ultimately, the inability to police 
these human relationships proved a disastrous state of affairs for the ESPC—one contributing 
significantly to the company’s eventual collapse after 1878. 
Money, Information and the Problem of Discipline 
A persisting irritation to the managers of the ESPC was the failure of agents to remit their 
contractually-stipulated revenue reports and royalty payments. The agent for the entire West 
Coast—no less trusted a figure than Hubbard’s own brother—remained delinquent on these 
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obligations throughout the history of the ESPC, for example. Cheever politely reminded him in 
June 1878 that he owed the company remittances and in August Redpath issued him a restrained 
epistolary upbraiding him over his failure to discipline his agent, Paul Oeker, who had yet to file 
a single report on his exhibition receipts. Redpath sent along a package of blank report forms just 
in case Oeker had lost his. A Quebecois licensee named J.E. Gore had failed to remit any money 
or reports as of June 17 and ten days later the Ball Brothers of Ironton, Ohio, had still not paid a 
cent in royalties nor filed a report with the company. The ESPC even had difficulty maintaining 
the sanctity of the territories, those portioned-out bits of geography designed to maximize the 
number of profitably-exhibiting parties. In 1878, an exhibitor working for licensees the Ball 
Brothers, had spent two weeks in Cincinnati and the company suspected him of exhibiting there. 
Not only was Cincinnati out of their territory, but it lay within the domain of another exhibitor.   38
In the most egregious cases, the various personnel marshaled to pursue the ESPC’s 
interests not only neglected their obligations or performed poorly but presented positive threats 
to the company and its ambitions. In early May, George S. Pike’s horse broke loose doing 
damage to persons or property, while he was making his appointed rounds as a phonograph 
exhibitor. The aggrieved parties, upon discovering Pike’s affiliation with the Phonograph 
Company threatened to sue the ESPC, while local authorities sought to confiscate his 
phonograph. Cheever wrote Pike to distance the company from liability. “We have nothing to do 
with the method you take for exhibiting. You are not employed by us and any action brought 
would not hold against the Company…The phonograph itself is our property and is held by you 
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subject to certain conditions set forth in your lease. Any attachment of the machine itself would 
be done at the peril of the court officer issuing such attachment…” In one summary motion 
Cheever distanced the company from its agent-turned-liability and reasserted its control over his 
phonograph aiming to protect revenue and fixed capital from the erosion of the open market. 
Personnel, then, served as sources of revenue but also vectors for infrastructure instability.  
The company’s reputation was equally vulnerable to wastage. In September 1878 George 
Warren (alias Norman C. Martin) was arrested in Youngstown, Ohio, for forging the signatures 
of president and vice-president of the New York Life Insurance Company and thereby stealing 
$64,000 from the company’s bank account at Union Trust. The ESPC could not have been 
pleased with the New York Times piece on the arrest which informed the public that Warren had 
been working as a phonograph exhibitor at a county fair and that he had exhibited in Cleveland 
months earlier.  39
In the case of the Ball Brothers, legal action was taken against the exhibitor, but this 
nearly never happened. With a shoestring budget and two or three full-time office employees, the 
ESPC simply did not have the resources to enforce their dictates across the country. Of course, 
the company had hoped to achieve a level of discipline through the hierarchy of their human 
infrastructure. In late May, the company tried to draw on this human capital, sending out a 
circular soliciting licensees for information on parties building or exhibiting phonographs 
without permission. It reassured would-be snitches that in most cases the infringers were merely 
unaware of the damage they were doing and that hardball would be reserved for the recalcitrant. 
Licensees and other “general agents” were also expected to bring recalcitrant exhibitors to heel 
 Charles Augustus Cheever to George S. Pike, June 6, 1878 (TAEM X154B2BA); New York Times, Sep 39
29, 1878, 1.
!65
but these straw bosses often proved just as impotent as those at headquarters in disciplining 
personnel. For example, the Canadian licensee J.E. Gore quickly deflected blame onto his 
exhibitor when Redpath wrote him looking for the company’s royalties. Gore had sent his 
subordinate the report blanks but had heard nothing from him.   40
Because of these failures of discipline, Redpath and the ESPC resorted to creative 
leveraging. At least once, Redpath had recourse to the public adoration of Edison to pressure a 
licensee into paying up. When the Committee for Boston’s Old South Church purchased the 
phonograph exhibition rights from its previous holder, there was confusion over the ongoing 
obligations tied to the contract. The Committee believed they had purchased the entire bundle of 
rights associated with the exhibition and owed the ESPC no royalties. Redpath disabused them of 
the error at which point George Simmons of the Committee threatened legal action as well as a 
“trial by newspaper.” Redpath dismissed the threat and countered with his own, informing 
Simmons that he “can show that if the Committee of the Old South Church do not pay the Co. 30 
percent of their receipts they are simply swindling Mr. Edison. You will excuse the phrase, but it 
states the exact truth.”   41
If moral suasion and the established lines of authority failed to discipline agents, the 
company’s only recourse was to enlist the help of its distant and tenuously-maintained contacts, 
offering rewards for their cooperation. In May, Redpath wrote to George H. Smardon, whose 
Portland, Maine, territory was yielding disappointing receipts. After reassuring him that the 
provinces take a while to cultivate, he brought up a “Mr. Foss,” whose exhibition territory lay in 
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the rural districts outside of Portland and who Redpath suspected of cheating the company. In a 
remarkable gesture of perverse incentives he asked Smardon to go spy on Foss, promising him 
the latter’s territory if he detected any chicanery. Even more brazen was the proposition Redpath 
laid before exhibitor E.E. McCroskey whose east Tennessee phonograph demonstrations were 
failing to generate much profit. The exhibitor for Georgia, it appears, had been “acting the 
scoundrel.” If McCroskey would find him and—under the authority of the ESPC— confiscate 
his phonograph, Georgia would henceforth be his. Perhaps Redpath’s crowning achievement in 
leveraging scarce human resources was his handling of J.M. Nixon, exhibitor for Wisconsin and 
Minnesota. By June 26 it had become evident that Nixon would not pay the ESPC royalties nor 
file reports on his earnings, so Redpath resolved to solicit another party to seize his phonograph 
as was done in Georgia. For whatever reason, this plan failed to materialize and Nixon continued 
to exhibit the phonograph without remitting royalty payments. By July 9 Redpath had had 
enough and resolved to sabotage Nixon, cost effectiveness be damned. He wrote to J.M. Hickey 
of Illinois who was looking for a territory and offered him a phonograph at sales price and the 
full run of Wisconsin and Minnesota if he would go exhibit in all the locales on Nixon’s circuit. 
Hickey could tour just ahead of him and reap a feast from Nixon’s advertising, leaving him the 
crumbs.   42
Collapse of the ESPC 
It is unlikely that anyone could have wrung a substantial profit from the royalties scheme, 
but Johnson, Roosevelt, and Cheever came to agree by no later than June 10 1878 that Redpath’s 
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management of the exhibition business had been a disaster— a rare instance of agreement among 
the company’s factions. Whatever comity arose from this meeting of minds, however, was short-
lived. By the end of the month Painter had successfully spearheaded a movement by the 
company’s directors to force Cheever's resignation as company treasurer, suspecting (correctly, it 
was eventually discovered) that he had been diverting company funds into his own faltering 
investment, the Telephone Company of New York. Johnson and Painter wasted little time in 
establishing hostile relationships with his replacement, Charles Bailey.  
By early July Redpath was advising his colleagues to abandon the royalty scheme for 
outright sales. The executive committee continued to kick the can down the road and Redpath 
eventually took matters into his own hands, doing away with exhibitor remittances in favor of a 
one-time up front royalty payment. The fee was adjusted according to Redpath's perception of 
the territories' commercial values, but in practice (as Johnson pointed out) it amounted to 
arbitrary pricing. By August Johnson had grown sufficiently weary of the practice to tell Painter 
baldly “I wish we were rid of this royalty nuisance.” Nerves frayed as receipts failed to live up to 
expectations. All the while, Painter worried over the company's anemic income and its office 
expenses and wrote a panicked letter to Redpath in which he fretted that the company would 
soon have to borrow money just to stay in the black.   43
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On October 1 the ESPC's exhibition contracts expired, ending exhibitors' territorial 
monopolies and allowing the company to sell phonographs to all comers. But with this sunset 
also came the end of royalties payments, the only steady source of income the company had ever 
known. All the same, by early September the company had turned its financial position around 
by selling off most of its stock, and Johnson was working on a new lower-priced phonograph to 
appeal to a wider market of non-exhibiting users. In January 1878, Edison and the ESPC 
concluded a new agreement absolving each other of many of the obligations stipulated in the 
original contract, but which preserved the ESPC’s right to build and market phonographs.   44
Johnson, Painter, and Hubbard also undertook several projects aimed at boosting the 
ESPC’s pitiable revenue stream. On January 18, they concluded an agreement with Edison 
extending the company’s sales license to all nations of the Earth except “India, Australian 
Colonies, Russia, England, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and 
Belgium.” Much of this proscribed territory belonged to another Edison associate, one Theodor 
Puskas, and while they appreciated their expanded horizons, the ESPC eyed Western Europe 
covetously. Puskas had struggled getting phonograph orders filled and Painter warned Edison 
that this could create a market for patent-infringing third party manufacturers. “Make Puskas ‘put 
up or shut up’ on phono[graph],” he begged Edison, “or let us in on some of European territory.” 
The same day Johnson complained that on the basis of Edison’s earlier (apparently more 
generous) promises regarding the expanded territory, he had began negotiations with a customer 
he was now prohibited from selling to. Because of the confusion, the company lost a twelve-
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phonograph sale. Getting to the heart of the matter, Johnson asked “When does Puskas’ time run 
out?” As if it weren’t obvious enough, he added “When he resigns— or you discharge him— we 
want a hack at it.”  45
Another set of circumstances was unfolding which eventually ended Johnson’s tenure as 
the ESPC’s treasurer and “company expert.” In early May 1878 Edison and a circle of investors 
organized the Edison Telephone Company of Europe to push Edison’s telephone system in 
Britain and the Continent. The company’s organizers met on the 12th to adopt by-laws and 
incorporated the ETCE two days later. Edison, needing a trustworthy proxy to represent his 
interests on the other side of the Atlantic tapped Johnson, who presented the matter to his wife, 
likely with all of the overblown exuberance he could muster. One day after the company’s 
organization Johnson wrote his patron: “She consents. Ergo, I go unless the company veto.”  
But “veto” the plan they did. On May 28 Hubbard mailed a letter to Johnson in which he 
piled on the young man’s shoulders all of the guilt he could mail in a standard rate envelope. The 
stockholders of the ESPC, he reminded him, had joined in this endeavor because of Edison’s 
promises to continue “perfecting” the phonograph—an obligation which he had been neglecting 
for several months. Johnson’s own labors to improve the phonograph represented the ESPC’s 
only hope for future profits and if he were to leave, they would not only be deprived of his future 
discoveries but also the months of technical expertise he had accumulated as a salaried 
employee. Though Hubbard left it un-explicated, both men would have understood that Johnson 
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was to some extent morally culpable in the matter because he was a close personal associate of 
the derelict Edison.   46
Edison, recoiling from this “row” rescinded his offer to Johnson. Fortunately, he had 
recently received a letter from De Lancy Horton Louderback, an employee of the Western 
Electric Company who had heard that Edison was looking for a European representative and who 
wished to volunteer his services. After a cursory “background check” Edison offered Louderback 
the position, but he declined: the job only lasted six months and Louderback was loath to 
sacrifice his salary at Western Electric for such an ephemeral revenue stream. Growing 
desperate, Edison turned to Charles H. Walton, an employee of the Gold and Stock Telegraph 
Company who came recommended by an associate. On June 9, as he was preparing to leave New 
York for Menlo Park, Walton received a letter from Edison, withdrawing the original offer to 
serve as Edison’s “expert” in Europe, and offering him an auxiliary position instead. As it turns 
out, Edison had recently been informed by an unnamed third party that Walton had 
misrepresented the nature of his position at the Gold and Stock Company. He was not an expert 
in matters telegraphic, as he had claimed, but was only a company clerk. On top of that, Edison 
was disconcerted by intelligence indicating that Walton was not “strictly temperate.” Furious, 
Walton refused Edison’s second offer and insisted that the inventor disclose the identity of the 
party spreading this libel against him. Two days later, Edison, disgusted with the accuracy of that 
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old adage about “finding good help,” hired Johnson for the position, Hubbard and associates be 
damned. Johnson sailed for Britain about July 1.  47
With Johnson’s departure across the broad Atlantic the Edison Speaking Phonograph 
Company was deprived of its progenitor and animating spirit. Still the men of the ESPC forged 
ahead without their nestor. In February Johnson had begun soliciting manufacturing quotes for a 
small mass-produced phonograph to be sold to the general public, a belated recognition of 
Edison’s initial recommendation to the company. In April it appeared that the ESPC would award 
the contract to Brehmer Brothers Manufacturing Company. Johnson continued tinkering with the 
phonograph, however, and negotiations dragged on, manufacturers submitting bids on a design 
and Johnson informing them that it was obsolete and that he would need a bid on a phonograph 
with the new specifications. Hubbard urged him to hurry but to no avail, and when Johnson 
departed in the summer the unresolved matter landed on Painter’s desk. Additionally, Painter 
began searching for a wholesaler to carry the new phonographs, and tried to enlist as the 
company’s sole distributor Strassburger Pfeiffer & Co, a mail-order firm specializing in toys. By 
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early August, however, he determined that wholesalers were too expensive and that the ESPC 
would sell the phonographs themselves.   48
Around the same time, Painter (finally) placed an order for 500 of the little phonographs 
with Brehmer Brothers who finished the first batch in early November and asked that the ESPC 
inspect their work before they continued. Painter retrieved two of the phonographs from Brehmer 
Brothers’ facilities and brought them to Menlo Park where Edison himself gave them a thorough 
going-over. Edison allowed that the work was generally very good, but several improvements 
would have to be made to the machine’s construction if it were to be reliable. Brehmer responded 
that they would incorporate some of the suggested improvements, but that others would increase 
manufacturing costs. After several rounds of such back-and-forth, Brehmer proceeded to fill the 
balance of the order. The ESPC did manage to sell some of these little phonos but ultimately the 
endeavor was a failure.   49
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In April, Brehmer Brothers’ workshop suffered a cataclysmic fire, irreparably damaging 
some of the phonographs, and necessitating that the rest be taken apart, re-polished, and fitted 
with replacement parts. They were not insured and much of the loss fell on the ESPC. While 
Brehmer Brothers did eventually repair around 100 of these damaged machines, the added 
expense shaved away most of an already meager profit margin. To make matters worse, the little 
phonograph proved nearly impossible for consumers to use and retailers had trouble selling 
them. Commenting on the situation from across the Atlantic, Johnson summed the situation up 
brusquely: “Yes the little phonograph is undoubtedly a failure and I would not expend another 
dollar on them.” The ESPC limped on for some time after this debacle, managing to sell a 
handful of full-size phonos every month and fending off returns of small phonographs from 
angry retailers.  50
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have detailed the rise and fall of the Edison Speaking Phonograph 
Company, emphasizing in particular the attenuated nature of the human and material 
relationships on which the company relied, and the economic and semiotic results of that strained 
infrastructure. On one hand, the inability to place mechanically-sound phonographs in the hands 
of adequately-trained exhibitors ensured that phonograph exhibition remained in the 1870s a 
decidedly mechanistic affair. Audiences remained aware at all times of the machine before them, 
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and spoke and wrote of the phonograph as a “talking machine” which “mimicked” its handler 
rather than “capturing” his or her voice and then re-releasing it. But the same infrastructural 
peculiarities which encouraged the “talking machine” discourse spelled the doom of the 
environment in which it thrived. Just as the ESPC found it difficult to convey expertise and 
machinery through the thinly-stretched social and material relationships of their infrastructure, 
the return flow of cash from licensees and exhibitors very regularly failed somewhere en route.  
Despite the underwhelming results of the enterprise, some of the Edison Speaking 
Phonograph Company’s investors remained involved with the development of the phonograph 
for years after the collapse of the ESPC. Charles Cheever later helped organize the Metropolitan 
Phonograph Company as well as the Automatic Phonograph Exhibition Company, firms 
established to capitalize on the technology after its resurrection in the mid-1880s. Nor had 
Gardiner Greene Hubbard’s involvement in matters phonographic come to a close. For others, 
however, the short foray into phonography had been all the fun they could stand. Uriah Hunt 
Painter would have little to do with matters phonographic following the collapse of the ESPC, 
and Hillborne Roosevelt would have no opportunity to do so, dying just a few years later “by a 
complication of disorders, aggravated by pleurisy.” The New York Times mentioned nothing of 
his involvement with the phonograph but eulogized him as “one of the largest organ builders in 
this country and in the world.” In his thirty-seven years he had contributed improvements to the 
telephone including the magnetic call bell and a telephone switch for which he drew royalties 
until his death. Edward Johnson’s sojourn in England proved highly successful and his original 
six-month contract was extended to nearly eighteen months—all this while feuding bitterly (and 
predictably) with his immediate supervisor, Edison’s telephone licensee, Edward Gouraud. 
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Returning to the United States in late 1880 Johnson went to work pushing Edison’s electrical 
system, running the Edison Lamp Factory and overseeing the electrical wiring of (very wealthy) 
homes before ascending to the presidency of the Edison Electric Illuminating Company of New 
York.   51
While these endeavors made him a wealthy man, Johnson never could settle down into a 
life of respectable acquisitiveness, and he remained a mercurial, imaginative spirit—albeit one 
with more expendable income. By 1890 he had secured for himself a country home outside of 
Greenwich Connecticut called “Alta Crest.” The hilltop Colonial-style mansion afforded vistas 
of the surrounding countryside including a view of the lighthouse at Bridgeport shoals over thirty 
miles away, but just as importantly, its liberal use of electrical lighting made it a highly visible 
landmark, earning it the nickname of “Electric Hill.” In its wainscoted hall “a large handsomely 
finished organ pour[ed] forth melodious music by the hour, by the simple manipulation of an 
ordinary electric switch.” Johnson’s upstairs “den” featured an electric cigar lighter, two electric 
stoves, an electric teapot, and electric fans and was presided over by a “huge horned owl” which 
“blinks electrically, with large yellow eyes, from his perch in one corner across the room at a 
hideous bearded Chinese mask, which emits the red fire of passion from its open eyes, mouth, 
and nostrils.” In the middle of the ceiling hung “a large specimen of porcupine fish, within 
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whose transparent and bristling skin is concealed an incandescent lamp sufficient by itself to 
light the room.” Nestled in among these electrified wonders, however, Johnson placed another, 
decidedly more primitive bauble—“one of the first phonographs ever made.” This device had 
once seemed to Johnson and others like an exercise in pure imagination, a miracle made real by 
the wizardry of Menlo Park. Now—bathed in incandescent light and surrounded by electrified 
gadgets—it seemed like a ponderous relic of the nineteenth century, as brutal in its materiality as 
a steam locomotive. Acceding to the demands of his imagination as well as those of his billfold 
Johnson had forsaken this “monument to tinfoil, lung power and muscle” for the thrilling and 
deadly possibilities of invisible electricity. Across the room from this artifact stood another 
phonograph, “the very last instrument, especially constructed for Mr. Johnson, at the phonograph 
works,” along with “a choice selection of musical cylinders, which prove an endless source of 
entertainment to everyone.” In the years since Johnson had deprived the phonograph industry of 
his labors, other imaginative souls had taken the field, breathing spirit into increasingly 
sophisticated talking machines.  52
 Scientific American, Aug 2, 1890.52
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CHAPTER II 
The Sonic Scribe 
In 1892, visitors to the World’s Dispensary Medical Association in Buffalo, New York, 
discovered a firm at the cutting edge of workplace rationalization. Established to market Dr. Ray 
Vaughan Pierce’s remedies (concoctions whose “curative” powers owed largely to alcohol and 
opium) the Dispensary maintained a mail-order operation of enormous scope sustained by a 
policy of liberal advertising in the nation’s newspapers. Keeping denizens of the fruited plain 
supplied with such indispensable articles as “Smart Weed” and “Dr. Pierce’s Pleasant Pellets,” 
however, forced on the Dispensary an organizational task of daunting proportions. In order to 
meet the challenge, Dr. Pierce and his colleagues had outfitted their headquarters with some of 
the era’s most sophisticated systems for the mechanization and rationalization of work. In the 
company’s two largest buildings a Corliss steam engine provided motive power for office 
machines, binding and printing equipment and elevators. To distribute this energy throughout the 
buildings, engineers had installed a system of pulleys and belts called “shafting” which ran along 
the ceilings of the complex’s workrooms and offices. With this system in place, the Dispensary 
achieved centralized, efficient, and relatively quiet motive power. To keep the various parts of 
the complex in constant communication, management had installed speaking tubes between its 
various rooms and the company had been one of the very first in Buffalo to embrace the 
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telephone, putting the company in instantaneous contact with suppliers and customers all over 
the country.  
Visitors to the World’s Dispensary Medical Association that year would have discovered 
one more sophisticated technological system, this one relying on phonographs to rationalize 
production of a resource just as important to the company as motive power or spoken 
communication—texts. Every morning employees brought to the company’s offices trays of 
unrecorded wax cylinder records or “blanks.” As necessary, doctors and other staff mounted 
these blanks on personal phonographs into whose speaking tubes they then dictated outgoing 
correspondence and other communications. The blanks, now containing records of the operators’ 
recitations, were removed from the phonographs and set aside. At intervals, “messengers” 
retrieved these records and deposited them in the company’s transcribing rooms, where a staff 
comprised mostly of women used their own phonographs to listen to the dictated messages and 
convert them into type-written texts ready for the mails. Through this method, the office manager 
might have pointed out to visitors, the World’s Dispensary Medical Association maintained a 
veritable torrent of correspondence, sending out an average of 2000 letters a day.  1
Beginning in the late 1880s, the phonograph industry embraced a business model based 
on sound recording’s potential as an aid to office dictation, and through their efforts scenes such 
as the one described above became common in American offices. In its first commercial outing 
in the late 1870s, the phonograph had been offered as an exhibition novelty, an application which 
had generated a great deal of curiosity but very little profit. The failure of phonograph exhibition 
(and with it, the Edison Speaking Phonograph Company, which had been organized to capitalize 
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on that business model,) inaugurated a period of several years in which the phonograph 
disappeared from public consciousness. After 1886, Edison and a new field of competitors took 
up the phonograph once more, determined to transform it from a useless toy into a serious tool of 
business.  
The present chapter details this, the second historical phase of the phonograph industry, 
posing and answering three closely-related questions. First, why did Edison, his colleagues and 
competitors all find so plausible the business potential of the office phonograph? From the 
vantage point of the early twenty-first century, nothing can be clearer than that the phonograph 
was destined to generate billions of dollars in revenue as a means of distributing pre-recorded 
music. How, one is tempted to ask, could phonograph capitalists of the late 1880s have failed to 
foresee that? Less negatively, what did they know that we do not? This chapter argues that the 
office phonograph recommended itself so readily to phonograph capitalists and consumers 
because, for them, sounds were made of letters, scripts or text. In this discursive context, the 
phonograph appeared as a sonic scribe—a machine which wrote sounds down and read them 
back. The textual bias in understandings of the phonograph suggested that profitable applications 
of the new technology would take the form of replacements for ink-and-paper texts and thus was 
born the business phonograph.  
Second, this chapter asks: how did the insinuation of the phonograph into the nineteenth 
century business office adapt to or transform pre-existing relations between people? It argues that 
at this stage in its commercial development the phonograph largely conformed to such relations 
of production as already existed and in some cases even exacerbated tendencies already apparent 
within the unfolding logic of capital—particularly those of mechanization and centralization. 
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Further, because of the mass entry of women into the formerly all-male preserve of the office in 
the late nineteenth century, the phonograph’s role in absorbing and restructuring existing labor 
relations implicated it in a project of reaffirming gender roles as well. 
Third, why did the phonograph’s role as an aid to dictation give way to an overriding 
emphasis on recorded music? This chapter argues that the replacement of the office phonograph 
business model by musical recording in the 1890s cannot be explained solely as an outcome of 
consumer disinterest. In some locales, after all, demand for office phonographs remained 
consistently high through much of the 1890s. Rather, high operating costs sunk the business 
phonograph, and in this the “agency of things” played a central role. Long distances, leaky 
batteries, and intransigent mechanisms conspired at every turn to rob local phonograph 
companies of their profits. While office managers were sometimes quite enthusiastic about the 
promise of phonographic dictation, few would or could pay enough for the labor- and resource-
intensive service to make it a profitable enterprise for investors. 
In the chapter’s conclusion we bring these various narrative and analytical strands 
together and place them in the broader arc of this dissertation. The (partial) eclipse of the office 
phonograph business model took with it the “sonic scribe” phonographic ontology with which it 
was so closely associated, opening the door not only to new monetizing paradigms but also new 
ways of understanding what sound and sound recording was. Additionally, just as new business 
models and new phonographic ontologies replaced old ones, the gender- and labor- based social 
relations sustained by the phonograph were eventually replaced by other, more protean ways of 
identifying and being in the world based on consumption and self-fashioning.  
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Sound as Text and the Business Phonograph 
Edison and others rallied around the phonograph’s potential as an aid to office dictation, 
in large part, because of that application’s close conceptual relationship to predominating ideas 
regarding the ontology of sound and sound recording. Sounds, in the understanding of Edison 
and his contemporaries were “made” of text. The phonograph could, of course, capture a wide 
variety of sonic data, most of it not in any way construable as “text”—pitch, timbre and rhythm, 
for example. Later, these sonic characteristics will move to the center of phonographic ontology. 
For the phonograph capitalists of the late 1880s and early 1890s, however, they represented non-
essential characteristics or even distortions of the more substantial (and profitable) sonic text. 
The phonograph, as a creator of sonic texts, represented to these men a “sonic scribe.”Though 
the phonograph-as-sonic-scribe found its most concrete instantiation with its introduction as an 
aid to dictation in the late 1880s, its discursive origins predate these events and even those 
detailed in Chapter One. For that reason, this section begins decades before the invention of the 
phonograph.  
No figure from the phonograph’s pre-history demonstrated the scriptive understanding of 
sound more unambiguously than Édouard-Léon Scott De Martinville. In 1853, Scott, a typesetter 
at a Parisian publishing house stretched a sheet of paper over a wooden frame and secured to it a 
rigid needle before positioning the entire apparatus so that the needle rested on a pane of soot-
covered glass beneath it. The glass was passed quickly under the needle while Scott and his 
friends directed claps and yells at the stretched membrane. The result was an undulating line 
scratched into the layer of soot looking very much like a modern seismograph or polygraph 
readout. Scott’s experiment had produced the world’s first sound recording and in subsequent 
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years, Scott repeated this operation countless times, slowly improving his apparatus and always 
transferring the soot-on-glass inscriptions onto paper for permanent keeping.  
Scott’s process captured a record of sound very similar to that achieved two decades later 
by Edison. They were, in fact, potentially “playable” a fact demonstrated with dramatic aplomb 
in 2008 by a team of American researchers who digitized Scott’s famous wave inscriptions and 
then “played” them using computer software. Scott himself never endeavored to “play” his 
recordings in this way, and phonograph enthusiasts, scholarly and otherwise, have excoriated 
him on the count for decades. These critics, however, have largely missed the point. Scott sought, 
not a method of “canning sounds” for later consumption, but rather, a method by which sound 
might “write” itself in graphic form, a usage hinted at by the name Scott appended to his 
apparatus—the “phonautograph.” When in 1878 word of Edison’s reproduction of sounds 
crossed the Atlantic, Scott denied altogether the significance of the achievement and moved to 
tamp down his countrymen’s enthusiasm for the Yankee novelty. In an essay written in 1878 he 
reminded his readers that the real desideratum—a readable sonic alphabet— still lay beyond 
science’s grasp and that “science and civilization are best advanced not by controlling sound via 
hearing alone, as Edison tries to do,” but rather, through “mastering sound via sight.” If any 
doubt remained as to what this meant, he added “the solution the civilized world seeks is for the 
voice to write itself.”  2
What Scott did not appreciate, however, was the profoundly scriptive understanding of 
sound which Edison had brought to his work on the phonograph or the degree to which that 
understanding persisted in his own and others’ conceptions of the technology. Edison’s 
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designation of the apparatus as a “phonograph”— much like the phonautograph before it— 
suggested a technique by which sound was written, but more than semantics linked Edison’s 
work to that of Scott. Just as Edison was in the midst of developing the first phonograph in July, 
1877, he received a letter from Edward Johnson, referencing an earlier discussion between the 
two men in which Edison had described his forthcoming invention. Johnson refers to Edison’s 
concept as the “idea of mechanically speaking the letters of the alphabet” and informs Edison of 
the reaction to the news by a mutual friend of theirs, physician and scientist George F. Barker. 
“Prof. B. is delighted,” Johnson wrote, “and says it looks as if you might reach by short cut the 
end sought by scientists for ages viz.- the ascertainment 1st of what constitutes a vocal sound of 
a letter & 2—how to mechanically reproduce it.” At this early stage in the technological 
development of the phonograph, Edison and at least two of his circle of scientifically-literate 
friends found the “idea of mechanically speaking the letters of the alphabet” an apt description of 
the new process. The conceptual continuity between Edison’s “sound writer” and that of Leon 
Scott is further demonstrated by a letter to Edison from one Joseph Edgar Crowell, dated 
February 28 1878. Crowell had read the description of the phonograph published by the Sun and 
worried that Edison had preempted one of his own ideas. In a deferential letter asking for 
clarification from Edison, Crowell described his own idea, a device utilizing a vibrating 
membrane to drive a pencil back and forth across a strip of moving telegraph paper. The device, 
Crowell said,  
could be placed in front of the speakers’ desk or table, and the machine wound up, and 
when he was through, the speech would be written out from this automatic phonography 
the same as manual short hand. Of course this is all theory, and would necessitate a good 
deal of trouble in ascertaining the phonetics of the unknown short-hand, but if the theory 
is correct it would be something that could be accomplished. 
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The phonograph, as described in the papers, suggested to Crowell a method of graphically 
recording sounds for visual inspection and reading. It is unclear whether he even understood that 
the phonograph could “read” the script aloud, such was his preoccupation with the device’s 
ability to create a written record.  3
Familiarity with the phonograph’s operations only further cemented subjects’ scriptive 
understandings of the technology. This owed in large measure to the fact that the early recording 
medium itself—flat sheets of tin foil— encouraged comparisons to paper and the spiraled lines 
of indentations impressed in them by the recording stylus to a form of writing. In early 1878, 
Edison explained to a reporter for the New York Sun that the phonograph’s stylus “pricks the 
tinfoil, leaving perforations resembling the old Morse telegraphic alphabet.” When it was time 
for playback one need only “reset the cylinder, so that the steel point may run over the holes or 
alphabet made when we talked in the mouthpiece.” The reporter later adopts Edison’s rhetoric, 
writing that “one of old Mother Goose's rhymes was murmured into the mouthpiece, and its 
alphabet pricked out by the action of the steel point.” In May the Toronto Globe described the 
mechanics of the phonographic process as well as the indentations made on the foil during this 
process. “These marks,” the author allowed,”are as little like ordinary words as could well be 
conceived, the nearest approach to them being the marks on the paper slip in the old-fashioned 
system of recording telegraphic despatches [sic].”   4
Some held out hope that the phonograph’s tinfoil records might someday be “read” by the 
human eye. In the same December 22, 1877, issue in which was recounted the phonograph’s first 
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public demonstration, Scientific American suggested to readers an interesting possibility: “there 
is no doubt that by practice, and the aid of a magnifier,” said the magazine, “it would be possible 
to read phonetically Mr. Edison's record of dots and dashes.” Fortunately, the inventor “saves us 
that trouble by literally making it read itself.” Though the necessity of “reading” the 
phonograph’s writing had been avoided, Scientific American had a cast made of a tin foil sound 
recording and then used it to print a “facsimile” of the indentations “in order to exhibit to the 
reader the writing of the machine which is thus automatically read…” Some, including Edison, 
refused to leave unexplored the possibility of this “self-writing” alphabet and searched 
vigorously for a way to decode the script. In October 1878 Nature reported that Edison himself 
“has made some experiments with a view to accomplishing of the reading of the phonograph 
record by sight.” He had found however that “although a fundamental form exists for each 
articulated sound” it was very difficult “to free the record from what might be called accidental 
influences.” Any number of variables, including the distance from the mouthpiece, the volume of 
the speaker or the regularity with which the crank was turned would dramatically alter the shape 
of the indentations. Even the same sound uttered by different people could manifest in starkly 
different ways in the foil.   5
Though the clues are more subtle, non-scientists and -technicians also responded to the 
early phonograph in ways which suggested an understanding of the device as a sonic scribe. One 
reporter visiting Menlo Park observed as Edison committed “Mary Had a Little Lamb”— that 
old standby of phonograph exhibition— to the phonograph’s tin foil, and then rotated its cylinder 
backwards so as to effect a reversed playback. The reporter claimed to hear: 
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Go to sure was lamb the, 
Went Mary that everywhere and, 
Snow as white was fleece its,  
Lamb little a had Mary.  
Interestingly, Edison’s nursery rhyme retains in reverse not only its phonetics but also the 
integrity of individual words. But the Wizard of Menlo Park had not yet exhausted his machine’s 
repertoire of gimmicks. He caused it to reproduce blowing, whistling, the sound of a bell, 
coughs, sneezes and laughter. “But most remarkable,” wrote the reporter, “the instrument sent 
back the voices of two men at the same time.” To demonstrate the effect Edison recited into the 
phonograph a verse of “Bingen on the Rhine” before resetting the machine and commencing 
playback. “While these affecting words were pouring out,” however, “the Professor shouted into 
the funnel several petulant exclamations.” Once more, Edison reset the machine and commenced 
playback: 
A soldier of the legion lay dying in Algiers, 
— —“Oh shut up!”— — — “Oh, bag your head!” 
There was lack of woman’s nursing, there was lack of  
— — — — — “Oh, give us a rest!” — — — — — — — — — — 
woman’s tears 
— — “Dry up!” 
But a comrade stood beside him while his life blood ebbed 
— — — “Oh, what are you giving us!” — — — “Oh, cheese 
away. 
it!” 
The dying soldier faltered, and he took that comrade’s  
— — — — —“Police! Police!” — — — — — — — “Po- 
hand, 
lice!” 
And he said, “I never more shall see my own, my native 
— — —“Oh, put him out!” — — — — —“Oh, cork your-self!”  
Edison’s rude interjections become in the reporter’s retelling seamlessly interlaced with the 
poem, the recording process leaving intact individual words which have merely settled in a new 
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order like a shuffled deck of cards. The account makes no gesture toward the concurrency of 
words nor the effacement of some words by others. All are present and accounted for ad 
seriatim, in brazen defiance of the medium’s temporal parameters. A week later a Times reporter 
was present when an exhibitor engaged in freewheeling innovation, marrying “Mary Had a Little 
Lamb” to the overdubbing technique employed by Edison at Menlo Park: “Mary had a little —oh 
shut up— lamb. Its fleece was white— give us a rest— as snow. And everywhere—go to bed— 
that Mary went, the lamb was sure to go—How’s that.”   6
The printed text medium in which these accounts circulated forced on them a particular 
logic— that of textual linearity. But there is little evidence that the writers felt constrained by the 
limitations of their format, even foregoing some editorial options (such as reversing the spelling 
of individual words) that would have conformed more closely with 21st century understandings 
of manipulated audio. Nor is there evidence that others found their accounts implausible. The 
Sun story was re-published without comment in no less skeptical an outlet than Scientific 
American. At the same time, to over-emphasize the role of these printed narratives in creating the 
discourses analyzed here is to miss much of the point: the mass-mediated circulation of these 
accounts was itself one current in the river of text that was nineteenth century culture. 
Textualizations of phonographic performance were cause and effect of a culture in which sounds 
were “made of” letters. 
In an 1878 letter to the North American Review, Edison informed his readers that “the 
main utility of the phonograph…[is] for the purpose of letter-writing and other forms of 
dictation.” Assuring the public that this was no distant projection but an imminent reality, he 
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went on to inform them that the application of the phonograph to dictation “will be made the 
moment the new form of apparatus, which the writer is now about completing, is finished.” No 
such “new form of apparatus,” however, was anywhere near completion and Edison’s 
pronouncements on the matter represented characteristically optimistic bluster. Throughout the 
end of the decade, exhibitions remained the only plausible strategy for monetizing the 
phonograph’s operations and the public continued to regard the device as a “talking machine.” 
The phonograph-as-sonic-scribe remained an ancillary paradigm in phonographic 
understanding.  7
With the failure of the Edison Speaking Phonograph Company after 1879, interest in the 
phonograph and its future as an aid to dictation quickly dissipated. Investors opted to quit 
“throwing good money after bad” and the public came to regard the phonograph as a diverting 
though ultimately useless gadget. For his part, Edison moved on to the problems of electrical 
lighting and allowed the phonograph to languish until the late 1880s when other inventors 
stepped in to challenge his claim over the principle and profits of sound recording. The industry 
subsequently built by Edison and these competitors achieved that which had eluded the inventor 
and his colleagues a decade before—the application of the phonograph to the problems of office 
dictation. It is at this point, when the phonograph was so unanimously associated with the 
mechanical reproduction of scripts, that it became in the eyes and ears of the world, a sonic 
scribe.  
 North American Review, May-June 1878, 527-36.7
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The Rebirth of the Phonograph 
The phonograph’s reintroduction to the world—and the realization of phonographic 
dictation—began, not with Edison, but with another of America’s techno-scientific titans, 
Alexander Graham Bell, who deeply regretted his failure to grasp the phonographic principle 
before Edison’s 1877 announcement of discovery. He had, after all, been working on problems 
very similar to those touching on phonography. In March of 1878, he had written his father-in-
law that “it is a most astonishing thing to me that I should possibly have let this invention slip 
through my fingers when I consider how my thoughts have been directed to this subject for so 
many years past.” The recipient, one Gardiner Greene Hubbard, might have reassured his son-in-
law, however, that this was no fait accompli, Edison’s claims to have fixed in foil the ephemeral 
essence of the spoken word. In his capacity as president of the Edison Speaking Phonograph 
Company, Hubbard knew better than anyone the hyperbole that Edison and others had employed 
in selling the world on the new device, and the distance between rhetoric and reality would only 
become clearer in the months to follow. Indeed, it is likely that as Hubbard’s disappointment 
with the phonograph mounted, he encouraged his son-in-law to work on improving it, perhaps 
even occasionally strolling out to Bell’s makeshift laboratory (in the loft of Hubbard’s stable) to 
press the issue.   8
In 1880 the French government awarded Bell its prestigious Volta Prize— including 
50,000 francs— in honor of his achievements in telephony. Bell, who had recently opened a lab 
in DC with his partner, Charles Sumner Tainter, renamed this operation the Volta Laboratory and 
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hired his cousin Chichester as company physicist. Owing in large measure to the fact that Bell 
was contractually obligated to hand over telephone improvements to the Telephone Company, 
Volta Laboratory turned its attentions to the phonograph. After experimenting with several 
approaches to sound reproduction, Tainter and Bell deposited at the Smithsonian Institution a 
device consisting of a modified first-generation Edison phonograph. The grooves on its brass 
cylinder had been widened and filled with wax, its diaphragm replaced with an improved (more 
sensitive) one, and the old indenting stylus replaced with one capable of incising. On June 25, 
1885 Bell and his colleagues applied for a basic patent covering the graphophone and shortly 
thereafter Hubbard (still president and director of the old ESPC) approached the Edison faction 
in hopes of establishing a unified company for exploiting the phonograph/graphophone. Edison 
refused, so when word arrived in December that their patents had been approved, Bell and his 
colleagues began organizing their own company. The Volta Graphophone Company was 
organized on May 3 1886 and immediately began efforts to publicize the machine. Their efforts 
caught the attention of House of Representatives reporters Andrew Devine and John White, as 
well as that of James O. Clephane, a former reporter currently occupied as the owner of a 
stenographic service. On June 22 1887 they organized the American Graphophone Company, a 
concern charged with marketing and distributing the graphophone.   9
The founding of the American Graphophone Company and the media buzz surrounding it 
lit a fire under Edison, who turned his attention to the phonograph again after years of neglect. In 
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May 1888 he unveiled the “Improved Phonograph” to the world. Edison had initially attempted 
to steer clear of elements covered by the graphophone’s patents but eventually determined 
(incorrectly) that key elements, including the incising stylus, were preempted by his original 
phonograph patent.  
His flagrant appropriation of the Bell improvements would have undoubtedly precipitated 
a court battle were it not for a Pittsburgh glass magnate named Jesse H. Lippincott. In the autumn 
of 1887 the American Graphophone Company had been approached by a Thomas R. Lombard, 
recently awe-struck by a demonstration of the Bell machine and desirous of forming a company 
to commercially exploit it in the United States. Negotiations fell through as the American 
directors insisted that Lombard take the contract on under personal liability (that is, without the 
protections of incorporation), but an associate of Lombard, Jesse H. Lippincott stepped forward, 
willing to assume such a contract. On March 29, 1888, Lippincott and American entered into a 
contract whereby the latter would manufacture graphophones and the former would lease or sell 
them across the United States. Moving quickly, Lippincott approached the Edison faction in 
hopes of securing control of the phonograph. On June 28 Lippincott secured from Edison the 
right to market the phonograph, in so doing bringing the Bell and Edison factions to heel 
(temporarily) and uniting the interests of the phonograph and the graphophone in one agency, the 
North American Phonograph Company.   10
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Under the terms of the contract American Graphophone Company was to supply 
Lippincott with an initial order of 300 graphophones to be manufactured by Western Electric. 
The Company would henceforth arrange for the production and delivery of no fewer than 5000 
machines annually for fifteen years, and Lippincott was obliged to take (and pay for) no fewer 
than 5000. No production quotas were established between North American and Edison until 
August of 1889 when Lippincott wrote to confirm a verbal contract by which the Edison 
Phonograph Works agreed to supply forty-five phonographs a day beginning August 1 and 
lasting until the first of the year. North American would pay $45 apiece for these machines until 
3000 had been purchased at which time the price would drop to $40. Before finalizing these 
arrangements, American Graphophone insisted that North American pay them a royalty on every 
phonograph sold or leased by the company—a recognition of the graphophone patents utilized in 
the Improved Phonograph.  11
To market the products of the phonograph and graphophone factories Lippincott arranged 
for the incorporation of over thirty local companies holding territorial monopolies in most of the 
United States and Canada. The telephone industry (with which many of North American's 
principles had experience) had earlier exploited the company-and-sub-companies business model 
to great effect, and Lippincott hoped the structure would prove as effective in his own nascent 
industry. The sub-companies idea represented an organizational halfway house. Local parties 
brought their own capital to bear in the formation of these firms, sparing the NAPC the herculean 
financial burden of erecting a sales infrastructure on their own. The formation of the sub-
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companies not only saved the NAPC expense in building their own infrastructure. The process 
also contributed positive revenue to the parent company's coffers in the form of an organizing fee 
paid by the local companies for the right to market phonographs and graphophones. On the other 
hand, the sub-companies idea sought to avoid some of the troubles attendant on dealing with 
"free market" independent contractors. When the sub-companies remitted to North American 
their organizing fee, they also deposited with the company 12.5% of their capital stock, to be 
increased to 25% when their license was extended in five years. As a shareholder in these local 
companies, North American Phonograph Company could exert a measure of control over their 
clients impossible in dealing with independent local distributing and retailing firms.  12
North American and its local clients were to pursue a relatively straightforward business 
plan: The parent company would lease machines to the local companies at a rate of $20 per 
annum and the local company would in turn rent them out for $40. Parties could and did rent 
phonographs for a number of public and private purposes, but the NAPC and its local 
subsidiaries expended the vast majority of its time and resources in pushing the devices as aids in 
office dictation. In a January 1889 circular sent out to prospective investors, Lippincott offered 
rosy projections of the company’s footing and its prospects:  
The entire United States has been given out for the formation of thirty local companies; 
all of these except two have been organized and received licenses ... And are now actively 
engaged in the promotion of the business. So far the demand for instruments has been 
largely in excess of the supply. Up to date about two thousand have been sent to the 
various companies and have gone into actual use. In the near future we are promised by 
the manufacturers one hundred and fifty a day, and judging from our experience of the 
past two months, and the demands made upon us, even this quantity will not be sufficient 
to fully supply the public. 
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By January of 1890 Lippincott reported that the local companies had rented 6,275 phonographs 
and graphophones, most of which were employed in offices.  13
Phonographs, Gender and the Transformation of Office Labor 
Even though the office phonograph’s time at the center of the industry’s attention was 
short, its insinuation into offices implicated it in a set of complex and ongoing economic and 
cultural reconfigurations. While the industry often positioned the phonograph as a remedy for the 
dislocations of these larger transformations, it more often than not helped to preserve or even 
intensify existing tendencies within the organization of office labor. When in the 1870s women 
began to flood into office employment as typists and stenographers, for example, partisans of the 
business phonograph argued that the technology would keep women employees separated from 
boorish and possibly abusive male coworkers. That it often did. But the phonograph also allowed 
office managers to cut labor costs, both by reducing the skills needed to replicate texts and by 
passing the work off from high-paid men to lower-paid women.  
Late nineteenth century office workers labored in an environment dramatically different 
from that of their professional forebears and one still in the midst of rapid evolution. In the 
eighteenth century a fairly concrete division of labor had separated "clerks" from their 
counterparts in the ranks of manual labor. By the early nineteenth century, however, it appears 
that these categories had come to overlap somewhat. Manual laborers now often possessed the 
training to pull double duty as clerks, and most clerks (especially young ones) were expected to 
deliver packages, handle inventory or even sweep or wash windows. Above all else, however, the 
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clerk's work entailed writing, and in busy commercial houses clerks spent the better part of their 
day scribbling at journals, ledgers, invoices, contracts, memos, correspondence, inventories, 
expense records, and receipts. The speed of one's pen became paramount in this context and 
writing, to the chagrin of many a clerk, took on an industrial character. "Ho!" one young clerk 
wrote, "The torn coat sleeve to the table. The steel pen to the ink. Write! Write! Be it truth or 
fable. Words! Words! Clerks never think." If the novice kept at the task, proficiency came, but so 
too did the aches and pains of daily repetitive exertions. In Billy Budd and other Tales Herman 
Melville described the clerk's ergonomic travails. "If, for the sake of easing his back," Melville 
wrote "he brought the table lid at a sharp angle well towards his chin, and wrote there like a man 
using the steep roof of a Dutch house for his desk, then he declared that it stopped the circulation 
in his arms." If the clerk "lowered the table to his waistbands and steeped over it in writing," 
however, he then experienced a "sore aching in his back."  14
For all the job's frustrations, the early nineteenth century clerk generally recognized in his 
occupation a type of employment superior to many. Clerks were understood as apprentices 
whose destiny lay in joining the ranks of the proprietary middle class and as a cohort shared an 
ethos of self-improvement and upward mobility. Their positions, unlike those of manual laborers, 
 Stuart Blumin argues that the early nineteenth century saw a decisive split between white collar work 14
and other forms of labor, giving rise to the middle class. More recently, Brian Luskey has pushed this 
separation back into the eighteenth century and argued that the nineteenth century saw a partial collapse 
of the headwork/handwork division of labor. Stuart M Blumin, The Emergence of the Middle Class: 
Social Experience in the American City ; 1760-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
66-107; Brian P Luskey, On the Make: Clerks and the Quest for Capital in Nineteenth-century America 
(New York University Press, 2010), 54-82; Thomas Augst, The Clerk's Tale: Young Men and Moral Life 
in Nineteenth-Century America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 219-232; Michael Zakim, 
“The Business Clerk as Social Revolutionary; or, a Labor History of the Nonproducing Classes,” Journal 
of the Early Republic 26, No. 4 (2006): 577; Quote from Zakim, “The Business Clerk as Social 
Revolutionary,” 580; Second quote from Zakim, “The Business Clerk as Social Revolutionary,” 581. 
Michael Zakim, Ready-Made Democracy: A History of Men’s Dress in the American Republic, 1760-1860 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
!96
were generally given only to whites, allowing them an increased measure of social distance 
between themselves and African Americans—no negligible "psychic wage" in an age of gross 
racism. Finally, the clerks of the nineteenth century worked and played in a nearly all-male 
environment far removed from their mothers' parlors. Inside and outside of work they conversed 
on the economy, on sports, and especially, on women. They drank in taverns together, rough-
housed, formed baseball teams and joined fraternal lodges. In an era in which women were 
associated with the stifling (if nurturing) domestic parlor, the all-male workplace represented for 
young clerks a sphere of unparalleled freedom.  15
White collar life began to change dramatically with new forms of commercial 
organization at mid-century. Beginning in the 1850s with railroads, massive multi-department 
firms evolved to manage the exponentially-increasing flow of information and goods made 
possible by improved manufacturing techniques. In order to keep up with firms' increasing 
paperwork, the number of office workers exploded in the decades following the Civil War, with 
the number of store and office clerks rising from a half-million in 1880 to 1.5 million twenty 
years later. This increase in the size of the workforce, however, meant little compared to the 
cultural and economic changes which occurred in the lives of the clerical classes. To manage the 
new multi-department firm, armies of "middle managers" moved into companies, creating new 
levels of bureaucracy and more starkly hierarchical distributions of authority. Gone were the 
days when the clerk enjoyed a special relationship with the company owner and could expect to 
be trained in general business practices for that day when he struck out on his own. No such 
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general practices existed in the increasingly specialized world of commerce, and even if there 
were, the late nineteenth century was no place for small time operators. The clerk, once an 
aspiring proprietor, had become by the last decades of the nineteenth century a lifelong 
"company man."   16
Other developments in the postbellum office contributed to the anxiousness of its 
expanding population of clerks. Beginning in the 1870s women flooded into offices as typists 
and stenographers further "feminizing" white collar work and disrupting the male-only patterns 
of office sociality which had long served as one of the job's perks. The profundity of this 
transformation in the American office's gender landscape is hinted at by its scale. Between 1870 
and 1930 the number of women employed as bookkeepers increased from 800 to 465,000. In 
1880 only 154 Americans reported their occupation as stenographer or typist. Four percent of 
them were women. By 1910, women represented 77 percent of the nation's 112,600 
stenographers and typists.  17
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Trained in one of the era's many systems of shorthand writing, a stenographer rapidly 
recorded the spoken words of a speaker before retiring to his or her desk and reproducing the 
message in traditional "longhand," intelligible to the world at large. In this way the labor of text 
construction was split in two: "head work”—the purview of management—and "hand work" 
which could be outsourced to an operative whose time was less valuable than his employer's. In 
the 1870s and 1880s, the typewriter contributed further to labor specialization by transferring 
some of this "hand labor" from stenographers to inexpensive and disproportionately female 
typists.  
It was at this anxious moment, in which long-established patterns of office work were 
rapidly realigning along new technological and gendered lines, that the North American 
Phonograph Company undertook to introduce the office phonograph. One professional group, in 
particular took particular heed of the new technology-- stenographers. Phonographs, it appeared, 
threatened a deskilling of stenographic labor, with shorthand reporters reduced from purveyors of 
an esoteric commercial alphabet to low-paid machine operators. They might also be replaced 
altogether. Unsurprisingly, many stenographers responded to these possibilities negatively. In an 
1891 address to his fellow stenographers, George B. Motheral admitted that “in speaking about 
the Phonograph-Graphophone before a body of stenographers …I feel that I am handicapped by 
the adverse opinions formed in the minds of many of the stenographers in this country in regard 
to that machine.”   18
Some stenographers responded enthusiastically to the phonograph, but this cohort tended 
to be comprised of those with secure employment. Among those men and women who welcomed 
 The Phonogram, May 1891, 109-110.18
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the device, one professional cohort stands out— court reporters and other state employees. Frank 
E. Nevins, of the St. Louis Circuit Court, for example, wrote to the Missouri Phonograph 
Company to offer his own perspective on the phonograph’s role in stenography, informing them 
that he had embraced the machine in his own work and that it allowed him to dispense with 
shorthand note-taking. He could now “discharge [his] work with one-half the expenditure of vital 
energy.” The Columbia Phonograph Company of Washington D.C. owed its success to its access 
to the city’s well-funded government offices and the New England Phonograph Company 
similarly placed many of their machines with the “official stenographers in Boston.” In general, 
enthusiasm for the phonograph among stenographers was the prerogative of a well-situated 
minority.  19
For their own part, industry personnel were quite explicit about the class element in 
stenographers' reactions to the new technology. George Hoit of the Chicago Central Phonograph 
Company remarked that his company had faced opposition from “nickel-in-the-slot 
stenographers” but from “first-class stenographers” had had no trouble to speak of. George E. 
Tewkesbury’s Kansas Phonograph Company also maintained good relations with his territory’s 
stenographers but ran afoul of the “nickel-in-the-slot organization,” apparently meaning the 
combined efforts of more precariously-employed shorthand reporters. Nor did “expert 
stenographers” cause much trouble for the Metropolitan Phonograph Company of New York, 
though more marginal stenographic laborers did oppose their efforts to introduce phonographs 
into the city’s offices. At the First Annual Convention of Local Phonograph Companies, W.L. 
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Smith of the New Jersey Phonograph Company reported that his company had been opposed in 
their efforts to introduce the phonograph in their territory by stenographers. In Minnesota by 
1890, stenographers had organized a body expressly to boycott the phonograph’s entrance into 
offices while Kansas City alone hosted nine such groups by the same year.  20
Nor were these marginal stenographers' concerns unfounded. An article in the March 
1890 edition of the National Stenographer reported on the phonograph’ impact in one office: 
…in a business house with a large correspondence, one that I know of personally, they 
formerly employed a number of stenographers. They now employ one good stenographer, 
to whom all members of the firm dictate the correspondence that he does not know how 
to answer himself; he dictates his notes into the Phonograph, the cylinders are turned over 
to six cheap typewritists, and in another room, from a like number of phonographs, are 
copied on typewriters rapidly and the work done without mistakes. 
According to George Hoit of the Chicago Central Phonograph Company, one of the company’s 
clients, S.A. Maxwell & Co. Had by May 1890 rented seven phonographs and replaced all of its 
stenographers.  21
 Industry insiders were well aware of the political-economic implications of the 
phonograph, and in their less-guarded moments recognized that their commercial ambitions put 
them in direct conflict with the nation's stenographers. At the first annual meeting of North 
American’s sub companies in 1890, Jesse Lippincott, president of the corporation, told 
colleagues that “we are trying to a certain extent at least, to supplant an industry that is already 
established, that of the stenographer.” At the same conference E.L. Lindsay of the Wyoming 
Phonograph Company spoke plainly of the need to undermine stenographers’ places in the office. 
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In Lindsay’s estimation, it was incumbent on the various companies to establish schools to teach 
typists how to take phonographic dictation and to transcribe it. Otherwise, he said, “you go to a 
stenographer there and he don’t like to change his method of doing business and claims he 
cannot operate the machine and at the same time operate the typewriter.” Similarly, the managers 
of the New England Phonograph Company concluded that the only way to circumvent the 
stenographers’ hold on office dictation was to train their own typist/phonographers “so that when 
a man wants a machine we not only give him a machine but we give him an expert operator with 
it.”   22
In more public venues the industry generally downplayed the threat posed by the 
phonograph to stenographers’ jobs. In a November 1892 article titled “The Phonograph and 
Stenographer Allied” the Phonogram declared “there is room for all” and urged stenographers to 
learn to use the machine which, at any rate, was already coming into wider use. Months earlier, 
the magazine had pursued much the same tack, insisting that stenographers should see the 
phonograph as “a supporter and ally,” and “not a supplanter and antagonist.”   23
The project of legitimizing the phonograph's role as an aid to dictation, however, required 
more of the North American Phonograph Company and its subsidiaries than cheap encomiums to 
cooperation. The industry had also to make a case for its salutary effects within the broader set of 
transformations in office labor with were going on-- transformations which deeply troubled 
office workers and even society-at-large. None of these "problems" presented themselves with 
greater urgency than women's recent invasion of the office, an invasion which put an end to the 
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space's homosocial character, but even, it appeared, might numerically overwhelm the men 
altogether.  
The phonograph itself, in its binary operations of recording and playback, suggested a 
division of labor that easily mapped onto a binary gender schema. The publications of the early 
phonograph trade came replete with illustrations of this relationship. The May 1891 issue of The 
Phonogram carried on opposing pages illustrations of the prescribed techno-gendered 
relationships. In the first, a young male office worker delivers a message into the phonograph’s 
speaking tube. In the second a young woman sits listening to the phonograph through ear tubes 
and transcribes the recorded message with the aid of a typewriter. A promotional publication 
from the Indiana Graphophone Company presented a nearly identically gendered presentation of 
phonographic practice. On one page is depicted an early middle-aged man sitting at the 
phonograph with its speaking tube pulled up to his mouth. Behind him are his desk, account 
books and other assorted office accoutrements. A caption informs readers that he is "dictating to 
the phonograph." On the opposing page, a younger woman sits at her own machine, hearing 
tubes in place, pecking away at the typewriter. She is "transcribing from the graphophone." On 
one hand, these illustrations emphasized the permanence of the (male) stenographer's role by 
anchoring the operations of phonographic transcription in the immutable nature of sexual 
difference. The phonographic reproduction of texts, no less than the biological reproduction of 
humans, they suggested, required the ongoing presence of men. At the same time, these 
illustrations affirmed that phonographic practice would serve to strengthen the existing gendered 
parameters of communication: men spoke and women listened. With the general proliferation of 
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phonographs, workplace patriarchy could be shored up against incursions by the rising tide of 
women.   24
Missing from the rhetoric and representations of the phonograph industry was a third 
possibility--that the phonograph might preserve patriarchal office relations while simultaneously 
eliminating the jobs of men. At Chicago’s A.N. Marquis Publishing Company, the dictating and 
transcribing room was staffed by a male dictator, whose cylinder recordings kept busy two young 
female typists. Similarly, a photo of The World’s Dispensary Medical Association of New York 
shows one of the company’s transcription rooms. Four female employees take dictation from 
phonographs, while a male supervisor monitors their labor from the back of the room. The 
preferred iconography of the phonograph industry depicted men and women in one-to-one 
Romantic dichotomy. The reality often looked more like Old Testament patriarchy with rooms 
full of female typists watched over by salaried managers and marginal younger men (like 
stenographers) banished to shift for themselves.  25
Not only stenographers, but also American society in general, found reason to fret over 
women's newfound roles in offices and much of this anxiety focused on the practice's threat to 
sexual propriety. In the 1901 novel The Typewriter Girl, by Olive Pratt Rayner, turn-of-the-
century readers are apprised of the moral danger presented by the promiscuous mixing of men 
and women in the office. The protagonist, an American typist, enters an office looking for work 
in London.  
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My voice trembled a little, but I mustered up courage and spoke. "I have called about 
your advertisement…" He eyed me up and down. I am slender, and, I will venture to say, 
if not pretty, at least interesting looking… The eldest clerk, with the foxy head, wheeled 
around, and took his turn to stare. He had hairy hands and large goggle-eyes… I felt 
disagreeably like Esther in the presence of Ahasuerus--a fat and oily Ahasuerus of fifty… 
He perused me up and down with his small pig's eyes, as if he were buying a horse, 
scrutinizing my face, my figure, my hands, my feet. I felt like a Circassian in an an Arab 
slave market…” 
Cromwell Childe, head of a stenographers’ and typewriters bureau, inadvertently acknowledged 
the situation's threat to propriety when he described the ideal female office employee: “There is a 
hint of merriment and tolerance, but, along with these, a decided evidence that bounds may not 
be overstepped.”   26
Women's entrance into the office also coincided with and exacerbated an ongoing crisis in 
the organization of workplace space. For most of the nineteenth century, the business office had 
generally been a fairly rudimentary affair, its proportions small and its spaces undifferentiated. 
Beginning in the 1870s and 80s, however, the increasing size and scope of corporate and state 
bureaucracies demanded more complexly-managed administrative facilities. At the same, the 
emergence of steel-frame skyscrapers facilitated the construction of larger spaces that could be 
partitioned in ways more complex than the old single-room office. Office managers brought 
more functions "in house" and sorted employees into spatially-segregated departments to 
increase efficiency. Of course, the project of rationalizing work spatially also represented a 
spatial rationalization of gender. Women overwhelmingly entered the office as typists or 
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stenographers (or both,) so the project of segregating the office by type of work came with the 
added "benefit" of cloistering women in their own spaces.  27
Architectural measures, however, could only accomplish so much, because the job of 
receiving dictation took the stenographer-typist into every corner of the workplace. Fortunately, 
the phonograph could be relied on to remedy this fraught state of affairs.“If the operator is a 
refined and sensitive lady, as is often the case,” Edward Easton reassured Phonogram readers, 
“she may write out the dictation of the most personally offensive and disagreeable member of the 
opposite sex, without the infliction of his presence, a necessary evil under the direct dictation 
system." Since the dictator's message could be stored on the phonograph's wax cylinders, there 
was no need for the stenographer-typist to meet with him in person. Like the typists at the World 
Dispensary Medical Association, they need only wait in their gender-segregated workspace for 
the company's "messengers" to deliver wax records from the various offices. On the other hand, 
the phonograph's potential for gender segregation could also be a liability. The Minnesota 
Phonograph Company discovered that, while it was rather easy to rent phonographs out to 
offices, after a period of time "[the phonographs] get old and [customers] don't use them; they 
lay them by." Why? "They've got a pretty stenographer somewhere that they'd rather use than the 
phonograph."  28
Just as with the phonograph's purported capacity to check the growing power and 
numbers of women in the office, its potential as an agent of spatial rationalization also reinforced 
the logics of capitalism in ways that workers probably did not foresee. Throughout the nineteenth 
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century clerks and other "head workers" had worked side by side with their bosses, an 
arrangement that conferred a certain dignity on the clerk's position, if not equality with 
management. The postwar expansion of the office workforce and of the managerial bureaucracy 
re-shaped office relationships along more explicitly hierarchical lines, with supervisors retreating 
to walled-off personal offices. Dictation, however, forced managers into real-time collaborations 
with stenographers, undermining the impersonal and hierarchical relationships of the corporate 
office and conferring on stenographers a special status at odds with the proletarianizing drift of 
the late nineteenth century office. Once again, however, the phonograph promised to shore up the 
logics of capital where architecture alone had proven insufficient to the task. By splitting 
dictation into distinct labors separated by time and space, it allowed managers to dispense with 
the unseemly ritual of collaborating with stenographers. The boss could, in this vision of 
phonographic dictation, recite his correspondence into the device, and then send the records out 
for transcription by stenographers or typists elsewhere. In an 1891 letter to the Phonogram, 
attorney J.H. McGowan explained his own investment in the phonograph as an agent of social 
distancing. He admitted that he was a “nervous man” but believed “that any person is more or 
less disturbed in his mental processes by the simple presence of another.” For this reason, he 
found it preferable to dictate his letters into the phonograph, shut up alone in his office without 
even the disturbance of a stenographer. “This opportunity to be entirely alone when one 
dictates,” he considered to be “one of the great advantages of the Phonograph.”   29
At several junctures the phonograph industry positioned the phonograph as a remedy to 
the ills of the postbellum office-- at least as perceived by some contemporaries. Just as often as 
 The Phonogram, May 1891, 131.29
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the technology successfully ameliorated these problems, however, it reinforced existing 
tendencies within the evolution of corporate capitalism, undermining the status of the office's 
traditional workforce and especially that of stenographers. The advent of the office phonograph 
did, in some ways, benefit women office workers. When male stenographers balked at the 
technology, North American's sub-companies turned to women. In those offices where the 
phonograph was taken up as an aid to dictation, this nearly always meant that men lost jobs to 
women. However underpaid, women stood to earn more money as phonographer-typists than 
most other occupations open to them in the late nineteenth century, and in this respect the 
phonograph's effects were positive. 
But, once again, even this benefit only unfolded within a larger framework in which the 
phonograph reinforced the larger logics of capitalism. The replacement of skilled male 
stenographers with semi-skilled female phonographer-typists represented a relative de-skilling of 
the workforce and--most importantly--a decrease in wages. Under some circumstances, the office 
phonograph even threatened to push the rationalization and division of labor one step further by 
facilitating the outsourcing and centralization of typewriting. In Chicago, for example, 
Stevenson’s Phonographic Exchange placed their machines in the offices of customers who used 
them to dictate their correspondence and memos onto wax records. An Exchange employee 
dropped in daily to retrieve the recorded cylinders and bring them back to headquarters where 
they were dutifully typed out by Exchange typewritists and sent back to the customer. M.R. And 
H.C. Snyder’s transcription bureau in Washington, D.C. provided similar services in the nation’s 
capitol “sending to members of Congress and others for phonograph cylinders for transcription, 
returning the copy, etc.” In large markets such as these, then, the phonograph contributed to a 
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further winnowing of the labor pool, replacing humans with machines and widening corporate 
profit margins.   30
Infrastructure Failures and the Death of the Office Phonograph 
Keeping these phonographs running (and the rental revenues flowing,) required an 
enormous amount of ongoing labor. Even more so than the crude mechanism of 1877, the 
Improved Phonograph and its competitor the Graphophone relied on an attenuated infrastructure 
of human and non-human components, and the specific demands of office phonography weighed 
heavily on this thinly-stretched web of relationships. Where conditions were ideal a respectable 
profit could be wrung from the precarious enterprise, but in most parts of the country vast 
distances stretched this infrastructure past the breaking point. This section argues that the eclipse 
of the office phonograph business model owed very little to public disinterest. Rather, the 
intransigence of material things and physical distance made the office phonograph business 
model a losing proposition in most parts of the country. Even in those cases in which the 
business model made money, the high costs associated with it cut into profits and ensured that 
phonograph companies would seize on any opportunity to widen their profit margins.  
Exceptions, they say, prove the rule, and this was never truer than in the early history of 
the Columbia Phonograph Company of Washington D.C. Columbia prospered in the office 
phonograph business by exertions which few territorial companies could match and under more 
promising circumstances than nearly any of them enjoyed. The origins of the company lay in 
February 1888, when Edward D. Easton, an American Graphophone Company shareholder, 
secured from that company an exclusive contract to handle graphophone sales in Delaware, 
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Virginia and Washington D.C. In January the following year he and a cadre of investors 
incorporated the Columbia Phonograph Company. When American Graphophone handed 
national marketing over to Lippincott, Columbia became the local company for the North 
American Phonograph Company, entitled to market both graphophones and phonographs in their 
district. Like most of his colleagues, Easton had placed great stock in the application of sound 
recording to business purposes and Washington’s armies of reporters, lawyers, and 
stenographers, combined with generously-funded federal offices, meant the company had as 
good a chance of “making a go” of the office phonograph business as any firm in the country.   31
Despite this advantage, Columbia maintained profitability only through the most 
stringent of industrial management and the company’s operations were characterized at every 
turn by an emphasis on efficiency. An office building near the center of the city served as 
headquarters for Columbia’s Washington operations, and like a commercial homunculus, it 
housed in microcosm most of the functions which would some day grow into fully-formed 
components of the “recording industry.” In its basement employees repaired broken machines 
and attended to customers’ batteries. On the first floor the company maintained offices for its 
president and general manager while the second floor housed “the display parlors, where the 
public transact their business,” and which were “the handsomest used for the purpose in the 
country.” The third floor eventually served as a musical department while the fourth floor was 
given over, anticlimactically, to storage. From these headquarters, poured forth every day a 
workforce of phonograph inspectors, men trained in the peculiarities of the machine and who 
were indispensable in keeping the company’s phonographs laboring away in customers’ offices. 
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“Mounted on bicycles,” the inspectors rode “swiftly from place to place over the smooth 
concrete streets of Washington” making regular rounds and attending to malfunctions as quickly 
as possible. Lest an impatient subscriber endeavor to fix their own malfunctioning machine, the 
company’s offices were staffed “days, nights and Sundays” and “telephone calls [were] always 
promptly answered.” Under normal circumstances, inspectors were expected to provide 
preventative maintenance for the company’s phonographs. In late 1891, The Phonogram 
described the handiwork of a diligent inspector: “the instrument had been overhauled, the rusty 
parts had received a polish, the adjustments were all correct, the cylinders were put into proper 
order, the electric motor ready, and the whole air of the machine life-like and waiting, as it were, 
to respond to a touch.”   32
The close relationship between operational efficiency and customer satisfaction (and 
Columbia’s profits,) led Columbia to even rationalize the workings of its customers’ offices. 
President Edward Easton of Columbia devoted a great deal of consideration to the ideal practices 
to be encouraged in phonographic offices. His prescriptions, spelled out in meticulous detail in 
an article for the Phonogram entitled “Make the Phonograph Convenient” suggested a continuity 
between the desiderata of technological and human efficiency, operational seamlessness, and the 
profits of the phonograph firms. Phonograph company managers, he said, should do everything 
in their power to facilitate their customers’ convenience. “Busy men, accustomed to calling a 
stenographer and dictating without leaving their chairs,” he said, “are sometimes embarrassed in 
the use of the phonograph, because before beginning they are obliged to gather up their 
correspondence, leave their desk, go to and open the machine, put on the speaking-tube, hunt up 
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a pared blank (or, worse still, pare one), and in short, undertake the entire operation in the most 
inconvenient way.” To address this problem, Easton said, phonographs should always be 
employed in pairs. One should be set directly into the dictator’s desk “far enough back to leave 
room for spreading out the letters to be answered or signed, but not to exceed fifteen or sixteen 
inches from the front edge of the desk." The office clerk would have sole run of the other 
phonograph, which he would use for listening to the former’s recorded dictations and typing 
them out. By employing two phonographs in this way, the customer could avoid a number of 
rank inefficiencies. First, a phonograph shared between dictator and transcriber required a 
sharing of workspace which was certain to cause mischief in time lost and misplaced office 
effects. Secondly, the shared machine would have constantly to be switched back and forth 
between “record” and “playback” setups, again causing frustration and inefficiency as well as 
constant uncertainty of the machine’s readiness for action. Thirdly, the use of one phonograph 
imposed a labor “bottleneck” and was hardly better than old fashioned stenography. Under those 
circumstances clerks or typewriters could not type out the boss’s dictations until he had ceded the 
machine to his subordinate. With two phonographs, recording and transcribing could go on 
simultaneously. Additionally, Easton advised phonograph companies to provide their customers 
with quite specific instructions for running their office phonograph: 
Three boxes, each to hold twelve cylinders, are used, the first bearing a label marked 
"Blanks”…; the second empty and marked "To be transcribed;" the third box empty and 
marked "To be pared." The dictator is instructed to draw from the box marked "Blanks," 
placing each cylinder as he fills it into the box marked "To be transcribed," which box is 
drawn from by the type-writer operator; the latter being taught to place all transcribed 
cylinders in the box at his desk marked "to be pared," which paring he does at the first 
convenient opening, returning the pared cylinders to the principal's box marked "Blanks."  
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Urging customers to adopt such a system, Easton explained, would ensure that “all friction is 
overcome from the very start” and that “unless some such method be suggested or employed, 
things will always be at sixes and sevens.”  33
In no sphere of activity was the company’s pursuit of seamlessness more dogged than in 
supplying its phonographs with motive power. In a letter to the Phonogram, the company 
informed the trade that “busy men will not use the phonograph commercially if there is much 
friction in regard to power” and for that reason resolved to avoid “friction” at any cost. In its 
early days Easton and Company had leased out quite a few of the treadle-powered devices put 
out by the American Graphophone Company. These proved unpopular and the company 
transitioned over to the battery-powered electric motor machines first supplied by Edison’s 
Phonograph Works. Recognizing that “efficient and absolutely reliable battery service was 
indispensable to the success of the phonograph,” Columbia secured in 1889 the services of 
William W. Donaldson, an electrician and storage battery expert who soon revolutionized the 
company’s approach to batteries and their maintenance. Donaldson divided Washington into 
twelve sectors, each containing roughly the same number of phonograph subscribers. Every 
morning, company employees canvassed one section of the city retrieving all of the batteries 
there and replacing them with freshly charged ones. The spent batteries were re-charged 
overnight at Columbia’s offices and then taken to the next sector the following day. In this way, 
every phonograph battery in Washington—numbering over four hundred by late 1891— was 
replaced every two weeks.  
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The company worked feverishly to prevent battery failures in their customers’ 
phonographs and even forewent efficiency (and profit) in some areas in order to ensure 
continuity. Donaldson noted, for example, that there were batteries made which could hold 
charges for longer than two weeks but that “the multiplicity of plates required in a battery of 
sufficient size and capacity to last for a longer period brings in the element of uncertainty, which 
must for successful work be avoided.” On balance, longer-lasting batteries might help cut 
Columbia’s labor costs by reducing the number of service calls necessary to keep customers’ 
phonographs running. In the long run, however, they injected into the phonograph’s operations a 
degree of unreliability, threatening the aesthetics of efficiency and continuity on which the 
company predicated its value-claims.   34
Columbia was largely successful in its mission to keep their customers’ cylinders turning 
and a disproportionate number of the laudatory letters turned over for publication to The 
Phonogram came from phonograph users in their Washington D.C. Territory. F.J. Haig, clerk of 
the Committee on District Columbia wrote that his phonograph had “never been out of order or 
needed the slightest repairs,” and attributed this faultless operation to E.D. Easton and the 
Columbia Company. J.H. McGowan also of the District of Columbia wrote “I have no trouble 
whatever with my two machines. The company sees to the changing of the batteries as frequently 
as necessary, and keeps the machines oiled and cleaned." Thomas W. Smith, remained quite 
pleased with the machine he rented from Columbia and had “no hesitation in recommending it to 
the business community.” Other metropolitan sub-companies also appear to have performed well 
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and letters to Phonogram consistently praised the operations of local phonograph companies in 
New York, Philadelphia, and other large cities.   35
For the majority of North American’s sub-companies, however, the inherent challenges of 
leasing and maintaining office phonographs proved nearly impossible, and this owed much to the 
effects of geographic distance. The office phonograph, as we have seen, relied on human and 
non-human actors for its successful operations. Where this infrastructure of people, things and 
ideas was stretched too far it invariably snapped, depriving office managers of the phonograph’s 
services and (eventually) phonograph companies of a revenue stream.  
Distance took its toll on the local companies’ operations from the very beginning, as 
companies far from centers of phonographic expertise in New York and Washington found it 
difficult to train their technicians. In the early 1890s the phonograph remained a particularly 
temperamental technology and its many quirks were best learned by first-hand training under an 
experienced mechanic. To that end, one of the very first maneuvers by the parent company was 
the scheduling of phonograph lessons at Menlo Park for sub-company employees. The Michigan 
Phonograph Company sent a man down for instruction and the Metropolitan Phonograph 
Company of New York made arrangements for a handful of their "operators" to visit the labs. 
George Dunham of the Ohio Phonograph Company wrote to say that, as he had experience with 
the old tinfoil phonograph, he did not believe a primer was in order. He would come to Menlo if 
Edison absolutely insisted, however.  
While firms “out east” might (or might not) take Edison up on his phonograph lessons, 
phonographic expertise was difficult to achieve in those areas far removed from the phonograph 
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and graphophone workshops, and provincial sub-companies struggled to adequately find and 
train technicians. In January of 1891, The Phonogram reported that applicants for positions as 
“company expert” with the various local companies would henceforth  “require a certificate, 
signed by competent authority” attesting to their qualifications, in order to receive a 
recommendation from North American. To underscore the necessity of this measure, the 
Phonogram noted that “heretofore the class of men filling this important position have not been 
at all times fully up to the standard.” By November, The Phonogram could remark that poorly-
trained phonograph inspectors were becoming fewer, but the problem continued for years 
afterwards. In 1896 a Phonoscope reader—presumably a company expert—inadvertently 
illustrated the persistence of the problem in a letter to the magazine. “Talk about ignorance of 
operators” he began, before describing an encounter with a phonographic novice who, in 
attempting to adjust his machine, misused the “speed—regulating thumbscrew of the phonograph 
standard speaker.” The writer adjusted the phonograph himself but the novice “remonstrated with 
me for interfering with the machine.” The writer revealed his credentials and “received his 
thanks afterwards." Unfortunately for the smug interloper, his pretensions to expertise were 
deflated in front of the entire industry by the editor who responded to his letter: “We do not know 
what the ‘speed regulating thumb screw of the phonograph standard speaker’ is, but trust Mr. 
D.'S views will interest, or amuse some of our readers.” The low level of expertise achieved by 
phonograph inspectors wrought havoc on the phonograph and its commercial prospects. In late 
1891 the Phonogram described vividly an office serviced by substandard phonograph “experts”: 
[The phonographs] are besmeared with oil and grease, the cylinders are left unpared or 
covered with shavings, and the whole aspect of the once polished surface and delicately 
neat fittings and appurtenances are neglected and forlorn. Along comes the inspector, 
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whose exterior is in keeping with the instrument which he has charge of; he seats himself, 
takes a whack at the phonograph, gives a prolonged roar into the funnel, and pronounces 
the machine ready for use. A repetition of this hurried and simple proceeding is continued 
from week to week, until reports are sent in and pay-day arrives. The trustful company, 
not having been informed as to the quality of work furnished, rates it as good and pays 
accordingly. 
Not only were company repairmen poorly trained, the Phonogram indicates, but the dispersed 
nature of their work also made it exceedingly difficult for the various sub-companies to police 
their employees’ work in the field.  36
In the country’s rural districts, the negative effects of distance were felt on sub-
companies’ bottom lines in other ways. Though an occasional party rented dozens of 
phonographs the majority of customers had use for a handful or fewer. In addition to the vast 
distances which separated them from the sources of phonographic competence at NAPC 
headquarters, then, the sub-companies were also forced to cultivate relationships with customers 
scattered all over their assigned districts. While Columbia’s inspectors and battery crews traveled 
quickly and efficiently between customers’ offices over D.C.’s well-paved streets, their 
colleagues in thinly-settled Texas faced “a vast expanse of thinly settled country,” and “in some 
cases, phonographs have been placed by [The Texas Phonograph Company] at a distance of eight 
hundred miles from each other.” The Phonogram added grimly “the expense and difficulty of 
maintaining machines at such distances can easily be imagined.” Similarly, as of the beginning of 
1892, the Florida Phonograph Company, had “never yet met with any marked success, owing to 
the sparsity of large towns.” Even if provincial sub-companies managed to secure the help of 
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adequately trained repairmen, maintenance calls were necessarily rare under these circumstances, 
and the full range of mechanical deficiencies endemic to the new phonographs took bloom.   37
The Improved Phonograph was capable of far more than Edison's original tin-foil model, 
but its increased technological sophistication came bundled with a similarly diversified range of 
mechanical infrastructure failures. One problem in this vein—one of the least intractable— was 
the set of practices necessitated by the phonograph’s wax cylinder records. North American and 
its sub-companies made much of the wax cylinders’ reusability and phonographs were outfitted 
with “knives”— attachments which scraped a layer of wax off used cylinders, leaving them 
smooth and ready for another recording. These knives, however, proved a constant source of 
customer dissatisfaction. Artemas Ward of New York wrote that “nine out of ten of the 
difficulties or mishaps in connection with the phonograph are directly connected with the knife. 
It does not cut evenly, or it does not cut deeply enough; it drops down by accident and cuts a 
nasty groove in the blank; or, indirectly it is at fault, because it is not used at the right time or in 
the right way.” “Why could not the company,” he asked, “employ a man to call regularly and 
deliver clean blanks to all regular customers, taking up the used ones and cleaning them at 
home?” Mrs. A.W. Evans, a transcriber for the Metropolitan Phonograph Company believed the 
process of paring cylinders too time-consuming and she wrote to Edison, urging him to develop a 
thinner cylinder that could be economically disposed of after one use. The range of frustrations 
associated with the shaving knife were suggested by an ad in Phonoscope run by one Samuel O. 
Paul, who cryptically promised readers the secret of shaving cylinders without a knife. His 
technique, he claimed “will not make any dust or dirt; will not clog up your Phonograph with 
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wax; will not wear out your blanks, as it takes off no wax; will not need a man, any child can 
work it; will not take the time a knife does; will no[sic] cost half a cent per record; will not need 
any electric power.” Paul’s technique, whatever it was, apparently failed to take the industry by 
storm and no record exists of its particulars. Even if one could get a company maintenance man 
to come have a look at the machine, he might not be much help in matters pertaining to the 
shaving knife. In a letter published in The Phonogram W.M. Benner of Chicago called the 
calibration of the phonograph’s knife “a study” and informed readers that “of the many 
phonograph men I have known, not one in six knew how to set a knife.” Indeed, learning how to 
do it was a matter of embodied knowledge, needing “experience, nice judgment and a keen 
eye.”   38
By far the most damning mechanical limitation of the new phonograph, however, was its 
lack of a reliable power source, and it was the NAPC’s grappling with this problem that throws 
into greatest relief its situated-ness within concrete networks of infrastructure. Having deemed 
hand-power unreliable, the Graphophone interests mounted their machines on treadle-equipped 
sewing machine chassis and treadles powered some of Edison’s early Improved Phonographs as 
well. In some quarters the treadle machine was warmly received. Louis Glass of the Pacific 
Phonograph Company wrote Edison in March 1889 to inform him that “all our people here are 
greatly pleased with the treadle” and to express his belief “that we will have more call for these 
machines than those actuated by electric power.” Apparently, however, Edison thought of the 
treadle machine as a stopgap measure and shifted production over to battery-operated models as 
quickly as he could.  
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Domestic and commercial electrification, however, was still rare and these motors had to 
be powered by batteries. Dissatisfied with those then available, Edison developed his own 
primary cell, an improvement on an older design by Felix Lalande. In a primary cell, electricity 
is derived from the reaction of electrodes immersed in acid and once the latent energy in these 
components has been discharged, they must be tossed out and replaced. An NAPC price list from 
May 1889, listed components for the Edison battery ($7.25,) chromic acid (200 lbs for .30) and 
replacement zinc electrodes (.30.) Sub-companies complained bitterly about these prices and 
disputed Edison’s claim that they were good for 100 hours of work. Richard Townley Haines 
wrote North American to tell him that his had not even worked when brand new. He had set up 
the battery himself, being “careful in every way,” but had gotten only a half hour of electricity 
out of it before it went dead and “has not run since.” Edison had sent an employee out to set up 
the battery with even less luck, proof that “their not going is not due to want of cleaning or 
anything of the kind.” The New Jersey Phonograph Company informed Edison that “the batteries 
have not met their guarantee. They have both failed several times after use of not longer than 
three or four days.” Even the Edison General Electric Company of Harrison N.J. Expressed 
dissatisfaction with Edison’s batteries, which they were using to power 30 phonographs and a 
dozen clocks. Around the time they had re-charged their batteries with new acid, the company 
began experiencing “little troubles daily” and could ill-afford them as “it is a serious matter with 
us when we are stopped on the phonographs for two or three hours.”  
Most alarmingly, the primary cells demonstrated a tendency to leak acid and damage their 
surroundings. The Western Pennsylvania Phonograph Company informed The Phonogram that 
the firm had so much carpeting (presumably that of customers) ruined in this way that they 
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eventually placed their batteries in “a japanned pan, made similar to a bread pan.” The acid made 
quick work of these pans until the company started coating them with acid-proof paint obtained 
from a New York firm, thereby achieving “satisfactory results.” Similarly, the Colorado & Utah 
Company of Denver were especially distraught over the their customers’ failing batteries and 
wrote to North American to recount their travails. The company paid $26.50 to have two of the 
Edison-Lalande batteries delivered express, one arriving damaged and utterly useless and the 
other only working after 48 hours of preparation. The “good” one produced current for two and a 
half hours over the course of the next week before going dead entirely. The sub-company’s 
patrons were “disgusted” with this performance and returned the phonographs altogether, and the 
company despaired that “this hurts our reputation as others were waiting to see how this battery 
would work.”  39
The shortcomings of primary cell batteries weighed heavily on the industry, and in some 
cases, local companies even urged a renewed focus on treadle machines. In May of 1889 Henry 
Goodwin informed Edison that the batteries were so useless as to prevent him from even 
marketing the phonograph until an improved model was discovered. Until then he would like 
some of the Edison treadle machines. Louis Glass, who had earlier encouraged Edison to pursue 
treadle-power, grew irritated with Edison as it became clear his interest lay in battery power. 
Glass wrote to Edison, “You seem to disparage the use of treadle machines” and reminded him 
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that the Pacific Phonograph Company already had a large number of outstanding orders for 
treadle-powered phonographs. Most importantly, Glass emphasized the spatial limitations 
imposed on the trade by Edison’s neglect of the non-electrified machines. Many of his 
customers, he informed the inventor, were “parties who are located in the mountains of 
California where battery material would be unusually expensive and unless we could supply 
treadles, we would, in our opinion, be shut out of this territory.” As far as Edison was concerned, 
however, the treadle phonograph was a dead issue.   40
Another solution to the power problem lay in “storage cells,” the late nineteenth century’s 
version of a rechargeable battery. Most batteries were built as primary cells which could be 
recharged chemically with supplies sent through the mails. The cheapness of this method made 
primary cells convenient for the vast distances involved in many of the sub-companies’ 
territories. As we have seen, though, primary batteries, were dangerous and destructive, given to 
regular acid spills. Storage batteries—the very same employed to great effect by the Columbia 
Phonograph Company—spared users the effort (and risk) of handling battery acid but had to be 
recharged through one of four labor and time-intensive methods. Some customers (like those in 
Washington) entrusted the periodic recharging of their batteries to their local sub-company, but in 
those circumstances where this was impossible the battery could be taken to an “electric light” 
plant. A third option entailed shipping one’s batteries to out-of-town electric companies for re-
charging. While this option allowed the use of storage batteries in places far away from town, it 
was by far the most risky as batteries were regularly damaged in transit. The Ohio Phonograph 
 Wisconsin Phonograph Co and Henry D. Goodwin to North American Phonograph Co. [supplied or 40
conjectured], May 15, 1889 (TAED D8963); Pacific Phonograph Co and Louis Glass to Thomas Alva 
Edison, June 8, 1889 (TAED D8963).
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Company advised its colleagues, when shipping batteries to out-of-town clients to “put them in a 
crate, taking the handles off of the sides of the batteries and putting one handle on the top of the 
crate, so that the expressmen are not tempted to take hold of a side handle and tip the battery up 
and thus perhaps spill the acid which it contains.” On the other hand, two batteries shipped to the 
same address were best crated together rather than separate “as they are less likely, on account of 
their weight, to be thrown carelessly on their sides or handled improperly.” Finally, those 
phonograph users in the deepest pockets of geographic isolation re-charged their storage batteries 
with primary cells, capitalizing on the reliability of storage batteries while retaining the 
infrastructural independence (and hassle) of primary cells. In nearly all cases, the convenience 
and safety of storage batteries were purchased by local companies at a steep price. The necessity 
of re-charging storage cell batteries intensified the phonograph’s reliance on the notoriously 
untrustworthy material infrastructure surrounding the late nineteenth century phonograph 
industry. It increased sub-companies’ labor costs as well as the likelihood of infrastructure 
failure, eventualities sure to damage an already precarious profit margin.   41
All of the foregoing limitations of the phonograph pressed heavily on those sub-
companies whose far-flung networks of customers precluded regular maintenance, and under 
such circumstances broken down phonographs remained broken down for days or weeks. Of 
course, it was reasonable to expect phonograph lessees to perform some of the preventative 
maintenance and cleaning themselves. “The subscriber should,” argued the Western 
Pennsylvania Phonograph Company’s Henry F. Gilg, “make it a rule for his operator to keep the 
phonograph clean at all times, and to see that blank cylinders are at hand for dictation.” He 
 The Phonogram, October 1891, 218-219; The Phonogram, November-December 1891, 251.41
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conceded, however, that “even in the best regulated business houses the ‘tail sometimes wags the 
dog,’ and the operator will do as he pleases about the phonograph” in which case “the 
phonograph can never be shown as a perfect success.” Far away from the headquarters of the 
leasing company and with its representatives only occasionally darkening their office door, 
provincial phonograph renters were unlikely to take good care of their machines. At the same 
time, leaving too much of the upkeep to lessees might undermine the technology’s claims to save 
labor. In fall of 1891 one office manager allowed that “considering the time required to keep [the 
phonograph] clean and in order and the cylinders ready for use… I can better expedite my 
correspondence by direct dictation to the typewriter.” The lesson was clear: poorly maintained 
machines represented liabilities, not assets, and if the sub-companies wished to rent phonographs 
to businessmen, they would have to take care of much of the machines’ upkeep themselves. This 
was an impossibility outside of most urban areas. The geographic obstacles to the office 
phonograph industry were expressed plainly by a St. Louis lawyer: “the phonograph can not be 
successfully used at a place remote from the main office, except by one who is sufficiently expert 
to keep it in repair… ”  42
These obstacles hobbled not only the local companies, but also North American 
Phonograph itself, with debt and hard luck moving as if by capillary action from the provinces to 
 The Phonogram, June-July 1891, 136-137; The Phonogram, October, 1891, 220.42
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the corporate center.  To address these problems, North American moved in late 1890 to 43
abandon the “rental only” policy and begin selling phonographs and graphophones outright. At 
the local level, these sales would take rental machines off company books, pushing maintenance 
costs onto their new owners and allowing the sub-companies to charge for the endless rounds of 
maintenance, tune-ups, battery-charging and the like. Unfortunately, legal troubles brought the 
plan to a halt and North American was not able to carry on an unrestricted sale of phonographs 
and graphophones until 1892. By then it was too late. Through all of these setbacks North 
 At the national level the North American Phonograph Company also struggled to cope with the 43
demands of a geographically-expansive market and a bewildering number of market actors and 
transactions. As early as 1889, production delays set off financial dysfunction across the entire North 
American commercial network as local companies found themselves unable to generate revenue and pay 
bills. One of them, New York’s Metropolitan Phonograph Company, threatened the parent company with 
damages amounting to $10,000, before a cessation of production problems brought a timely end to the 
crisis. No sooner had the production shortages abated, however, than another problem altogether 
materialized. Lippincott had agreed to take from the American Graphophone Company a minimum of 
5000 graphophones every year but customers developed an overwhelming preference for Edison’s 
phonograph. By 1891, the imbalance between the two machines had reached a crisis stage with only 
sixty-five graphophones placed with customers against 2000 phonographs. American Graphophone 
agreed to release Lippincott from the obligation to purchase 5000 units a year, but only if he paid the 
royalty fee due on all undelivered graphophones. Thomas R. Lombard to Metcalf, James B Metcalf, 
March 6, 1889 (TAED D8962); Metropolitan Phonograph Co and James B. Metcalf to Jesse H. 
Lippincott, August 1, 1889 (TAED D8962); Jesse H. Lippincott to Metropolitan Phonograph Co. and 
James B Metcalf, August 9, 1889 (TAED D8962); Welch, Burt, Read, From Tinfoil to Stereo: The 
Acoustic Years of the Recording Industry, 1877-1929, 36; Wile, “The North American Phonograph 
Company: Part I (1888-1892),” 14-15.
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American hemorrhaged funds and the company only remained solvent because of generous 
infusions of capital from Lippincott’s own pocket.  44
When he died in April 1894, it signaled an end to his financial support of the company 
and the necessity for immediate action on the part of Edison who sought to regain control of his 
patents. In August of that year, he and three other North American bondholders called in the 
principal on their loans, a sum of $300,000, pushing the company into receivership and 
presenting Edison with the opportunity to buy the entire operation outright. After a protracted 
legal conflict between Edison and a handful of NAPC shareholders, the courts allowed the sale to 
proceed, and on February 8 1896 Edison formally bid on and won the assets of the NAPC. He 
then assigned them to a newly-created and un-creatively named entity called the National 
Phonograph Company, bringing an end to the great North American Phonograph Company, and 
with it, the second phase of the phonograph industry.  45
 Months before North American had concluded an agreement with Automatic, in which the former 44
promised to use its influence over the sub-companies to get the Automatic mechanism adopted across the 
country. Phonographs sold to the general public, however, could be used for anything, including public 
commercial use with one of Automatic’s competitors’ nickel-in-slot designs. This, said Automatic, 
represented an abrogation of their agreement with North American. The courts agreed and imposed a 
temporary injunction against sales which was extended to a permanent injunction a month later. After 
months of back-and-forth between the two companies Automatic consented to a limited sale of 1000 
machines in July of 1891. On condition that every machine thus circulated be fitted with a plate reading: 
“This machine constructed under U.S. Letters Patent as specified thereon, has been sold with the 
restriction that it is not to be used or exhibited in connection with any coin slot machine; the right to such 
use is expressly reserved to The North American Phonograph Company and its assigns; and also with the 
further restriction that said machine shall [be] used only within the State of _________, and a bill of sale 
shall contain among other things a reference to such provision.” Almost another year passed before 
Automatic was conciliated and the door was opened to unrestricted sale of phonographs and 
graphophones. Raymond R. Wile, “The North American Phonograph Company: Part I (1888-1892),” 
11-36; Raymond R. Wile, “The North American Phonograph Company: Part II (1893-1898)” Association 
for Recorded Sound Collections Journal 35, No. 2 (2004): 206-216; Sherburne Blake Eaton to Thomas 
Alva Edison, January 2, 1891 (TAED D9144).
 Wile, “The North American Phonograph Company: Part II (1893-1898),” 216-231.45
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Conclusion 
In a 1906 lecture before the Lowell Institute of Boston, philosopher and psychologist 
William James outlined a new conception of truth, one that drew on the era’s instrumentalist turn 
of mind and which challenge long-established and comfortable articles of epistemological faith:  
The possession of truth, so far from being an end in itself is only a preliminary means 
toward other vital satisfactions.... True ideas would never have been singled out as 
such, would never have acquired a class name, least of all a name suggesting value, 
unless they had been useful from the outset in this way .... Our account of truth is an 
account of truths in the plural, of processes of leading; realized in rebus, and having 
only this quality in common, that they pay. 
Truth, James tells us, is what pays. By saying as much, however, he never meant anything so 
crude as a conflation of what is true and what makes money. Rather, his was a general case for 
the instrumentality of belief. Still, James’ account of truth suggests a relationship between the 
pragmatism (and Pragmatism) of late nineteenth century thought and the psychology of the 
market. As Habermas has argued, the market has always represented a sphere of human activity 
peculiarly characterized by means-ends logic. It is not surprising, then, that as the mechanisms of 
corporate and consumer capitalism expanded into public and private life with breathtaking 
rapidity, some late nineteenth century thinkers considered seriously the possibility that all 
knowledge was instrumental.   46
At the exact historical moment that James and others were reconsidering the relationship 
between truth and utility, agents of the North American Phonograph Company and its 
subsidiaries were working unsuccessfully to wring profit from the office phonograph business 
model. Their failure to make it pay— especially in the hyper-instrumental intellectual milieu of 
 William James, “Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth,” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and 46
Scientific Methods 4, No. 6 (1907): 148; Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action 
(London: Heinemann Educational, 1984).
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the late nineteenth century— exercised a profound influence on the viability of the truth claims 
associated with that business model. Thinking of phonographs as sonic scribes was economically 
unprofitable, so it was also psychologically unsustainable. The mechanics of this reciprocal 
relationship are two-fold. Most obviously phonograph capitalists were themselves more likely to 
commit themselves to sonic ontologies whose implications for the phonograph proved more 
rather than less remunerative. But profit and un-profit exercised another systemic and largely 
hidden influence over the range of imaginable possibilities within nineteenth century American 
culture. Because office phonographs could not generate sufficient revenue they soon disappeared 
from social reality taking the metaphysics of sonic textuality with them. Edison and others might 
(and did) cling to the conviction that the phonograph was properly destined for dictation 
purposes. The social efficacy of that idea remained fettered by its unprofitability, however, and 
like the phonograph-as-talking-machine before it, disappeared from the fund of imaginable 
ontologies for the technology of sound recording.  
The death of the sonic scribe was a necessary precondition for the birth of sonic 
modernity. Like the phonograph-as-talking machine before it, the phonograph-as-sonic-scribe 
gave wide berth to the idea that the sound recording apparatus was itself an agent. Sonic scribes 
were active participants in the transmission of recorded sounds, literally writing them down and 
then reading them aloud for the benefit of human users. Sonic modernity, as we will see, evolved 
after 1900 and consistently occluded the role of machines and human labor in facilitating 
phonographic playback. It presented media and commerce as passive conduits for sonic events 
which happened elsewhere and at other times, and forwarded the recorded subject as the locus of 
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agency. It purported to provide unmediated access to the lives and labor of distant people in a 
way the sonic scribe did and could not. 
Another key difference between the sonic scribe and the later paradigm of sonic 
modernity lay in these paradigms’ effects on existing social structures. The sonic scribe absorbed 
and even intensified tendencies already at play in the deployment and management of human 
labor, contributing, for example, to the ongoing project of separating “hand work” from “brain 
work.” It also facilitated the gendering of space and of labor within the office, drawing on and, in 
turn, reaffirming and strengthening the assumptions on which those distinctions were built. The 
sonic scribe’s compatibility with existing forms of social organization lay in sharp contrast to the 
protean, consumption-oriented patterns of identification which sonic modernity encouraged 
beginning after 1900. While arguments for the liberatory potential of popular culture have nearly 
certainly been oversold, it is also the case that under the regime of sonic modernity, interactions 
with recorded sound have contributed to the rise of a protean subjectivity unimaginable from the 
vantage point of the late nineteenth century.  
By the late 1890s nearly all industry participants had abandoned their unprofitable 
preoccupation with phonographic dictation and had moved to cash in on the application of sound 
recording to a new kind of commercial amusement— the coin-in-slot phonograph. In the next 
chapter, we turn to the evolution of this, the third phase of the phonograph industry. We pay 
particular attention to how this business model, like those preceding it, implicated the 
phonograph in new infrastructures of human and mechanical agents and how these 
infrastructures, in turn, represented new contexts in which subjects had to make sense of the 
phonograph and its labors. Concretely, the advent of the coin-slot phonograph business model 
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brought in its train a novel set of relationships later generations came to call a “recording 
industry.” As the coin-slot phonograph business model coalesced in the 1890s, however, subjects 
had not yet fully abandoned the textual biases in their understandings of sound. In this context, 
understandings of the centralized production and distribution of recorded sounds undertaken by 
this new recording industry borrowed liberally from an earlier moment in the evolution of mass 
media. The phonograph became a sonic printing press.  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 CHAPTER III 
  
The Sonic Printing Press 
Beginning in the late 1880s, something like a “recording industry” coalesced in the 
United States, with firms of various sizes producing records of sound and distributing them 
nationally. Profound differences existed, however, between the structure of that recording 
industry and the one which eventually emerged after 1900. These differences in technology and 
commerce, furthermore, came entangled with different conceptions of recorded sound. In the 
twentieth century audiences came to understand their favorite recordings as moments captured in 
time— pieces of the artist’s personality, soul, or essence sealed in wax. According to this 
understanding, the singer or instrumentalist is an author. In the recording studio, he or she creates 
something indelibly unique and noteworthy— something giving listeners access to the time, 
labor, personality, and sociability of another human being. A twentieth century consumer, for 
example, would not likely disregard a Beatles recording on the grounds that he already owned a 
record of the same song by Chuck Berry. Purchasers (and manufacturers) of the earliest musical 
recordings, however, did generally think in such terms. Drawing on earlier discourses of the 
sovereignty of the “musical work,” they assessed recordings in terms that emphasized the text, 
melody and the harmony of the song itself, and they expected the singer or instrumentalist to 
render these pre-existing works with virtuosic accuracy. The recorded subject appeared to these 
audiences, not as a sovereign author of a moment in time, but as a publisher, mass-reproducing a 
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musical text. And one excellent rendition of “Roll Over Beethoven,” they would tell us, is 
enough for anyone. It is easy to overstate the prevalence of this discourse. Elements of 
“personality” began creeping into discussion of recordings almost from the beginning, especially 
as regards comedic songs and character sketches. At the same time, the “talking machine” trope 
of the 1870s and 1880s persisted throughout this era as well and even into the 20th Century. The 
transformation under investigation here is subtle. It is one of emphasis and it takes place over 
several decades.   1
In this chapter, we sketch the industrial and commercial relationships which formed the 
basis of the first recording industry, and examine the connections between it and contemporary 
understandings of recording and records. Through the 1890s phonograph makers, sellers and 
boosters shifted their aspirations from building an industry founded on “serious” business 
applications to one embracing amusement as the primary role for recorded sound. This 
undertaking, however, involved more than marketing and selling machines to another, less 
serious, variety of sound consumer. It required a wholesale reorganization of the industry, and the 
perfection of a new species of “manufacturing”— that of musical records. Owing in part to the 
peculiarities of the technologies, processes and relationships mobilized in early recording 
industry, the manufacture and sale of recordings remained a competitive arena throughout the 
1890s. These circumstances pushed recording companies to thrust themselves forward into 
discussions of recording for two reasons. First, in competitive markets, branding is central to 
viability. If one’s competitors market a more-or-less identical commodity to one’s own (say, a 
recording of a given singer singing a specific song), then, it is crucial that the public can identify 
 For more on the evolution of the idea of musical works see Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of 1
Musical Works: an Essay In the Philosophy of Music. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
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your brand and know to ask for it by name. Secondly, competitive circumstances meant that 
small (and sometimes disreputable) concerns could survive in the recording industry while 
economies of scale laid waste to their counterparts in other industries. While this was good news 
for the “mom and pops” of the record business, it also meant a less legible commercial 
environment—one characterized by anonymity where recordings’ origins and quality were 
always suspect and where the pervasive anxieties of nineteenth century capitalism were given 
fertile soil in which to grow. Because of this, a company’s prestige and industrial acumen 
mattered greatly in consumers’ estimation of their sound recordings.  
Finally, a word about “consumer” as the term works in the context of this chapter. In the 
1890s record companies did not generally market their wares toward the general public. Because 
the home phonograph remained relatively rare until the very end of the decade, purchases of 
phonograph records were overwhelmingly made by the proprietors of phonograph arcades and 
exhibitions. The concerns of middlemen, merchants, and jobbers, then, are those that dominated 
talk of recording. In some measure the discursive evolutions which took place in the years 
around 1900 stem from a change of audience in the extant documentation. As the market for 
recorded sound evolved toward a more single-minded orientation to the “final consumer,” 
manufacturers jettisoned advertising language emphasizing industrial processes for that 
emphasizing refinement, culture, and transcendence. But this change of focus mapped onto wider 
cultural currents, marking the ascendancy of a new consumerist ethos. It is not merely the case 
that the existing documentation reflects the interests of one class and, then later, another, but 
rather, that the dominant tropes of society at large came increasingly to reflect the interests and 
anxieties of consumers rather than those of producers and distributors.  
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Coin Slot Machines 
When Edison returned to work on the phonograph in 1887, one of the very first 
applications to which his mind turned was that of automated exhibition. Albert T. Keller, an 
employee of Edison’s associate, Ezra Gilliland, had developed a coin-in-slot mechanism for the 
new talking machine, but with the sale of the Edison rights to North American, the attention of 
all had turned squarely toward business applications. The company had operated for scarcely a 
year, however, when the systemic shortcomings of the office phonograph business model pushed 
North American’s local companies to seek alternative sources for income. When North American 
signaled that it would allow its local subsidiaries to pursue nickel-in-slot exhibition, Keller 
resumed work on his mechanism, perfecting it and selling the rights to the nascent Automatic 
Phonograph Exhibition Company of New York, which was incorporated on February 9, 1890. 
Automatic’s connections with Ezra T. Gilliland and Charles Cheever— both Edison associates 
whom the inventor had come to suspect of shady dealings— worried heads at Menlo Park, and 
Edison anxiously sought to box them out of the market. He directed his personal secretary Alfred 
O. Tate to inform all of the local phonograph companies that “in the course of a month I shall be 
able to furnish nickel in slot attachment at factory prices, and they need not pay large price to 
outside parties, if they desire such a device.” At first Edison had hoped to have Lippincott use his 
influence over the local companies to prohibit dealings with Automatic. When this strategy 
failed, he sought—and was awarded— a manufacturing contract for Automatic’s coin-slot 
mechanisms. The Automatic Company, however, believed they were vulnerable to lawsuit, and 
the agreement may have only been a measure to conciliate Edison. They continued to produce 
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and market nickel-in-slot mechanisms while Edison worked on a prototype, at least one version 
of which they rejected as unworkable.   2
Meanwhile, other firms stepped forward to try their hand at nickel-in-slot machines. In 
the summer of 1890, the Denver Phonograph Company announced that it had developed a 
workable coin-in-slot mechanism and were besieged with letters of inquiry by their cash-
strapped colleagues. The Hartford Model Company of Connecticut developed a coin-slot 
mechanism in the fall and about the same time, the Nebraska Phonograph Company began 
marketing an improvement facilitating multiple hearing tubes on coin-in-slot machines—each 
set, of course, requiring another nickel to work. Within a year, even the poor Texas Phonograph 
Company had a model to offer.   3
The exhibition trade lay at the origins of the phonograph industry in the late 1870s and 
traveling talking machine exhibitions formed an important part of the economy of recorded 
sound well into the twentieth century. But the advent of the coin-in-slot phonograph in the 1890s 
The Automatic Phonograph Company also signed an agreement with Louis Glass of the Pacific 2
Phonograph Company who had earlier developed a working (and profitable) nickel-in-slot machine on the 
west coast. The Washington Post, Feb 10, 1890, 1; Thomas Alva Edison to Alfred Ord Tate-- Telegrams 
and Cables, February 13, 1890, (TAEM D9052AAA); Alfred Ord Tate [supplied or conjectured] to 
Thomas Alva Edison, October 17, 1890 (TAEM D9052AAG1); Felix Gottschalk to Thomas Alva Edison, 
December 3, 1890 (TAEM D9052ABC). See also Raymond Wile, “The Automatic Phonograph 
Exhibition Company and the Beginnings of the Nickel-in-the-Slot Phonograph,” Association for 
Recorded Sound Collections Journal 33, No. 1 (spring 2002). 
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October 13, 1890, (TAEM D9059AAS2); The Phonogram, February 1891, 52.
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provided an automated (and lucrative) outlet for recorded sound. Here as elsewhere, specific 
conjunctures of commerce and technology shaped the subjective experience of recorded sound, 
and contributed to an overall vision of what it is that happens when one puts the “needle in the 
groove.” In the case of the coin-in-slot phonograph, the most salient aspect of this overall vision 
lay in a cluster of anxieties about the technology’s disregard for foundational social boundaries. 
Sound, much like the leveling tendency of the price mechanism itself, invisibly colonizes spaces 
and like the Greeks who ceremonially cordoned off the agora to rein in its invisible corrosion of 
established order, the men and women of the 1890s sometimes took measures to control the 
“externalities” of their neighbors’ phonograph consumption. On the other hand, spaces of 
phonograph consumption themselves upset distinctions between public and private, and self and 
other. 
It is common to speak of the shift in phonograph industry marketing in the 1890s as one 
driven entirely by demand. In this understanding, consumers did not want phonographs for 
dictation, but they did want phonographs for amusement. Perspicacious men of means read this 
writing on the wall and acted on it. This telling avoids a naive belief in the power of industry 
insiders to “force” their wares on an unwilling public. But in itself, it ignores basic insights of 
economic science and in doing so, makes a travesty of cultural history. There is a decidedly 
“supply side” undercurrent to this story. However much the American public would have liked 
talking machines to sing songs for them or to tell them jokes, their desire would have remained 
un-sated were it not for a conducive set of commercial, mechanical and social technologies. The 
amusement phonograph had to be profitable for it to command the attention of men of means, 
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and profitability relied on a raft of considerations outside the inherent attractiveness of the 
phonograph itself.  
First, the economic logics at play in the coin-op business proved more promising for the 
“amusement” trade than for office rentals. The most important difference between the office 
phonograph and amusement phonograph businesses obtained in the structures of commercial 
relationships created under each system. The business phonograph served at the pleasure of 
skeptical office managers, keen to wring their $40 a year worth of goods and services from the 
company. The sub-company was already on the hook for maintenance and repairs, so no 
incentive existed for lessees to take care of the phonograph. Even worse, the device was often 
placed under the care of the office stenographer, for whom its success was a decidedly 
uncomfortable possibility. Conversely, the amusement phonograph produced profit directly and 
could therefore be kept "in house.” Under those circumstances, the mechanism need only draw 
enough nickels to pay its upkeep and the parent company’s rental fee of $20.  
In addition to these conducive economic considerations, the nickel-in-slot phonograph 
also avoided altogether some of the technological and logistical problems confronted in office 
use. As we have seen, the business phonographs of the 1890s were delicate in the extreme, 
needing constant tuning-up and cleaning and re-charging. But coin-in-slot phonographs were not 
intended for recording and therefore did not produce the mechanism-wrecking wax dust or 
shavings of the office phonograph. These machines were for “playback” only. Because of this 
narrowed range of users’ engagements, access to the mechanism was unnecessary and, in fact, 
represented a liability. Coin-in-slot phonographs, were placed in cabinets, shielding them from 
the curious (or malicious) tinkering of the general public. Thus “black boxed,” the amusement 
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phonograph required substantially less upkeep than its business phonograph counterpart. 
Capitalizing on the nickel-in-slot model, firms like the Spokane Phonograph Company of 
Washington managed to wring profit from a far-flung fleet of phonographs, surpassing anything 
feasible in the office dictation business. When fire gutted the company’s headquarters and most 
of Spokane Falls in 1889 North American sent out expert J.W. Wilson to help get the company 
on its feet. The young mechanic did just that, fixing up the company's four remaining 
phonographs and placing them in popular resort areas in the territory. Making headway against 
the company's debts, he ordered more phonographs from out east and "then placed machines in 
the mining towns of Cœur d’Alene, Wallace, and Wardner, in Idaho and shortly thereafter in 
Moscow, Walla Walla, Dayton, Pomeroy, and Colfax.” In Wilson's case a generous 
apportionment of mechanical ingenuity contributed to his ability to overcome distance, and he 
habitually shored up the intransigent human and non-human elements of his infrastructure with 
technological workarounds. The storage cell batteries used to power the company's phonographs 
required periodic shipment to Spokane for recharging. To reduce these costs, Wilson inaugurated 
a policy of shipping with every storage battery a galvanic cell capable of keeping it charged for 
six months. Wilson faced "another trouble and source of considerable annoyance" in "the 
persistent and pernicious practice of slugging"-- the use of fake coins to cheat the phonograph. 
These "slugs" sometimes amounted to 25 to 30 percent of a machine's take and often jammed the 
mechanism up, preventing its operation for legitimate customers. To combat this variety of 
mischief, Wilson developed a "patent slug ejector" and after installing them on the Spokane 
Company's machines reported a 100 percent decrease in slugs. Wilson's most interesting 
innovation, though, belonged to the realm of discipline and surveillance. Though he had placed 
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his phonographs "in the hands of responsible agents" the weaknesses of the flesh invariably 
worked on these agents’ minds. To discourage the inevitable temptation to pilfer, Wilson 
developed an automatic register that recorded every nickel placed into the machine. With the 
register dutifully recording the phonograph's take, he could trust the agents to empty the 
phonograph's coin box without skimming.   4
While the closed nature of the nickel-in-slot mechanism—particularly when bolstered 
with new innovations— allowed it to labor semi-autonomously in the provinces, rural exhibition 
remained far from a “sure thing.” In an 1891 article for the Phonogram, “a local agent” wrote 
that “the question as to the practicability of placing the phonograph in small towns is, apparently, 
not yet settled.” While allowing that “the small country places present a field (ripe with nickels) 
for the phonograph agents to work in with their slot cases,” he cautioned that “the proper place 
for gathering the harvest does not seem to have been discovered.” In 1891, August Sampson of 
the New England Phonograph Company reported that his fifty coin-slot phonographs were 
“reaping a harvest,” and that this was the case “especially in the country towns.” Several months 
later, however, it was revealed that much of the company’s extra-urban success had not occurred 
in lonely rural whistle-stops, but in seaside resort towns. They had so infiltrated the public areas 
of “The Pines, Nantucket Beach, Downer’s Landing, “Willows,” and numerous other places,” 
said the Phonogram, “that the New England beaches fairly ring with melody…” Many of the 
local companies resisted altogether the impulse to invade the American hinterland with coin-slot 
phonographs. The Louisiana Phonograph Company shrewdly avoided spreading themselves thin 
through their territory, and instead leased phonographs to independent exhibitors in the areas 
 Phonogram, June 1891, 140-141.4
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outside of New Orleans. The Georgia Phonograph Company and the Missouri Phonograph 
Company also pursued policies of renting out coin-in-slot machines in territories outside of their 
immediate metropolitan infrastructures. This policy, in short, allowed local companies to offset 
onto intermediary parties the expense and risk of operating the phonograph, while collecting a 
steady revenue all the same.   5
Where the nickel-in-slot business truly paid dividends, however, was in those areas where 
the robustness of the mechanism combined with the efficiencies of urban density. By the summer 
of 1891, for example, the Missouri Phonograph Company had placed somewhere between fifty 
and one hundred phonographs in the “large saloons and restaurants” of its territory, and several 
of them regularly netted $100 or more a week. The company employed two operatives to visit 
the machines twice daily, fixing any mechanical problems that may arise, emptying their coin 
vaults and changing out records. Columbia’s 140 coin-slot phonographs were employed 
“principally in Washington and Baltimore,” while the Manhattan Phonograph Company’s urban 
coin-slot machines proved so profitable, that by 1896 the firm was willing to pay $1000 per 
annum to the Union Ferry Company for the privilege of placing its machines in their ferry 
houses. The Louisiana Phonograph Company, however, represented one of the most successful 
of the sub-companies engaging in the coin-slot business in the 1890s. Just as Columbia had done 
for the office phonograph business, the Louisiana Company brought an enormous amount of 
company discipline to bear on the problem of space and intransigent mechanism. While a natural 
inclination existed to place “automatic” phonographs by the score, the Louisiana Company 
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resolved that “comparatively few machines should be placed in the city on public exhibition.” 
Further, “such a close watch should be kept upon the machines that the disgust and loss of 
prestige, consequent upon failure to operate, should be avoided.” To achieve this high level of 
maintenance, the company employed highly-competent inspectors and each was assigned fewer 
than ten machines, though they were personally accountable for the sound operation and 
profitability of each of those machines.   6
Since any given office seldom had use for more than a pair of phonographs, the local 
companies had devoted enormous amounts of time and money to servicing their widely-
dispersed business phonographs. The advent of the nickel-in-slot phonograph, however, allowed 
the local companies to do something new. The local companies could now place machines in 
larger groupings, driving down the cost of maintenance and “customer service.” While exhibiting 
at a fair in Dallas, the Texas Phonograph Company discovered that “the most successful manner 
of conducting the exhibit at an occasion like that, to be, to group the machines and have one or 
two assistants when the crowd was greatest to watch machines, make change, and otherwise 
accommodate the visitors.” Where circumstances allowed (which was very seldom in places like 
Texas) phonograph companies soon capitalized on these economies of scale, placing together a 
dozen coin-in-slot phonographs or more, pioneering that late nineteenth century forerunner of the 
movie theater— the “phonograph parlor.” The Ohio Phonograph Company opened what might 
have been the first such parlor in Cleveland on September 15, 1890, and followed it with another 
in Cincinnati’s Emery Arcade six weeks later. Very often, and especially on weekends and 
holidays, these rooms were filled to capacity as the public thronged to hear each parlor’s twelve 
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coin-in-slot phonographs playing popular selections. The managers of the Louisiana Phonograph 
Company also took notice of the Ohioans success with phonograph parlors. Though they were 
raking in profits from their own nickel-in-slot machines dispersed through New Orleans, they 
admitted in a letter "the best way of exhibiting the phonograph for profit is to do as the Ohio 
Phonograph Company has done…Have a large parlor fitted up, with fifteen or twenty nickel-in-
the-slot machines, and have a polite and gentlemanly attendant to assist, and make change for its 
patrons." In fact it had only been the “utter impossibility of securing a suitable location,” which 
had prevented them from establishing their own parlor in New Orleans rather than pursuing their 
present course.  7
For all its benefit, the coin-slot business had its detractors and well-positioned voices 
within the industry immediately recognized the automatic phonograph as a threat to the trade’s 
ascendancy to respectability. In January 1891, the Phonogram ran un attributed piece called “An 
Important Suggestion,” cautioning the local companies against the coin-slot trade: 
I have always been of the opinion that the exhibition of the phonograph for amusement 
purposes was liable to create a wrong impression in the minds of the public as to its 
actual merits for other purposes… those companies who fail to take advantage of every 
opportunity of pushing the legitimate side of their business, relying only upon the profits 
derived from the “coin-in-the-slot,” will find too late that they have made a fatal 
mistake. I think, also, that the “coin-in-the-slot” device is calculated to injure the 
phonograph in the opinion of those seeing it only in that form, as it has the appearance 
of being nothing more than a mere toy, and no one would comprehend its value or 
appreciate its utility as an aid to business men and others for dictation purposes when 
seeing it only in that form… 
But the coin-slot phonograph had its supporters as well. In a Phonogram article entitled “The 
Nickel-in-the-Slot Machine Defended,” W. Conyngton rejected the logic of “respectability 
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economics,” juxtaposing the ambiguous financial calculus supporting the “office phonograph” 
with the “bird in the hand” certainty of the coin-operated phonograph. The piece narrates a 
conversation between a business phonograph and its amusement trade counterpart. After 
conceding that amusement phonographs now purveyed some of the best music available, the 
business phonograph insisted “still it is acknowledged that business is our chief use, and your 
work… has a tendency to cause people to regard the phonograph as a mere toy, with no practical 
application in the real business of the world.” The amusement phonograph calls the business 
phonograph’s bluff and asks him “how much have you earned to-day for the frail bundles of 
flesh and bone for whom we work?” “Just how much I cannot tell” the dignified office machine 
responded, “but in a single letter references were made that may result in gains of hundreds of 
dollars, while other letters were of much importance, and may secure large profits.” The 
amusement phonograph pressed his case: “these letters could have been taken by a stenographer, 
and by your own admission you cannot tell just what they will result in… To-day I have taken in 
fourteen dollars, thirty-five cents. Its seems to me this is a very practical application of the 
phonograph, and a decidedly business one to boot. I earn money absolutely, while you only aid 
in business operations that would be carried on had there never been a phonograph under 
heaven’s broad canopy.”   8
The Coin-Slot Phonograph and its Public 
In the 1890s, the coin-in-slot phonograph served as the most conspicuous representation 
of the recording industry and would have been the form of recorded sound most familiar to the 
public-at-large. Early experiences of the coin-in-slot phonograph are difficult to excavate, and 
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one of the few extant “first-hand” accounts comes to us by way of fiction. In Charles Stevens’s 
Uncle Jeremiah and Family at the Great Fair, a Midwestern farmer and his family travel to the 
1893 Columbian Exhibition where, in addition to a great many other adventures, they find 
themselves in the phonograph gallery of the Manufacturers and Liberal Arts Building. The 
episode (like the rest of the work) trades in stereotypes of rural naivety, and for this reason must 
be read carefully. All the same Stevens’ own preoccupations and assumptions peek through the 
interstices of the text: 
Some nickles[sic] were soon in the slots and the family for the first time listening to music 
coming from some where by singers unseen. Johnny had a face covered with smiles as he listened 
to some loud-mouthed artist singing “Throw him down McClosky.” Between each verse Johnny 
told the boy who stood in open-mouthed wonder near him that the “feller is a singer from way 
back.” He could not realize that he was not in a concert hall and that all standing about were not 
hearing what he heard. When the music ceased and he withdrew the tubes from his ears he said to 
the boy, “Wasn’t that out of sight?” “Sure and out of my hearing too, but I guess I got a 
nickle[sic] to try it on” and his nickle[sic] disappeared in the slot and the unwearied singer hid 
away in the machine told again his story of the great fight.” 
True, the recording represents to Johnny (and Stevens) a “loud-mouthed singer”— not a 
performance by a talking machine— but the singer remains anonymous. The indeterminacy of 
phonographic identity is re-emphasized when Jeremiah removes his hearing tubes and is crying. 
He explains to his granddaughter: “Well, you see, I heard something I used to hear long time ago, 
and I couldn’t tell just who was a singin’ it to me. It was some woman, though, and I let myself 
think it was somebody else, and I was a thankin’ God for lettin’ me hear her once more.” Uncle 
Jeremiah has imagined that the singer is his deceased daughter Mary.   9
Another theme reiterated through the excerpt is that of the strange interiority created by 
the phonograph’s hearing tubes. Johnny converses with the boy next to him as though both can 
hear the recording pouring from the hearing tubes because he forgets he is “not in a concert hall 
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and that all standing about were not hearing what he heard.” The account, of course, draws on a 
long American narrative tradition about country rubes’ engagement with popular culture— from 
backwoodsmen threatening to throttle theatrical villains to moviegoing farmers’ fear of 
oncoming locomotives. But Stevens does draw on a collective experience, an impulse apparent 
to anyone who has ever accidentally yelled to overcome the din created by one’s own earbuds, to 
reflexively treat sound as a collective phenomenon. Uncle Jeremiah’s emotional reaction to the 
phonograph also suggests a break with the continuity of collective experience, as he believes that 
the voice he hears is his daughter, singing to him. Like an Old Testament prophet, eyes fixed in 
ecstatic rapture, Jeremiah has been momentarily separated from the mass of humanity and 
spoken to. He weeps and thanks God for the experience.  
This experience of an enforced interiority would have been particularly jarring in the 
context of the phonograph parlor. An undated photograph [Figure 1] held by the Edison National 
Historical Site depicts a somewhat cavernous looking room where a dozen or more tall cabinet 
nickel-in-slot machines are stood against the walls. One is struck by the publicness of the room. 
Close to twenty people pose for the camera, the majority of them connected to a phonograph 
cabinet by a pair of rubber listening tubes. The crowd is predominately male, though a number of 
women are in attendance. Similarly, most of the subjects in the photograph appear in middle 
class attire, but several are more than likely working class. Especially given the implied 
domesticity of the “parlor” (with its carpeted floors, and framed portraits, and ornamentally-
plastered ceilings) the promiscuous mixing of strangers must have struck contemporaries as 
incongruous. The sensory isolation enforced by the hearing tubes may have made the social 
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promiscuity of these spaces particularly unnerving as one could not hear the approach of a 
stranger.   10
Stevens’s account of the Columbian Exhibition also draws into focus the mercenary logic 
of the coin-in-slot business as first the family and then Johnny’s unnamed interlocutor place their 
“nickles” into the mechanisms. But there is evidence that such tawdry business of collecting the 
spare change of passersby fit poorly with the industry’s preferred self-presentation. In November, 
1896, the Phonoscope offered an illustration [Figure 2] and article describing the ideal coin-op 
parlor (which by now featured Edison’s moving picture mechanism, the kinetoscope, in addition 
to phonographs.) “In all exhibitions,” the article begins, “the neater and the more attractive the 
show, the greater is also the financial success.” This rule of thumb, said the Phonoscope, is even 
more important in the exhibition of phonographs and kinetoscopes, “where it is desired to attract 
all classes of society, even the most fastidious.” The parlor depicted in the attached illustration 
presents a thoroughly bourgeois space. Attendees perambulate about the room on a runner carpet, 
laid over a polished (marble?) floor and potted plants sit atop Greek pedestals and fold their 
fronds against wainscoted walls. All are very smartly dressed, including the pair of attendants 
who tend the ten coin-slot machines at the center of the room. Curiously, a brass or wooden rail 
encircles the outward facing machines, cordoning off a space of mechanism and coin from the 
milieu of refinement and consumption without. All told, the phonograph parlor depicted here 
evokes the bourgeois valorization of transcendence. It is a space that denies the material, 
economic, and social foundations of its own existence, in favor of a vision of the Victorian Parlor 
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made “public.” Everyone is (upper) middle class and women outnumber men (discounting the 
quarantined attendants) three to two.   11
If the phonograph parlor represented the avant garde of a new hedonistic (yet still 
refined) culture, in reality it also still bore the tool-marks of work and industry and very seldom 
presented the image of transcendence prescribed by the Phonoscope. In Figure 1, the 
phonographs are nearly indistinguishable from one another, save for the written placards placed 
over each machine announcing the musical selection it contains. They suggest industrial 
production, both in the commodity-esque indistinguishability of their appearance, but also in 
their arrangement around the room like presses in a workshop. Covering the floor, a shoddily lain 
carpet—covered with stains from acid spills and shoes— bears the evidence of machines and 
workmen, giving the lie to Victorian connotations of the “parlor.” Edison presides over the scene 
by way of a photographic portrait hanging on the otherwise barren walls of the room, a fitting 
patron saint (with his preference for perspiration over inspiration) for this most sober and 
mechanical of carnivals. A depiction of Edison appears, as well, in the Phonoscope’s ideal parlor 
but here, the plebeian medium of photography has been spurned for a marble bust of the Wizard, 
who has also doffed his jacket and tie in favor of evening wear.  
A second photograph [Figure 3] held by the Edison National Historic Site evidences 
much the same tone in its depiction of a phonograph parlor in Longport, New Jersey. Around 
fifteen nickel-in-slot phonographs ring the room and stand atop a similarly filthy, though 
uncarpeted, floor. Like the first photograph the second image comes suffused with an attitude 
toward amusement anchored in the optics of economic reality but if the first image suggested 
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industrial dreariness, the New Jersey parlor reflects a transient and dynamic commercial space. 
The room is longer than the first phonograph parlor and may even be open at both ends reflecting 
a kind of expanded “hallway.” Large black letters on the left wall announce “Pennsylvania 
Railroad Time Tables,” suggesting that the men and women who plied the room’s bare 
floorboards were likely “passing through,” possibly stopping in Longport for a seaside respite. 
The mercenary and commercial nature of the amusement on offer is kept in constant sight by 
placards reading “ATTENDANT IN CHARGE WILL PROVIDE CHANGE.” At least seven of 
these notices festoon the beaded walls of the parlor, encouraging patrons to keep the exchange of 
coin for sound rolling along with the uninterrupted efficiency of the railroad.  12
The Anxieties of Buying and Selling Sound 
Among industry personnel as well as the public at large, phonograph parlors spurred 
anxious comment ranging from worries about getting one’s “money’s worth” to concerns over 
the phonograph’s possible health effects. Abstractly, these apprehensions grew out of two closely 
related aspects of the parlor’s status as a commercialized and industrialized space. First, the 
interactions and transactions one entered into as a phonograph patron were profoundly 
anonymous, and as such, encouraged many of the same kinds of anxieties precipitated by the 
wider ascendance of urbanization and market relations. Secondly, the phonograph and the 
phonograph parlor violated boundaries foundational to the bourgeois worldview— some more 
“ancient” than others. Like its anonymity, the phonograph parlor’s transgression of boundaries 
grew partially out of its role as a thoroughly commercialized space, but it also came about 
because of characteristics peculiar to the trade and its technology.  
 Image provided by Thomas Edison, National Historical Park.12
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The problems presented by phonograph parlors were sometimes quite mundane. For a 
great many of those committing nickels to the phonograph, for example, the investment was not 
a negligible one and it often came with none of the assurances of a yearly rental. One local agent 
wrote that “a good machine is an absolute necessity in a town or village, as country-people think 
more of a nickel than city folks.” Should a phonograph take their nickel and give nothing in 
return, “even once,” he predicted, “it is doubtful if they would ever risk another.” Even in urban 
areas, however, the public evidenced little patience for unreliable machines. Commenting on the 
Ohio Phonograph Company’s experience with the coin-slot phonograph, the Phonogram 
announced that “one secret of the great success of these Arcade parlors lies in the fact that 
persons always get a good return for their nickels, as the cylinders are kept in adjustment by the 
attendant, the automatic machinery is well looked after, and there is plenty of change to be had in 
the shape of nickels, a supply being always ready when asked for.” The consequences of 
violating the sacred trust between seller and buyer could be draconian for phonographs. When a 
phonograph cheated a man in Peak’s Island, Maine, he “smashed the deceitful phonograph into 
bits to recover his money.” “Nickels” noted the Wichita Daily Eagle dryly, “are highly esteemed 
in the outlying neighborhoods of Portland.” The “point of sale” was just as anxious for the 
industry, owing to the public’s penchant for cheating nickel-in-slot machines. In March, 1892, 
detectives for the Edison Phonograph Company of New York tracked down three “crooks” in 
New Haven Connecticut who had been manufacturing fake nickels for the purpose of cheating 
coin-in-slot phonographs. Similarly, in Leavenworth, Kansas, a young coal miner had a “circus 
all to himself” with the coin-slot phonographs thanks to a pocketful of fake nickels. The fun was 
cut short when he was caught by the phonograph company manager, who summarily handed him 
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over to the police. Whether a “seller” or a “buyer,” transacting business by way of the coin-slot 
phonograph was disconcertingly anonymous.   13
Anonymity, however, characterized the phonograph trade at many junctures besides the 
fateful dropping of change into the slot. The phonograph parlor itself, owing to its traffic in 
anonymous persons, could serve as a conduit for criminal enterprises. Such was the (alleged) 
case when one of the employees of Tally’s Phonograph Parlor in Los Angeles found himself 
accused of receiving stolen property from Harry Croft, “the diminutive boy burglar.” Even 
acquiring a phonograph slot machine could be a fraught undertaking. In December of 1898, the 
Phonoscope reported that “Baron and Baroness de Bara” had been apprehended in St. Augustine, 
Florida, and were being charged with “using the United States mails in an alleged scheme to 
defraud.” Setting up office in Chicago the year before, the couple advertised non-existent nickel-
in-slot machines in English and Scottish newspapers, promising very favorable terms in 
exchange for a share of the proceeds. Would-be phonograph moguls had only to send along a 
deposit and wait for their machines. The machines never came, and it was estimated that the 
perpetrators had taken in over $50,000 in deposits. Several months later, it was reported that 
Edison himself had provided much of the impetus for the arrest and his motivation for doing so 
sheds light on his own anxieties regarding the murky optics of the phonograph infrastructure. 
The criminals, it turns out, had operated under the name the “Edison Phonograph Company” and 
the inventor “bothered by the actions of irresponsible persons who organized Edison ‘companies’ 
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or established themselves as ‘agents’ of the inventor without authority” resolved to make an 
example of the Baron and Baroness.   14
Anonymity, however pervasive, represented only one-half of the causes for public 
distrust of the phonograph parlor. Closely related to the anonymity of commercial amusements 
was the persistent tendency for these new institutions to disrupt long-established and 
foundational social boundaries. This included, as we have seen, the boundary between the 
“public” and “private” as well as the gender and class boundaries implied in those two spheres. A 
phonograph parlor on Detroit’s Woodward Avenue sought to capitalize on the possibility of a 
mixed clientele informing the public that “ladies and children as well as gentlemen can spend a 
very pleasant hour” at their facilities. Promiscuity of clientele proved as socially disruptive as it 
was economically conducive.   15
But phonographic technology itself also presented challenges to established boundaries 
owing to the fugitive nature of sound. In 1898, the Los Angeles Times reported on a “lively 
discussion” taking place before the city’s board of public works. Businesses in the vicinity of 
Tally’s Phonograph Parlor complained that “the parlor was a nuisance, as there were emitted 
from the place sounds which were anything but musical, and which were calculated to disturb the 
nerves of persons who were compelled to hear the alleged music every day and all day.” The 
problem, they claimed, was the parlor’s use of a “megaphone” to broadcast music into the open 
air. A restauranteur “went after the parlors hammer and tongs,” asserting that “the phonograph 
had almost reduced his wife to nervous prostration, and had caused many a customer to pass his 
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place… In conclusion the restauranteur “strenuously objected to his place being ‘bombarded,’ as 
he expressed it, by the sound waves which came from the parlors.” The phonograph proprietor 
responded with a petition—signed by a large number of local merchants— attesting to the fact 
that, though the music did resonate in their shops, it “was something of beauty and a joy 
forever.” Not stopping there, he submitted another petition, signed by over 400 members of the 
general public, expressing approbation at the megaphone’s daily declamations, and even brought 
along to the board meeting a large contingent of supportive customers. The board deferred the 
matter to a later date, but the withdrawal of several names from the original complaint pointed 
toward a likely victory for Tally’s Phonograph Parlor. At stake in the episode was the status of 
sound itself and its relationship to established property norms. Lockean property presupposes the 
owners’ security from trespassing, theft, and damage, and that structure of rights maps onto a 
decidedly materialist conception of contract and consent. One cannot touch another’s property 
without his permission. But what claims did one have against a neighbor whose depredations 
came in the form of invisible waves?  16
In 1899 the San Francisco Call fulminated against Peter Bacigalupi’s phonograph parlor 
in an article headlined “[Chief of Police] Lees Indifferent to the Outrage: Moral Corruption 
Allowed to Flourish Unchecked.” The language evokes a hidden and fetid infestation. As is very 
often the case, the phonograph parlor’s flouting of established social boundaries encouraged 
some to worry that it might represent another kind of border transgression— a threat to the 
biological body in the form of disease. The Los Angeles Times pushed the rhetoric of contagion 
even further later that year when it referred to phonograph parlors as “plague spots” and insisted 
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“the city’s moral health demands the immediate cleansing of the festering plague spots known as 
‘phonograph parlors.’” But there is also evidence that comparisons of the phonograph to disease 
drew on deeper motivations than the merely rhetorical. In 1898 a Philadelphia jeweler attributed 
a botched sale to a phonograph which sang “Get Your Money’s Worth” just as the customer 
prepared to exchange cash for a diamond ring. The machine belonged to a “phonograph 
establishment” next door which had long been a nuisance but this was the last straw and the 
jeweler called on the authorities. But who did the “disgusted and nervously prostrated” merchant 
contact regarding this invisible contamination? None other but the city’s Board of Health.   17
In pursuing this course of action, the jeweler may have been influenced by local events of 
a few years prior. In 1890 the Philadelphia Park Commission “banished” all phonographs from 
Fairmount Park shortly after several local merchants had placed machines there for the purposes 
of paid exhibition. No less a medical expert than “a member of the Committee on Police” had 
deemed them a public health risk “not only on account of the liability to cause deafness,” but 
because the hearing tubes could transmit diseases of both the ear and the blood. Here the 
phonograph not only threatened public safety with its invisible and germ-like sound waves, but 
also provoked fears of literal disease. The New York Times, derided the Philadelphians’ fears as 
“a senseless objection” and sent a reporter to the New York Ophthalmic Hospital to enquire after 
the number of patients so far injured by the phonograph. “No cases of ear trouble arising from 
the use of the phonograph had ever been reported” though there was a minimal risk of infection 
“on a par with the cups at public drinking fountains, the use of the general brush and comb in 
hotels and barbers’ shops, or the customs of handshaking and kissing.” The City of Brotherly 
 The San Francisco Call, April 1, 1899, 9; Los Angeles Times, August 9, 1899, 5; The Atlanta 17
Constitution, December 11, 1898, 27.
!153
Love enjoyed vindication four years later when the Medical Press called attention to “several 
cases in which patients with catarrh and even suppuration of the external ear have dated the onset 
of the affection[sic] from their interview with the…phonograph.”  18
Recording 
By January of 1891, the local subsidiaries of the North American Phonograph Company 
had placed 744 nickel-in-slot phonographs in the United States and that number was steadily 
growing. The spread of these machines now presented the local companies with a brand new 
obstacle to profit: a lack of musical records. In May 1889, North American had first announced 
the availability of these novelties supplied by Edison’s Phonograph Works and in January of the 
next year published the first official catalog of these cylinders. The supply of records from 
Edison, however, soon dried up. In a letter dated January 25, 1890, Edison announced his 
decision to cease cylinder production at the Phonograph Works. The local companies had been 
keeping up quite a fuss about the poor quality of his records, and—since he had only launched 
the operation as a courtesy to the trade—determined that his facilities would be better employed 
in some other way. North American, scrambling to source cylinders, arranged for production to 
be carried on by the New York Phonograph Company as well as at their own facilities. Perhaps 
enticed by the increasing value of the business Edison re-commenced record production in spring 
of 1892, but by this time several of the sub-companies had initiated recording programs of their 
own. In June of 1891, the Phonogram already informed readers that “the securing of musical 
selections has grown to be quite an industry,” and that “it is done mainly by the Columbia 
Phonograph Company, of Washington, D.C., the New Jersey Phonograph Company, of Newark, 
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N.J., the New York Phonograph Company and the Ohio Phonograph Company.” The most 
durable of these local recording initiatives—that of Columbia—began prior to November 1889 
when the company informed clients of their “musical records of orchestras, of brass bands of 
eight pieces, cornet solos, flute, piccolo, violin, organ, piano, banjo” in addition to recordings of 
artistic whistling and other types of performances.   19
In characterizing the recording process, commenters both inside and outside the 
professional community of recording specialists consistently spoke and wrote of the 
phenomenon in terms which emphasized its continuity with more quotidian forms of production, 
and, in fact, muted the distinction between the physical fabrication of wax cylinders and the 
process of “filling them” with sound. The verb “to record” had not developed the close 
association with sound recording which now facilitates discussion, but for that same reason the 
term could not perpetrate the conceptual occlusions which it now gets away with; namely, the 
construction of an essence—distinct from any material quality of the record itself—which later 
generations have come to call “the recording.”  
In this section, we have dispensed with the language of “recording” whenever possible, in 
favor of a term borrowed from the nineteenth century— “cylinder making.” As it is used here 
(and in the nineteenth century) the term denies the sharp distinction—suggested by 
“recording”—between manufacturing of wax cylinders and their inscription with sonic data. 
Similarly, “cylinder maker,” will refer to such parties as sang, recited, or played an instrument 
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for the benefit of this inscription process. That the term could (and did) sometimes refer to those 
specialists later called “recording engineers” or to the entities later called “record companies” 
illustrates one of this chapter’s central arguments— that the industrial understanding of cylinder 
making reduced the “recording artist” to a kind of skilled artisan. He left in wax the evidence of 
his training and talent, but in ways differing in degree— not kind— from the operatives who 
chemically prepared the wax or poured it, still boiling, into cylindrical molds.  
The public kept well-apprised of the particulars involved in recording, owing to interest 
in the process by newspapers and other media. But the phonograph companies themselves were 
also eager to use the curious ritual of recording to their advantage and often did everything they 
could to get it before the public. At the 1898 Pittsburgh Exhibition, for example, the Stieren 
Home and Commercial Phonograph Company sponsored an exhibit of phonographic wares for 
the public. Amidst the display of gold- and silver-plated exhibition phonographs, the company 
staged demonstrations of the recording process, about which Company treasurer, F.G. Stieren, 
had recently taken up “an exhaustive study” and was now quite an expert. And in that same year, 
a visitor to Columbia’s phonograph parlor on Broadway would have found a piano sitting atop a 
riser next to three phonographs, all connected to tin horns and arrayed on a single rack. If she 
were fortunate enough to have stumbled onto this scene on a certain sweltering evening in late 
summer, she would have witnessed three of the era’s most prolific recording specialists, Len 
Spencer, Billy Golden and Roger Harding, demonstrating their craft for curious onlookers, 
recording songs in the very room they would soon be consumed by the public. Finally, because 
the earliest phonographs were built both to record and play back, the question of successful home 
recording occupied manufacturers of talking machines as well as their customers. A number of 
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guides to the maintenance and operation of the phonograph and graphophone circulated in the 
1890s and generally shared information on recording “best practices.” Because of the coverage 
of the recording process through print media, its public demonstration by phonograph 
companies, and the circulation of phonograph handbooks, the recording process and descriptions 
of it directly shaped the semiotics of record consumption.  20
Those who consumed demonstrations and descriptions of recording were rewarded with a 
bizarre and esoteric spectacle, one which began with the preparation of the room. For an 
especially “resonant” or “ringing” tone, the National Phonograph Company informed readers, 
one must strip the room of furniture, curtains and draperies, but if this produced a “blasting” 
recording, one could add just enough soft surface to “break up any echoes.” The phonograph 
itself must be properly adjusted before recording begins, and this depended in large measure on 
selecting an appropriate diaphragm. These sensitive circular films vibrated in response to sounds, 
moving an attached recording stylus which registered these vibrations by cutting a groove in the 
wax cylinder record. To achieve maximum volume, the engineer used a thin (and therefore 
sensitive) diaphragm. If the recording was too loud, however, a sensitive diaphragm would over-
vibrate, lifting the stylus from the wax surface altogether. This produced “blast,” an unpleasant 
and raspy tone unsuitable for consumption. If a recording sounded “blasty,” the engineer should 
replace his diaphragm with a thicker, less sensitive, one and try again. Having outfitted his 
phonograph with the appropriate diaphragm, the engineer placed it in the center of the room.  
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The singer (if a solo vocal record was to be made) “should stand immediately in front of 
the recording horn, not more than three or four inches from the opening, and sing directly into 
it.” If the song featured piano accompaniment, the piano was placed on a riser directly behind the 
singer, with its back facing the horn. The vocalist should be forewarned: the recording horn made 
demands on singers which no live audience would. Certain consonants could be recorded only 
with great effort so articulation must be impeccable. The technical limitations of the recording 
apparatus, on the other hand, required a constrained approach to delivery and one had to “avoid 
singing with too much expression.” When the song called for a particularly high note “the singer 
should draw back the head, away from the horn, so as to equalize the vibrations.” Similarly, 
when making band recordings, the proto-recording engineer should stand instrumentalists closer 
or further from the recording horn in consideration of their tonal range and volume. According to 
a guide issued by the National Phonograph Company, bass instruments including tubas, altos, 
and trombones sat in a semi-circle five feet from the phonograph. The cornets stood ten feet 
behind them and the rest of the band— piccolo, clarinet, snare drum, and so forth— were arrayed 
between these two extremes. The prescribed arrangements of instruments varied from source to 
source, but the principle remained the same— balance through distance. Similar techniques were 
employed to balance recordings of vocal ensembles.   21
Especially in the years when mechanical record duplication remained an unrealized 
aspiration, cruder production methods were employed to pump out as many records as possible. 
The most efficient— and capital-intensive— of these methods entailed the capturing of a live 
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performance with as many separate phonographs as possible. In this manner, a single 
performance could produce several more-or-less identical recordings. In 1890 a Detroit Free 
Press reporter visited the recording facilities of the Michigan Phonograph Company. “In the 
center of the room,” he reported, “stands a wooden frame, a sort of clothes-horse device, 
depending from which are five huge funnel-shaped arrangements.” Connected to these were a 
like number of phonographs. Peter Bacigalupi’s San Francisco recording operation employed 
eight phonographs, while I.W. Norcross of the Norcross Phonograph Company inaugurated his 
recording career with a bank of twelve. As the latter’s recordings grew in popularity, he added 
more machines, and by the late 1890s Norcross’s recording specialists bared heart and soul for 
forty phonographs with every take.  
Most serious enterprises employed multiple recording phonographs in this way, but the 
purchase and maintenance of dozens of machines lay outside the reach of the majority of them. 
For all record companies (but especially for smaller operations) a second strategy proved a 
crucial element in augmenting the bottom line: working longer and harder. When Antonio Vargas 
visited Peter Bacigalupi’s San Francisco establishment to record a song, he sang the selection for 
Bacigalupi’s phonographs sixteen times. As of late 1898, George Gaskin was weekly singing 
“Break the News to Mother” thirty-six times; “She was Bred in old Kentucky” twenty; “On the 
Banks of the Wabash” thirty; and Sweet Savanna,” fifteen times. This in addition to the time 
spent “supplying the regular demand for his large repertoire.” For smaller recording operations, 
the regimen was even more grueling. At his recording room in Chicago, Silas Leachman played 
piano and sang over his shoulder toward the horns of three recording phonographs. “As soon as 
he has finished one song,” reported the Daily Chicago Tribune, “he slips off the wax cylinders, 
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puts on three fresh ones without leaving his seat, and goes right on singing…” Leachman kept 
himself occupied in this manner for four or five hours every day and in four years had managed 
to place on the market nearly 250,000 records.   22
The Taylorist ethos embodied in these processes encouraged observers to think of them in 
terms that conflated the industrial and the musical, folding everything from pouring hot wax into 
molds to pouring lyrics into a recording horn into a single process of “cylinder making.” In 
December 1900 Scientific American carried an article which treated the fabrication of wax 
cylinders and the operations of recording as a single process.  
The first process in the manufacture of records takes place in the melting room, 
where the proper constituents to form the special grade of wax employed in 
making the records are brought together and melted in several large vats… The 
wax is taken from the melting vats in a can and poured into the moulds… the wax 
cylinders are removed… After they have cooled, the cylinders are first reamed out 
to gage, then edged and rough-turned, and finally given a finishing cut, the finish 
turning being done with a fine sapphire knife. The records are then given a final 
inspection.. The cylinders are now ready for the important work of making 
records.  
After a brief aside concerning cylinder sizes, the article resumes its narrative of manufacturing in 
the “record room” where singers and instrumentalists record songs. “One of the first things that 
strikes a visitor to the record room,” the author allows “is the rapidity with which the artists sing, 
the speed being much greater than that to which one is accustomed in a music hall or opera 
house.” These electric age tempos were matched with an equally muscular attitude toward 
volume as “the songs are sung with the full power which would be used before a public 
audience.” Finally, “as soon as the record is made it is taken off the mandrel and placed in a 
 Detroit Free Press, June 1, 1890, 3; The San Francisco Call, May 7, 1899, 32; The Phonoscope, 22
September, 1898, 11; The Phonoscope, October, 1898, 14; Chicago Daily Tribune, April 8, 1895, 5.
!160
phonograph and reproduced to test its quality. If there is the slightest defect, it is, of course, 
rejected.” All of the foregoing, we are told in the article’s title, are steps in the process of “The 
Manufacture of Edison Phonograph Records.”  
The “manufactual” logic of these discourses similarly shaped discussion of what we now 
call the “recording studio.” In 1891, The San Francisco Chronicle described a Pine Street “music 
factory” under the supervision of Frank T. Canall, where brass band selections were committed 
to wax for the benefit of phonograph listeners. According to the Phonogram of January, 1891, 
the North American Phonograph Company “runs a music factory on an extensive scale at Jersey 
City, where thousands of fresh airs are turned out on wax every month.” The Washington Post 
reported on a “song factory,” while recording specialist Estella Mann undertook her recording 
operation, according to The Phonogram, in a “record-making plant.” As late as 1898, the 
Phonoscope could report that the Excelsior Phonograph Co. Had relocated “their plant” to a 
location on 28th Street “where, with increased facilities, they will be able to supply the demand 
for records.”   23
Similarly, the laborious nature of the undertaking, together with its industrial pace and 
repetitiveness spurred writers to note how much like “work” the business of playing for the 
phonograph had become. The Phonoscope revealed to readers that “singers to the talking-
machines occasionally tire of their work and at times it must seem monotonous.” Why? “Over 
and over again the song must be rendered in order that the demand may be supplied.” According 
to the same publication, Freddy Hylands, pianist for the Columbia Company, once gave vent to 
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his workaday frustration, exclaiming “I am hired to play and draw my salary for playing, but still 
this company insists on making me work.” Those whose music and speech found their way onto 
commercial wax cylinders, then, were generally not understood as “performers” but rather as a 
peculiarly melodious species of artisan or industrial operative. In 1898, George J. Gaskin 
purchased ad space in Phonoscope in an attempt to generate interest in his services as a record 
maker. Next to a photograph of the singer rakishly slouched in a high-backed chair, the ad 
announced: “I wish to inform my friends in the phonograph business that I am at liberty to sing 
for any company desiring my services without restriction by any particular one. The thousands of 
cylinders that I have made speak for themselves as to my ability.”   24
Gaskin positions himself as an “independent contractor” for hire by larger firms. Others 
with more capital on hand sold their cylinders directly to the trade, but these cylinder makers 
also promoted themselves in terms which flout modern distinctions between business and art. 
The Lyric Phonograph Company of New York, for example, served as the primary sales outlet 
for the Original Lyric Trio, comprised of Estella Louise Mann, John C. Havens, and William F. 
Hooley. Mann operated the company herself, and at least at first, the firm carried only the trio’s 
recordings, making the Trio and the Phonograph Company partially coterminous entities. Singer 
Roger Harding of New York advertised himself as a “manufacturer of musical records for the 
Phonograph and Graphopone” while Reed, Dawson & Company of Newark New Jersey 
trumpeted in one advertisement “We are surpassed by none for strictly first-class originals. We 
make everything. The most complete Laboratory in the country.” The advertisement featured a 
photo of a mustached violinist, identified in the caption as “T. Herbert Reed, maker of the only 
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successful violin records…” Mr. Reed served both as co-owner of Reed, Dawson & Company 
and one of its record-makers.  25
The industrial conception of recording also shaped ideas about records themselves, and 
there was a tendency to present the little wax cylinders as undifferentiated good—“commodities” 
in the strictly economic sense. A Phonoscope advertisement for G.E. Emerson’s record company 
featured fourteen lines of the word “RECORDS” arranged in four vertical columns. No titles 
were mentioned but the “RECORDS” could be had for $5 a dozen. The practice of selling 
cylinders in large lots was common. The Norcross Phonograph Company not only offered 
records of the Metropolitan Band, twelve for $10.00, but even sold them by the barrel. The Lyric 
Phonograph Company also shipped records by the barrel and when a dispute erupted between 
that company and the Edison American Phonograph Company of Kansas City, one of these 
“barrels of music” found its way to the Justice of the Peace’s office. A reporter for the Kansas 
City Journal remarked “unpretentious though it is in appearance, more suggestive of brown 
sugar, or buckwheat flour or potatoes than that which ‘hath charms to soothe the savage beast,’ 
yet this barrel contains within its basswood exterior melodies which have enchanted 
thousands.”   26
Similarly, the emphasis on records as a type of commodity, meant value would be tied to 
craftsmanship rather than the unique offerings of this or that “artist.” One Columbia ad in 
Phonoscope informed would-be customers that the company’s records had gained such renown 
“because they are made under the direction of the most expert record makers.” Their superior 
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facilities, the advertisement continued, allowed Columbia to “supply records unrivaled in quality 
at less than the cost at which others can make inferior ones.” Similarly, Harms, Kaiser and Hagen 
informed readers of their advertisements that their wax cylinders were “original master records 
of the highest attainable quality made on the best Edison blanks by skilled artisans.” In some 
cases, the emphasis on well-made (rather than unique) records was taken to the point of 
indifference as to their “contents.” Roger Harding assured prospective record buyers “I do not 
substitute something that is just as good”— evidently, a common practice in the trade. At every 
turn, technique— in the sense embodied in technology— out-shined considerations of 
“technique” in the artistic sense.   27
Selling Records 
All together the industrial logics embedded in the early recording industry encouraged a 
specific understanding of the recording. Like his scribbling cousin at the fiction factories, the 
cylinder maker was not so much a creator in his own right but an industrial operative, and 
cylinder making was not performance or creation, but was rather a kind of “publishing.” No one 
subscribed more fully to the conception of recording as a form of publishing than Edison, his 
employees and distributors. The inventor himself had always conceived of sound recordings as 
texts. In early 1878, for example, he informed the world (improbably) that he had “succeeded in 
putting 48,000 words on a sheet of tin foil about ten inches square.” Edison’s announcement 
elided completely the temporal character of the phenomenon and uses language suitable to the 
fitting of ink on page. And how else does one mass-produce texts but through “publishing.” In 
March 1878 he told a reporter from the New York World “we’re going to start a publication office 
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in New York when the phonograph is ready.” The reporter asked him to elaborate and the 
inventor explained that all manner of works will be published and describes his plans for musical 
records. “We will phonograph orchestral concerts by brass and string bands, instrumental and 
vocal solos and part songs. The sheets bearing the sound impressions of this music will be 
removed from the phonograph and multiplied to any extent by electrotyping.” Tellingly, the 
reporter asks “what will such a sheet of music cost?” A “sheet of music” could have as easily 
described sheet music— printed compositions to be performed by amateurs in the home. These 
early phonograph discourses also took root in the popular imagination as when The Atlanta 
Constitution reported that the Edison organization “proposed to print books upon the tin foil,” 
explaining that “a single sheet of foil will take a book of 400 pages and it can be read off to a 
family instead of them having to read it.” Similarly, the Cincinnati Commercial asked “what 
more agreeable home entertainment than a novel read aloud by the phonographic machine, which 
never tires, never is hoarse, never coughs, never grows husky, to the family circle.”   28
As we have seen, the sound-recording-as-text discourse fit particularly well with Edison’s 
preferred strategy of marketing phonographs as stenographic aids, but it also inflected early 
understandings of recorded music. As with all publishing, the work of cylinder making meant—
first and foremost— the clean and accurate reproduction of a pre-existing text. The text, rather 
than any idiosyncratic flourishes appended by the publisher (whether with printer’s ink or 
instrumental improvisation) represented the ontological core of the publication. Even in the age 
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of the recording industry writers could be quite explicit in their understanding of recordings as a 
kind of book. In 1900 Scientific American informed readers that “the great growth in popularity 
of the phonograph, and the necessity for keeping the owners supplied with fresh ‘literature,’ has 
caused the mere work of manufacturing the records to assume truly enormous proportions.” 
Generally, however, text-centric understandings of sound recording manifested after 1890 in an 
emphasis on a particular kind of text— the “song.” When George J. Gaskin returned to work 
after a “pleasant trip abroad,” he arrived “prepared to supply the various phonograph companies 
with the very latest songs.” Similarly, Phonoscope’s monthly list of “New Records for Talking 
Machines” was printed the side-by-side with another monthly feature: “The Latest Popular 
Songs,” comprising a “list of the very latest popular songs published by the leading music 
publishers of the United States.” The relationship between recording and publishing was 
sometimes quite concrete. In 1897, Joseph W. Stern & Co., “well-known New York music 
publishers,” incorporated the Universal Phonograph Company, in order to market records of 
talent hitherto unheard on recordings. The Phonoscope predicted “patrons of the talking machine 
will surely be benefitted by having the latest metropolitan successes offered to them by the 
publishers who will furnish them records of celebrities.” This development—late in the coin-slot 
era—marks an intermediate step in the process of recording’s evolution from a process of 
publishing to one of capturing performances.   29
The emphasis on text also meant that descriptions of phonographic music very often did 
not name the cylinder maker at all, and here the close relationship between recordings-as-texts 
and recording-as-manufacturing becomes more clear. When North American first offered 
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prerecorded cylinders to the industry it merely included these new items in its usual price list like 
any other quotidian article for the phonograph. Next to “Battery, Complete, With Chord,” and 
“Chromic Acid, In Original Packages of about 200 LBS” the company offered “Musical 
Phonograms.” The price list made no mention of performers or even song titles, but informed 
would-be purchasers that the cylinders were sent in boxes of six or twelve and were “assorted.” 
When North American published its first “Catalogue of Musical Phonograms” the following 
year, it provided more information about its wares— but not much. The catalog listings included 
song title and categorized records by the type of ensemble or instrumentation featured on them
—“Brass Band,” “Cornet,” “Piccolo,” or “Vocal Quartettes.” Still, the catalog made no mention 
of the parties responsible for playing on the recordings.   30
From the beginning, the Columbia Phonograph Company tended to emphasize the 
identity of its cylinder makers to a greater degree than Edison, but even here there were turns of 
thought setting the nineteenth century off from the twentieth. First, and especially early on, 
Columbia’s promotional materials subtly interposed the musical work between the cylinder 
maker and the cylinder. In February of 1890, for example, the company announced it had 
“arranged with Mr. Henry Jaeger, the celebrated flute and piccolo soloist of the Marine Band, to 
keep us constantly supplied with records of his best solos.” When Columbia secured the services 
of the rest of that ensemble in November, the company informed subscribers that “it is now ready 
to furnish promptly to users of the phonograph, records of the music of the celebrated United 
States Marine Band.” Secondly, Columbia’s early reliance on the U.S. Marine Band exercised 
influence in two directions. On one hand, it did represent an early instance of the eventually-
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ubiquitous claims of sonic identity, and Columbia was ever ready to remind would-be customers 
of the Marine Band’s prestigious role as the “President’s Band.” On the other hand, early 
Columbia materials positioned the ensemble as a kind of “house band,” providing nearly all of 
the music for the company’s recordings. House bands, as a matter of course, are subservient to 
the work and to the occasion. They vamp between acts, play “Hail to the Chief” or “Auld Lang 
Syne” as circumstances require, and provide rim shots for comedians. If variety theater—with its 
quick procession of performers—pushes identity to the very fore, the house band’s sonic ubiquity 
ensures invisibility.   31
One of Columbia’s earliest record catalogs, a short document dated November 24, 1890, 
illustrates this effect. The “List of Records by the U.S. Marine Band” begins with a brief 
introduction of the catalog as a selection of records chosen for their “loudness and clearness,” 
and consisting “of music of the celebrated United States Marine Band.” Following this, the 
catalog presents the company’s recorded offerings in numbered lists segregated by the style of 
the piece— “Marches,” “Polkas,” “Galops” and so forth. The catalog presents seventy-seven 
titles scattered across six “genres” and two pages of text before again mentioning an artist, John 
Y. AtLee, the “Famous Artistic Whistler.” Like a house band tucked into the corner of the stage, 
the U.S. Marine Band’s presence in the catalogue becomes attenuated by its own ubiquity. The 
catalog is overwhelmingly a list of songs— not of performers. The U.S. Marine Band’s recorded 
oeuvre grew in the months to follow, intensifying the predominance of music over musician in 
the Columbia catalog, and the November 18, 1891, edition offered 184 Marine Band selections 
listed across four pages.  
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By this time, the company had also diversified its cylinder-making talent, offering 
seventeen selections from the United States Third Artillery Band, eighteen from the Brilliant 
Quartette, and a quickly expanding range of whistling and non-whistling selections from John 
AtLee. Most interestingly, two classes of records lack attribution altogether. Fourteen selections 
depicting “The Auctioneer” are listed with titles like “Sale of Pawnbroker’s Goods,” “Sale of the 
Old Slave,” and “Sale of Drug Store.” The Auctioneer is not identified though an earlier bit of 
promotional copy from the company had announced (just as cryptically) “we have arranged with 
a well known auctioneer to keep us supplied with auction record [sic] covering very many 
varieties of sales and interspersed in a humorous way with bids of mock purchasers.” The catalog 
also announces the availability of recorded recitations, “carefully prepared by artists of 
unquestioned ability… clear and distinct, every word being easily understood.” These featured 
dramatic recitations (“Opening Soliloquy from Hamlet,” “Damon’s Speech to the Syracusans,” 
the “Quarrel Scene from Julius Caesar,” Parts I-III) as well as humorous selections (“The Yankee 
Still Ahead,” “The Railroad Crossing,” “Kentucky Philosophy”) but none are attributed to a 
cylinder maker.   32
The framing of recorded music as “songs” rather than performances by performers also 
characterized communications to the general public. In 1896 Tally’s Phonograph Parlor in Los 
Angeles enjoined consumers to come “Hear the new songs ‘It Don’t Seem Like the Same Old 
Smile,’ ‘Send Back the Picture and the Ring,’ ‘The New Bully,’” and “’I Want Yer, My Honey, 
Ma Angeline’” before adding that “the beautiful ‘La Fiesta March’ was played by the San 
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Francisco Band for Mr. Tally and can now be heard in the phonograph.” And when Professor 
William G. Porter appeared at Park Baptist Church, Brooklyn, in 1898 he presented to those 
gathered a “choice collection of pieces, as reproduced by the phonograph.” The Phonoscope 
noted that “among those received with the greatest favor were the ‘Stars and Stripes Forever,’ 
‘TheStar Spangled Banner,’ and the ‘Anvil Chorus’ from ‘Il Trovatore.’” No performers were 
mentioned.  33
Consuming Records 
Addressing the changes to phonograph consumption wrought by the coin-slot 
mechanism, Edward Easton of Columbia wrote that “for a considerable time after the 
phonograph was invented it was only accessible to those who were able to pay the annual rent, or 
who were so fortunate as to have acquaintances possessing instruments. Now public automatic 
machines are located in drug-stores, hotels, depots and other places where people gather…” A 
nearly identical sentiment was expressed in an Edison brochure of 1906 which stated that “not 
everyone can afford to buy a Phonograph, but few there are who cannot spend a cent in a coin-
slot Phonograph to hear some favorite selection.” Prior to coin-slot technology it was impossible 
(or at least very difficult) to “socialize” the costs and benefits of phonograph consumption. Long-
term commercial viability of the technology required that its handlers find parties able to supply 
the total sum of the machine’s upkeep and profit for a year—and this generally meant parties 
interested in business applications. Some of the parties who rented a phonograph for themselves 
might occasionally turn them to “amusement” purposes. Having already rented the machine for a 
year, bought her own records and extracted a maintenance agreement from the phonograph 
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company, one could listen at leisure. When one owns a record, the logics of “sunken cost” 
encourage one to listen to it again and again. Under these circumstances, the listener might 
consume the same records hundreds or thousands of times, developing a connection to them and 
seeing them as timeless and permanent. He or she might refrain from listening to their records to 
preserve them, but the logic remains the same— the investment is a long term one. But that type 
of record consumption remained exceedingly rare in the 1890s and the leisurely and patrician 
culture of listening would not be democratized until after 1900 when new financial mechanisms 
allowed it. Until then, the coin-slot mechanism made it possible to massify the consumption of 
recorded sound, not through ownership, but through an escalation of rental: any man, woman, or 
child in possession of the requisite five-cent piece could “rent” the phonograph for two minutes 
at a time. This increasing commodification of phonographic time, however, intensified the 
mercenary semiosis of the technology: all the difference in the world obtains between renting 
365 days for a $100 and renting two minutes for 5¢. Consequently, the coin-slot phonograph 
encouraged an attitude toward record listening which was quite different from the patrician 
attitude which spread to larger and larger swathes of the American public after 1900.   34
Namely, coin-slot customers and the entrepreneurs who hunted down records for their 
amusement evolved a particular temporality vis a vis the cycle of record production and 
consumption— one that emphasized ephemerality. While coin-slot consumers certainly re-
listened to favorite selections, they faced no “sunken cost” and could—with a clean conscienc—
abandon a record for a new one just as often as he or she liked. At the Ohio Phonograph 
Company’s arcades interest in the parlors’ “handsome automatic cases and phonographs” was 
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especially keen at those regular intervals when the “phonograph man” switched out old records 
for new ones. According to the Chronicle, “the airs in the public phonographs” in San Francisco, 
were “changed every day, a man being specially employed to look after them.” Similarly, the 
Georgia Phonograph Company advertised that “the latest band and vocal music [could] be heard 
daily” at their nickel-in-slot parlors and the selections on the machines were daily changed,  and 35
a Wichita parlor advertised in similar fashion a “change of program each day.” Manufacturers 
and distributors, recognizing the short periodicity at play in record consumption, did all they 
could to accommodate their clients, most of whom were phonograph parlor managers. Roger 
Harding advertised to prospective customers “I advise my customers of the Newest, Latest and 
Best Records.” While a Maine record supplier inaugurated a policy of giving 25¢ credit for 
exchanged records, a policy calculated to “enable you to keep up with the times and have the 
latest records without having a large number of ones that you do not use because they are out of 
date.” That same year the Universal Phonograph Company of New York urged customers to 
“come and take the records off the rack as they are being made,” a catchphrase sounding much 
like the baker’s injunction to “get ‘em while they’re hot!”  36
The perceived ephemerality of the recording came closely entwined with the material-
economic determinants of its existence. First, the circumstances of records’ production tied them 
to an ongoing and laborious cycle of manufacture and dissemination, one that was always 
running against the clock. By 1890 George Greim of the Michigan Phonograph Company could 
already characterize the demand for cylinders as “very considerable” and informed a reporter 
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from the Detroit Free Press that it was “increasing regularly.” Indeed it was quickly becoming 
difficult to keep up with customer demand. In February, North American informed the sub-
companies that “the demand for musical phonograms has been so unexpectedly large during the 
past few weeks, that it has found us unprepared to fill orders as promptly as we could wish.” In 
October of that year, R.S. Boswell of the Old Dominion Phonograph Company wrote to Charles 
Cheever, hoping to enlist his help in securing more records from the Metropolitan Phonograph 
Company of New York. They were having the greatest difficulty getting records anywhere and 
asked Cheever to push the Company to provide “not only prompt shipments but good 
selections.”   37
At the same time that demand grew for records, the decentralized state of the industry 
(anyone owning a phonograph could enter the fray as a cylinder maker) prevented firms from 
establishing the economies of scale necessary to inundate the market. In February of 1891, the 
Phonogram informed its readers that Edison “can now make musical and other records …far 
superior to anything that has ever heretofore been produced,” but in order to capitalize on the 
technological improvements he had in mind, he would have to “invest a large sum of money in a 
plant.” Unfortunately, this expansion “would not be justified by the present condition of the 
musical-record business, owing to the fact that so many of the local companies are trying to 
make these records for themselves.” The Phonogram followed with a plea for “cooperation” by 
the various sub-companies: hand Edison a monopoly on record production, it urged, and we will 
all benefit. Apparently, there were no takers. The decentralized and fiercely competitive set of 
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affairs would persist in the record industry for the rest of the 1890s, with cylinder makers always 
running behind schedule in trying to meet demand.   38
In 1898 Estelle Mann, the proprietor of the Lyric Trio Company could “scarcely keep up 
with demand” in the months following the commencement of cylinder making operation. A year 
later a “severe attack of la grippe” prostrated her for several weeks and the operation fell behind 
in supplying its customers. When she returned from this miserable sabbatical she “work[ed] like 
a [Trojan] to fill large orders that have been accumulating since her sickness.” By this time, some 
firms were making headway against the tide of orders, but success in the undertaking required 
system and discipline. “Promptness in business,” according to Reed, Dawson & Company “is 
everything” and when a representative of the Phonoscope visited their facilities in Newark in 
1899 he was shown just how the firm achieved it. The company “filled with choice stock from 
all their talent…” a gigantic cabinet “taking up the better part of a large room.” Every recording 
in the company’s catalog was “constantly on hand and ready to fill orders without delay.”   39
As difficult as it was to procure cylinders, it was just as hard to keep them, as wax 
records—as compared to later formats—were short-lived commodities, generally not outliving 
more than a few thousand plays. The above-mentioned Maine company with the policy of 
accepting records on exchange assured its would-be customers that “the old records may be 
played out and weak, but so long as they are not cracked they all be taken in exchange.” So 
ingrained were assumptions about the ephemerality of sound recordings that by 1898, 
Phonoscope could inform its readers of a novel state of affairs: “old records are now in great 
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demand by enthusiasts who aim to possess valuable collections.” These “old records” could only 
very rarely have been more than ten years old.   40
The problems presented by the circulation of sound recordings, like those presented by 
the advent of the phonograph parlor, ranged from worries over the quality of purchased goods to 
the perennial battle over “boundaries.” And just like the threats posed by the phonograph parlor, 
it is important to see the problems of the phonograph record as on a single surface, stretching 
from the realm we generally call “economic” to that designated “cultural.” At the far end of that 
surface were relatively straightforward concerns about the material quality of records. In 1896, 
for example, one Boston customer paid an unidentified record company $25 for as many records. 
But within three weeks, sixteen of them were covered in a a “foggy scum” or “mouldy 
substance,” as unfit for human consumption as the canned beef sent to American troops in Cuba 
two years later. Since the company in question did not manufacture the “blank” records (Edison 
did) they denied responsibility and left the Bostonian holding the bag. Like any mass produced 
commodity, cylinder records occasioned hand-wringing because of their embeddedness in 
impersonal long-distance commercial relationships, circumstances making it difficult to hold 
sellers accountable. The occluded social and material origins of the wax record were humorously 
(and tastelessly) alluded to by the Phonogram when it commented on a congratulatory record 
sent to Grover Cleveland, who had been “handed a small package by a messenger, which 
resembled in almost every particular one of those mysterious boxes that has caused so much 
wonder and fear to the recipients, bringing up visions of dynamite, gunpowder, etc.”   41
 Phonoscope, December, 1898, 11.40
 Phonoscope, November 1896, 9; Phonogram, April 1892, 241.41
!175
Along with the threat of anonymity the Phonogram’s recounting of the episode hints at a 
potentially-nefarious interiority to the record. Beginning in 1895 there circulated across North 
America a number of cylinder records deemed “obscene” by state local and federal authorities. 
The subsequent string of prosecutions under anti-obscenity laws threw into stark relief the still-
contested ontology of the sound recording. One of the first of these took place in Toronto when 
George and Mamie Barry were charged with “having exhibited… a phonograph containing 
immoral passages…” Their attorney moved to have the charges thrown out as “allowing people 
to listen to the phonograph was not ‘exhibiting’ a show,” but the judge rejected the argument, as 
the broken statute in question “came under ‘printing and publishing.’” In January, 1896, two 
phonograph men in Springfield Massachusetts were charged with “publishing selling and 
reproduction of human speech… said reproduction containing obscene language manifestly 
tending to the corruption of the morals of youth.” One month later, Reverend Frederick Bruce 
Russell of Brooklyn, while making his rounds as a member of the Law Enforcement society, 
entered the saloon of August Viemeister and there chanced to hear a “wicked and depraved 
phonograph” emitting a lascivious song. Russell alerted the authorities and Viemeister was 
charged. Following an excruciating episode in which the saloonkeeper’s lawyer forced the young 
minister to repeat what he heard that day (no doubt wagering that he would not,) Viemeister was 
found guilty and fined $50. For his part, Viemeister claimed to have had no knowledge of the 
record’s contents as they had been insisted he would appeal the decision.  
In February, a very similar scene unfolded in Jersey City, when Charles Fletcher and John 
Leon were arraigned before the General Sessions Court for “exhibiting a phonograph containing 
unlawful songs.” Remarkably, the men were discharged because the judge “understood the 
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machine was controlled by some of the most eminent men in science and in the financial world” 
and that “this [recording] company manufactures such cylinders, without which the phonograph 
is useless.” The court confiscated and destroyed the objectionable cylinders but, reported the St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, “the cylinder matter will be investigated, and if possible the persons 
responsible for the manufacture and issuing of them will be reached.” And when in October 
1897, Anthony Comstock apprehended two Long Island men guilty of exhibiting an obscene 
phonograph, the New York Times was noted that “it is alleged that the man who sung into the 
phonographs the words composing the songs is in prison serving a term for doing so.” Even as 
the question of attribution creeps into the foreground, writers continued to employ language 
suggesting more layers of mediation than modern understandings allow for.   42
Conclusion 
In the 1890s the phonograph record evoked a range of connotations that, superficially, fit 
poorly with one another. A constant focus on the recording process—with its Rube Golberg-
esque congeries of processes—encouraged record companies, parlor managers, and their 
customers to think of the recording artist (as later generations designated that character) as a type 
of skilled artisan closely linked to the industrial process itself. He or she was a “cylinder maker.” 
This emphasis on manufacturing, when combined with the era’s preoccupation with “the musical 
work” as the ontological core of a performance contributed to a conception of recording as a kind 
of “publishing.” Like idiosyncratically set book type, the peculiarities of any given “take” were 
less the cylinder-maker’s stock-in-trade than her mistakes. At the same time that consumers were 
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encouraged to think of cylinder records as publications, the economics of coin-slot sound 
consumption pushed them to engage with them fleetingly.  
The scriptive understanding of recording also dovetailed with a conception of the record 
as ephemeral. Advertisements for famed baritone J.W. Myers’ recording company made explicit 
the centrality of the text as well as the up-to-date quality of its products when it advertised its 
wares as “All the Latest and Most Popular SONGS, carefully selected from all the Leading 
Music Publishers in the United States as Soon as Published” [Emphasis in original]. Similarly, 
when the United States Marine Band—house band of the Columbia Company—left Washington 
for a national tour in 1891, Edward Easton assured the trade “we are laying in a large stock of 
records previous to their departure.” Here the ephemerality of the recordings meets with their 
status as commodities as Easton speaks of them in terms usually reserved for foods. Records 
were quasi-mass-produced texts, meant to be discarded (or recorded over) every few weeks. Like 
the unattributed columns of printed periodicals or the pseudonymously published “pulp” novels 
of the late nineteenth century, the ephemerality of the recording mitigated its status as an 
enduring document with a flesh-and-blood author. Because records were physically and 
conceptually ephemeral, few initially considered them “canned” performances. The cylinder did 
not represent a conduit to a timeless performance out there in the spaceless and timeless ether but 
seemed more like a script—a script with a distinct analog birth and a pre-ordained death-by-
stylus on the near horizon.  43
At the other end of the supply chain record manufacturers were keen to emphasize the 
status of cylinder-making as an author-less, industrial process. The late nineteenth century 
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witnessed a valorization of capitalistic production, foregrounding the industrial and commercial 
might of firms as proof of their contribution to the public weal. The logos and advertisements of 
manufacturers regularly featured illustrations of the company’s facilities, invariably long multi-
storey structures ribbed with belching smokestacks. Capital, market share, output, efficiency, size
—these were the guarantors of quality. These preoccupations, however, were not transhistorical 
standards, but were part and parcel of a peculiarly nineteenth century value regime, one that 
neared its expiration in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The labor theory of value—a 
mainstay of classical political economy, and the bedrock of Marxism—had posited a generic 
measure of economic value derived from the number of man-hours consumed in an article’s 
production. While never so one-dimensional as its detractors have argued, the labor theory of 
value represented an industrial and producerist understanding of economic processes—one in 
which production’s “ends” are pre-determined by the technological and economic necessities of 
reproducing capital. Barring “mistakes” in the production process, a railroad tie is a railroad tie. 
Competition between manufacturers of railroad ties necessarily takes place according to a 
quantifiable and objective measure— price. There is little in the way of metaphysical residue to 
stymy our calculations, here: low prices are preferred over high. As production shifted 
overwhelmingly toward supplying the demands of consumerism beginning in the 1890s, 
however, this objective understanding of value appeared increasingly anachronistic. Now, 
commodities became suffused with a new kind of value, irreducible to the amount of labor 
consumed in their production but dependent on the subjective valuations of consumers. This 
year’s serviceable application of labor—boater hats, say—might next year command no attention 
whatsoever in the marketplace. This turn to subjective value came paired, as well, with a new 
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world of abundance and these circumstances of (apparent) post-scarcity reinforced the 
disjuncture between material processes on one hand and value on the other. It is in this context of 
shifting value regimes that the next phase of the cultural history of recording unfolded.   44
Beginning in the early 1890s, cylinder makers achieved their own measure of industrial 
post-scarcity employing crude methods of record reproduction. Some of these methods were as 
crude as playing a record on one phonograph while others captured the sounds from the air, and 
through that decade the practice was increasingly blamed for many of the quality control issues 
faced by the industry. "I have a great deal of trouble,” one record purchaser wrote in 1897, 
“getting uniform, good loud originals…” The problem, he believed, lay in the “tendency even on 
the part of the best and most reputable concerns to work off all the poor and duplicate records 
they can with each order as originals." When G.W.W. of St. Louis received a record catalog 
advertising “a number of original records at 50¢ each, $5 per dozen,” he grew suspicious. He had 
“been ‘swindled’ so much lately by the different companies who advertise originals,” he decided 
to ask advice from the editor of Phonoscope. The editor confirmed his suspicions: original 
records could not be marketed for 50¢. Similarly, a letter-writer identified only as “L” declared in 
the pages of Phonoscope that “it is our duty to put on guard all of our great phonograph and 
supply firms against filling the market with duplicate records called ‘high grade,’ while the 
original remains in their cabinets.” Intensifying competition, he argued, had encouraged cylinder 
manufacturers not only to “duplicate” but also to use cheaper wax blanks in their recording. And 
while “amateurs will not perceive this at once,” these slipshod methods will eventually come to 
light. “When they do, good-bye phonograph amusements.” So pervasive were these problems 
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that by 1896 one record purchaser resignedly informed Phonoscope readers that “the way things 
are being run now in the business, your [sic] going to get ‘done’ anyways, so we might as well 
take it easy and ‘let nature take its course…’” For their part, record manufacturers insisted that 
they were engaging in no such debasement of the currency. Edison advertisements reserved for 
that company a designation as “The Only Company Selling First-class High-Grade Original 
Records at Fifty Cents Each.” The Excelsior Phonograph Company announced “Guaranteed 
Original Records of the Highest Standard of Excellence” and explicated that they “handle no 
duplicates.” The Norcross Phonograph Company of New York City also advertised their “high-
grade originals” adding “we have no duplicates to sell at any price.”  45
Particularly in the earliest days of mechanical record reproduction, the negative attitude 
toward “duplicate” records undoubtedly reflected shortcomings in quality. But as methods for 
mechanical duplication were perfected, complaints about the practice continued, and 
“duplication” came to serve as a convenient explanation for all exhibitors’ dissatisfactions with 
cylinders. One forward-thinking record consumer wrote the Phonoscope in 1896, urging a 
transvaluation of values with regards to cylinder records: 
"In visiting the different cities in different parts of the country, I am very much amused 
by the great wail that the exhibitors offer up in reference to duplicate records…Whenever 
the general run of exhibitors get a bad record they immediately cry, "Oh! That’s a 
duplicate;" when they get a good one they say, "That's a fine record; it must be an 
original." Let me tell them it is just the other way. When they get a good, loud, clear 
record it is generally a duplicate, the bum ones originals. I'll tell you why. Most all of the 
phonograph singers sing to five or six horn[sic] at a time, and about two of the records 
are good; the rest are only fair… Why don't we run around to our printer and want the 
type he uses to print our circulars? Why don't we ask our photographers to give us all 
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negatives when he furnishes us pictures? When I buy records, I buy them for the results 
they give, I don't care whether they made [sic] with a tack hammer or a steam engine. 
The writer forcefully rejects the argument that a record’s value bears any inherent relationship to 
the labor committed to its production. Whether cylinders are made painstakingly and one at a 
time by artisans (“a tack hammer”) or spat out in torrents by industrial processes (“a steam 
engine,”) makes little difference. What matters is the way the record sounds.   46
The same author defined cylinder quality in explicit terms. Good cylinders, he said, “give 
a good, loud, clear and brilliant reproduction.” His emphasis here, as it was for most record 
purchasers throughout the decade, lay in considerations of accuracy and clarity— the virtues of a 
competent printer. By the end of the nineties, however, there emerged the outline of a new 
sensibility, one which would eventually transcend the “publishing” paradigm altogether. In 
October of 1898, J.W. Of Providence, Rhode Island, reiterated many of the common anxieties 
regarding wax cylinder production and distribution in a letter to the Phonoscope. He had recently 
received a circular advertising phonographs, graphophones, and records at discounted prices, and 
was particularly interested in the offer of “original records” for 65¢. Could this be? He had been 
told original records could not be had for less than $1 apiece. The editor’s response depicts a 
wholesale re-framing of the question of value as it relates to sound recordings: 
It is very difficult to answer your question in reference to original records. The fact that a 
record is an original does not add any value to it. The value is governed by the following 
question: “Who made the record?” An original record of such talent as Gaskin Spencer, 
Quinn, Myers, Hunting, Ossman, Emmet, etc., is a staple article with a recognized value. 
An original record of Bill Smith, Charley Brown, or Sam Simpson might be worth only 
the price of the blank it is on.  
 Phonoscope, December 1896, 7.46
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The author of these comments, Russell Hunting, was not only intellectually but financially 
interested in such a conceptual transformation. In February of 1897 he had cast his lot with a new 
firm, The Universal Phonograph Company of New York, which intended “to manufacture high-
class records by celebrated artists of the vaudeville and dramatic stage.” This, wrote the 
Phonoscope (likely Hunting himself) represented a “field that has been heretofore neglected[!]” 
An advertisement for Universal in the same issue commented on the old dispensation in recorded 
sound and pointed in a new direction. “The entire phonograph and graphophone world for the 
past six years,” Universal said, “has had to satisfy itself with records which were limited to the 
product of about ten vocalists, three bands and a few instrumental soloists.” This the company 
sought to remedy, and it would soon “offer to the patrons of the phonograph and graphophone a 
series of records by celebrated artists that command public attention at the leading theatres…” 
Additionally, it would “manufacture and keep in stock” records by those “cylinder makers” who 
had long been popular with the public “Spencer, Gaskin, Quinn, Golden, At Lee, Hunting Favor, 
etc.” Several months later Roger Harding of New York City opened a phonograph parlor and 
announced his intentions to “place on the market high-class original records of celebrated 
artists.” The idea was catching.   47
Ironically, it was precisely the mass production of cylinder duplication that facilitated the 
evolution of the wax cylinder record from an impersonal (though artisanally-produced) artifact of 
human labor to a personality-laden stand-in for the laborer himself. First, cylinder makers’ output 
increased dramatically in the years following the advent of mechanical record duplication and (as 
our perspicacious Phonoscope correspondent above argued,) the process exerted a Darwinian 
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influence on the quality of recordings. Since it only took one good “take” to get hundreds or even 
thousands of cylinders, cylinder makers could toss out all but the very best. As quality improved, 
exhibitors and coin-slot proprietors came to take for granted those printer’s virtues of clarity and 
accuracy. Secondly, duplication facilitated the evolution of new constellations of relationships 
within the record industry. According to Russell Hunting, the advent of record duplication caused 
cylinder makers (specifically, those industrial operatives responsible for singing, playing and 
orating) to “rave and wail” believing that the “machines would ruin their income.” But by late 
1897 it had become clear that just the opposite was true. Recording talent, he claimed, was now 
busier than ever and were being paid around double what they had been paid a few years prior. A 
few months after Hunting narrated this tale of technological triumph it was announced that 
Columbia had made “exclusive contracts with the recognized ‘star’ record makers, for their 
exclusive services for one year” an arrangement deemed both “very expensive” and “very 
valuable” by Phonoscope. As Hunting suggested, duplication was, indeed, creating work for that 
select aristocracy of “star record makers” and increasing their fees. Eventually a single good 
“take” would produce millions of records and millions upon millions of dollars in profit, making 
it worthwhile for recording firms to pour funds into the marketing of a single star— or even just 
one of her records. Lesser talents— those hearty souls whose primary virtue lay in their ability to 
sing dozens of takes at top volume— fell by the wayside, replaced by the “recording star.” At the 
same time, the conception of recordings as published material fell away, replaced by 
“performances” by those recording stars.   48
 Phonoscope, March 1898, 4.48
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The end of the nineteenth century, however, still found the popular conception of sound 
adrift in a tide of brackish discursive waters. Though some of the public began to entertain the 
notion that recordings were “of” the people who made them, older modes of speaking and 
writing persisted. A 1900 ad for the Ray Phonograph Company of Louisville, evoked the old 
“talking machine” discourse, informing readers that “the Phonograph talks, sings and plays for 
the entertainment of your family and friends. Similarly, Phonoscope reported that in the home of 
Peter Porter of Niagara Falls, Lord Kelvin and other “electricians” had been recently 
“interviewed by the phonograph…” Sometime before the year’s end Mr. Porter hoped to host a 
party in which “his friends will be allowed to hear the phonograph tell what the great men said to 
it.” Even when addressing the pioneering methods pursued by Columbia, the trade sometimes 
slipped into older modes of though. When in 1898 W.H. Smith, manager of American 
Graphophone, invited the company’s “record-making force” to tour their Bridgeport facilities, it 
was Columbia’s stable of “star” singers and instrumentalists who showed up— not workmen in 
rubber gloves and aprons (who were quite familiar with the company’s factories, at any rate.)   49
The Edison organization, ever conservative in matters of imagination, did absorb much of 
the new commercial ethos from its competitors after 1900 but continued to forward the scriptive 
understanding of musical records well into an era when others had abandoned it. An Edison 
catalog distributed sometime around 1907 by Chicago’s Babson Brother’s mail-order house 
encouraged consumers to make up their own musical “programmes” for home entertainments, 
and provided four sample programs to catalyze one’s creativity. Each program offered a 
particular kind of entertainment—“An Afternoon Concert” or “An Evening’s Fun”—and 
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helpfully listed relevant Edison records by list number and title. At first glance, the programmes 
also seem to describe the ensembles captured on each record: “Concert Band,” “Military Band,” 
“Symphony Orchestra,” and so on. These phrases do not, however, describe the recording 
ensemble so much as the style of song published on each cylinder and other records on the 
programs are characterized in ways unambiguously referencing the selection itself: “Song,” 
“Talking Sketch,” “Sentimental Ballad,” “Vaudeville,” “Comic Song, or “Coon Ditty.” Other 
records are characterized by the musical instrumentation employed in their manufacture: “Cello 
and Piano,” “Banjo,” and “Xylophone.” Record makers are mentioned only twice in the entire 
list of programmes: once for the Vassar Girl’s Quartette and once for John Philip Sousa. The 
latter’s name, however, appears only in the context of a song description, in this case “Stars and 
Stripes Forever,” a “Sousa March.”   50
The mode of thought we have characterized as “sonic modernity” crystallized only after 
1900. And while we have gone to great lengths to argue that this mode of thought arose in 
response to a panoply of cultural, economic and technological forces, it is also true that “forces” 
are not the immediate agents of historical change. Individuals are. In the case of sonic modernity, 
the “cunning of history” employed the labor of many actors, but none as crucially as the group of 
men calling themselves the Victor Talking Machine Company of Camden New Jersey.  
The phonograph industry induced many of the same anxieties spurred by other industries 
of the late nineteenth and these anxieties were partially attributable to a discursive disjuncture 
between the reassurances desired by the public and those stale guarantees offered by record 
manufacturers. The exponential growth of the industry, for example, presented its participants 
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with a collective action problem: how to police quality and comportment among thousands upon 
thousands of strangers. Since commodities themselves no longer presented to the eye the proof 
of their own value, the misbehavior of a minority of industry participants could have dire 
consequences for all. This tendency was nowhere as threatening than among the phonograph 
exhibitor, an often itinerant variety of phonograph man whom the public held in generally low 
regard by the late 1890s. In 1896, an unidentified industry insider spoke to the Chicago Daily 
Tribune, regarding the value of the phonograph in electioneering efforts. “Though he may be 
regarded in the light of a ‘faker,’” he began, the phonograph exhibitor “is nearly as valuable an 
adjunct to the campaign as the best of stump speakers…” The following year a phonograph 
exhibitor visited in prison one Frank Butler, the notorious “Murderer of the Blue Mountains,” 
paying him to speak into the phonograph and to commit a few lines of his poetry to paper. When 
it was discovered that the verse was plagiarized, Butler protested that he had never claimed 
original authorship and that the phonograph exhibitor had chosen to market the poem to the 
public as such. Commenting on the dispute, the San Francisco Chronicle asked glibly, “between 
a phonograph man and Ashe [alias], murderer of the Blue Mountains, whom would you 
believe?” The writer admitted that “Ashe, or Bulter, may have slain Captain Lee Weller and 
young Osborn and robbed Frank Harwood—committed crimes that would have exhausted the 
angel to record…” but still, he wondered, “is his repute for veracity therefore lower than the 
status of the show man of the vocal cylinders?”   51
Legitimate exhibitors, recognizing their poor reputation in the public’s mind did all they 
could to enforce standards of decorum among themselves. William S. Wrote to the Phonoscope 
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to warn his co-laborers off of street exhibition as it degraded the enterprise in the minds of 
observers. C.F.D. Of Pottsville, Pennsylvania, responded to his missive with one of his own, 
arguing that street exhibitions had in no way impaired his reputation nor his machine, though he 
admitted “I do not expect the elite of the town nor society people to patronize me.” In some 
cases, the conscientious exhibitor could expect the discerning consumer to separate wheat from 
chaff. Such was the case in Maine when audiences “criticized keenly” the low quality records 
carried by marginal exhibitors. On the other coast, however, the market for phonograph 
exhibitions proved vulnerable to a kind of sonic Gresham’s Law.  John Monroe wrote to the 52
Phonoscope: 
In regard to the business, I may say that up to the first of April it was fairly good, but 
since that it has been very light, though last week was a great improvement. There is no 
use in mincing the matter, the cheap machines and cheap records have knocked the life 
out of the business. When you see two great “lubbers”—big burly men—going around 
the country with a machine that costs $10.00—and records that cost 50 cents each and 
only about twelve records at that, surely the business is getting into a corner… Now what 
is a fellow to do that has a first-class machine that costs $100.00? With records that cost 
$12.00 per doz[en]…?” 
Good records and phonographs looked an awful lot like bad records and phonographs. Any doubt 
over which was which was sure to multiply the legitimate exhibitor’s troubles. Another problem 
occasioned by the rapid expansion of the industry and its attendant anonymity lay in the 
difficulty of procuring accurate information about the state of the business. In 1898, “J.K.” 
Complained in a letter to the Phonoscope that “for some time an unknown person has been 
causing unpleasant rumors to travel among the talking-machine fraternity…” These “unpleasant 
rumors,” he said, spuriously claim that “this or that concern… is going to suspend business or 
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they are on the verge of bankruptcy or are going to introduce some vast improvement on the 
machine which will revolutionize the business…” This irresponsible chatter had “reached 
various dealers and caused considerable anxiety and unpleasant feeling for the parties 
involved…”   53
Columbia, owing to changes in the legal and technological structures of the recording 
industry, shifted dramatically toward sonic modernity beginning in 1893, increasingly 
conceptualizing records as captured performances by performers. Still, Columbia’s approach 
remained distinct from the Twentieth Century paradigm, and would remain so until after the turn 
of the century when it absorbed the tactics of a new entrant to the industry— the Victor Talking 
Machine Company.  
 Phonoscope, July 1897, 11; Phonoscope, November 1896, 14; Phonoscope, May 1898, 10; 53




Beginning in the 1880s new organizational, legal, and mechanical technologies permitted 
manufacturers of consumables to capture hitherto undreamed-of economies of scale and to place 
their foods, drinks, and drugs in markets far-removed from their points of origin. In 1906 the 
United States Congress responded to an increasingly strident call on the part of their constituents 
to do something about the state of affairs elucidated by muckraking journalists. The muckrakers 
certainly did their part in galvanizing attention on the shortcomings of commercial food 
processing, but the behemoths of industry had hardly to be dragged kicking and screaming into 
the era of federal oversight. The new legislation promised to wipe away a welter of state and 
local policies inhibiting interstate commerce. It drove smaller, less economically-efficient 
competitors onto the shoals of increased costs, draining their coffers. Most importantly, the 
legislation served to protect food packagers’ most ephemeral form of capital— the trust and good 
will of the American public. Rather than a unilateral victory over corporations by the democratic 
polis, the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 marked the ascendency of a new sensibility 
emphasizing cooperation over competition; long-term planning not only in the production of 
commodities but also of consumer demand; and a muted distinction between politics and 
commerce, state and corporation. Most importantly, this new sensibility entailed an 
!190
aestheticization of efficiency, system, and rationalization that elided the differences between 
mechanical and social technologies.  
That same year The Victor Talking Machine Company of Camden New Jersey rolled out 
its new “price agreement,” a complete overhaul of its distribution policies calculated to solve 
problems very much like those faced by food packagers. The gigantic scale of the phonograph 
industry had recently brought consumers into relationships and transactions made opaque by the 
fog of social and geographic distance as well as the accelerating pace of technological change. 
These consumers faced no perils directly parallel to sawdust-infused bread or poison patent 
medicines. But the purchase of a phonograph— just like that of processed foodstuffs—pushed 
before them the same anxious questions: am I receiving something valuable for my hard-earned 
money? Is this the “real thing?” The Victor Talking Machine Company, more so than any firm 
before it, seized on the problems of opacity and market value, expertly assuaging the anxieties 
introduced by the market to sell phonographs and records. Like the food packagers and their 
cronies in Washington, the strategies Victor enshrined in its 1906 price agreement drew on the 
cluster of political-economic-aesthetic notions constituting the Progressive Era sensibility. The 
firm sought to rationalize its supply chain, tamping down competition in favor of cooperation 
between dealers, distributors and the manufacturer and it worked mightily to keep prices for its 
goods consistent from one corner of the country to the other. It cultivated in Victor Dealers a 
kind of commercial virtuosity hiding the artistic “craft” of distribution and sales at the same time 
that it efficiently converted stock-on-hand into revenue.  
The result of Victor’s efforts in this direction was the semiotic concealment of the 
company’s distribution infrastructure. As dealers and distributors more and more closely 
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approximated the behavior deemed ideal by the Company, so too disappeared the signs of 
mercenary mass commerce—market competition, supply and demand, anonymity, the uncertain-
ness of value. Like an expertly-crafted machine, the infrastructure’s silent and invisible 
operations underwrote a feeling of magical productivity. The Victor Talking Machine Company 
forwarded its brand as a placeless, timeless, transcendent and non-contingent guarantor of 
Quality (always capitalized in company communications.) In place of a multinational army of 
distributors and dealers and freely-floating prices and uncertain value the company offered its 
ubiquitous trademark—a phonograph-transfixed terrier known to the world as “Nipper.”  At the 
same time that these maneuvers concealed the fraught relationships of capitalism, they also 
capitalized on longstanding bourgeois notions of aesthetic excellence predicated on the 
transcendence of material determinants, and the rejection of the pragmatic or “useful.” Here as 
elsewhere, the economic prerogatives of capital and the psychic needs of consumers came 
closely entwined with contemporary aesthetic ideals. 
The Victor Talking Machine Company 
The rise and fall of the North American Phonograph Company represented a joining and 
then parting of ways between two of the three major commercial-technical tributaries of the early 
phonograph industries. While the Edison and Columbia factions were mingling and then un-
mingling their money and manpower another stream in the corporate history of sound recording 
took shape under the hand of a man named Emile Berliner. While working as a dry-goods clerk 
in D.C. the German emigre had developed an early microphone design, sold it to the Telephone 
Company and then entered their employ as an inventor. In this capacity he became an expert in 
sound science and technology and soon directed his talents toward the phonograph. He came to 
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suspect that the sonic distortions of the Edison and Bell-Tainter designs were introduced by 
mechanical resistance of the medium to the stylus’ vertical incising/indenting procedure and in 
1886 he began experimenting with a laterally undulating stylus. To his great satisfaction, the 
process produced louder and more distinct recordings. Berliner secured a patent for his talking 
machine in November of 1887 and spent the rest of the 1880s working to perfect this new entry 
into the phonograph wars— the “gramophone.” His design featured a rotating flat disc traced by 
an arm-mounted stylus guided by its own weight in the spiraling groove of the record— a setup 
which would eventually become the basis for all phonographs in the twentieth century. In late 
1889 Berliner traveled to Germany in order to exploit his invention in the form of a talking doll 
and a small hand-powered toy phonograph but returned to the United States in 1890, determined 
to establish the gramophone as a serious reproducer of words and sounds. After trying 
unsuccessfully to sell the invention to Jesse Lippincott, Berliner endeavored to market his 
invention through a number of ephemeral companies, the last of which was the Berliner 
Gramophone Company incorporated in October of 1895. In the months that followed the 
Berliner Company established marketing agreements with at least two subsidiary companies, 
including the New England Gramophone Company and the New York Gramophone Company.  1
Frank Seaman, proprietor of the New York Gramophone Company, proved adept at 
advertising and marketing the gramophone and in October, Berliner handed over to him the 
contract for the entire United States. Almost from the outset, however, the relationship between 
the two companies was fraught. Seaman complained incessantly about the quality of Berliner’s 
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machines and pushed the company for new catalogue items including a coin-operated 
gramophone and a model to compete with cheap phonographs produced by their competitors. 
Most importantly, he believed that the company’s supplier for spring motors, one Eldridge 
Reeves Johnson, was charging too much and came to suspect (correctly) that the Berliner 
Gramophone Company were in bed with Johnson, inflating the cost of his spring motors and 
passing those costs (and Berliner’s 40% markup) onto him.  
A distressingly capacious contract clause allowed Seaman to source machines or parts 
elsewhere if they could be produced at similar quality at lower cost. In late 1897 he contracted 
with another manufacturer to make 2000 spring motor gramophones and the Berliner Company
— assured of their 40% royalty— allowed the transaction, but henceforth refused to honor 
Seaman’s right to source machines elsewhere. Relations soured between Seaman and the 
Berliner faction. In February Seaman organized the Universal Talking Machine Company for 
two purposes: the legitimate outfitting of Berliner machines with coin-op mechanisms for sale; 
and the decidedly less-than-legitimate ambition of marketing gramophones in Belgium. Berliner 
had not licensed Seaman to sell in Belgium nor was the gramophone protected by patents there.  
At the same time Seaman continued to push for a cheaper machine and initiated plans to 
construct one through his Universal Talking Machine Company. Berliner refused to allow it and 
in early 1900 Seaman’s patience gave out. He secured a license from Columbia to manufacture 
his new disk talking machine, dubbed the “zonophone,” under the Bell-Tainter patents. And then 
in May a pair of legal maneuvers by the Columbia Phonograph Company culminated in an 
injunction against Berliner, prohibiting the company from selling gramophones in the United 
States. The Berliner faction responded by shunting their operation into a new entity called the 
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Consolidated Talking Machine Company of America and handing marketing and sales over to 
Eldridge Reeves Johnson. Columbia, unfazed by Berliner’s shell game sued Johnson in October 
for violation of the Bell-Tainter patents. Despite Columbia’s backing, Seaman’s run as a 
phonograph mogul was short-lived and National Gramophone Company dissolved in September 
1901, a casualty of bad press and worse sales.   2
The following month E.R. Johnson formally re-organized the gramophone interests under 
his own hand, incorporating the Victor Talking Machine Company. Until now Columbia’s patent 
infringement suit against the Berliner faction loomed in the background but was laid to rest in 
January 1902 when E.R. Johnson purchased the Globe Record Company of Milburn, New Jersey
—Columbia’s sole disc record source. The company was forced to the table and within weeks 
had agreed to retire their suits against the Berliner faction. In exchange Johnson sold Globe to 
Columbia and foreswore any possible patent-infringement suits against Columbia’s disc 
graphophone.  3
Disappearing Infrastructure 
The Victor Talking Machine Company represented a dramatic new approach to the 
business of selling sound. Before the relationship soured between Seaman and the graphophone 
faction, the former had done remarkable promotional work, most notably drawing on his friend 
George Eastman’s half-tone Kodak advertisements for his own work. From the outset, the old 
Edison Speaking Phonograph Company had been hobbled by its inability to stabilize its 
infrastructures. Its suppliers missed deadlines; its products refused to work for customers in 
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distant locales; and its agents proved inept or sometimes even mendacious. The ESPC’s lack of 
resources—financial, technological and legal— ensured that these problems would remain 
insuperable. Similarly, the North American Phonograph Company had struggled to overcome 
geographic and social distance, but eventually collapsed under the strain. Victor set out to 
overcome these obstacles to profit by all means necessary.  4
To begin with, Victor sought to overcome the informational bottlenecks which caused so 
much dysfunction in their forebears’ operations. From 1906 on, Victor sent to all of its 
distributors, jobbers and salesman a trade journal called The Voice of the Victor, and used its 
pages to establish a kind of company “public sphere.” On one hand, the Company presented this 
publication and other written communications as helpful guides to the niceties of phonograph 
and record sales, encouraging graders to “absorb from Victor literature all the information you 
possibly can concerning Victor Records,” so that they might “get the Victor Record business 
right at your finger tips.” But under the geographically-distended circumstances of corporate 
capitalism, dealers, jobbers and distributors shared relationships with their suppliers (and with 
each other) which were especially opaque and which could engender distrust. It was absolutely 
necessary, then, for the company to provide a platform for the dissemination of information and 
in order to establish a degree of transparency for its geographically-dispersed agents. One area 
well-sown with the seeds of discord was the question of advertising. If Victor failed to 
sufficiently advertise its products, the company’s retailers would suffer. Further, the Company’s 
continuous injunctions for dealers to run their own local advertising, in that case, would 
represent a particularly damaging “passing of the buck.” In order to prevent this resentment and 
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reassure dealers that their advertising dollars were being matched and surpassed, The Voice 
regularly touted its advertising expenditures. In 1907 Victor installed at Broadway and Thirty-
Seventh Street in New York a “great sign… 50 feet wide, by 40 feet high” featuring the 
company’s trademark fox terrier listening to a Gramophone. In producing this, “the largest and 
most expensive sign in the world,” The Voice informed readers, “the Victor Company…feels that 
it is advertising every Dealer in the United States, and there is no question but that the influence 
of this great sign reaches from Maine to California, from Canada to the Gulf, and in fact all over 
the world.” In September a column heading in The Voice read “Victor Advertising, Covers the 
Country, Every Dealer Receiving Direct Benefits Therefrom…” The piece begins “do you realize 
what the Victor Company’s advertising is doing to help you sell goods?…” before proceeding to 
an in-depth discussion of the company’s advertising expenditures. Pointedly, The Voice reminded 
its readers “it only remains for you to make yourself known in your community to obtain your 
share of this splendid Victor business.” Dealers could pitch in for local printer’s ink, The Voice 
reassured them, secure in the knowledge that Victor was doing its part.   5
Just as mysterious were the mechanisms by which Victor determined prices, and the 
company was ever vulnerable to dealers’ accusations that factory cost figures had been inflated. 
In March 1907 The Voice published a table showing the increasing cost of raw materials over the 
past three years. Nearly all of the phonograph’s constituent materials had become more 
expensive and The Voice “hoped that the struggle the Company is making to absorb these heavy 
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advances in the cost of manufacture themselves…will cause Distributors and Dealers to be more 
loyal than ever to Victor goods.”  6
Victor’s efforts to establish a “public sphere” highlights the cooperative and voluntaristic 
element at work in its approach to their infrastructure. But there were obstacles to these methods, 
none more intractable than the careless disregard of company communications by some dealers. 
Ironically, the reach of Victor’s industrialized communications infrastructure proved a liability in 
some cases, such as when The Voice warned readers “our letters, even though printed, should not 
be carelessly passed over and classed as circular letters. The only reason they are printed is 
because it is absolutely impossible to simultaneously write ten thousand personal letters…” 
Victor’s robust (if tendentious) traffic in information, then, had to be bolstered by elements of 
coercive control, the centerpiece of which was the 1906 Price Agreement. This set of contracts 
between Victor on one hand and their dealers and distributors on the other, formed the basis of 
the company’s project of infrastructure maintenance for the better part of a decade. The most 
important element of the new Price Agreement was the establishment of set prices for all 
transactions. Every Victor product would be sold by the factory to all distributors at the same 
price. Distributors were to sell Victor goods at the same price to every dealer and dealers were 
obliged to do the same in retailing to the public. Prices were set by the Company itself and 
communicated to the trade via periodically-updated price lists.  7
Victor employed a number of measures intended to prevent cheating. The 1906 contracts 
dictated that dealers and distributors “co-operate in absolute good faith with the Victor Talking 
 Voice of the Victor, March 1907, 7.6
 Voice of the Victor, January 1910, 6.7
!198
Machine Company and inform them direct of any person, or persons… who, not being entitled to 
them, are enjoying our discounts.” More generally, the contracts stipulated that signees “inform 
us direct of any dealer who is not living up to the contract system.” Recalling the Edison 
Speaking Phonograph Company’s earlier efforts to pit agents one against the other, Victor’s 
efforts in this direction were generally successful, though not without their own liabilities. In 
January 1907 The Voice cautioned its readers “The Victor Company trusts that all Dealers will 
use discretion and be careful to enter only just complaints against their fellow Victor Dealers…
an accusation against a Dealer on mere hearsay is unjust and unpleasant to all concerned.” Given 
their position at the nodes of distribution, distributors were charged with policing duties. Not 
only were they responsible for signing their own agreements with the Company but were also 
charged with securing signed Victor dealers’ contracts from their buyers and sending proof of the 
same along to the factory. For a time, it was necessary for dealers to send triplicate copies of 
their Victor contract to distributors who, in turn, remitted them to the factory. After undoubtedly 
losing many contracts in the mails, Victor began in 1907 issuing identification cards, to be 
presented with all first-time orders. Distributors’ contracts further stipulated that they “must keep 
a register or list of the serial numbers of all machines sent to dealers and be in readiness to 
supply the Victor Talking Machine Company with information relative to the said goods at any 
time.” Having built a network of legitimate, contractually-bound dealers, Victor was anxious that 
distributors sell to those dealers, and those alone.   8
If these pre-emptive ounces of prevention failed to bring about salutary results, Victor 
stood at the ready with a—usually coercive—pound of “cure.” Beginning in the September 1906 
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issue, The Voice published the names of dealers suspended for failure to abide by the terms of the 
agreement. The company and its network of dealers took the suspension list seriously, and in 
1910 the Company suspended in one fell swoop nine dealerships on New York’s East Side. In 
New York and elsewhere suspension served both as a humiliating deterrent to those who might 
cheat as well as a formal “blacklist,” informing distributors that they were no longer permitted to 
sell to the parties named.  
In particularly egregious cases of contract violation the company could (and did) sue. 
Such was the implicit threat of a September 1907 The Voice article warning “the Victor 
Company’s position in this matter [of establishing sales prices] is beyond question, the Federal 
Courts having sustained them in their action, and Victor Dealers will either maintain the prices 
fixed by the Company, or suffer consequences.” In 1908 Victor sued a price cutting New York 
dealer for patent infringement and was awarded an injunction against the dealer as well as 
damages amounting to $59.87. In September of the following year The Voice crowed with a 
headline reading “Price Cutting Suits from the Atlantic to the Pacific” before detailing the 
outcomes of suits filed in New York, Toledo and Portland. These, the magazine assured readers, 
were “only a few of the suits which have been instituted by the Victor Company for the benefit 
of Victor Dealers and Distributors.” If any doubts lingered concerning Victor’s commitment to 
the price agreement, they were dispelled in 1911, when an Eastside Victor Dealer was thrown in 
jail. He had earlier been fined $1500 for violating the Company’s patent rights and had failed to 
pay.    9
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In the final reckoning, however, Victor relied less on policing, espionage and lawsuits 
than they did on appeals to their dealers’ self-interest. In a 1906 Talking Machine World article 
reprinted in the May issue of The Voice the author conceded that some “new or ill-informed 
talking machine dealers, and even jobbers are wont to question the utility of the agreement” and 
that “many look upon it as being somewhat dictatorial or as a scheme of the strong manufacturer 
to coerce the dealer into doing something for the sole gain of the former.” Fortunately, however, 
“the reputable dealer now sees the price agreement in an entirely different light and knows by 
practical demonstration that it is an instrument designed primarily for the good of the dealer, and 
that he is the greater gainer by its protection.” “Where,” asked the author, “is there a person who 
doubts that a manufacturer now selling his wares under price agreement principles could sell 
more goods (and get just as much for them wholesale) than if he should lay aside the price 
agreement?”   10
Eldridge Reeves Johnson and his lieutenants were not merely trying to maximize short-
term profit and they were not acting (necessarily) in the interests of their distributors and dealers. 
The company was, in fact, engaging in a more complex, more “twentieth century,” calculation. 
One aspect of this more sophisticated economic calculus involved the semiotic value of prices 
themselves. In the same article quoted above, the Voice continued on, arguing that “the 
manufacturer gets comparatively little benefit, except in so far as it prevents the wholesale 
cutting of prices which ultimately would destroy the reputation of his product…” [emphasis 
added.] So much depends on this “except.” Capitalizing on the circular semiosis so familiar to 
scholars of consumer capitalism, phonograph manufacturers (and especially Victor) recognized 
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that the price of their goods were themselves commodities to be consumed. Consumers would 
grasp for any signal that might relay information about the worth of a prospective purchase and 
higher prices suggested higher worth. This semiotic quirk could be employed in any number of 
situations: one Cedar Rapids dealer, for instance informed The Voice that “two-cent stamps are 
used by the firm on all advertising matter,” owing to the fact “that the replies are 50% greater 
than when one-cent postage is used.” Elevated prices signaled value. On the other hand, the act 
of merely stabilizing prices imparted its own measure of perceived value. Drifting prices 
suggested the opaque and anxious set of processes and relationships that characterized capitalism 
of the old variety— the irrational, inhumane, and unrefined “Devil catch the hindmost” 
capitalism of the Gilded Age. In January 1907 The Voice published a letter from an unidentified 
(and probably fictitious)Victor customer, who allowed that “one great thing about a Victor is—
it’s the same price wherever you go. When you buy a Victor you know that you are paying just 
what each and every other Dealer in the United States would charge you. When bargains are 
offered, you immediately know that the original price permitted undue profits.” Stable prices 
represented control. Rationality. Floating prices represented the irrational and inscrutable 
mechanisms of capitalism.  11
The impetus to stabilize prices dovetailed with a contemporary preoccupation with high 
modernist “rationalization” of economies. The wasteful anarchy of open competition, in this 
understanding, should be supplanted with a new political economy of cooperation. In September 
of 1906, The Voice of the Victor praised one of its distributors who had recently “greatly 
developed Victor business in their territory by exploiting new avenues of trade without doing the 
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slightest injury to neighboring Victor Distributors, [and] In fact, their neighbors’ Victor business 
has increased largely in the same time.” Victor’s tendency to view their supply infrastructure in 
cooperative rather than competitive terms escalated in the years to come. A 1908 meeting of the 
National Association of Talking Machine Jobbers elicited from The Voice of the Victor the 
opinion that “the concerted action of Jobber, Dealer and Manufacturer has eliminated many of 
the obstacles that retard healthy and satisfactory progress.” In November of that year, the 
magazine expounded even more floridly on the same theme: 
The Victor Company is proud of its Dealers. Proud of the good work they are doing. 
Proud of the splendid organization that binds together in one great, harmonious working-
body the Dealer, the Jobber, and the Victor Plant. The French people use a very 
expressive phrase-esprit de corps… Esprit de corps doesn’t translate into English very 
well, but its essence is co-operation, party spirit, enthusiastic action in a general 
undertaking. Co-operation is acquired only by organization, and organization means—
Power. 
The Voice’s ecstatic praise of its collectivized sales force matches the most millenarian of high 
modernist rhetoric, whether of the democratic-capitalist or socialist variety. What was sought 
was a machine of flesh, steel, and information, conveying merchandise outward and profit 
inward.   12
But just as in the case of maintaining prices, Victor’s engineering endeavors in the realm 
of economic efficiency meshed with its semiotic project. At the 1913 meeting of the National 
Association of Talking Machine Jobbers at Niagara Falls, Victor’s General Manager Louis F. 
Geissler expressed his desire that Victor dealers in all localities establish merchants associations 
among themselves, the object being simply to get acquainted and fraternize with your 
competitor; to eliminate hoggishness; to educate one another; to do away with unbusinesslike 
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methods, unbusinesslike and unprofitable offerings.” Along with whatever other benefits might 
be derived from such associations, Geissler argued, “the entire community will notice the change 
in atmosphere, the courtesy of one Dealer towards another… The atmosphere of complaint, of 
doubt and of insinuation, which now permeates to the factory, will be well nigh removed…”  13
Finally, the price agreement served to police Victor’s distribution infrastructure—
specifically its vast army of dealers—at two opposite margins. On one hand, the Company 
shunned the mass distributors much-loathed by the country’s “mom and pop” businesses. The 
Voice reminded readers that “where there is no price agreement covering an article it is most 
often, if not always, sold by the stores at a reduction in price that the dealer cannot meet.” A 
similar point was made by a dealer from Savannah, Georgia, who noted in his published letter to 
The Voice that mail-order houses generally will not handle a product which they cannot steeply 
discount. The pricing agreement kept such firms out of the market with the result that 
independent Victor dealers could successfully compete.  
At the other extreme, the Company wished to exclude from the ranks of its dealerships 
such concerns as might be described as “fly by night.” Under the 1906 agreement, distributors 
were prohibited from giving dealer’s discounts to “anyone but a regularly established talking 
machine dealer in Victor goods.” Even more importantly, they were to recognize as new dealers 
only those parties who owned a “regularly established store, or place of business,” and who 
would “buy an initial order of three Victor machines, of different styles, and one hundred Victor 
records.” “Small Dealers with ragged stock,” The Voice informed its distributors, “can never be 
genuine Victor Dealers.” The author conceded that “competition can generally [be] alluded to as 
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‘the life of the trade,’” but argued “it is no encouragement to a Dealer, nor is it good business on 
the part of Victor Distributors, to have a half-dozen little Dealers in a town or city that can only 
support or justify one or two, carrying a ‘right’ stock.”   14
By engineering infrastructure makeup in this way, Victor cultivated an army of middling 
proprietors. These men were neither soul-sucking national retailers driving honest businessmen 
into bankruptcy nor their counterparts, the proletarianized and precarious smalltime shopkeepers 
clinging to commercial life by methods degrading or immoral. By refusing to scatter their wares 
across legions of marginal dealerships, however, Victor also sought to achieve a critical density 
of merchandise within dealerships. Dealers with such superabundant stores were “in a position to 
display the goods to a better advantage, which in time has a tendency to promote their sales.” 
The showroom, the Company believed, should appeal to the eye’s love of abundance at the same 
time that it indicated the dealer’s faith in Victor goods (dealer’s paid for merchandise up front.) 
To incentivize them to pursue the Company’s cornucopic ideal, special discounts were extended 
to any dealer who placed a one-time order of $500 or more.   15
Intimately wound up in the aesthetic and economics of middling proprietorship pushed by 
the Victor Company, was a sense of bourgeois self-assuredness. During the rollout of the new 
price agreement in 1906 The Voice informed its readers that the Victor dealer would receive “the 
profit he is entitled to,” allowing him to “prosecute his work of selling Victors without having to 
think about unfair competition.” When in 1908 Victor once again tightened the rules on small-
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time dealers The Voice justified the ratcheting down by expressing a desire that “those now 
handling our product may never be in fear of some poor representation being placed with some 
very weak merchant, a barber shop or other undesirable person.” One letter—purportedly from a 
dealer—offered that “from the day the contract went into effect, the honest dealer has not been 
afraid to ask the full list price and stick to it, for the dishonest dealer is no longer getting the 
goods.” Furthermore, the dealer need not worry about investing in a large amount of stock 
because “he knows that no one can undersell him and he can make a good straight legitimate 
profit with no trouble.” The cultivation of middling proprietors not only looked good (to 
customers) but also felt good (to dealers.) Assured of their spot at the well of profit, Victor 
hoped, the dealers would spurn the mercenary behavior associated with the impersonal mail-
order houses as well as the stench of proletarian necessity.   16
Of course, all of this represented so much leading a horse to water and the intransigent 
equine in question might choose not to drink. The price agreement, therefore, also entailed a 
certain coercive tendency that helped ensure that dealers would seize the opportunities afforded 
them by the Company. Victor’s emphasis on dealer cooperation was not meant to suggest the 
cessation of all competition. To the contrary, The Voice insisted that ”no one has a right to 
complain of legitimate competition, and stimulating competition is the end sought by the Victor 
Company in the rulings sent out from time to time under the contract system.” But what form did 
this “legitimate competition” take in the minds of Company management? In March 1909 The 
Voice informed readers “no other Dealer can sell Victors at a lower price than you—you are 
protected against price competition. But some Dealers outstrip others in their Victor enthusiasm. 
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That’s something the Victor Company can’t protect you against— and you shouldn’t need it.” 
Price-cutting was illegitimate competition. With that option taken off the table, the Victor dealer 
had no choice but to cultivate enthusiasm for his job. If any dealers remained confused about the 
relationship between fixed prices and personal effort, Lewis Kean Cameron of Chicago’s 
Wurlitzer Company expressed the point concretely, telling dealers that “your knowledge of 
Victrolas, your ability to print your selling arguments clearly, your power to impress your 
customers favorably, your personality, are all the ‘inducements’ you can offer as a Victor 
salesman to persuade your prospective purchasers to place his order with you. So it is up to every 
salesman to increase his personal efficiency to the utmost.” The Victor dealer could not sell a 
cheaper phonograph than the dealer across town, but he could advertise more, learn his product 
line thoroughly, refine his sales pitch and make his store more appealing.  17
The Company hoped that with these incentives and disincentives in mind, dealers would 
turn their attentions to the subtleties of sales and psychology, ultimately cultivating a kind of 
commercial virtuosity that replaced the mechanical aptitude demanded of an earlier generation of 
phonograph purveyors. In a prize-winning essay entitled “Four Elements of Success in 
Increasing Record Business,” F. Hess of Cleveland, Ohio enjoined his fellow dealers to “be 
familiar with your stock, the names and numbers of records, especially the popular ones… When 
[a customer] calls for a record by name or by number, you should be able to wheel about, pick it 
out of the rack, and turn it loose at once…” Hess linked this need for competence to the demands 
of efficiency, but also recognizes a certain kinesthetic component to the art of selling: “It is a 
wonderful help in selling records if you can move along smoothly and swiftly, answering 
 Voice of the Victor, January, 1907, 7; Voice of the Victor, March, 1909, 8; Voice of the Victor, March, 17
1913, 16.
!207
questions as they are put instead of stammering and fingering through a catalogue.” In October 
1913 The Voice again emphasized the value of a refined comportment: “Almost every day, 
certainly every week, you meet some one whose way of doing things or saying them excites your 
admiration. Don’t you suppose the same qualities which excite your admiration have the same 
effect on others?”   18
Beyond expertly handling records, the dealer was expected to become adept at reading 
the customer, able to “study his tastes, and anticipate his wants” with the aim of being able to 
“sell him more than he intended to buy when he first came in your store.” In a regular article 
entitled “If I were a Dealer,” Victor customer F.W. Lawson made an impassioned plea for 
profiling, writing that “a great deal can be learned from a person’s dress, from his, or her 
conversation, from the neighborhood in which they live, by approximating their apparent age.” 
Further, in watching customers at his local Victor dealership, Lawson had discovered that “in 
eight cases out of ten, the people who wear the loudest clothes like the liveliest records.” Victor 
sometimes went to great lengths to inculcate the values of commercial virtuosity called for in the 
pages of The Voice. In 1911 the Company offered to all dealers an index system consisting of 200 
cards packed in a handsome oak case with alphabetized dividers for easy reference. Each card 
was to represent a dossier on a single customer, with space given at the top for name and address 
but also for the style of machine purchased and on what terms—cash down or payments. These 
final two pieces of information would assist later in determining what grade of records to try and 
sell him or her, with operatic and symphonic selections trotted out for those with plenty of 
money and more earthy fare for those with little. As the customer returned for record purchases 
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in the months and years to follow these purchases too would be recorded, as would “information 
regarding names of her friends who enjoy the Victor, little characteristics, family history, etc., 
that have come under the observation of you or your salespeople…”  19
Victor was also quick to offer dealers’ advice on their showrooms and here, The Voice 
was just as eager to impress upon their reader’s a disciplined middle-class aesthetic. The 
magazine praised Sol Bloom’s Philadelphia dealership for its “handsome interior furnishings,” 
“beautiful mural decorations,” and its use of electricity, noting that these refinements served as 
“a source of admiration to the visitors who form the vanguard of fall patronage.” In 1908, the 
Phillip Werlein Co. of New Orleans refurbished its Victor department and moved it from the 
fourth floor of its building to the ground floor. The Voice noted that these “arrangements for the 
comfort and convenience of patrons are said to be the finest and most complete in the South.” 
And at the Pittsburgh showroom of McCreery & Co. “a delightfully hospitable appearance is 
presented by the deep luxurious chairs scattered about the studio, while the artistic atmosphere of 
the place is heightened by its beautiful pictures, statuary, tapestries and Oriental rugs.” As if to 
underscore the domesticity of the space, the author noted that “the parlors are provided with all 
the comforts and conveniences of a private music room…”  20
The politico-economic-aesthetic project undertaken by the Victor Talking Machine 
Company sought to conceal from view the mechanisms of corporate capitalism. Factory-set 
prices denied the primacy of the irrational “higgling of the market,” while culling mail-order 
houses and “shoestring operators” from its sales network meant Victor could distance itself from 
 Voice of the Victor, May, 1908, 8; Voice of the Victor, July 1913, 8; Voice of the Victor, January-19
February, 1911, 4.
 Voice of the Victor, Sept, 1908, 2; Voice of the Victor, May, 1913, 5.20
!209
the sociological pathology represented by proletarianization as well as “the trusts.” At the same 
time, the progressive ideal of cooperation over competition entailed a smooth interplay between 
manufacturer, distributors, and dealers, central to keeping the Company’s mechanism humming 
along quietly under the hood where no one would notice it. Further, the price agreement ensured 
a kind of infrastructure transparency, reassuring individual dealers that their colleagues were not 
underselling them, and in turn, removing their own motivation to cut prices. The dealer could fill 
his store with Victor goods, ask full price for them, and cultivate a familiar easiness with his 
stock and his craft, replacing the old phonograph purveyor’s mechanical aptitude with a 
virtuosity in salesmanship.  
Within the dealership itself, the company encouraged its proxies to strive for a decidedly 
non-commercial presentation, with the intended effect being that of the bourgeois parlor. Even 
the salesman’s comportment could come laden with disconcerting evidences of the wider 
commercial context, and he was instructed to avoid habits that might interrupt the unconscious 
set of psychological processes leading from unarticulated desire to consummated sale. Of the 
adept salesmen, The Voice said “he knows the exact place where each record can be found, so 
that he can hand it out the minute it is asked for” the reasoning being that “people who are 
patient enough at any other time are always in a hurry when they go to buy anything,” and that 
“if you keep them waiting a few minutes they may change their minds.” Whether intentional or 
not, however, The Voice’s advice on this count did more than capitalize on the impetuous 
psychology of consumerism. It also served to conceal the network of relationships standing back 
of the sale. In 1907 The Voice asked distributors to evaluate the quality of the dealers they 
worked with: “does he keep his stock up-to-date, and so arranged that he can fill 75 per cent of 
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his orders from hist stock on hand? Or must he give the stereotyped reply to the request for 
certain numbers: ‘I haven’t them in stock, but will send for them?’” The sales clerk who did not 
master his craft failed to produce for customers the drama of commercial abundance demanded 
by the Victor Company. He thrust in his customers’ faces the exact reality that the magic of 
consumer capitalism sought to conceal: that the goods were not safe and familiar productions of 
the native soil, but rather mysterious fruits of indeterminate value, produced by distant and 
possibly dishonest hands. They had to be “sent for.”  21
Quality 
When the magic was performed with due diligence however, the occlusion of labor and 
capital presented yet another problem—an “agency gap.” Who was responsible for these 
machines and these records and these advertisements that arrived, as if by magic, in one’s life? 
The phonograph would not foist on anyone fraught or opaque capitalistic relationships, but it was 
just as disconcerting to have no one to credit—or blame—for the machine’s existence. To allay 
these anxieties the Victor Company offered itself as an omnipresent guarantor of “Quality.” 
Victor’s close association of the company, its products and its agents with a nearly reified 
conception of “Quality” was demonstrated by The Voice in 1907: 
…The success of the Victor is built on one idea, ‘Quality.’ No effort or expense has been 
spared in making the Victor a perfect exemplification of all that ‘Quality’ stands for. The 
markets of the world are sought and searched, and that which is ‘best’ is all that is good 
enough for the Victor. No single detail in the manufacture of the Victor is less important 
than another, be it Cabinet, Motor, Horn or Record. The Dog, and the word ‘Victor,’ 
wherever they appear, stand for ‘Quality.’… Your store should look ‘Quality’; your 
advertising talk ‘Quality;’ Your salesmen should so study the Victor and Victor Records 
as to become imbued with the full meaning of Victor ‘Quality.’ The Victor has ‘Quality,’ 
and ‘Quality’ sells.  
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In its pursuit of this “Quality” the company grew increasingly anxious to control the optics of its 
infrastructure, replacing the anarchy of thousands of self-directed agents with a centrally-planned 
aesthetic uniformity.   22
One of the most obvious manifestations of this effort was Victor’s ever-evolving 
approach to advertising. While the Company was for a while content to handle its end of the 
bargain by running manufacturer’s ads in national magazines, the years leading up to WWI 
found the company increasingly willing to lend its hand to the shaping of dealers’ and 
distributors’ advertising efforts. The Company stood at the ready with a line of “Ready-Made 
Newspaper Electrotypes.” Expertly crafted by Victor’s in-house marketing department, these 
mass-reproduced and uniform advertisements were sent to dealers for only the price of postage. 
Those agents who insisted on going their own way with their marketing efforts were encouraged 
to send in recently designed ads to the Voice of the Victor. These were made the subject of an 
occasional column called “Good Advertisements Made Better,” in which their submissions were 
streamlined, de-cluttered, and amped up in conformity with the attention-grabbing advertising 
philosophy of the day. Starting in 1912, the Company intensified its efforts to place uniform 
promotional copy and illustrations before the public, instituting a number of innovative ad 
campaigns. In March, for example, The Voice informed readers that since “there is hardly any 
class of advertising more immediately profitable for Victor Dealers in cities than street-car 
advertising,” the Company was offering to send to all dealers free ready-made placards for that 
purpose. Beginning the following month dealers could order from the Company lantern slides 
advertising their store as the local Victor agency, and “arrange to have them shown nightly at the 
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moving picture parlors.” The dealerships themselves, as the brick-and-mortar instantiation of 
Victor’s project of ubiquitous excellence, came in for especially intense branding. In June of 
1912 The Voice announced that the Brilliant Manufacturing Company of Philadelphia had agreed 
to manufacture “Victor” signs for dealerships, 13 feet long by 3 1/2 feet tall and lighted by 14 
electrical lamps. The Pennsylvania Rubber Company of Jeanette, Pennsylvania, could supply one 
with a sturdily-made door mat, whose center had been inlaid with the Victor fox terrier logo and 
“His Master’s Voice.”   23
The provisions of the price agreement had done much to militate against the dealer’s 
natural tendency to serve self-interest at the expense of the Company and the customer. Still, he 
or she presented a potential threat to the promises of unmediated “Quality” made by Victor. The 
solution to this dilemma lay in co-opting the Victor Dealer (always capitalized like a proper noun 
in company literature) into the brand itself. This could entail relatively straightforward marketing 
strategy, as when The Voice insisted that “it’s right up to each Victor Dealer to associate his store 
so closely with the Victor and Victor advertising, that he will be turned to as the right place for 
the right kind of Victor service.” Similarly the magazine urged its readers in October 1913, that 
“not only should your advertisements be coupled with ours in the daily papers…” but one should 
also “have your local sign painter or card-write prepare a series of cards using the same wording 
as the headlines of the advertisements, [and] place them in your windows and about your store.” 
If these measures failed to assuage prospective buyers that the man before them was truly a 
“Victor Dealer” the salesman’s body could even be colonized with the Victor logo. By 1912 the 
company had “completed arrangements with a leading manufacturer” to supply “His Master’s 
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Voice” watch fobs (sterling silver) and scarf pins (sterling silver or 10-karat gold) to the trade. 
The following year, they made available to dealers a key ring of the same type.  24
The most intensely scrutinized aspect of the dealership, however, was the store window. 
In Victor’s evolving attitude and approach to window dressing lay clues to the complex 
relationships that obtained between Victor’s aesthetic and economic prerogatives and the cultural 
and material contexts in which the Company pursued them. In the spring of 1906 the Company 
held a window-dressing competition between dealers with a purse of several $10 prizes and a 
$50 grand prize. Photographs of the winning entries, which ran in the May issue of The Voice, 
evidenced a decidedly earthy tone on the part of the dealers, many of whom had taken inspiration 
from the Easter holiday. The window of C.W. Hjort of Ottawa, Kansas, featured three Victor 
phonographs on a straw-strewn floor surrounded by chicks and rabbits. A banner above read 
“The Old and Young Chirp For The Victor.” Ottawa evidently boasted more than one window-
dressing prodigy and Hjort’s competitor George Mauck, upped the stakes when he depicted his 
own clutch of Easter chicks in ‘a typical Kansas chicken house’” with walls “made of old boards 
covered with newspapers, roughly patched with Victor signs.” Similarly, the Grand Prize Winner 
featured “4 large rabbits and 50 small ones crowding up to hear the stunts” performed by a Victor 
No. 4 phonograph. The background “was made of green baize to carry out the forest effect and 
decorated with an arrangement of transparent trade-mark pictures,” while “the floor of the 
window represent[ed] a hilly glen, entirely covered with natural moss.”  
Other windows depicted concrete scenes of phonograph consumption, often placing them 
in motion or outdoors as if to emphasize their readiness to move into the consumer’s life. A 
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Detroit window designed by Max Strassburg, for example, depicted a woman reclining with 
parasol in the stern of a canoe, serenaded by a large-horn Victor phonograph. In 1909, Lyon & 
Healy of Chicago developed a window depicting “a forest glade with realistic accessories in 
which a charming lady was entertaining her husband in hunter’s costume before the flap of their 
tent with a Victor talking machine.” The Voice added that “no effect of theatrical art was missed 
in making this picture the similitude of fact and the manikins were well disposed and lifelike.”  25
Victor was loath to discourage initiative on the part of its agents, but as the Company 
refined its own aesthetic sensibility it grew dissatisfied with the general quality of these window 
displays. A frustrated note published in the March 1909 issue of The Voice enjoined dealers to 
“get away from the idea that window display means jamming the whole window full of samples 
of everything you carry in stock. A few articles in a window will attract more attention than a 
window that is crowded; and the people will be more impressed by what they see because they 
are not confused by a multitude of articles.” Two years prior, the magazine had praised as 
“beautiful,” “very attractive,” and “most appropriate to the season” a remarkably busy window 
by the Musical Echo Company oh Philadelphia. A variation on the canoe-woman-phonograph 
theme, it featured two female mannequins, a pair of crossed oars, fishing rods, polo equipment, 
tennis racquets, a life-size replica of Nipper and two Victor phonographs in addition to the 
aforementioned watercraft—all in front of a rough-hewn log pavilion.   26
This kind of Victorian bric-a-brac would no longer pass muster, but fortunately, a solution 
to this anarchic state of affairs had been germinating for several years in the mind of one Ellis 
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Hansen the window dresser for Victor dealer Sherman, Clay & Co. of San Francisco. In 1906 the 
San Francisco Earthquake destroyed Hansen’s workplace and home, and he was forced with 
many thousands of others to set up camp outside the city. A week before the earthquake he had 
received news that his entry in The Voice window dressing competition had won a $10 prize, and 
as he tossed and turned with a hollow belly beneath the California stars, he clutched that thought 
like a talisman against his miseries. As Hansen told it, on the second night of his wilderness 
sojourn he dreamt that his prize window could be reproduced over and over and shipped to all 
Victor dealers in the country. He shared the idea in a letter to Victor’s General Manager who 
politely declined Hansen’s advice. Two years later, however, the Company concluded that their 
dealers did, in fact, need all the help they could get, and tapped Hansen to run their new “Ready-
Made Victor Windows” department.   27
At its inception, this “department” consisted of Hansen, an artist, and an errand boy, but 
quickly grew to a fifteen-person outfit when orders started pouring in for the windows. 
Notwithstanding this augmented workforce, the Company struggled to keep up with demand and 
was critically behind in the filling of orders by September of 1909. By April 1912, Victor 
claimed to have sent Ready-Made windows not only to every part of the United States but also to 
”England, France, Germany, Cuba, Porto Rico, Philippine Islands, China, Japan, Mexico and 
South America.” In 1909, The Voice apprised readers of just how this business of Ready-Made 
Windows worked. After assembling a new window design at the factory “each display is 
photographed…and all the paraphernalia and parts are neatly marked for identification so that 
any one who gets the parts can easily arrange the same display…” The ready-made window 
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display together with photograph and complete instructions were then packed for shipment and 
sent out to dealers. The displays themselves consisted of three elements the first of which was a 
range of heavy-duty “paraphernalia”— connecting rods, platforms, frames, record display easels, 
and the like. A complete set of this paraphernalia cost the dealer $18.50 but could be used with 
all subsequent Ready-Made designs. Secondly, most of the Ready-Made designs required the use 
of actual Victor products—machines and records—and these were to be taken, presumably, from 
the dealer’s own stock. Finally, the focal point of each window display consisted of painted 
cardboard and paper elements which were to be mounted on the aforementioned paraphernalia.   28
The manufacture of these elements entailed a Warhol-esque production process in which 
the initial design was created by artists and then handed over to teams of artisans whose job it 
was to turn one piece of art into hundreds or thousands. The paint shop replicated by hand copies 
of the artists’ painted backgrounds and other elements, while a group of female employees was 
set the task of coloring enlarged photographs for use as cardboard cutouts. In another area 
employees—also mostly women—designed and cut out stencils and hand-lettered display cards. 
Having wended their way through these sub-departments the Ready-Made Window Displays 
were taken to the Packing and Shipping Room, where they were sent out to the nations Victor 
dealers. The Voice emphasized that by manufacturing these constituent parts in bulk and 
spreading the cost over hundreds or even thousands of dealers, materials costs were slashed. 
Even more importantly, the program “makes it possible for Victor Dealers everywhere to avail 
themselves of the services of a high-priced window designer at the very lowest cost.” Victor, in 
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other words, had ingeniously massified the traditionally imaginative labor of window-dressing, 
driving down its cost by centralizing it and capitalizing on economies of scale. The Voice hit 
even more explicitly on the centralizing tendency of the Ready-Made windows in October 1910, 
informing readers that “their small cost enables even the smallest Dealer to take advantage of the 
original ideas of this biggest and best department of its kind in the world.”   29
Hansen emphasized the connection between the Ready-Made Windows and the ethos of 
virtuosity imposed on dealers by the price agreement, arguing that since “bargain sales, cut 
prices and other foolish inducements are out of the question for Victor Dealers, it becomes still 
more important to induce people to come to your store through well-dressed and interesting 
window displays.” The aspiration of providing dealers with “well-dressed and interesting 
window displays” meant that Hansen’s Ready-Mades dripped with a particular sensibility— one 
that tells us much about the project pursued by his employer, the Victor Talking Machine 
Company. First, they tended toward a highly-muted representationalism. Dealers’ windows had 
often favored outdoor scenes with fake grass and animals— sometimes listening to a phonograph 
which was thereby situated as a concrete material presence within the imaginary world of the 
scene. Other dealers’ windows employed mannequins grappling with the ready-to-hand world, 
camping or canoeing while enjoying their Victor machines. In the early Ready-Made Window 
displays, human beings have moved from depictions of flesh-and-blood human beings to 
depictions of gilt-framed portraits of human beings— now no longer consumers of the 
phonograph but the opera stars whose records the Company hoped to push. Phonographs in these 
 Voice of the Victor, March, 1909, 3; Voice of the Victor, September-October, 1910, 14.29
!218
displays are turned outward at the “fourth wall” emphasizing the non-representational aspect of 
their presence and blurring the line between the display and its audience.   30
The approach of the early Ready-Made Windows is geometric and the dominant motif 
here is the circle. Forward-facing phonographs presented viewers with a battery of circular horn 
mouths and in most designs this effect was compounded by dozens of easel-mounted disc 
records. These records, in turn, were displayed in sweeping curves, ovals, and circles, reiterating 
the radial logic of the horns and disc records at a wider angle of view. Further, an 
uncompromising symmetry pervaded the first catalogue of Ready-Made windows, pushing the 
eye toward the middle of the window and emphasizing the predominance of center over 
periphery. In some designs, the domination of center over periphery was made especially 
explicit. Victor Window No. 3, the “World’s Greatest Singers Display” featured a circle of twelve 
disc records mounted on easels at the center of the field. To each was appended a white streamer 
running outward and connecting to a placard featuring a profile of the recording star associated 
with that record. The display is intensely radial in its symmetry, conjuring the octopus of 
“influence” so loathed by political cartoonists.   31
The appearance of the Ready-Made Window displays represented a tightly wound chord 
of material and intellectual influences. One one hand, Victor sought to impose its taut conception 
of aesthetic refinement and to that end, the designs embodied the “weightless,” ethereal, 
detached tone of much fin-de-siècle bourgeois culture. Artistry in this vein entailed denial of the 
day-to-day, the tawdry, and the instrumental. Chicks and bunnies (which may have come to 
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Easter through a syncretic relationship with earlier pagan fertility rites) had to go. Folksy 
camping and canoeing mannequins had to go. In their place, Victor offered rarefied and abstract 
geometric motifs that denied the material circumstances of production— and reproduction. On 
the other hand, this aesthetic was partially dictated by the limitations of the medium. The Ready-
Made displays had to be made cheaply and, above all, that meant simplicity. If the artists 
produced backdrops too finely wrought for the painters to duplicate at top speed they would be 
worthless—dealers could not afford to pay for the requisite labor. For the same reason, three-
dimensional design elements were supplanted in large measure by flat cardboard cutouts, 
colorized photographs, and placards, which were far cheaper to make and ship through the mails. 
In any event, the first batch of designs ranged in price from $.80 to $10.05.  
But here we have come full circle, because the material and economic constraints that 
shaped the materiality of the displays were also constituent elements of the social reality to 
which the bourgeois aesthetic was an intellectual response in the first place. The visual 
vocabulary of sparse, decontextualized abstraction stood as an aesthetic corollary to the 
rationalized and abstract notion of “value” embedded in the capitalist cash nexus. It is the same 
abstraction that Newton forwarded in his understanding of mathematics as the language of nature 
and which Descartes forwarded with his evacuated, context-less understanding of space. It is the 
same abstract and context-less metaphysics that underwrote the Early Modern faith in the 
equality of human beings, independent of accidents of birth or breeding. The Ready-Made 
Windows spoke in the language of the bourgeois aesthetic— a language meant to deny the 
mercenary and grasping implications of “art with a purpose.” But this language of simple, 
iterated, geometric designs also owed its existence to the shaping power of these same 
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capitalistic productive forces. The aesthetic was a triangulation of these two influences—the 
strictures of economical fabrication and distribution on one hand, and the psychological impetus 
to deny those very circumstances of production, on the other.  
The Early Modern world which had underwritten the faith in abstraction as the King’s 
Road to understanding had also insisted on a theoretical, disembodied and neutral observer to 
epistemologically “center” the world. “Objectivity” in scientific representation required the 
natural philosopher to look past the accidental and create an image of nature that denied the 
specificities of this or that specimen and the interpretive quirks of the imperfect observer. The 
abstract equality of men found realization in the equal subjection of all to the laws of the 
superordinate state. Similarly, the intense symmetry of the Ready-Mades tended to direct the eye 
toward the center of the field and in many cases, the domination of center over periphery was 
made explicit. Another Ready-Made, Victor Window No. 7, the “Special Thanksgiving Window” 
conveys the same visual language of a dominant center and an ancillary periphery, but with one 
more semiotic valence. Here fourteen disc records form a circle at the center of the field. 
Radiating outward from them are 14 pennant shaped placards labeled with genres of recordings
— vaudeville records, band records, minstrel records, and so forth— the assemblage strongly 
evoking a sun.  One of the most deeply resonant applications of solar imagery in modernity was 32
that of France’s Louis XIV who declared himself the “Sun King,” a title which declared his 
supremacy and centrality in all affairs of state. Importantly, the title also emphasized the 
unmediated subjection of all parties to his authority. The feudal world had been built out of a 
universe of personalized relationships, suffused with local and contingent circumstances of 
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tradition and prescription, the sovereign’s authority exercised only through intermediaries. The 
Sun King concealed his network and insisted on unmediated authority over all his subjects. The 
promise of “Victor Quality” rested on a similar politico-economic-aesthetic mechanism. The 
Company—represented by its omnipresent trademarks—guaranteed Quality. The conception of 
“quality” which the Victor Company worked toward drew on nineteenth century ideas of artistic 
transcendence in which works denied the material circumstances of their production to attain 
something higher. This Progressive Era understanding of excellence lent to Victor’s 
infrastructure-building project a peculiar tendency: infrastructure—whenever possible—had to 
be made invisible. The tawdry business of getting and spending; of supply and demand; of 
competition; and distribution chains had to be hidden from eye. 
Conclusion 
In early 1910 The Voice of the Victor announced a change of policy regarding their line of 
Ready-Made Windows. “Since issuing our first catalog of window displays” they informed the 
trade, they had “learned that a special window devoted to one particular artist, or in 
commemoration of national holidays like Thanksgiving Day or Christmas, is the true way to 
create strong and convincing advertising from show window display, and our future windows 
will be built accordingly.”  As promised, the Company’s window designs abandoned hardline 33
abstraction in the months to follow and depicted concrete people and concrete events. The 
cautious first steps of this evolution can be seen in Ready-Made Windows erected at the National 
Association of Piano Dealers Convention in Richmond, Virginia, a few months later. The display 
belonging to the Cable Piano Company, recapitulated Hansen’s earlier preoccupation with circles 
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and radial symmetry, but the rarefied geometrics of streamers and pennants have been replaced 
by a circle of outward-pointing brass and wind instruments. The window belonging to the Victor 
Company was overseen by Hansen himself, and retained the earlier radial orientation by placing 
disc records and portraits not on a floating (and inconspicuous) iron frame as earlier, but on the 
extravagantly fanned tail feathers of a peacock. In these two windows, recording stars are 
depicted, but in both cases they’re penned up inside classical conventions of representation. In 
the first, the disembodied heads of John Philip Sousa and Arthur Pryor peer out from behind 
rings of laurel. Caruso and Melba[?] are corralled in like fashion in the second window, but a 
third Ready-Made display erected by the Walter D. Moses Company abandons the convention of 
containing recording stars, and features a not-quite-lifesize cardboard cutout of Enrico Caruso. 
The familiar ring of records persists in this design but encircles and focuses attention on Caruso. 
The ubiquitous Victor phonographs have been pared down to a duo of machines, while the 
musical instruments depicted in the first window are echoed by a pair of pianos.   34
Representationalism proliferated in the months that followed. Window Display No. 24, 
featured a Fourth of July motif with cardboard cutouts of the “Spirit of ’76” fifer and drummers. 
Victor Grand Opera Window Display No. 25 “the great proscenium arch of the Metropolitan 
Opera House…reproduced in exact miniature, as regards both design and colors.” The five foot-
wide stage was crowded with cardboard cutouts of Victor opera stars, each seventeen inches tall. 
A set of “magic lantern” slides offered in May jettisoned direct appeals to buy for images of 
Caruso, Melba and others performing scenes from Faust. Nipper persists in heeding His Master’s 
Voice in these images and the Victrola remains. But both have diminished drastically in size and 
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have moved out of the center of the images. The most dramatic development in aesthetic policy, 
however, happened in Victor’s Ready-Made Windows Department, which unveiled its first 
motorized display October 1911. Three cutout figures from Faust stand interspersed with 
phonographs and records. “Faust hesitates to enter into the bargain proposed by Mephisto, who 
thereupon tempts him with the vision of the beautiful Marguerite at her spinning wheel…the 
right foot of Marguerite is treading the pedal, and the wheel is kept turning, just as though the 
figure were human and actually spinning.” Another mechanical window prepared in time for the 
1912 holiday season depicted a grand opera stage with glowing stage lights, raising and lowering 
curtains and six scenes which automatically changed between “acts.”  35
There had existed for several years indications that Victor’s vision of rarefied and 
timeless “Quality” would have to be amended as dealers—intermediaries between factory and 
consumer—had long resisted the Company’s totalizing vision. In 1913 L.K. Cameron described 
in a letter to the Voice a window display built by the Rudolph Wurlitzer Company: 
Everything in it is absolutely natural. We have real grass growing, live plants, a small 
lake with real water, in which young ducks are swimming, three large wild ducks and 
two live rabbits. There is also a real waterfall running continually…There is a small 
log cabin built in the background, and this also is built of real logs… The Victrola is 
placed, naturally, in the foreground, as if someone has been playing the machine and 
left a couple of records lying about. The folio for Victor records is conveniently 
attached, and a ‘Book of the Opera’ is laid where the owner of the cottage placed it as 
he went into the house.” 
That same year, the E.W. Owen Company of Mankato, Minnesota built a display window 
featuring “a background of green oak boughs, which it is necessary to replace every other day.” 
A fire pit made of “common boulders, laid upon a bed of ashes, in which is imbedded an electric 
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light bulb with a dark red paper covering” accompanied a Victrola “upon a natural stump sawed 
off just at the surface of the ground.” Grass mats, wind-blown by an electric fan, lay scattered 
around a tent, inside of which the window dresser “carelessly threw an old pair of boots and a 
couple of blankets, and other articles which might be found in any camper’s outfit.” At the same 
time, the refined domesticity of the ideal Victor showroom seemed, for some dealers, unequal to 
the imaginative work of selling phonographs. True, the transformation of a commercial space 
into a residential space represented a kind of creative sleight-of-hand but some dealers seemed 
alive to more expansive possibilities for their showrooms. A year after Sol Bloom refurbished his 
Philadelphia location, he did the same for his dealership on Fifth Avenue. Among the “unique 
demonstrating apartments” he built in the basement was one built to look like “a ship’s cabin, 
with the familiar port-holes and swimming fish in inclosure; a Japanese tea room, cool and 
restful;” and “a Greek room, in strictly classical style.” He later added an “Egyptian Room” as 
well as a room decorated as a “rustic garden.” Similarly, Wanamaker’s Department Store in 
Philadelphia hosted regular phonograph concerts in their newly-built “Egyptian Hall,” apparently 
“a veritable temple of music;” decorated with “allegorical figures symbolic of Music,” “massive 
pillars,” “huge Sphinxes”and richly-stained glass, wrought appropriately into mouths of the 
Egyptian lotus.”  36
The Victor Talking Machine Company discovered that in distributing phonographs and 
records, no less so than in building railroads or selling sausage, space is money. The torrents of 
production unleashed by late nineteenth century improvements in manufacturing, finance, 
accounting and labor management required a concomitant increase in the scope of distribution. 
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More products have to find more buyers. But while space holds out the promise of increased 
efficiency and profits it also provokes anxieties. For the consumer, the problem is one of value: 
Is this good… good? What is it worth? The very long distances and obscured relationships 
entailed in bringing a Victrola to Ottawa, Kansas, ensured that the price attached to it was 
difficult to assess. How much money did the cigar-smoking suits in Camden make off the sale? 
The varnishers, and carpenters, and mechanics? The railroads? The distributors? And that 
grinning, slick-haired wag at the dealership—what was his cut?  
Further, how could all of this getting and spending produce anything of artistic value? Art 
is the province of magnanimous and aristocratic souls like Signor Caruso—not that of carpenters 
and porters and salesmen. In order to assuage these concerns, the company worked intensely to 
remove the phonograph from the semiotic taint of industrial capitalism. It strove first to conceal 
the tawdry and rapacious mechanisms of industrial capitalism and then sought to replace them 
with the optics of cooperative and fair petty bourgeois capitalism whose commitment to 
excellence was guaranteed by a monolithic mythical entity called “Victor,” representing less the 
brick-and-mortar institution headquartered in New Jersey than a transcendent, timeless and 
placeless distillation of the Platonic ideal of quality. The obfuscating primacy of “quality” could 
help to further conceal the mercenary underpinnings of the sale. After all, The Voice informed 
readers, “price is the last consideration when you get the thing you really want.”  37
Victor sought to assure consumers that its products were worthy of their consideration, 
and to that end pursued a strategy very similar to that of its corporate contemporaries Nabisco 
and Quaker Oats. Under the geographically-distended circumstances of consumer capitalism, 
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brandnames and trademarks provided some assurance of quality but they also helped to de-
emphasize the troublingly un-coopted intermediaries between the factory and the breakfast table. 
The Victor brand assured customers that what they were buying was true “culture” and not some 
adulterated version thereof. But Victor mounted this campaign just as the discursive parameters 
of “culture” were changing. Starting around the turn of the twentieth century, the Arnoldian 
formulation of culture as “the best that has been thought and said,” began to lose purchase in the 
popular mind. What replaced it was, in many ways, an exact inversion of the older bourgeois 
ideal. Instead of art as the capturing of placeless, timeless, abstract “truth” it became an arena for 
“authenticity.” Rather than the refined and the perfected, audiences increasingly yearned for the 
“undiluted” and the “real.” Roosevelt’s injunction to embrace the Strenuous Life found middle 
class men (and women) leaving behind their parlors for weekends of camping and canoeing, but 
it also came as part of a larger complex of ideas about the real and the ideal, the beautiful and the 
ugly.  
In removing from view their commercial infrastructure, Victor contributed unwittingly to 
a larger current of cultural transformation. With the social apparatus of distribution swept out of 
sight, a new understanding of sound recording capitalizing on and reinforcing the newfound 
valorization of “authenticity” was given breathing room. The effacement of commercial 
infrastructures, however, represented a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence 
of sonic modernity. In the next chapter we turn to the evolution of phonographic apparatus, and 
its implications for the perception of recorded sounds.  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CHAPTER V 
Not a Machine 
By 1913 the modern trade in talking machines no longer relied on public exhibitions, 
business rentals, or even nickel-in-slot arcades but on domestic consumption. Victor, Columbia 
and Edison now manufactured phonographs principally for private domestic use and these 
machines and their ubiquitous cylinder and disc records had insinuated themselves into millions 
of middle class parlors in the United States and beyond. In that year Louis Jay Gerson, head of 
the Talking Machine Department at Wanamaker's Department Store of Philadelphia offered to 
readers of The Voice a few observations on the development of the trade. The modern business of 
"selling sound," said Gerson, lay in the phonograph parlors of the 1890s, but the parlors 
ultimately presented an obstacle on the road to massification because a great many people could 
not go to them. Gerson was correct; most Americans lived outside of the densely-inhabited 
regions where the phonograph parlor made "business sense," and even though single or paired 
coin-slot machines occasionally thrived in small towns or even rural outposts this was a game 
hardly worth the serious capitalist's candle. On the other hand, the phonograph parlor itself—
owing to its social promiscuity and its association with commerce, transience, prurience and 
crime—would have discouraged the custom of many middle class consumers. No, the 
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phonograph parlor would never do. "As all the homes could not come to the amusement parlor," 
Gerson recalled," the phonograph had to go to the homes."   1
Pursuing this tack, however, had required more than convincing Americans that they 
wanted a talking machine in their homes. Beginning around 1900, manufacturers and dealers had 
to build new infrastructures to make the phonograph a plausible and profitable home commodity 
and this entailed reconfiguring the material “infrastructure” of the phonographic apparatus itself, 
as well as the less-tangible web of information and money on which the apparatus relied. First, 
the phonograph of 1895 had been mechanically incompatible with domestic consumption as it 
relied on electric motors requiring either dangerous, messy and unreliable batteries or “wall 
current,” a rarity in all but the wealthiest homes. Another source of power was required. At the 
same time, the phonograph industry had lacked the financial technologies necessary to move the 
phonograph into the home. In the 1890s, the nickel-in-slot attachment had facilitated a kind of 
free market “socialization,” spreading the cost of recorded sound out over hundreds or even 
thousands of anonymous strangers. After 1900, the phonograph still cost more than most 
individuals could (or wanted to) put on the hogshead, but allowing the million into one’s parlor 
to help subsidize a phonograph habit one nickel at a time was an unworkable solution. The 
financial relationships implicated in the phonograph purchase, no less so than the mechanical 
“infrastructure” of the apparatus itself, required a thoroughgoing reconfiguration. 
Other peculiarities of the domestic phonograph market intensified the need to re-
configure infrastructures. As phonograph consumption shifted from the arcade to the home, the 
industry also changed its focus from the sale of phonographs themselves to the marketing of 
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cylinder and disc recordings. Ranging in price from less than ten dollars up to several thousand 
dollars, the talking machine promised a healthy commission for the enterprising salesman and 
manufacturers were no less gratified to see their talking machines find takers. But manufacturers 
in particular came soon to recognize a potentiality embedded in recordings that was not matched 
in the talking machine itself, nor in any other commodity for that matter: Recordings held out to 
consumers the promise of infinite novelty. We discuss why that was in Chapter 6 but for now it is 
enough to say that the perception of unlimited variety among record consumers meant the 
possibility of infinite sales for the industry. Because of this enthusiasm for record sales, the sale 
and delivery of a home phonograph marked only the beginning of the dealer’s relationship with 
the consumer. An ongoing commerce in information, money, material, and expertise was 
required to keep the phonograph and its owners regularly consuming new releases.  
In other words, the industry’s infrastructure of people and things had to be stretched to 
encompass not only the factory, the warehouse, and the salesroom but also the customer’s home. 
To begin with, the mechanical infrastructure of springs and gears inside the phonograph could 
cease performing satisfactorily over time. If the phonograph stopped working or if it reproduced 
scratchy or “out of tune” music, consumers would have little incentive to rush out and buy new 
records every month. For this reason, manufacturers and dealers sought to control the use, 
maintenance, and repair of phonographs even after they were ensconced in consumers’ homes. 
That ambition on their part implicated them in long-term and sometimes intimate relationships 
with their customers. But even with a perfectly functioning talking machine in the parlor the 
consumer might still lose interest in purchasing new records once the novelty of his or her 
phonograph had worn off. The industry responded to this threat by staying in regular contact 
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with talking machine owners through the mails, through personal visits and by engineering 
excuses to bring him or her back into the dealership.  
Just as with other phases of the talking machine industry, the home phonograph required 
not only that the industry build sturdy infrastructure, but also that that infrastructure be 
streamlined, smooth, “noiseless” and, whenever possible, invisible. To begin with, this emphasis 
on streamlined efficiency was a natural implication of the network’s raison d’être. The fewer 
problems with the transmission of money, material and information; the fewer occasions on 
which the phonograph stubbornly asserted its own mechanical “agency” (which in any event also 
disrupted the transmission of money,); the less likely the infrastructure would be noticed in the 
first place. But beyond this concern with operational efficiency, manufacturers paid special 
attention to the semiotics and materiality of their wares as elements of the home and worried that 
sonic, material or aesthetic obtrusiveness would disrupt the regular reciprocal flow of money and 
shellac. They worked, for example, to make the phonograph purchase one in which the customer 
“wouldn’t even miss” the money spent, and they encouraged consumers to place phonographs 
and records in non-obtrusive places once they were inside the home. Finally, inconspicuous 
infrastructures also served the bourgeois aesthetic ideals on which the phonograph industry 
aspired to build a national industry—consumption dissociated from production. In the years 
following 1900 phonograph design evolved to conceal the mechanisms inside, and absorbed 
more and more of the trappings of respectable parlor furniture. Within the home, the phonograph 
and its attendant paraphernalia were expected to offer no reminders of the tawdry and unartistic 
market relations on which its existence actually depended. Similarly, manufacturers increasingly 
programmed consumers’ interactions with the apparatus out of the machine itself, designing, for 
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example, phonographs that rendered longer and longer programmes of music without human 
intervention. Phonographic sound itself was subjected to this operational sleight-of-hand, with 
manufacturers striving to eradicate all traces of the mechanical from the sound of their talking 
machines. In this way was created and sustained the myth of sonic modernity— that of artistic 
achievement democratized without the intermediary agency of labor, commerce, or technology. 
Building the Domestic Phonograph Infrastructure  
Louis Jay Gerson’s 1913 retrospective suggested another “wrinkle” in the history of the 
domestic phonograph: No facet of the phonograph’s mechanical evolution proved as important 
for this new market than “…the equipping of machines with spring motors as an adjunct to 
electric motors with storage batteries.” The possibility of a clockwork phonographs seems to 
have exercised Edison’s mind almost from the beginning of his experiments in recorded sound. 
Very early in 1878, he began experimenting with motors and was certain by early February that 
the clockwork phonograph was just around the corner. Ten days later he conducted an 
experiment using “a very hard thick foil… a proper point agate and a good governor on the 
clockwork” and concluded “I can never hope to get it to speak plainer.” Charles Cheever of the 
ESPC visited Edison and saw the clockwork motor in early March and reported that it appeared 
promising. By the end of March papers were reporting on Edison’s clockwork phonograph motor 
as all but accomplished.   2
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September, 1913, 13; Thomas Alva Edison to Clarence J. Blake February 9, 1878 [Supplied year, month, 
and day] (TAEMX011AA); Charles Augustus Cheever to Uriah Hunt Painter March 12, 1878 (TAEM 
X154A2AU); “Edison: Perfecting the Phonograph Beyond Even the Dreams of the Caricaturists,” New 
York World, March 24, 1878; Washington Post, March 29, 1878, 1.
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Edison associate Edward Johnson was conducting researches into clockwork motors 
around this same time, and, like Edison, believed that the talking machine would be successfully 
mechanized any day. Certain that a motorized phonograph would prove a boon to his own 
exhibiting career, he had contracted clockmaker Henry Loriot to construct a motor for his 
exhibitions. Unfortunately, Loriot “made a miscalculation as to power” and ended up creating “a 
beautiful piece of mechanism” that didn’t function. Nonetheless, the clockmaker promised 
Johnson a working motor by the time of his exhibition in Rochester, New York, on February 12 
and did in fact deliver such a mechanism into Johnson’s hands before he left that morning. 
Unfortunately, it was insufficiently robust in construction and was “broken by N.Y. Central bag 
smashers”— most likely before Johnson had a chance to exhibit it. Despite these setbacks, it 
appeared to all interested parties that the project remained an achievable goal and in March the 
ESPC issued a circular promising exhibitors a clockwork motor in the near future. 
Characteristically, the assurances of Edison and his circle proved premature and the clockwork 
motor remained an elusive dream for the first generation of phonographers.   3
A second key piece of the phonograph’s evolution after 1900 entailed the development of 
a new technology—fiscal rather than mechanical—facilitating the movement of the technology 
into private homes en masse. Earlier, phonograph parlors had overcome a specific set of 
political-economic obstacles. Practically no one could afford the purchase and maintenance of a 
talking machine, but the coin-slot attachment facilitated a kind of free market “socialization” of 
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the phonograph, allowing users to rent or buy its output in three-minute increments. But the 
phonograph was now set to move out of the public arena; away from the massed bodies on the 
sidewalks, and boardwalks and train depots; away from the staging ground of collectivized 
culture and economy. It was moving into the cloister of the middle class home, where it would 
labor for the nuclear family alone. The considerable cost of the phonograph could no longer be 
spread out laterally through social space but it could be spread out over time and this is the 
solution hit upon by the phonograph industry. The phonograph’s birth as a piece of domestic 
technology came about and was intimately tied up with the proliferation of consumer credit in 
the form of the “installment plan.” 
For those unaccustomed to cash transactions, “buying on time” represented a strange 
modern innovation. To help assuage potential customers’ anxieties on this count, phonograph 
dealers early on enveloped their installment plans in a social fiction— the “phonograph club.” 
The purpose of this fiction is not entirely clear, but might have assured consumers that their 
relationship with the dealer (which smacked of irresponsible indulgence or even dishonesty) was 
no anonymous transaction. Rather, it was a part of a socially embedded institution, one of civil 
society’s oldest intermediary organizations— the fraternity. In 1900 Murray, Blanchard, Young & 
Company announced to readers of the Boston Globe that, through their “Club Plan” one could 
take home an Edison phonograph, “complete with records, horns and all sundries.” All 
phonographs could be had “on terms in proportion to the amount of purchase” with payments as 
low as $1 down and $1 a week. Most enticing of all, the phonograph purchaser would have “full 
benefit of its use and pleasure while paying for it.” The “phonograph club” proved an intuitive 
way to sell consumers on credit and the idea proliferated in the coming years. In a circular sent 
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out by dealer Alfred K. Hobbs of Manchester, New Hampshire, the dealer informed prospective 
customers that by paying a small “membership fee” and promising to remit weekly “dues” 
amounting to between 75¢ and $3, club members could have their own phonograph. After a 
stipulated number of dues payments, the machine would belong to them, free and clear. J.B. 
Ashby’s Rockdale, Texas, dealership developed an approach to credit that capitalized on 
customers’ sense of chance and play. Every week, the twenty members of his “phonograph club” 
paid $1 into a general fund and then participated in a drawing, the winner to receive a 
phonograph. Every member promised to pay for 20 weeks but was excluded from future 
drawings once he or she had won a machine. The commercial fiction of the phonograph club, 
eventually gave way to the more mercenary language of “installments” familiar to later 
generations of consumers. By 1907, Cressy & Allen were selling phonograph outfits “on terms 
from $1 to $5 down and the balance in small payments.” W.J. Dyer & Brother put out Victor 
products for “a small payment of $3, $4 or $5 and the balance in payments of $1 or $2 a week. 
D.A. Devinell informed his fellow Edison dealers that his terms were simply “$1.00 down and 
$1.00 per week on Phonographs…”  4
At the same time that phonograph clubs were becoming installment plans, the practice of 
extending consumer credit to phonograph purchasers proliferated widely. In 1906 Talking 
Machine World remarked that “the installment business in all grades of talking machines has 
grown to enormous proportions” and cited one dealer to the effect that 60 percent of all talking 
machine sales were conducted on a credit basis. In 1907 E.E. Forbes Piano Company of 
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Birmingham, Alabama, claimed that at least 90 percent of its talking machine business was done 
on installments. While dealers extended customers’ credit from their own capital, the Big Three 
had begun to take notice of the practice of installment selling and and were actively encouraging 
it. In the summer of 1903, the National Phonograph Company had surveyed some of their dealers 
and found that the installment “method of doing business” was a winning proposition and that 
six of them, in particular, had “made a lot of money by selling our apparatus in this manner.” 
Edison Phonograph Monthly assured dealers that if they too adopted an installment scheme they 
“would meet with unqualified success.” The following May, the Columbia Record noted with 
approval that department stores carrying the company’s products were doing “a great amount of 
instalment [sic] business.” Victor proved uncharacteristically sluggish in its response to the 
growing craze for “paying on time,” but by 1907 they too were encouraging dealers to institute 
installment plans. In May the Voice, informed its readers that “arguments in favor of the 
Installment Plan are convincing” and that “the Victor Company endorses everything that has 
been said in favor of this method.”  5
The institution of installment payments opened the wallets of consumers who could not 
afford the outlay required for a phonograph purchase. For example, the Columbia Record argued 
that while “selling goods on instalments [sic] is a radical departure from the old-time methods of 
doing business,” the practice had allowed “graphophones as well as many other luxuries of life… 
[to find] their way into thousands of American homes where hitherto they were unknown.” 
Similarly, Grinnell Bros.’ Department Store emphasized the massive marketing potential of 
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selling phonographs on the installment plan: “there are thousands and thousands of people who 
want a talking machine, but cannot pay the full price in cash for it, while they could pay for it if 
given a chance, at the rate of from $1 to $2 a week or from $5 to $10 per month.” The author 
knew what he was talking about. In the previous year his department had sold 5,000 talking 
machines, with 75 percent of those paid for in installments. An Indiana dealer made the ultimate 
claim for the democratizing tendencies of the installment plan, writing of the phonograph that 
“anyone who can afford it cannot afford to be without it. And anyone can afford it with our 
payment system.”  6
These advantages notwithstanding, many dealers, according to the December 1905 
Edison Phonograph Monthly, had “not given the subject proper thought,” and had developed a 
“considerable prejudice” against the idea of installment sales. A year and a half later the 
magazine still groused about those stiff-necked dealers refusing to offer payment plans and 
characterized them as provincials whose businesses were “usually in the smaller towns.” But 
dealers’ anxieties on this count were not entirely unfounded. In New York, an Edison jobber 
named Victor Rapke helped break up a “swindling gang” guilty of taking out talking machines 
on the installment plan, selling them at steeply discounted prices to the public and then 
disappearing without making payments to the dealership. With Rapke’s help the police 
apprehended gang member Jack Greenfield but unfortunately, his accomplices had already fled 
the city, possibly to cause mischief in other jobbers’ territories. Another dealer found that while 
the majority of credit customers honored the terms of the sale, “a very few proved what we 
would call bad pays; that is, paying about half to three-fourths, the balance being difficult to 
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clean up.” Two to three percent of the machines put out were “entirely lost,” presumably neither 
paid off nor retrieved. For a great many talking machine dealers, however, the dangers were well 
outweighed by the rewards, particularly when they were able to hedge their riskier bets. D.A. 
Devinell of Des Moines, Iowa, in addition to securing a signed “rent bill” and promissory note 
from installment customers, sometimes also required that they pay half the machine’s price as a 
down payment. This measure, he generally reserved for customers from out of town.  7
While some dealers required constant prodding in order to move into installment sales, 
others embraced the idea with over-enthusiasm, offering phonographs on too easy terms. “Why, 
oh why,” asked the Voice of the Victor in 1914, “do Victor Dealers do an installment business 
without interest, and why, oh why, do some of them spend money to call attention of the world to 
this pet folly?” Dealers pursued this “foolish and profitless policy,” the Voice believed, “…
because others do.” The magazine conceded as much but in a characteristic rhetorical gesture, 
brushed aside the importance of market forces, asking sarcastically “do you cut your throat 
‘because others do?’” Similarly, the Columbia Record inveighed against overly generous terms 
in the form of low down payments, arguing that “it is about as easy to get a deposit of five, eight 
or ten dollars down from any man you want to do business with as it is to get a smaller one.” 
Gesturing to dealers’ persisting anxieties about installment paying, the Record added “it is that 
mistaken ‘dollar-down’ idea that makes all the risk in the business, nothing else.”   8
Once a phonograph had been sold, the next task lay in putting it in the customer’s home 
and setting it up, a task generally trusted to the dealership’s own personnel. This arrangement 
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became increasingly important in the years after 1906 when talking machines grew in size and as 
more and more dealerships purchased “delivery wagon” automobiles in which to haul them. A 
1915 advertisement for Lyon & Healy of Chicago suggests the importance of this service to 
would-be customers: “Place? Your own parlor! Time? Within a few hours after you give us your 
order for a Victrola.” An essay, “Delivering the Victrola,” recounted one Voice writer’s afternoon 
spent as part of a Victrola delivery crew:  
It was mighty cold on the front of that automobile delivery… the first stop made was at a 
cozy little home on a small side street, and to our surprise the instrument to be delivered 
was a XVI… When the khaki cover was first taken off the lady of the house fairly gasped 
with astonishment, which seemed to augur well for future record sales. Standing silently 
in the background we watched the chauffeur-repairman explain the mechanism…Then 
deftly slipping on “Ave Maria,” by Caruso and Elman, he stood aside and urged the lady 
to set the brake, start the turntable and lower the sound-box. For a moment she hesitated, 
but nervously followed his instructions. At the first strain of the music a half-smile crept 
over her somewhat worn features.  
After repeating the lesson for the benefit of the woman’s husband, the deliveryman and his 
journalist sidekick departed, after adding a final warning “to be sure to wind the motor” and to 
carefully read the Victrola’s instruction manual, “How to Get the Most Out of Your Victrola.”  9
This brief interaction marked only the beginning of the industry’s efforts to keep in touch 
with the customer and to bridge the distance between the home and the dealership. The necessity 
of maintaining these relationships across time stemmed from a peculiarity of the phonograph as a 
consumer commodity—its value to consumers lay in the relatively cheap shellac and wax 
records made to play on it. In May 1907, the Edison Phonograph Monthly emphasized this 
peculiar facet of phonograph consumption to customers: “It is the Record that is new—not the 
Phonograph.” Each recording in that month’s catalogue, the copy read “is as entertaining as any 
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you ever heard when you heard it for the first time.” To get the most out of one’s Edison 
Phonograph, the advertisement continued, one should “hear the new Records and pick out those 
you like.” Victor similarly urged its dealers to “make [the consumer] realize that her Victor is 
absolutely new every time she buys new records,” and that it will “give her just as much if not 
more pleasure than it ever did before.” For the diligent dealer in phonographic goods, of course, 
this universe of “unique” recordings held out the promise of indefinite sales. In 1911 The Voice 
explained the uniqueness of the phonograph in this regard:  
Just pick up any magazine or newspaper and search its every page, and see if you can 
find any single thing that even compares with the Victor as a source of perpetual profit. 
You will find full-page advertisements of automobiles, pianos, cash registers, razors, 
typewriters, sewing machines, vacuum cleaners, etc.; and granting (which we do not 
believe) that each and every one of these articles is as readily sold as a Victor—what is 
there to look forward to after consummation of the sale?… while you are sending Victors 
to new homes, bear in mind that all the Victors you have previously sold are (or certainly 
should be) returning to you a continuous stream of record profits… 
But while the purchase of records should "more than treble" the revenue produced by equipment 
sales, dealers often neglected their record business in favor of big ticket machine purchases. The 
Voice allowed that "it is very natural to feel proud and enthusiastic when a big volume of 
business has been done," but warned dealers that "in the eagerness to make new customers it is a 
very serious mistake to disregard the old." To that end the Voice and other periodicals supplied 
the trade with an unending stream of advice on how to conduct a lively business in recordings. 
Invariably, their prescriptions enjoined dealers to maintain the tenuous bonds of the commercial 
infrastructure; to transmit information to customers; to engage with them face-to-face; and to 
even pursue policies aimed at shaping their home-life and their daily rhythms. In the pursuit of 
record sales, the Big Three pushed the logics of infrastructure building into the inner sanctum of 
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the domestic space and maintained these relationships long after the deliverymen had dusted off 
their hands.  10
One of the more obvious strategies for maintaining the domestic phonograph 
infrastructure lay in the companies' regularly published record supplements. Edison Phonograph 
Monthly made the case for record supplements in a brief article entitled "See That All 
Phonograph Owners Get A Supplement." Edison saved shipping costs by transmitting the 
supplements through their own network, with the monthly publications going out to jobbers, who 
in turn passed them on to dealers. Ideally, dealers were then to "see that they are sent to all 
customers who have bought phonographs." Though cheaper than a direct mail campaign, the 
practice implicated the full breadth of the company's commercial network in the enterprise, with 
predictably "bureaucratic" results. "Dealers who do not get a supply [of the supplements]," said 
the Edison Phonograph Monthly, "should take the matter up with their Jobber, and if the latter is 
not getting a large enough supply to meet such demands, we desire that he shall increase his 
order with us." Sending out record supplements, however, marked only the beginning of the 
savvy dealers' efforts to "keep the conversation going" with his customers. J.D. Moore of the 
Lion Dry Goods Company of Toledo, Ohio, enclosed with every mailed supplement a 
"personalized" letter informing customers that his company "prompted by a sincere wish to keep 
bright the fire of interest in your Victrola" were sending along "a list of especially selected 
records." Of course, Moore's note emphasized to recipients that "upon the kind of records you 
buy, depends the amount of enjoyment your Victrola will give you."   11
 Edison Phonograph Monthly, May 1907, 23; Voice of the Victor, May-June 1910, 2; Voice of the Victor, 10
January-February, 1911, 4; Voice of the Victor, January-February, 1911, 4; Voice of the Victor, February, 
1915, 22.
 Edison Phonograph Monthly, June 1903, 10; The Voice of the Victor, August, 1915, 158.11
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As the Big Three came to recognize the centrality of record sales in their business, the 
matter of phonograph maintenance also took on grave importance in the pages of the industry’s 
periodicals. If the talking machine’s motor refused to turn or if its reproducer ceased registering 
the sonic information embedded in records, customers could hardly be expected to continue 
purchasing more. The phonograph, ensconced in the carpeted recess of the customer’s parlor, 
remained the dealer’s and the manufacturer’s concern because on its satisfactory and 
uninterrupted operations depended their profits. “Every Victor,” argued the March 1909 Voice of 
the Victor, “sells another Victor. It is its own best salesman; but if not running true, or the sound 
box is in need of repair, it does more harm than good.” Nor was the threat of malfunctioning 
phonographs any less dire when the customer's own neglect had caused it. "When you let a 
Victor owner abuse his property through ignorance," the Voice informed dealers, "… he does it 
largely at your expense." Edison Phonograph Monthly argued as well that “many times the 
Phonograph is subject to unjust charges due only to the carelessness of the owner who perhaps 
has allowed oil to get on the belt or some equally trivial thing due to ignorance…” The disc and 
cylinder records also served as a vector for infrastructure failure insofar as poor reproduction 
always threatened to damage the companies’ reputation and discourage more record sales. In 
1906 the Voice noted the “habit for dealers and users of Victor records to handle and throw them 
around just the same as so many pieces of steel plate…” as though “Victor records are 
indestructible and need be given no particular care.”   12
For the edification of reckless dealers and consumers, the Voice offered some tips for the 
handling of disc records. 
  Voice of the Victor, March, 1909, 5; Voice of the Victor, September, 1909, 14; Edison Phonograph 12
Monthly, October, 1907, 17;
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1. Keep the records free from dust particles.  
2. Do not expose the records to severe heat.  
3. Brush dust off of records with a camel’s hair brush or a piece of cotton before playing. 
4. Keep records lying upon a flat surface or in a vertical file.  
5. Do not throw records carelessly on hard surface.  
6. Do not put edge of one record on the face of another. 
7. When shipping, take care to have records so packed that no sliding of one upon another 
can take place. 
Dealers also sometimes supplied consumers with instructional literature in order to combat the 
threat of phonograph abuse. St. Louis Edison jobber Marks Silverstone did just this, sending out 
pamphlets entitled “Phonographic Advice,” to owners of talking machines.   13
Even well-cared-for talking machines, however, wore out over time. To remedy this, one 
might convince customers to bring their phonographs into the dealership for regular 
maintenance, but as a writer for Talking Machine World noted "it is a good deal of nuisance for 
owners of machines to carry them to the dealer to have them adjusted.” This "nuisance" would 
have only grown more discouraging as manufacturers produced larger and larger models of 
talking machine. To solve this problem, Talking Machine World proposed that dealers send 
repairmen on regular visits to customers' homes for the purposes of routine maintenance and 
repairs. Similarly the Voice argued that it might be a good idea for the dealer to pay "personal 
calls” to customers whose record purchases had tapered off. "You may find the instrument 
reproducing poorly owing to the need of oiling, adjustment or some other slight repair.” Dealers 
and their employees would have to carry the project of infrastructure maintenance into the home 
itself.   14
 Voice of the Victor, November, 1906, 9.13
 Edison Phonograph Monthly, October 1907, 17; Voice of the Victor, March 1908, 4; Voice of the Victor, 14
May-June, 1910, 2.
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As it turns out, some dealers had long been aware of these considerations and had been 
sending repairmen to customers’ homes for several years. Further the practice was spreading 
across the country. Dealers Lyon and Healy of Chicago apprised owners of the relationship 
between talking machine maintenance and customer satisfaction: "Do you realize that, to get 
perfect reproduction from your records, your machine should always be in perfect playing 
condition? The motor should run smoothly and steadily; the tapering arm tube shaft should swing 
freely at all times; most important of all, the sound box should be free from any imperfection…" 
Fortunately, the company would service any machine bought from their showroom free of charge 
for thirty days, an offer which "kept two expert repair men busy" for the next month. Similarly, 
the firm of Cressy & Allen of Portland Maine informed customers "that a competent repair man 
will call at their homes to regulate their Victor and see that it is put in perfect order, provided no 
parts are broken." These regular maintenance calls also served as an opportunity to sell records. 
In addition to servicing customers' phonographs, Cressy & Allen's repairmen arrived "prepared 
to offer suggestions and take orders for records." Lyon & Healy's technicians "acted not only in 
the capacity of repairmen, but as salesmen, telling people about new records being made, the 
new process under which they are made, the beautifies of the Victrola, etc…” Talking Machine 
World even suggested that repairmen take with them "a few choice records, entirely new, of 
course," in order to whet the customers' appetites for new releases.  15
Of course, as with every other initiative undertaken by phonograph manufacturers, the 
project of keeping America's talking machines mechanically-serviced proved easier said than 
done. Phonographs sent to Victor's factory for major repairs regularly evidenced all manner of 
 Voice of the Victor, January, 1910, 12; Voice of the Victor, January, 1909, 9; Voice of the Victor, January 15
1910, 12; Voice of the Victor, March, 1908, 4.
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ineptitude on the part of repairmen--"springs put in backwards; the spring barrels filled with 
sticky, gluey substances intended to act as lubricators; …home-made parts or parts of other 
manufacture…," and so on. To shore up the tenuous infrastructures of expertise linking 
manufacturer to customer (and to keep records from gathering dust on dealers' shelves) 
manufacturers took it upon themselves to disseminate to dealerships as much information as 
possible regarding the maintenance of talking machines. The company's trade publications were 
themselves the most direct avenue for broadcasting this information and regularly featured 
articles on the maintenance and repair of spring motors, tone arms, reproducers and so on. When 
these efforts proved insufficient Victor sent their own factory-trained repairmen out into the 
hinterland to teach dealerships "how to best adjust the Victor mechanism when anything has 
gone wrong."  
Even if local repairmen were adequately knowledgable they or their employers might cut 
corners in order to save money. In doing so they often employed cheaply-made replacement parts 
produced by third parties. When a western jobber complained that the phonographs in his district 
were performing poorly, the National Phonograph Company sent a factory expert to give the 
mechanisms a once-over. He found that in many cases the original mainspring driving the motor 
had been replaced with one of third-party manufacture. These springs were too “soft” and “not of 
the same quality” as those supplied by National. Edison Phonograph Monthly added that “in the 
same way complaints about belts, governor springs and balls, feed nuts, button arm hooks, 
sapphires and rubber gaskets have been found to be due to inferior parts manufactured by other 
concerns.” Third-party replacement parts failed to live up to manufacturer standards at Victor as 
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well. There, tests were performed on replacement springs and the company claimed over 75 
percent of them performed more poorly than the average Victor spring.   16
The use of replacement parts by dealers damaged the efforts of phonograph 
manufacturers on several fronts. Most obviously it deprived Victor, Columbia and Edison of a 
source of revenue, though this consideration alone is inadequate to explaining the companies’ 
antipathy to replacement parts. In fact, the Victor Talking Machine Company even claimed 
willingness to forego profit in the name of quality control. In January of 1908 the Voice 
announced that the company would henceforth supply the trade with mainsprings at factory cost, 
so desperate were they to stamp out the use of cheap replacements. In addition to costing 
manufacturers lost sales revenue, replacement parts threatened to damage companies’ prestige 
when they failed to perform adequately. The Edison Phonograph Monthly argued that the use of 
cheap replacement parts by dealers was a “transaction that is positively injurious to the Edison 
reputation,” and declared that the company was “determined that it shall be stopped.” But 
assaults on the Big Three’s reputations or their corner on replacement parts probably vexed 
management less than a third problem presented by the cheaply made belts, screws, springs and 
governors. As we have seen, manufacturers were highly solicitous that their machines continue 
to function and provide musical entertainment for their owners. A phonograph that ran poorly or 
not at all served as poor inducement to buy more records, and this the Big Three sought to 
avoid.    17
 Voice of the Victor, March, 1913, 5; Voice of the Victor, May, 1914, 94; Voice of the Victor, June, 1914, 16
107; Voice of the Victor, July, 1914, 134-135; Voice of the Victor, July-August, 1910, 11; Edison 
Phonograph Monthly, April, 1907, 4; Voice of the Victor, January, 1908, 9.
 Voice of the Victor, January, 1908, 9; Edison Phonograph Monthly, April, 1907, 4.17
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Even if dealers sent out supplements and kept their customers’ phonographs 
maintenanced, the infrastructure could always fray at the other end. The steady flow of profits 
from record sales necessitated that the industry shape the habits of the customer herself— to 
make the regular pilgrimage to the phonograph dealership part of her life. As we have seen, the 
general adoption of installment plans allowed dealers to place talking machines in homes they 
would have otherwise never entered. But extending credit to customers also served the purpose 
of enmeshing them more closely in the industry’s commercial infrastructure and guiding their 
activities in ways conducive to its own interests. First, a onetime sale of several records was 
likely to accompany any phonograph purchase, and since, as the Edison Phonograph Monthly 
noted “Records are seldom sold on instalments [sic], the Dealer makes a nice cash sale of 
Records with every Phonograph put out.’ But the practice of breaking up the sale into many 
small payments could itself serve the dealer’s interests. Payments were generally made in person 
at the dealership, giving the dealer a chance to continue the commercial conversation, to firm up 
his relationship with the customer, to sound their musical preferences and ultimately, to sell them 
more records. The September, 1908, issue of the Voice carried a dealer’s letter expressing the 
opinion that “installment buyers, as a rule, make generous cash outlays for records.” Another 
Victor dealership, the Piano Player Company believed “there is not a machine sold on the 
installment plan that does not, on the average, secure more sales of records by the time it is paid 
for than do those sold for cash…” The cause of this discrepancy, the company believed, was 
obvious: “few payments are made without records are purchased at the same time.” Edison’s 
National Phonograph Company concurred, arguing that the dealer whose clients made regular 
payments “has a steady and profitable customer for Records for at least the time the payments 
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are being made…” and added that “it is worth while to get a Phonograph into a home for the 
Record business that will follow.” Similarly the Voice enticed Victor dealers into credit sales by 
promising that “the weekly installment idea brings the customer to your store every week, and 
with this opportunity you sell ten records to every one sold by the mail order house.”  18
Hiding the Domestic Phonograph Infrastructure 
Profitability in the phonograph industry depended, in large measure, on the willingness 
and ability of dealers to bring their customers and their customers’ homes within the ambit of the 
commercial infrastructure. The home had to be made safe for the phonograph (industry.) But just 
as with their approach to the sales environment, the Big Three’s efforts to build robust 
infrastructures often implicated them in a project of infrastructure concealment. This project 
proceeded along two routes. First, manufacturers labored to shield the domestic phonograph 
infrastructure (both its human and mechanical elements) from the semiotics of commerce, labor 
and mechanism—elements alien to the bourgeois conception of the home and parlor as respites 
from the means-ends logic of the public sphere. Secondly, just as manufacturers sought to 
insulate their larger infrastructure from the signs of commerce and capitalism, they performed a 
similar feat in acoustic design. Continuing a project that had commenced with Edison’s first 
experiments in the late 1870s, the Big Three worked to remove all evidence of mechanism from 
the sound of the talking machine. Concretely, this entailed two measures. First, they insulated the 
playback apparatus of the phonograph (including the reproducer and horn) from the 
phonograph’s power plant, the spring-driven motor inside which was always given to shaking 
and whirring. By so doing, manufacturers sought to engineer phonographic music as pure 
 Edison Phonograph Monthly, December, 1905, 4; Voice of the Victor, Sept, 1908, 9; Voice of the Victor, 18
May, 1907, 4-5.
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artistry, stripped of the sonic evidence of the “means of production.” Secondly, they sought to 
temporally rationalize phonographic playback, so that the record turned at a consistent speed 
during playback. Motors which sped up or slowed down shifted the pitches and tempos of music 
during playback. A phonograph that “improvised” like this could only serve to emphasize the 
role of the “talking machine” itself in the production of mechanical music, as it threw into relief 
the labor being performed right there in the home. Once the phonograph became capable of 
keeping more-or-less perfect time, the apparatus could “disappear” leaving the listener in his 
parlor with sounds ontologically identical to the voices of the singers he knew and loved.  
Money 
Installment plans facilitated the movement of phonographs into the American home by 
bringing them within reach of the cash-strapped masses. But another, more subtle, mechanism 
associated with installment purchasing also peaks through the historical record. One dealer found 
that while “not one customer in ten will pay cash for a Phonograph… many who are able to do 
so, prefer the installment plan.” Many who “bought on time” might have just as easily paid in 
cash, but opted not to. A straightforward and economistic understanding of this preference is, of 
course, ready to hand in the guise of “liquidity.” This is the underlying appeal of an Edison 
advertisement enjoining readers to “pay us a small amount down, and spend your Christmas 
money for those small articles necessary to purchase for cash.” But the market virtue of liquidity 
is and was entwined root-and-branch with a more encompassing economic aesthetic emphasizing 
efficiency, regularity, and seamlessness. Installment payments allowed purchasers to keep cash 
on hand for other expenses. But it also promised to do away with the singular and traumatic one-
time expenditure of the cash sale, spreading it out into innocuous and regularly-scheduled 
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payments. One Chicago distributor for Edison advertised that “these monthly payments are so 
very small that you will hardly notice them.” Similarly, an advertisement in the April 1928 issue 
of Good Housekeeping presented testimony from a (fictional) Victor customer to the same effect: 
“Our local Victor dealer allowed us to pay so much down and so much a month on our 
Automatic Victrola. We never missed the little bit of money each month, and in the meantime, 
we had the use of the Victrola.” Connecticut Victor dealer A.B. Clinton distributed to prospective 
customers a bank envelope printed with the following message: “Just see how easy it is to slip a 
few nickels, dimes or quarters now and then into this Victrola Dime saver. When it contains $5 
bring it to us and select your Victrola. We will send it to your home at once and furnish you with 
another Victrola bank, and in this way you will have a fine Victrola and not miss the 
money.” [Emphasis added]   19
Practice 
Secondly, manufacturers hoped to minimize users’ interactions with the phonograph. 
Constant fiddling with needles, and records and brakes threatened to undermine the 
phonograph’s appeal as a leisure device and, again, to put a halt to the customers’ record 
purchases. To combat the problem, manufacturers created phonographs and phonograph 
attachments that played longer and more records, stopped on their own, needed fewer windings 
and required new needles less often.  
 Edison Phonograph Monthly, February, 1906, 12-13; Boston Daily Globe, December 16, 1900, 9. 19
“Edison Phonographs, For Cash or on Easy Payments,” Edison Phonograph Distributors, Illinois. 
Playback Advertising Ephemera Collection, Rodgers and Hammerstein Archival Collection, New York 
Public Library for the Performing Arts. Good Housekeeping, April 1928, 1; Voice of the Victor, July, 
1916, 138.
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One of the first tasks manufacturers sought to automate was the stopping of the 
phonograph record. No mechanism existed on early phonographs to stop the record’s rotation at 
the end of the music, nor to keep the needle from continuing to travel off the edge of the cylinder 
creating a racket and possibly damaging the record or playback equipment. Third party 
manufacturers quickly stepped forward to address the problem. An advertisement in the February 
1908 Talking Machine World announced that the “Gibbs Attachment” for use on Edison Home 
and Standard phonographs “automatically stops the machine when the music is finished; thereby 
preventing the sapphire from being damaged in running over the end of the record.” It was 
necessary to manually set the device for every record played. The Condon-Autostop, made for 
use on disc machines like the Victrola, promised to “[cut] out the disagreeable noises at the end 
of the record.” Long the “bane of the talking machine” these noises often startled phonograph 
listeners who rushed to the phonograph to stop them and in the process “many records have 
become scratched, cracked and broken.” This, the Condon-Autostop would prevent. Like the 
Gibbs stop, the Condon attachment required that users set the attachment for every record and 
this necessity persisted after phonograph manufacturers began installing automatic stops at the 
factory. The Aeolian Company’s Vocalion phonograph required that one first place the machine’s 
needle in one of the last three or four grooves of the record before pressing “the little metal 
button situated at the lower left hand of the turn-table. The record could then be played from the 
beginning, the user assured that the record would stop as soon as the needle reached the spot it 
had been when the button was pushed. The process had to be repeated for each record. The next 
round of automation in phonograph stops appears to have been an innovation by the Columbia 
Company, which by 1920 was advertising Grafonolas with “Non Set Automatic Stop.” The only 
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such article available on the market, the Non Set Automatic Stop left users with “nothing to 
move or set or measure.” One need only “start the Grafonola and it plays and stops itself.” Non-
set automatic stops soon thereafter became standard on higher end Victor products as well. 
Automatic stops did little to reduce users’ physical interactions with the talking machine. They 
did, however, facilitate another kind of listening, one in which listeners could forget the 
mechanism entirely and focus on the musical event on offer. As a 1920 Grafonola advertisement 
emphasized to readers: “You’ll never need to leave your favorite partner in the middle of a 
dance. With the Columbia Grafonola you can dance to the last lingering note and step.” Without 
a peal of terrifying mechanical racket lying in wait at the end of every record, listeners could 
suspend momentarily their custodianship over the machine and believe they were dancing to the 
strains of Issler’s band.   20
The constant necessity of winding the home phonograph’s motor, however, proved 
wearisome, and manufacturers very quickly moved to minimize its prominence in the ritual of 
phonographic music consumption. The first phonographs produced by the Victor Talking 
Machine Company, for example, relied on a simple single-spring motor not quite capable of 
playing two 7-inch disc records between windings, or enough music to entertain for nearly four 
minutes. Playtime could, however, be increased by adding more springs to the motor assembly, 
and manufacturers began pursuing this strategy very early. The double spring motor introduced 
by the company in 1901 played five 7-inch records or three 10-inch records, increasing playtime 
 Talking Machine World, Feb. 15, 1908, 6; Talking Machine World, May, 1912, 23; The Aeolian 20
Company. “Instructions for the care and operation of the Aeolian Vocalion” (New York: The Aeolian 
Company). Playback Advertising Ephemera Collection, Rodgers and Hammerstein Archival Collection, 
New York Public Library for the Performing Arts, 9-13; Good Housekeeping, Nov 1920, 102; Red Book 
Magazine, October 1920, 129.
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to around ten minutes. In 1902, Victor again pushed the envelope of music automation by 
releasing for public consumption a three-spring motor, capable of playing six 10-inch disc 
records— or around eighteen minutes of music. The truly dramatic break in this direction, 
however, occurred in 1915 when Victor introduced its domestic electric motor phonograph, 
forever dispensing with the need to hand-wind the device.   21
As long as the phonograph had to be provisioned with more music manually, however, 
the revelry of playback would never last more than four and a half minutes at a time. Mitigating 
the tiresome ritual of putting records on the phonograph, then, also occupied the engineers at the 
Big Three and their competitors. Automatic repeater attachments provided one of the first 
methods by which phonograph users could avoid feeding the phonograph every few minutes. A 
necessary element of the commercial coin-slot phonograph, repeater attachments existed from 
the beginning of the domestic phonograph industry and allowed the mechanism to repeat the 
same recording without human intervention. They were limited in their appeal, of course, by the 
fact that the same selection was played over and over again. A workable solution to the problem 
had to wait for Victor’s Automatic Orthophonic Victrola, released for public consumption in the 
late 1920s. A 1929 ad for the Automatic Orthophonic enjoined readers to “just think of having 
Orthophonic music without the labor of winding, putting in needles, or changing records!” All 
one need do is “put an arm-load of records in the Victrola and press a button.” An uninterrupted 
hour of music followed. The following year, the Brunswick Company announced its Automatic 
 See Robert Baumbach. Look for the Dog: An Illustrated Guide to Victor Talking Machines (Los 21
Angeles: Mulholland, 2005).
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Panatrope capable of playing up to 20 10-inch records without reloading, also about an hour’s 
worth of music.  22
In the 1910s, a number of phonograph manufacturers flouted the expectations of user 
passivity. The Pathephone, produced by Pathé Frères Phonograph Company of New York came 
with a “tone control” the use of which would allow users to “add their own interpretation of the 
volume, shading and expression to any reproduction.” One of the most widely-advertised of 
these new devices was a selling feature of the Aeolian Company’s “Vocalion” phonograph, 
introduced in 1915. An advertisement for Vocalion claimed that “as no other phonograph has 
been, the Aeolian-Vocalion is a true musical instrument—an instrument to control, to play, an 
instrument which anyone may use to exercise the natural instinct for musical expression with 
which everyone is gifted in some degree…” For its peculiar musicality the Vocalion was 
indebted to the Graduola, its hand-held volume control. “To take the Graduola” read the 
advertising copy, “and with slight, instinctive pressure to shade each tone or phrase, to make the 
music live with your own feeling and thought, is the test decisive.” The Vocalion’s instruction 
manual advised users on best practices for the Graduola. The phonograph’s volume knob should 
be set to full volume, in order to allow the widest dynamic range. “For an easy and effective 
operation,” the manual instructed users to “hold the tube of the Graduola in the left hand so that 
the thumb may remain on top and in position to push the knob outwardly.” The Graduola should 
generally be “operated slowly rather than suddenly, as the greatest charm is imparted to the 
records by the crescendo and diminuendo effects thus achieved.” Importantly, the operator 
 National Phonograph Co. “Edison Phonograph in the Home” (Orange: National Phonograph Co., 22
1906). NYPL Performing Arts, Recorded Sound Research Collection, 28; Talking Machine World, 
January, 1908, 13; Good Housekeeping, May, 1929, 1.
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should attempt to emphasize the dynamics of the selection, making loud passages louder and soft 
passages softer. “Care should be taken,” for example, “not to place the Graduola in the extremely 
soft position in passages of records which are of great force and power.”   23
Of the established firms, none responded as unequivocally to the enthusiasm for 
attachments than Victor who rejected them outright. On one hand, the company’s antipathy 
toward attachments drew on its longstanding policy of disparaging aftermarket additions to its 
machines. “There is a certain moral effect produced,” said the March 1915 Voice of the Victor, 
“when attachments are fitted to our instruments. The public conceives the idea that we are 
responsible for it. So that we unconsciously and unwillingly are held responsible for hybrid 
products which, since they are not advantageous, are decidedly detrimental to our perfected 
instruments.” Victor’s opposition to devices such as the Graduola, however, drew on and 
reinforced a specific philosophy of recorded sound emphasizing the role of the phonograph as a 
passive conduit for earlier sonic events. A 1917 Victor ad insisted that “no instrument can be 
made to improve on Melba, Caruso and the other great artists. The true function of the Victrola is 
to reproduce faithfully the work of these artists….” The rhetoric of “personal expression” 
forwarded by the Aeolian Company and others amounted to patent nonsense when applied to the 
phonograph. “Your interpretation of a piece of music may be in itself a highly artistic 
achievement,” allowed a 1920 Victor ad, “but not if super-imposed on the interpretation of a 
master. It then would be neither one thing nor the other…”  
 Pathé Frères Phonograph Co. “Pathé Pathephone” (New York: Pathé Frères Phonograph Co.), 8. 23
Playback Advertising Ephemera Collection, Rodgers and Hammerstein Archival Collection, New York 
Public Library for the Performing Arts. McClure’s Magazine, Oct, 1916, 44; The Aeolian Company. 
“Instructions for the care and operation of the Aeolian Vocalion” (New York: The Aeolian Company), 
16-19. Playback Advertising Ephemera Collection, Rodgers and Hammerstein Archival Collection, New 
York Public Library for the Performing Arts.
!255
One problem with this tack, however, was that Victor products had long facilitated the 
manipulation of playback. The Victrola cabinet’s “tone doors,” for example, could be opened and 
shut so that “the volume of tone may be regulated to suit varying conditions.” The company 
insisted that the tone doors were “not intended to be used in imposing amateur ‘interpretations’ 
upon those of the world’s greatest artists…” The company did not explain the distinction nor was 
it intuitive. A 1917 advertisement for Columbia’s Grafonola talking machine had made very 
different claims for that machine’s version of tone doors— “shutters.” It compared them to the 
swell-box of the musical organ and informed would-be buyers that they would allow them “to 
play the world’s great music with the depth of expression that it deserves.” In a 1915 
advertisement Victor had offered an even more confusing apologia for the tone doors as well as 
its volume-altering system of interchangeable needles. “The Victor Record…” said the company, 
“is perfect musically, but—it must be adapted to the acoustic limitations of any room, and that is 
accomplished by the Victor system of changeable needles and the modifying doors of the 
Victrola.” Most importantly, this manipulation took place “without interfering in any way with 
the artists’ interpretations.”   24
Victor’s difficulties in delineating just what difference there was between manipulating 
the talking machine’s tone “to suit varying conditions” and doing the same in such fashion as to 
interfere with “the artists’ interpretations” are illustrative. The ontological equivalence of 
“original” and “copy,” so important to the marketing strategies of the Big Three and, especially, 
Victor, was not a trans-historical technological fact. Rather it had to be constructed out of a 
heterogeneous assortment of material and discursive bits. In regards to gadgets like the 
 Voice of the Victor, March, 1915, 56; Vogue, September, 1917, 1; Vogue, June, 1920, 32; Ladies’ Home 24
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“graduola” Victor executives, as was often the case, recognized what many of their competitors 
did not. Sonic manipulation by phonograph users upset the founding myth of the sonic identity of 
“copy” and “original.” The industry’s general drift, however, pointed directly to user passivity. 
Aeolian, Pathé Frères, and Columbia might occasionally encourage users to take an active hand 
in the sonic event of playback. But Victor carried the day. Phonographs became, not musical 
instruments or talking machines making sounds in the parlor, but conduits to personalities and 
sonic events elsewhere.  
Records 
The goal of the phonograph industry consisted largely in maintaining a two-way traffic 
with their customers, money coming in and records going out. This constant flow of records, 
however, threatened to fill the consumer’s home with unsightly stacks of shellac which could 
very easily become a nuisance and sour enthusiasm for further record purchases. They cluttered 
the home, posing an obstacle to housekeeping but they also made the very act of record-listening 
a chore. The phonograph owner who stored his records “in bunches on the table, chairs and 
window-sills, where he must look through the whole lot the find the record he wants…” would 
not likely keep at the habit long, nor would he be inclined to spend money on new records. The 
size of a customer’s collection could also contribute to the mishandling of his or her records. The 
Voice of the Victor informed Victor dealers that when a consumer accumulates a sizable number 
of records, “say fifty or more,” he very often has to rifle through the entire collection to find the 
one he wants, thus damaging them “…through constant handling and rubbing…” These damaged 
records would, of course, play miserably and discourage their owner from investing in more. 
Even more telling, however, is another worry expressed by the Voice. When the customer thumbs 
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through all these records, Victor’s organ argued, he or she “is often impressed with the amount of 
money he has invested in a lot of records he has tired of and don’t [sic] want to hear.” When a 
record spun on the phonograph’s turntable, the magic of infinitely reproducible labor cast a haze 
over the collector’s assessment of his expenditures. As piles of black, silent and dead shellac on 
one’s window sill, however, phonograph records presented a discouraging record of foregone 
opportunities.   25
To address this problem manufacturers produced and sold albums for the storage of 
records. The Voice urged salesmen to “forcibly impress” upon phonograph purchasers “the 
necessity of properly filing and caring for their records” and in order to facilitate that project 
supplied albums for ten-inch and twelve-inch records. The company advised dealers to place 
them in every home in which a Victor phonograph had been purchased. These albums, said the 
Voice, would allow the phonograph enthusiast to find whichever of her records she wished to 
hear at any given time without having to thumb through her entire collection. As collections grew 
to encompass hundreds or even thousands of records, however, these albums could themselves 
become a confused maze of aural data. In January of 1914, Victor company redesigned their 
record label, broadening the gold band at its edge. This change, the Voice informed readers, had 
not been intended as a merely decorative innovation, but was designed “to provide a space in 
which people might put their own catalog number and so simplify the process of returning each 
record to its proper album.”   26
 Voice of the Victor, September-October, 1910, 4.25
 Voice of the Victor, March-April, 1911, 9.26
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Even if manufacturers and dealers of phonographic equipment managed to discipline 
their customers’ handling of records, they might still grow weary of the phonograph’s presence in 
the house. This was especially true if owners put them in inconvenient places. Victor, for 
example, fretted over the placement of its smaller models and enjoined its dealers to guide every 
purchaser of such an instrument into buying a stand on which to place it. The Voice added “by all 
means keep the Victor off the centre table where it positively does not belong and where if it 
does find a resting place it is soon discovered to be in the way.” The Columbia Record shared its 
own cautionary tale about poorly-placed talking machines: 
Of course, it is going to be set on the table in the parlor first. Oh! What joy and pleasure 
that machine affords the first two or three days! The recipient can barely keep away 
from it; in fact, is playing it every spare minute… Saturday comes, the day when the 
house is cleared, and the machine is lifted off the beautifully polished parlor table, and, 
to the utter astonishment and dismay of its owner, the table is found all scratched up… 
So the lady removes the machine from the parlor into the living room and leaves it 
there for a week until she finds out that the library table has been as badly scratched up 
as the parlor table.  
At the same time that the talking machine damages her furniture, the fictional homemaker is 
confronted with that problem familiar to all record collectors: stacks of unsightly records. “They 
are on the window-sill, they are on the tables, they are on top of the chairs, they are on the 
bureaus and on the chiffoniers.” To make matters worse, the baby breaks a few by pulling them 
off a table, and she fears her husband will find out and become angry. Columbia’s fictional 
homemaker finally has enough of the inconvenience, removes the talking machine’s horn and 
stashes the entire assemblage in a corner of the room on the floor. Most alarmingly for the 
Record’s readers, she resolves “to tell my husband not to buy any more records; we have got 
enough.” In case the parable had not spelled out explicitly enough its intended message, the 
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Record addressed its readers directly. “Now, Mr. Salesman, that is about the end of your record 
sales.”  27
This unfortunate set of circumstances could have been averted, the Columbia Record 
assured, if the salesman had sold the new phonograph enthusiasts on one more piece of 
equipment—a record cabinet. In an alternative scenario in which the salesman has attended to 
this detail, the “cabinet is put in a convenient corner, the machine is put on top of the cabinet and 
the records placed inside.” The parlor table is spared and clutter eliminated, and the lady of the 
house realizes “we have got to buy more records yet, for the cabinet is pretty nearly empty!” Her 
husband makes his way back to the dealership, where, “in a feverish haste” he “buys all the 
records he can possibly carry in order to fill his cabinet.” Whether or not record cabinets proved 
as conducive to sales as Columbia projected, the years after 1900 saw a quickly proliferating 
trade in the new articles. By 1905, many furniture companies advertised cabinets for both 
cylinder and disc records in the industry’s trade magazines.  28
Machines 
Unlike their counterparts in America’s business offices, parlor phonographs of the 1890s 
were totally enclosed. Edison’s 1897 Class ‘M’ coin-slot model, for example, came in an 
imposing-looking rectangular cabinet which sat on four ball-and-claw legs. Users had no access 
to the mechanism itself aside from listening tubes which protruded through the top of the cabinet. 
This hermetically sealed case, however, served primarily to keep customers from tinkering with 
the mechanism, and was not intended to block the view of the mechanism. The top segment of 
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the cabinet housing the phonographic apparatus featured four glass panels providing easy 
viewing of the mechanism. Most, if not all, of the Edison coin-slot models of the period used 
similar glass panels. The use of glass in these cabinets did not merely provide a transparent panel 
through which users could peek to sate a natural curiosity. Like the jeweler’s display or the 
heterogeneous accumulations of the centuries exhibited in a cabinet of curiosities, the 
phonograph appeared under its glass case as an artifact, eminently worthy of close examination. 
Glass paneling worked to construct the talking machine as a spectacle, providing a view to the 
mechanism at the same time that the hermetically sealed cabinet around it suggested that 
something of value—something worth looking at—lay inside. In this sense, the coin-in-slot 
phonograph of the 1890s and beyond represented a continuation of the exhibitionary logic of the 
earliest phonographs of the 1870s.  
If an amusement-seeker looked through the glass case of a Class ‘M’ coin-slot 
phonograph while the device was in action, she would have found a decidedly mechanical 
spectacle. The wax cylinder record lay mounted on the phonograph’s mandrel which rotated at a 
rapid rate of speed while drifting slowly across the body of the phonograph, guiding the wax 
record under the needle of the reproducer. Next to this assembly, she would have noticed a 
peculiar contrivance called a “governor” consisting of a pair of weighted spheres attached to a 
rapidly turning shaft. Both the mandrel and the governor were driven by a series of exposed belts 
and pulleys drawing power from the phonograph’s battery-operated motor, concealed below. 
That the attraction of the coin-slot talking machine lay as much in looking as in listening was not 
lost on proprietors of the nation’s phonograph parlors and some even worked to augment their 
machine’s visual appeal. In late 1891 the Phonogram noted that “on the automatic phonographs 
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at the permanent Musee Theatre in Buffalo incandescent lamps have been placed on the cabinets, 
lighting up the machine and calling a person’s attention thereto.” As it turned out, the 
enterprising New Yorkers had acted wisely and saw the receipts from these machines “nearly 
double.”  29
As a public amusement the phonograph’s mechanical complexity redounded to its 
popularity by presenting a spectacle—one that the consumer could enjoy without knowing how 
to operate, maintain or repair it. In the office, the phonograph presented the image of a serious 
aid to business, and might be forgiven (or even valued) for the byzantine complexity of its 
various moving and exposed parts. As early as 1890, however, it occurred to some interested 
parties that a larger future lay open to the talking machine if it could clean up its act. In that year, 
Edward D. Easton of Columbia wrote to a counterpart at the Edison Company that “on the 
present phonograph, the motor and governor mechanism are in sight and give an appearance of 
complication to the machine which it does not deserve. It might be well to conceal this 
mechanism…" Easton had argued along similar lines in a letter written several days earlier. "The 
present instrument…” he had written, “would live forever in the business world.” But “a much 
larger field can be taken, and with much less intelligent effort on the part of the Phonograph 
Companies, if the mechanism is simplified and improved.” It is not entirely clear where Easton 
understood this “much larger field” to be, but he was very likely thinking of the home market.  30
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Some of the earliest phonographs intended for the home market were the “residence 
outfit” Edison machines supplied by the North American Phonograph Company beginning in 
1893. Elaborately cabineted and intended to look like office desks, these ponderous and 
expensive articles found few takers and within two years were replaced with more manageable 
“domestic outfits.” The class ‘M’ and class ‘E’ domestic outfits presented users with the same 
mechanical spectacle of mandrel, governor, belts and pulleys as the coin-slot phonograph, now 
liberated from the parlor’s glass case. These persisted on the U.S. Market until 1909, but by that 
time had largely been superseded by other models developed by the company, including the 
Triumph, Home and Standard Phonographs. On all of these models, Edison’s engineers managed 
to fit the governor and its confusing array of belts and pulleys inside the cabinet, which on many 
models now featured a slightly more refined facade than had been the case with the M and E 
models. With the entrance of Victor Talking Machine Company into the home market after 1901, 
the concealment of phonographic apparatus intensified. Excepting one “toy” model, the 
company’s earliest phonographs concealed nearly all of their mechanism inside of compact 
round or square cabinets, while the company’s flat disk records required a less conspicuous 
mounting apparatus than that of cylinder machines. The cabinets of Victor phonographs were 
themselves representative of a move away from utilitarianism in phonograph design and toward 
polite aestheticization, and nowhere was this clearer than in the company’s “De Luxe Monarch” 
model, which was covered in finely wrought hand-carved figures including animals’ heads.  31
Methods of sound amplification were also in flux during the early years of sound 
recording technology and these evolutions, too, carried implications for the experience of 
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Guide to Victor Talking Machines (Woodland Hills: Stationary X-Press, 1996), 1-30.
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recorded sound consumption. In the earliest days of the home market, manufacturers supplied 
their domestic customers with hearing tubes, hollow rubber conduits which ran directly from the 
reproducer or “speaker” into the ears of the listener. Especially necessary in the nation’s noisy 
public phonograph parlors, hearing tubes helped mute outside sounds and directed the 
remarkably quiet sounds of early recordings directly into the ear. In the less noisy environment of 
the home, however, hearing tubes lost much of their appeal. Beginning in 1893 Edison offered 14 
inch funnel-shaped horns for use on their home phonographs but by around 1900 the public had 
made known its overwhelming preference for horns over hearing tubes and the company began 
outfitting most home models with horns. Demand soon arose for louder horns and by 1907 the 
company was outfitting some home models with a horn 33 inches long and two feet across at its 
bell.  32
Superficially, the shift from hearing tubes to horns and then to larger and larger 
specimens of horn appears to counter the general trajectory of home phonograph design in these 
years. While Edison, Victor and Columbia worked to conceal their instruments’ unseemly 
mechanisms behind polished wood, the public’s desire for volume necessitated that the 
phonograph’s horn cut a more and more imposing figure in the home outfit’s profile. Indeed, the 
talking machine’s horn did come to be viewed as an eyesore within a few years and designers 
eventually bent their talents to eradicating it from the visual landscape of the parlor. But the shift 
toward horns effected a subtle change in the phenomenology of phonograph-listening by 
facilitating a drift away from the phonographic apparatus as the locus of the sonic event. With 
hearing tubes, the phonograph’s audience must stand or sit closely the instrument, and because of 
 Frow, Edison Cylinder Phonographs, 16-37.32
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this, they constituted an intuitive phenomenological “bundle” with the phonograph-as-spectacle. 
Where to rest one’s eyes while standing at attention before the phonograph but on the mechanical 
carnival of belts and pulleys and governors unfolding before you? With the spread of horns and 
their increasing size over the first decade of the twentieth century, listeners came untethered from 
the phonograph. This was, one can assume, one of the primary reasons users desired more 
volume in the first place, particularly where phonographs were desired for background music for 
social occasions or household chores.  
However functional these giant horns, they still threatened to disrupt the domesticity and 
refinement of the middle class home, and manufacturers minimized to the best of their ability the 
horn’s profile. On the earlier Victor models, the horn projected directly outward into the parlor 
from the front of the phonograph, putting the full length of the horn in the family’s living space. 
In 1902, Victor introduced a new a line of phonographs with rear-mounted horn assemblies. On 
these a “tone arm” led from the phonograph’s needle toward the back of the cabinet. There it fed 
into the base of the horn proper which doubled back toward the front of the phonograph before 
flaring open in a morning glory-shaped bell. The result was that the new Victor models retained a 
substantial amplifying horn which just barely pushed out from the front of the machine. Edison’s 
engineers also worked toward a solution to the problem of horns, though at their own pace. In 
1909, the company unveiled a new horn, the “Cygnet” which preserved much of the straight 
horn’s tone-enriching length, but which saved space by angling sharply upward before flaring 
forward at the bell. The effect, as suggested by the device’s name, was of a swan’s neck.   33
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Sound and Time 
Louis Jay Gerson linked the movement of phonographs into domestic spaces to the 
development of the reliable spring motor. It is true that few middle class homes would have 
tolerated the inconvenience attending the electrical storage battery, including its need of constant 
recharging and its propensity to spill acid. At the same time, domestic electrification remained in 
its infancy and there were few places where one could "plug in" a model run on wall current. But 
the role of the motor in the evolution of domestic phonograph proved more complex and 
circuitous than Gerson suggests. The first phonographs placed before the public in 1877 and 
1878, after all, had run on perfectly clean and renewable hand power and could have easily made 
their way into middle class homes. This broaches a question: why motorize the phonograph in 
the first place? If necessity is the mother of invention laziness enjoys a strong claim to paternity, 
and convenience certainly played a role in the birth of the spring-wound phonograph. The hand-
powered models of 1877 proved tiresome in the extreme, with early exhibitors constantly toiling 
away at the machine's hand-crank. If he or she stopped working, so did the phonograph and this 
was hardly the kind of pastime one could expect middle class consumers to spend thousands of 
hours at. More pointedly, this was hardly the kind of machine for which they could be expected 
to amass voluminous libraries of expensive records.  
Convenience, however, only goes so far in explaining the mechanization of the 
phonograph, because Edison and others who worked toward the phonograph’s automation very 
often did so with other aims in mind: They were driven by a techno-scientific preoccupation with 
exactitude. From a more pedestrian standpoint, (the one most observers would have assumed) 
phonographs with well-regulated motors, just “sounded better.” But here too, the standard of 
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“good” phonographic sound would have been predicated on the machine’s ability to exactly 
replicate the sounds which had been recorded earlier and this was particularly true in those cases 
when audiences brought to bear on the problem well-established standards of what constituted a 
good sound— such as in singing. Even if defined in less exacting terms, then, audiences 
expected accuracy in sound reproduction no less so than Edison.  
As we have seen, the successful application of clockwork to the problem of driving 
phonographs evaded the industry until the middle of the 1890s. This engineering failure was in 
some ways surprising, as the motive power necessary to turn a cylinder at a steady rate of speed 
lay well within the technological affordances of the day. But the specific limitations and 
requirements of the phonograph industry placed obstacles before them not faced in other 
applications of clockwork technology. In a letter dated July 16, 1878, Edison’s lab assistant laid 
bare the true crux of the clockwork problem: “It is easy to make a good clockwork,” he wrote, 
“but it is difficult to make one without extra vibrations.” A decade later Edison disgustedly 
registered the same frustration with clockwork and spring motors calling them “untrustworthy 
and noisy.” As efficient and as steady as these motors were by the late nineteenth century, 
phonography placed a new demand on the clockmaker’s shoulders: absolute silence. This 
desideratum was difficult enough to achieve even in those simpler models without motors to 
contend with. In a letter to Clarence J. Blake, Edison revealed that in the cheaply made ESPC 
phonographs “the shake and grinding noise in the gearing are recorded…” Edison himself had 
attempted to dampen the mechanical vibrations of the phonograph by wrapping the cylinder in 
paper and in gutta percha while Blake had done the same with rubber. Edison’s ambition to purge 
the sonic evidence of mechanization from his recordings pushed him to indulge some unlikely 
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solutions. Even as he toiled away at a clockwork mechanism, Edison experimented with steam 
engines and around February 12 he successfully powered a phonograph with the same. Though 
the steam engine was noisy, the additional horsepower it commanded allowed Edison to connect 
it to the phonograph via a long belt and to place it at a distance from the recording apparatus—
perhaps even in another room. At least in theory, then, the steam engine could power 
phonographs with less acoustic interference than that caused by clockwork. Edison found the 
results of his steam engine experiment “astonishing,” but in a letter to Alfred Marshall Mayer, he 
admitted that acoustic interference was still a problem as “there is a light chattering in the pulley 
yet.”  34
E.R. Johnson and other innovators in spring-driven motors seem to have greatly reduced 
the amount of extraneous noise produced by these mechanisms in the 1890s but the noise had not 
disappeared entirely. The mechanical sonic signature of the spring motor remained a part of 
phonographic playback throughout the early years of the century, and the literature of the period 
is rife with complaints about the spring motor’s sonic intrusion into users’ lives. One of the first 
efforts to combat this problem lay in a 1904 decision by Edison to place “strong springs between 
the motor frame and the body box,” on some phonograph models, in the process greatly 
increasing the sonic insulation previously provided by rubber washers. Through this measure, the 
New Phonogram informed readers “all humming noises were eliminated.” Similar efforts to 
insulate the phonograph from the vibrations of its motor were undertaken by home tinkerers. One 
English phonograph enthusiast, perhaps driven to desperation by his machine’s clangorousness 
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wrote to a London paper to describe the phonograph modifications he had undertaken in the 
name of pure tone: “The [phonograph’s]motor is entirely insulated from the rest of the machine, 
the only connection between the two being the leather belt. The carrier arm is insulated from the 
feed screw and the replacer tube is insulated from the clamp.” These efforts by amateurs and 
professionals notwithstanding, dissatisfaction with phonograph motors persisted into the years 
leading up to the First World War, and this was reflected in the claims of upstart talking machine 
manufacturers. A 1907 ad for the Star Talking Machine, for example, claimed for that device the 
“only absolutely noiseless spring motor, running or winding on the market.” The Star motor very 
likely was not noiseless, but the implication is clear: consumers believed that all other makes 
were noisy. By 1910, claims of noiselessness had been tamped down a bit with the U.S. 
Phonograph Company assuring consumers only that its “new type” motors offered “the closest 
approach to absolute noiselessness yet reached in phonograph construction.” Edison 
phonographs were particularly vulnerable to complaints in this vein and by 1911 the company’s 
customers still reported “that their machines run with considerable noise and that the springs of 
them release with a jump and thud.” Particularly in the home where electrically-driven models 
were for a long time infeasible, engineers found themselves pinned between two mutually 
contradictory ambitions. One one hand, they sought to remove from sonic playback the 
uncertainties of the human-powered hand crank, handing those duties over to clockwork 
mechanisms which could keep perfect, Newtonian, time. On the other hand, the addition of this 
!269
complex clockwork motor to the phonographic apparatus injected into playback mechanical 
noises which interfered with the mechanism’s claims to accuracy.   35
The persisting problems with phonographic “accuracy,” whether caused by irregular 
playback or noisy motors, brought with them specific phenomenological consequences. To 
understand some of what might have entailed it pays to revisit the earliest perceptions of the 
phonograph by the general public, particularly in those cases when the machine was not well-
regulated. In 1878, the Chicago Tribune, explained the newly-unveiled technology to readers, 
arguing that “to prevent flats, sharps, and unfortunate naturals, the cylinder must be revolved at 
precisely the same rate of speed in producing as it was in the original taking of the impression.” 
Failing to do so, the paper said, “would involve utter ruin of effect, and would result in such 
discord as not infrequently gets the better of some of our theatrical orchestras.” Three months 
later Edison staged an exhibition for the benefit of the New York Public and according to the 
Times “the clear notes and intricate variations” of famed cornetist Jules Levy were “repeated by 
the magical instrument so distinctly as to be audible in the remotest portions of the hall.” At one 
point, however, an operator’s [Edison's] error altered the pitches of Levy’s notes during playback 
and “the key was changed, and many discords and false intonations were introduced that caused 
Levy to writhe in his chair, and sent shudders through the audience.”  36
In both of the foregoing examples, the unpredictability of the hand-powered phonograph 
encouraged witnesses to speak of phonographic playback as a kind of musical performance
—“flats,” “sharps,” “discord,” “key,” “false intonations”— going on right before their eyes. 
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While the perception of playback as autonomous might implicate the person turning the crank as 
a musician, it could just as easily point toward the agency of the phonograph itself—the “talking 
machine” discussed in Chapter One. In June of 1878 Scientific American reported on the same 
New York demonstration as that covered by the Times above. While the account differs slightly 
in that Edison has now purposefully manipulated the playback, the agential locus of the 
performance has counterintuitively shifted onto the machine itself.  
…the bell of the cornet was placed near the mouth piece, and Yankee Doodle, first plain, 
and then garnished with variations of the most decorative character, assumed the form of 
dots on the foil. Without the loss of a note, the phonograph repeated it, and not only this, 
but even the peculiar expression imparted by the player, and the triumphant kind of a 
flourish which brought the tune to a conclusion, were reproduced with wonderful 
accuracy… After several other popular airs had been similarly replayed, Mr. Edison 
showed the effect of turning the cylinder at different degrees of speed, and then the 
phonograph proceeded utterly to rout Levy by playing his tunes in pitches and octaves of 
astonishing variety… Then it delivered the variations on Yankee Doodle with a celerity 
that no human fingering of the cornet could rival, interspersing new notes, which it 
seemed probable were neither in the cornet nor on any other instrument—fortunately.  
In either case, erratic, aleatory, or improvisational phonograph playback had the effect of 
situating (in the minds of observers) the sonic event in the here and now. Rather than a “copy” of 
an earlier moment (like the cornet-playing of the famous Jules Levy) playback appeared to be the 
work of a mischievous mechanical imp named “Mr. Phonograph” or his inept human handler.  37
The Victrola  
Edison and his engineers remained doggedly committed to the pursuit of sonic accuracy 
throughout the entirety of the phonograph’s early history. The Victor Talking Machine Company, 
however, committed itself to a similar path in acoustic engineering, but for slightly different 
reasons. Rather than techno-scientific pretensions to accuracy, Victor’s drive for sonic purity was 
 Scientific American, June 22, 1878, 384.37
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driven by a more explicitly aesthetic set of considerations, closely linked to the company’s 
ambition of stripping from its public presentation all signs of mechanism and commerce. Just as 
they sought to hide stacks of expensive records from the potentially pennywise collector and oily 
moving parts from fastidious homemakers, Victor worked diligently to channel the sounds of 
mechanism away from the ears of the budding connoisseur of recorded music. Fittingly, it was 
from the facilities of the Victor Talking Machine Company that there emerged in 1906 a single 
phonograph which served as the solution to nearly all of these aesthetic projects—the Victor 
Victrola.  
In 1906, Leon F. Douglass, sales manager for the Victor Talking Machine Company told 
company president, Eldridge Reeves Johnson, that something had to be done regarding the 
talking machine’s aesthetic shortcomings. “It was my opinion,” he later recalled “that ladies did 
not like mechanical looking things in their parlors.” To address the problem Johnson worked to 
improve on earlier cabinet designs pioneered by Douglass himself and “the result was the 
Victrola, an instrument fully enclosed in a cabinet which was an attractive piece of furniture.” 
Despairing of selling a large number of these expensive new phonographs, Johnson authorized 
production of 200 units. Douglass, even though he had championed the Victrola, found no cause 
to argue with this small run and both men waited anxiously to hear of their performance as 
sellers. As Douglass recounted in his autobiography, Victor not only sold those 200 machines but 
went on to place millions more in American homes.  38
This first run of Victrolas (actually produced outside the Victor plant by Philadelphia’s 
Pooley Furniture Company) contained all of the elements which would come to characterize the 
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entire line. The most immediately recognized difference between the Victrola and its 
predecessors was the new phonograph’s considerable size. Nearly every model of phonograph 
produced prior to the Victrola had been designed to sit on top of a table or, more ideally, a record 
cabinet but the Victrola stood four feet tall and was intended to rest directly on the floor. Unlike 
earlier phonographs, the Victrola did not clutter up or damage one’s furniture. It was furniture 
and had the heft and copious woodwork to prove it. Further highlighting the Victrola’s shift 
toward “furniturization” were the design innovations apparent in the machine’s amplifying horn, 
or more specifically, the apparent lack thereof. While manufacturers had earlier sought to 
minimize the horn’s obtrusiveness, Victor engineers hid the Victrola’s amplifying horn 
altogether, running it under the turntable and through the hollow body of the machine’s cabinet, 
thus addressing one of the detractors’ most damning criticisms. Finally, a hinged lid covered the 
top compartment of the cabinet where sat the turntable itself. The complete concealment of the 
Victrola’s mechanism very quickly attracted attention, and shortly after its unveiling the 
magazine Talking Machine World noted that “every mechanical part is concealed when not in 
actual use.” In truth, the Victrola’s mechanism was concealed even when being played if its lid 
had been closed, and one need only open it when putting on a new record.   39
The success of the Victrola convinced Victor’s competitors of the need to launch their 
own versions of the popular phonograph and these imitations were not long in coming. 
Columbia’s “Symphony Grand Graphophone,” which went to market in 1908, attempted to 
satisfy two home markets by concealing a phonographic apparatus inside a cabinet designed to 
look like a player piano. In a piece of marketing directed toward dealers, Columbia pointed out 
Baumbach, Look for the Dog, 82-84; Talking Machine World, September 1906, 44.39
!273
that with the Symphony Grand Graphophone there was “no horn in sight.” But it also attempted 
to cash in on the contemporary cache of the player piano, informing its dealers that “every man 
in your town who has bought a Pianola is ready right now to have the Symphony Grand 
Graphophone demonstrated to him.” That a buyer might be hesitant to purchase a second piano-
style piece of furniture for the same home seems not to have occurred to the company. The 
company soon settled on a more Victrola-esque presentation with their famous Grafonola 
concealed-horn graphophone. In 1909, Edison entered the fray with its amberola, which like the 
Victrola, featured a substantial 48” cabinet, a concealed horn and a top lid for concealing the 
mandrel and reproducer. So successful were these new phonograph models that by World War I, 
fully-cabineted phonographs had all but completely eclipsed the once-popular exposed horn 
talking machine.   40
If the complete occlusion of the phonographic mechanism had not been enough to 
convince prospective customers that the Victrola, the Grafonola and Edison’s “Amberola” could 
be trusted in the parlor, their manufacturers were more than willing to push the logic of 
furniturization even further. In 1908 Victor offered its flagship model in new styles including 
“satin-finish Circassian walnut, the most beautifully figured of all woods,” as well as “weathered 
oak” in “dead flat finish.” This marked only the beginning of the company’s attention to facade. 
In 1909 the company offered for sale a Victrola XVI with a cabinet in Moorish Marquetry, inlaid 
with mother-of-pearl and made in Morocco. Its $750 price tag meant very few were ever 
produced and it lasted only a few years before disappearing from the company’s catalogs. 
Another opulently designed Victor product was the Vernis-Martin Victrola XVI, which featured a 
The Columbia Record, November, 1907, 8; Frow, Edison Cylinder Phonographs, 88-109.40
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cabinet with hand-painted scenes on the sides and front, emulating a furniture style popular 
during the reign of Louis XV. The Vernis-Martin sold for $400 presenting a more “affordable” 
alternative to the Moorish Marquetry model.  
In the years following, most of the major (and some of the minor) makers of 
phonographic equipment rushed to fill the popular demand for higher-end furniture grade 
phonographs only whetted by Victor’s early forays into the market. In a brochure for its Vocalion 
phonograph, the Aeolian company boasted “a special series of models designed by such world-
famous decorators of this country and Europe as: Wm. Baumgarten & Co., Huber & Co., W. & J. 
Sloane, Wm. Pierre Stymus, Jr., inc.” By 1916, all of Edison’s standard model phonographs were 
housed in imitations of period style furniture, but the company decided in that year to push the 
stakes even higher, commissioning Minneapolis firm W.A. French to produce eight “New Period 
Models” later called “Art Models.” Two of these designs featured gigantic gothic cabinets 
modeled on actual specimens of antique French furniture and the whole line ranged in price from 
$1000 to $6000.  
In 1917, never willing to be upstaged in the pursuit of good taste, Victrola released a 
catalog of 46 new Victrolas in such historical styles as William and Mary, Gothic, Jacobean, 
Chippendale, Empire, Adam, Queen Anne, Louis XV, Louis XVI and Chinese Chippendale. 
Victor, like its competitors, sold few of these opulently-made phonographs. The aim was not, 
however, to capture the minuscule sliver of the market which could bear traffic in such expensive 
instruments, but rather to signal the prestige of the company’s brand to the mass market. The 
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mere existence of the Chinese Chippendale Victrola redounded to the perceived value of all of 
Victor’s products because it distinguished the company as a serious arbiter of taste.   41
Victor’s flagship line of talking machines very obviously reshaped the visual semiotics of 
the home phonograph, transforming the awkward talking machine into a respectable piece of 
furniture. Often under-appreciated, however, is the extent to which the Victrola and the knock-
offs it inspired represented a departure in the semiotics of phonographic sound, as well. A 1906 
piece in the Talking Machine World describing the recently-unveiled Victrola suggested just what 
an informed observer might have found noteworthy in the new talking machine:  
The Victor-Victrola, a description of which will be found elsewhere in this issue, made its 
appearance in Chicago last week. Everybody is talking, not simply about the beauty of 
the cabinet, and the perfect concealment of the mechanism and the facilities for record 
“albums,” but principally about the tonal effects produced by means of the lid over the 
turntable by which departing sounds are eliminated… 
A bit of promotional copy released by Victor around the same time informed the trade that “when 
the [Victrola’s] lid is closed down it shuts out all sound of operation.” The lids of phonograph 
cabinets trapped such noise as might escape from the top of the machine. But by concealing the 
motor and other parts of the drive mechanism behind a wooden facade, it was possible to 
eradicate much of the mechanical sound from phonographic playback altogether.   42
 Drawings for a new type of phonograph cabinet designed by Stephen M. Wirts around 
1910 illustrated the sonic logic at play in the new phonograph cabinets by exaggerating it. In 
Wirts’ drawing the mechanism is ensconced in a cabinet designed like a desk except that one of 
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its narrow sides is intended to face outward into the room. The motor and turn table are situated 
far in the back of the cabinet and a long horn runs from the turntable all the way to the other end 
of the enclosure where it delivers the phonograph’s sounds into the open air. A secondary object 
of the new cabinet is aesthetic, but its primary aim is sonic: “to eliminate as far as possible all 
noises arising from the movements of the motor and to amplify sound waves from the diaphragm 
without destroying their effect.” The more cabinetry one could place between the listener and the 
phonograph’s motor, the less noise would reach her ears. Provided that recorded sounds were 
conducted through the labyrinth of wood by a suitable amplifying horn, the signal-to-noise ratio 
would be increased dramatically. Three years later descriptions of a new device patented by one 
Alfred R. Cunnius, spelled out the sonic effects of enclosed-horn cabinets even more explicitly. 
“…The cabinet type of machine,” readers of Talking Machine World were informed, “is provided 
with a cover for inclosing the revolving table, the sound box and tone arm,” the result being “that 
machine noises and the noise of the reproducing stylus upon the record tablet as well as such 
sounds as are caused by the reproducing diaphragm on the exposed face are all hushed.” This, 
together with the fact that “the motor mechanism for driving the revolving table is housed in the 
body of the cabinet” meant that “only such sounds as travel through the sound conduit [horn] and 
are emitted through the large end of the sound amplifier are observable by the listener.”  43
Conclusion  
In a 1912-1913 catalogue of the company’s Disc Model Phonograph’s, the Edison 
Company employed a brilliant rhetorical trope to distinguish its wares from those of the 
competition. The unnamed author begins by first insulating the Edison Disc Models from the 
Talking Machine World, August, 1910, 56-57; Talking Machine World, February, 1913, 52.43
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business of buying and selling. True, he or she has been hired to compile a catalog for the 
instrument, but one might as well attempt “to write commercially of a Stradivarius violin.” The 
author concludes “I shall not attempt to prepare a catalogue for the Edison Disc Phonograph,” (it 
is a catalogue) opting instead to relate “what I have witnessed in the past two years as Thomas A. 
Edison approached and finally reached the successful culmination of thirty-five years of 
endeavor to perfectly reproduce sound.”  44
This rejection of commerce for the language of artistry and technical achievement 
represents only the first step in the catalogue’s infrastructure-hiding sleight-of-hand. Assuming a 
familiar tone, the author pursues a curious approach to talking machine marketing: “Perhaps you 
are prejudiced against talking machines. I confess a very strong dislike for talking machine 
music.” As the reader soon discovers, however, the Edison disc phonograph—according to the 
unnamed author—is not a talking machine! “Any talking machine” the catalogue states, “can and 
does reproduce the fundamental tone of the original music, but the quality and beauty of music 
are in the overtones or tone colors.” Instruments incapable of reproducing musical overtones, on 
the other hand, are incapable of true music and “that is why you and I dislike talking machine 
music— or at most are merely tolerant of it.” In creating his new Disc Phonograph, however, 
Edison had sought “the reproduction of every tone color.” The distinction between Edison 
products and “talking machines” becomes more explicit when the author asks rhetorically “how 
can I best compare the new Edisonian reproduction of music with talking machines?” The 
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narrative ends with an injunction to readers: “Listen to talking machines. Then listen to the 
Edison Disc Phonograph. Then tell me if I have overstated the facts.”  45
In the same years Victor also moved to insulate its brand from the taint of mechanism. 
The October 1913 issue of the Voice of the Victor advised its salesman on “a very vital point 
which should never be lost sight of…”: “records and Victors are only the means to an end. What 
the public wants is music— not mechanism.” By way of illustration, the Voice narrated a story, 
reprinted from the Musical Times, in which piano player salesman confronts a prospective 
customer with a laundry list of technical questions regarding the salesman’s models. From 
experience, the salesman knows that the customer does not really care about these matters and 
that they will likely only confuse and discourage him from purchasing. He moves swiftly to 
reframe the conversation: 
If you really want to know those things… I will take the player mechanism out and show 
you just how everything works and explain the reasons. But, am I wrong in supposing 
that you are interested in the music the player will produce, or perhaps you are more 
interested in the mechanism? 
Why no… I want a player for the family—of course. 
That’s all I want to know, and all you should care about either. What do you care about 
whether the player is built out of sheet iron or lignum vitae, so long as it plays to suit 
you? We guarantee it—that’s sufficient. You can easily find out whether we are reliable or 
not and you will find that there is no stronger guarantee than we can give you. If music is 
what you want, this player will suit exactly. But just plain mechanism—you can get all of 
that you want by taking an alarm clock apart. We are selling music, not mechanism. 
Rather than becoming bogged down in technical discussions which can only serve to damage the 
magical aura of the device, it was far better to “blackbox” the mechanism, to insist that no 
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knowledge of its workings are necessary because the whole assemblage had been wrapped in the 
good faith and credit of a reputable firm.   46
Unfortunately for Victor, the new strategy of discursively concealing mechanism would 
prove challenging. The firm, after all, had cast its lot with the decidedly mechanical name the 
Victor Talking Machine Company. In a promotional pamphlet entitled “What have you got in a 
Victor Talking Machine?” the company addressed just this embarrassing detail. “Who knows 
what the King of England’s family name is?” it asked before reminding readers that it was 
“Wettin.” “But” the pamphlet cautioned, “he has outgrown everything but ‘Edward,’ long ago,” 
and so too had Victor outgrown the designation of a “talking machine” company. The Victrola, to 
be sure was a machine “but we are forgetting this and many of the Victor’s enthusiastic owners 
are doing likewise, because it’s so lifelike. ”  47
Manufacturers’ growing uneasiness with the designation “talking machine” brought 
together in one trope the many discursive and mechanical strands of the phonograph’s evolution 
in the years after 1900. The apparatus itself had become an increasingly opaque signifier with 
more and more of its works hidden behind finely-wrought cabinetry. Superficially, the impulse to 
hide the phonograph’s mechanism owed to a belief, like that expressed by Leon F. Douglass, that 
women did not like “mechanical looking things.” But this rather superficial line of reasoning left 
unquestioned the historical foundations of middle class women’s determination to keep machines 
out of the parlor. Simply put, the bourgeois parlor was itself intended as a respite from the 
means-end logic of the workaday world. Money, machines, labor, and anything redolent of 
Voice of the Victor, October, 1913, 15.46
 Victor Talking Machine Company, “What have you got in a Victor Talking Machine?” (Camden: Victor 47
Talking Machine Company). Playback Advertising Ephemera Collection, Rodgers and Hammerstein 
Archival Collection, New York Public Library for the Performing Arts.
!280
necessity had no place there. Women, as the appointed guardians of that sanctified space, 
recoiled (or at least were expected to recoil) from any such intrusion.  
The same set of cultural dynamics demanded that art— including music—disentangle 
itself from and transcend the material circumstances of its production. For the phonograph 
industry and its customers, then, the ideal consumption of recorded sound took on a decidedly 
passive character, valorizing longer playtimes, automatic braking, and fewer changes of records 
and needles. Phonographic sound, too, had to be stripped of all evidence of mechanism. This 
entailed, in the first instance, the development of high-quality spring and then electric motors 
which could reproduce recordings accurately enough that their own role in the sonic event of 
playback could disappear from view. As Edison’s phonograph exhibition in New York 
demonstrated, the talking machine was capable of musical feats unparalleled in the annals of 
human performance, and, while this sort of thing might prove entertaining for a season, it was 
manifestly not art. The phonograph would have to be tamed and its operations rationalized and 
brought into accordance with abstract Newtonian time. This emphasis on clocklike consistency, 
however, was offset by a countervailing sonic desideratum: the necessity of removing from 
playback the tell-tale sounds of machinery at work. As it happened, the spring and electric 
motors best able to “keep time” were noisy affairs. The job of separating sonic wheat from chaff, 
then, relied largely on creative use of cabinetry.  
Victrolas, Amberolas, and Grafonolas, as well as the various cabinet phonographs offered 
by lesser competitors represented a two-fold coup in manufacturers’ war against the semiotics of 
mechanism. They concealed belts and gears from the eye at the same time they redirected 
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fugitive whirrs and clicks from the ear. By World War I the industry had largely achieved its goal 




In March 1908 the Voice of the Victor, ran an article by music critic Marc A. Blumenberg, 
originally published in the Musical Courier. In the piece, Blumenberg meditates on the nature of 
recorded music, attempting to reconcile Romantic notions of musical ephemerality with the 
permanence of the recorded medium: 
The performance of great works of music are transient, because music is motion. It 
passes forever when once it has been uttered. To hear an artist sing a song is to hear it 
once and never again just as it was sung then, because no great artists can always be in 
the same mood and no artists can repeat exactly. The same applies to a symphony or 
piano performance. To perpetuate, therefore, a song sung by a great artist, a symphony 
played by a great orchestra, is to place on record, like the human voice can be placed on 
record in Victor, in perpetuity, an artistic event representing the time and the moment 
itself only and nothing else, because it is impossible of duplication.  1
Musical performances, Blumenberg asserted, cannot be "duplicated" because their very essence 
lay in their ephemerality. In this he drew on older Romantic notions of music as an untranslatable 
sphere of human experience, one irreducible to anything other than itself. One could not simply 
"write down" musical performance as one could a poem or a speech because the musical moment 
consists of exactly that what which evades representation. For Blumenberg then, only one 
interpretation of the phonographic art remained: Recorded music was ontologically identity to 
 Voice of the Victor, March, 1908, 5.1
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the original performance. That really was Caruso, Gluck, or Melba pouring forth from the 
phonograph’s horn.  
Until just a few years before Blumenberg’s commentary, however, observers had 
understood the phonograph as a talking machine. The ontological relationship between the 
original performance and its phonographic echo spurred little comment as the matter was largely 
settled—the phonograph, observers believed, merely mimicked the sounds it "heard." That it did 
so with preternatural accuracy surprised and delighted, but it caused little trouble for the "talking 
machine" interpretation. What, then, had changed by 1908? How could Blumenberg so 
emphatically assert that phonographic music was no duplicate of the original performance, but 
the thing itself?  
Previous chapters have offered part of the answer to this question. By 1908, 
phonographic playback had become a completely different kind of event from the phonograph 
exhibitions of the 1870s and 1880s and even the nickel-in-slot parlor machines of the previous 
decade. To begin with, the phonograph itself now bore few outward signs of human or 
mechanical labor. Its gears, pulleys, motors, belts and other various bits of mechanism had been 
hidden behind polished cabinetry. The sonic signals of the machine’s presence—shakes, whirrs, 
or grinding sounds—had also been removed, swallowed by the machine’s spacious cabinetry or 
muffled with springs and rubber washers. Listening tubes, which in the 1890s had anchored 
listeners to the phonograph and centered their focus on the mechanical origins of its sounds, had 
come and gone. They were replaced with projecting horns that allowed listeners to range away 
from the apparatus. The signs of human labor, too, had been winnowed from the phonograph’s 
performance. The simple hand-powered cylinder phonograph had given way to a procession of 
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alternative power sources from water-powered motors to alternating and direct current electrical 
motors. The earliest home phonographs relied on a spring motor that, while hand-cranked, stored 
increasing amounts of potential energy and allowed listeners longer and longer periods during 
which to forget that the phonograph was human-powered. By the twenties, home phonographs 
not only included electric motors which used wall current to run (seemingly) indefinitely, but 
also automated most of the labor of phonograph-listening. Some home units could play as many 
as twenty records without the slightest intervention on the part of their owners. 
While phonographic apparatuses were slowly disappearing from view in the years after 
1900, however, another material-semiotic revolution was taking place in the production of 
records, and in this lies the last piece of the puzzle of sonic modernity. In the 1890s performers 
who made their livings from singing for the phonograph appeared to the public as a special breed 
of artisan—the “cylinder maker.” His or her work was not understood as artistic achievement, 
but rather as a form of repetitive, industrial labor, and observers thought of the etching of sonic 
information onto records as a process very much like pouring wax into molds or shaving the 
finished blanks to size. Those who recorded their performances for the phonograph, then, were 
thought of as a class of printers who produced duplicates of sonic texts just as traditional printers 
churned out copies of the Bible or the New York Times. As with printed scripts, sound recordings 
produced in this era were valued for their success in clearly and accurately reproducing a pre-
existing text. 
After 1900 all of this changed, when Edison, Columbia and Victor engineered new and 
improved processes for the duplication of phonograph recordings. These new processes brought 
in their wake two closely-related consequences for the public face of recording. First, they drove 
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a material and conceptual wedge right through the practice of recording, separating the rote labor 
of mass-production from the rarefied realm of “high art.” This, in itself, tended to undermine the 
earlier conception of phonograph records as labor-soaked sonic "scripts" produced by relatively 
impersonal "cylinder makers." Secondly (and more importantly,) the new duplicating 
technologies opened the field of phonograph recording up to a new class of performer—the 
established performance star. On one hand, the entrance of Enrico Caruso, Nellie Melba and 
other practitioners of art music reinforced the conception of the performance as a thing apart 
from the record on which it was captured. “Good music,” in the sense in which early twentieth 
century Americans were accustomed to thinking of it, had little to do with the mundane and the 
material and was sheathed in a metaphysics of transcendence. On the other hand were the 
mechanics of celebrity. Cylinder makers were known as cylinder makers, and they existed in the 
public mind by dint of the industry and the machines which they served. Not so with the new 
recording stars. These were men and women of established repute whose names preceded 
chronologically and conceptually their involvement with the industry. Further, as celebrities the 
new recording stars cast a long and conspicuous shadow across public consciousness and their 
appearances in other forms of media like the press allowed the industry to capitalize on every 
facet of recording artists’ identities for the selling of records. In the same years that the 
phonographic apparatus and its operational infrastructure were becoming difficult to see and 
imagine recordings themselves were being purged of the semiotics of labor. 
Records 
Some of the earliest prognostications for the future of phonography—including those of 
Edison—envisioned an endless and nearly effortless duplication of recordings along the lines of 
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modern printing. The earliest efforts in this direction began in the 1870s when the Edison 
Speaking Phonograph Company sought a method to electrotype the crude foil records of the first 
phonograph. Several parties turned their attention to the problem but to no avail and by June 
1878 Charles Cheever of the ESPC had grown sufficiently desperate to propose distributing free 
phonographs to inventors and giving a prize of $1000 to the first to electrotype a record. It does 
not appear that the scheme was ever tried and in any event, would have only been a case of 
throwing good money after bad. The tinfoil phonograph suffered limitations more damning than 
the lack of a duplicating process, and as we have seen, it had largely disappeared from the 
attention of the public within a couple years.   2
With the phonograph’s rebirth after 1886 the search for a mechanical duplicating 
technology recommenced. “Cylinder makers” of the 1890s industrialized the production of 
phonograph records and even approached the output of the primitive printing press by 
multiplying the number of recording devices and by pouring take after take into their attentive 
horns. Theirs was a decidedly labor-intensive business. The earliest successful record 
duplications by cylinder makers likely relied on an acoustic method in which an original wax 
master was taken of a musical performance and then played on a phonograph while one or more 
recording phonographs captured its sounds from the open air. Acoustic duplications, however, 
suffered enormous loss of fidelity and the first patent awarded for phonographic duplication 
represented an improvement on this approach. By connecting the diaphragms of two 
phonographs with a hollow tube, inventor and phonograph industry mainstay Leon F. Douglass 
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was able to more forcefully channel sound waves from a playing record into the recording stylus 
of a recording phonograph, thereby achieving greatly improved sound quality in his duplicate 
records. He assigned the patent, filed on March 7, 1892, to Columbia who promised Douglass a 
two cent royalty on each duplicated record.  3
By the 1890s, however, Edison and others had already been long in search of a method 
for mass-duplicating records—a method more truly analogous to printing. Edison’s duplication 
technology, known as “pantography,” relied on a single diaphragm with a reproducing stylus on 
one side and a recording stylus on the other, allowing vibrations to pass directly from one 
cylinder to the other without the loss of energy entailed in acoustic transmission. Vastly superior 
to acoustic methods of duplication, pantography became the industry standard within a few 
years. Inventor and phonograph entrepreneur Gianni Bettini filed a patent for a pantograph in 
1892 and soon after sold interests in the patent to Columbia as well as the New York Phonograph 
Company, one of North American’s local subsidiaries. In 1895 Columbia’s T.H. MacDonald filed 
a patent for his own pantographic duplication method.  4
By the middle of the 1890s, then, pantographic duplication had replaced acoustic 
methods at Columbia and Edison. For the most part, major industry players managed to keep a 
lid on their duplication methods. Edison chose the route of secrecy, and a January, 1893, letter 
from A.O. Tate to Edison suggests the seriousness with which the company took the project of 
concealing its duplicating secrets:  
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Following your suggestion I have placed Walter Miller in charge of our Musical Record 
Department. He is going to send Hagen down to see me and I will engage Hagen as an 
Assistant to Miller. I am satisfied that we can keep the Duplicating process secret at the 
Phonograph Works, in the Toy building. We will adopt every precaution to effect this end. 
While Edison sought to prevent loose lips from sinking his ship, Columbia turned to the courts, 
claiming control of all duplication techniques on the basis of the Douglass patent. When apprised 
of Columbia’s claim, Edison waved it off, arguing that "four years ago [I] made 40 special 
machines to do what is described in this patent, and in the same way.” Additionally, Edison 
claimed, “the whole thing was set out in caveats long before the machines referred to were even 
made” and that “these caveats must be ten years old..." Unshaken by Columbia’s bluster or the 
prospect of litigation, Edison’s Phonograph Works continued to turn out duplicated records. 
Columbia was, however, able to discourage lesser concerns from entering the waters of cylinder 
duplication, and with the duplication market cornered, Edison and Columbia provided 
duplication services for smaller companies engaged in cylinder production. Edison lobbied 
aggressively to have all of North American’s subsidiaries contract with him for record 
duplication.  5
Despite its marked superiority over acoustic duplication, pantography suffered from 
serious limitations of its own. As with the earlier method, pantography required that the record 
be played for duplication, adding costly minutes to production time. Further the earliest 
pantographs employed at Edison’s factory and elsewhere likely produced only one duplicate at a 
time, and original master records wore out after so many runs through the pantograph. Edison 
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claimed to get anywhere from 200 to 300 duplicates from a single “master” record before it had 
worn out. Scholar Allen Koenigsberg believes the figure to have been much lower, citing 30. 
Pantography, then, hardly represented the route to post-scarcity sound dreamt of by industry 
personnel, a fact borne out by the scattered production data afforded by the archive. An October 
1891 report prepared by Edison’s National Phonograph Company tabulated the output of 
duplicated cylinders for several months prior:  6
Table 6.1. National Phonograph Company 
Weekly Shipments of [Duplicate] Cylinders
Week Ending Duplicates Shipped
August 8, 1891 50
August 15, 1891 0
August 22, 1891 79
August 29, 1891 0
September 5, 1891 24
September 12, 1891 254
September 19, 1891 266
September 26, 1891 112
October 3, 1891 200
October 10, 1891 160
October 17, 1891 60
Total 1205
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These numbers reflect the earliest days of the Edison cylinder duplication service. Best 
practices had yet to evolve and many eventual customers had not placed their first orders. By 
September of 1893 the Phonograph Works had made 18,626 duplicate records, suggesting a 
drastic improvement in production in the two years since the first report, but still a far cry from 
the river of wax characteristic of the later recording industry. Despite these underwhelming 
production figures, the Edison plant managed to stay ahead of orders. In January 1892 Edison’s 
secretary A.O. Tate informed his employer that enough cylinders were on hand to satisfy orders 
for the time being and Edison called a moratorium on production. In the coming years, the paltry 
output of the pantograph continued to outpace demand and of the 18,626 duplicates produced by 
September 1893, 11,517 remained in the Phonograph Works’ warehouse.   7
The relatively small traffic in mechanically-duplicated cylinders, however, should not be 
construed as a general lack of demand. Edison’s phonograph works supplied the blank cylinders 
to most of the industry—including the many “music factories” great and small who had taken as 
their business to supply the trade with pre-recorded music. Consequently, the company could 
gather fairly accurate data regarding the market for musical records. In the autumn of 1893 A.O. 
Tate estimated that between 150,000 and 200,000 musical records were purchased annually. 
Unless Columbia had shipped substantially more duplicates than Edison’s total of 7,109, these 
figures suggest that the manufacture of musical cylinders remained, at least for a while, a 
remarkably de-centralized industry. Some music factories probably employed crude acoustic 
methods of duplication or even—despite the best efforts of Columbia’s lawyers—their own 
pantograph devices. The great majority of recorded music, however, found its way onto wax by 
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the methods outlined in Chapter 3, with singers and instrumentalists gathered before batteries of 
recording horns, churning out dozens of performances per session.   8
The demand for musical records increased steadily throughout the 1890s and by the end 
of the decade cylinder manufacturers were proving unequal to the task of keeping up with 
demand. Improvements had been made in pantography, and at least one firm, Columbia, 
eventually developed a pantograph which could make three duplicates at a time. Similar 
advances in the art of cylinder manufacture were undoubtedly made in other corners of the 
industry but the demand for records spurred by the burgeoning home phonograph market 
outstripped these production improvements.  
Around 1900 the cylinder record industry reached its next quantum leap in duplicating 
technology: molding. With the limitations of pantography so obvious Edison had always hoped 
to introduce a more efficient system. At the Second Annual Convention of the Local Phonograph 
Companies in 1892 Edison representative Walter Miller announced to the assembled industry 
representatives that in addition to his present (pantographic) method of duplication Edison had 
developed a second. However, while this second method yielded much better copies, it was more 
expensive. To even consider this second duplication method, Edison would require the local 
companies to commit to a substantial number of records ahead of time. Given the fiscal 
constraints of the local companies they predictably opted for the cheaper pantographic method 
and the matter was laid to rest. The second duplication method was molding.  9
 Alfred Ord Tate to Thomas Alva Edison, September 30, 1893 (TAEM D9343ABZ).8
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To mold a phonography record a newly-recorded master cylinder was coated with an 
ultra-fine layer of gold dust so that it would conduct electricity, after which it was electro-plated 
with copper. The copper-coated cylinder was then, in turn, placed in a more durable brass shell. 
The entire assembly was then cooled, causing the wax master to shrink inside of its copper 
casing and allowing the mold-maker to remove it from the mold. If the procedure had been 
conducted correctly a perfect “negative” of the record and its spiraling hill-and-dale sound 
groove would be preserved in the copper sheath lining the inside of the mold. To make a 
duplicate, Edison employees reversed the process. First, they shaved a fresh blank cylinder down 
to a size just a bit larger than the mold and shrank it with cool water. In this state it easily slid 
inside the mold where it was then heated causing it to expand and push against the copper lining. 
Once more, the blank was shrank by cooling and removed from the mold. If this stage of the 
procedure had been conducted properly the wax blank would now contain a perfect copy of the 
original record’s sound groove.  10
Around the beginning of 1902 both Edison and Columbia introduced molded cylinder 
records and the new technology almost immediately revolutionized the industry. In 1900, the 
United States Census of Manufacturers estimated the total output of all American cylinder record 
manufacturers to be 2.2 million for the previous year. By 1904, that number had grown nearly 
tenfold with approximately 21 million cylinder records issuing from the factories of the nation’s 
record makers that year. The explosive growth of cylinder manufacture in the years around 1900, 
however, should not distract from a crucial fact. Edison and those who followed in his wake had 
dreamt of a way to “print” sound— a nearly costless and phenomenally profitable method of 
 Wile, “Duplicates,” 194.10
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reproducing sonic texts. But printing was a fundamentally two-dimensional art while cylinder 
records complicated matters immensely by the introduction of the third dimension. First and 
most obvious is the matter of the recording medium itself: paper is flat but wax records are 
cylindrical. Written text stretches across the paper page in orderly flat lines while phonographic 
“writing” wound around its wax cylinder in tight spirals that resembled a spring.   11
Even if the recording medium could be stretched out flat (such was the case with 
Edison’s earlier tinfoil records,) the data on cylinder recordings would have remained 
fundamentally three-dimensional. Printed text depends for legibility on the correct placement of 
ink on the two dimensional plane of the page, and with the exception of Braille, does not rely on 
depth or texture. The recording and playback technologies on which wax cylinder recordings 
relied, however, did. The recording stylus registered sound waves by cutting a line which 
undulated perpendicularly to the surface of the record. When the sounds on a wax cylinder were 
played back, the reproducing stylus did not zig-zag left and right over the surface of the record, 
but rode over a bumpy up-and-down pattern etched in the bottom of the record’s wax groove—
the famous “hill and dale” groove of the Edison recording technology. Because of the complex, 
three-dimensional spatial orientation of their data, cylinder records could not (in the early 
twentieth century) be printed, and their duplication would always rely on relatively involved 
operations like those involved in molding.  
While Edison and Columbia struggled with nineteenth century 3D printing, a competitor 
had slowly but surely been perfecting a system of recording in two dimensions which could be 
duplicated through methods truly analogous to printing. Emile Berliner’s gramophone utilized 
 Tim Brooks, “High Drama in the Record Industry: Columbia Records, 1901-1934,” Association for 11
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round and flat records— the discs so familiar as “records” to children of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. But Berliner’s records departed from those of Columbia and Edison in one 
other, crucial, way. Instead of incising sonic data in a hill-and-dale pattern perpendicular to the 
plane of the record’s surface, Berliner’s recording method produced a laterally zig-zagging 
incision parallel to the plane of the recording surface. Like hand-written script, the 
gramophone’s “writing” presented entirely in two dimensions and its sonic data could be “read” 
without regard to depth.  
After experimenting with several techniques, Berliner hit upon an ingenious method. He 
covered a zinc disc with a thin waxy film of beeswax and gasoline, a concoction which was 
extraordinarily soft and which yielded to the slightest movement of the recording stylus. Even 
more importantly, it was acid resistant. Berliner then used the zinc disc to make a master 
recording, with the stylus etching a long undulating groove into the beeswax/gasoline, exposing 
the zinc disc below. He then placed the recorded master into an acid bath and waited while its 
corrosive action ate a fine groove of even depth into the exposed portion of the disc. Removing 
the wax film, Berliner discovered a perfect copy of the original groove etched by acid into the 
zinc disc beneath. Utilizing an electrotyping technique similar to Edison’s, he then produced a 
steel or iron negative which could then be used to stamp perfect copies of the original recording 
into heated and pliable India Rubber blanks.   12
The preparation of these flat disc matrices, was, to be sure, an involved process. But once 
made, they facilitated duplication which was dramatically more efficient than molding 
techniques. In his 1942 memoir The Music Goes Round, industry veteran Fred Gaisberg, argued 
 Fabulous Phonograph, 58; Raymond Wile, “Etching the Human Voice: The Berliner Invention of the 12
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for the centrality of Berliner’s duplicating process to the success of the Victor Talking Machine 
Company, arguing that “the stumbling-block to the rapid development of the old phonograph was 
the difficulty of duplicating record cylinders.” He believed “simple stamping of endless copies 
from one master” to be “one of the two great advantages of the gramophone process” and went 
so far as to attribute the eventual triumph of disc records over cylinders to Berliner’s stamping 
technique.  13
1904 proved to be the high-point of the cylinder’s popularity as a recording medium, and 
had, in fact, already been surpassed by the disc in total production figures. By the early 1920s the 
total output of American record manufacturers reached 107 million, but the once-mighty cylinder 
accounted for fewer that 4 million of that figure. Discs accounted for over 105 million.   14
Table 6.2. Annual Production of Disc and Cylinder Records in the U.S. (millions)
Year Cylinder Records Disc Records Total
1904 21.0 4.0 25
1909 18.6 8.6 27.2
1914 3.9 23.3 27.2
1919 5.9 101.1 107.0
1921 1.8 103.4 105.2
 In 1901, the Victor Talking Machine replaced Berliner’s ingenious, if byzantine, zinc disc method with 13
one utilizing a simpler hard wax recording medium. Fred Gaisberg, The Music Goes Round (New York: 
Macmillan, 1942), 19-20, 44. The other great innovation produced by the company, he argued, was that 
the gramophone’s reproducing stylus was guided by the record’s groove. Edison’s machine tracked across 
the surface of the record mechanically.
 Table taken from Brooks, “High Drama in the Record Industry,” 39.14
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Much more than cheap duplication techniques lay at the heart of the disc’s conquest of 
the market. The Victor Talking Machine Company, inheritor of Berliner’s gramophone patents, 
championed the cause of disc records and did much to create a market where one had not existed. 
Its management, led by president Eldridge Reeves Johnson, was a remarkably imaginative cohort 
whose work established templates not only for the recording industry but for the emerging 
culture of marketing and consumption in twentieth century America. Without the deliberate and 
concerted efforts of Victor the disc record would never have inundated the world. It is equally 
true, however, that the wide profit margins afforded by flat disc recording made Victor a very 
lucrative enterprise. The robust stream of revenue generated by record sales allowed the 
company to experiment in all directions, producing novel and epoch-making consumables like 
the Victrola. It also provided the company with the financial resources necessary to pursue one of 
the most innovative marketing campaigns in history and company president E.R. Johnson was 
noted for his nearly fanatical faith in (and outlays for) print and outdoor advertising.  
In that sense, the flat disc record proved a particularly effective oil with which to prime 
the pump of American consumer culture. At Victor, Columbia and a quickly-proliferating cohort 
of smaller competitors, record output exploded in the first decades of the twentieth century. 
Retail prices dropped, encouraging higher consumption. Skyrocketing corporate profits 
facilitated higher and higher expenditures on advertising which in turned stimulated consumer 
enthusiasm for the phonograph and its records.  
The second major shift in the consumption of recorded sound after 1900 obtained in the 
piles of shellac discs and wax cylinders that accumulated in the parlor of every phonograph 
owner. In June 1903 it was reported in the pages of Edison Phonograph Monthly that a Chicago 
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enthusiast had accumulated a total of 404 Edison Standard Records, intelligence which was 
received by the phonograph community as a declaration of war. The following month a west 
coast dealer apprised readers of the same publication that one of his customers owned “upwards 
of 500 records.” Unfortunately, the Californian’s reign as world champion record collector was 
short-lived. The same issue of Phonograph Monthly reported on a Kewanee, Illinois, man in 
possession of over 1,900 records, while O.R. Looker, President of the Michigan Mutual Life 
Insurance Company, owned over 3000. These early high-water marks were seldom surpassed, 
but dealers and consumers continued to write the trade journals for years, trumpeting their 
prowess as record collectors. In 1912 W.N. Moulton of Danvers, Massachusetts, informed the 
New Phonogram that his record collection numbered 1558 and “issue[d] a challenge to any and 
all Edison owners to match his list, in point of numbers.” Apparently no one bothered to inform 
Moulton that collectors had surpassed his achievement a decade prior. The same issue of the New 
Phonogram did, however, carry word of a 3,000 record collection, deflating Moulton’s grandiose 
pretensions as a collector.  15
Collections of all kinds had existed since antiquity, but the hobby had almost always 
focused on oddities, valuables, works of art and other singular or very rare items. Even collectors 
of books—some of the world’s first mechanically reproduced commodities—gravitated toward 
manuscripts, first editions and other rarities. What to make, then, of the phonograph enthusiast’s 
compulsion to pile up hordes of mass-produced commodities? Consumers and even industry 
personnel occasionally described the impulse to hoard sound in terms that evoked an epidemic. A 
Cincinnati man wrote to the Edison Phonograph Monthly that “our folks have got the craze in all 
 Edison Phonograph Monthly, June, 1903, 11; Edison Phonograph Monthly, July, 1903, 7; New 15
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its stages, and we have Records for breakfast, dinner and supper. It’s phonograph from morn till 
night, and we’re all broke buying Records. We always talk, speak and recommend the Edison 
Phonograph to our friends." One Roseburg, Oregon, phonograph dealer ran a newspaper 
advertisement declaring “Phonographitis Still Spreading” prompting the Edison Phonograph 
Monthly to note with satisfaction that, though the dealer offered many makes of talking machine 
as “temporary reliefs,” his advertising had insisted “the only permanent cure is an Edison, put up 
in $20, $30 and $50 packages.” According to the jobber responsible for supplying this dealer, the 
metaphor was working. “We think our man, one of our best Edison Dealers, has coined a new 
word,” the jobber wrote to the Edison Phonograph Monthly, adding that “he has procured 
business on the strength of it as we are shipping him stacks of machines, Records and horns 
every day.”   16
An even more bizarre attempt to link recorded sound and disease took place in 1914 
when the Memphis Prosperity League ran an ad entitled “Wanted: A Good Samaritan” which 
began with a quite lengthy “windup”:  
Doctors say that our bodies are filled with good and bad germs. When the good germs 
predominate, they drive out the bad ones and we enjoy perfect health. Among the new 
good germs and, in fact, the best that has ever been discovered, is the Victor-Victrola 
germ. This germ may be caught through the eyes, the nose, the mouth, the ears or in the 
summer it may be absorbed through the pores of the skin… Just as soon as this germ 
becomes full grown, then there can never be any permanent happiness for that individual 
until he possess or has the use of a Victor-Victrola.  
And the pitch: 
We are informed that the Victor-Victrola germ has become almost an epidemic among the 
Sisters of the Good Shepherd, and the object of this advertisement is to locate a “Good 
Samaritan” who is willing to supply this most worthy institution with a Victor-Victrola 
and a suitable selection of records as a Christmas present.  
 Edison Phonograph Monthly, March, 1904, 9; Edison Phonograph Monthly, June, 1907, 18.16
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The League’s acting president at the time of this advertisement was O.K. Houck who, not 
incidentally, also ran a phonograph dealership in Memphis. Undoubtedly, Houck hoped to 
generate a sale for himself as well as a little public goodwill while at it, but the advertising copy 
is itself evocative. Houck would very much like readers to believe in the inexorable spread of the 
“Victor-Victrola germ” and maybe even to rush out and buy a talking machine as an inoculation 
against it.   17
Through the language of epidemic observers attempted to describe (and cultivate) a 
cultural phenomenon evolving before their eyes. The trope relied on external agencies in the 
form of disease to explain why some were enthusiastically adopting a habit—hoarding—which 
had hitherto represented a marginal aspect of human existence. The comparisons, of course, were 
intended less to explain than to evoke. Consumers were not crazy or diseased, though their 
grandparents might have thought so. 
The post-1900 entry of phonographs and records into American homes also precipitated a 
shift in the temporality of record consumption. In the previous decade owners of nickel-in-slot 
phonographs monetized recorded sound one listen at a time, and in so doing encouraged a very 
rapid turnover in consumer demand. Some particularly popular cylinders undoubtedly 
encouraged repeat business, but the constant outlay of five-cent pieces kept consumers ever-
ready to head for new sonic pastures. How much better, after all, was it to spend one's nickels on 
different selections, rather than on repetitions of the same? Phonograph proprietors serious about 
their bottom line, then, switched out records once or even several times a day. Proprietors 
operating phonographs in different neighborhoods or cities could rotate their stock, but even 
 Voice of the Victor, January, 1914, 18.17
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here, the limited durability of the decade's wax cylinder records militated against prolonged 
consumption.  
After 1900, consumers increasingly paid for their recorded sounds up front, purchasing 
cylinders and discs for private home consumption. Now, the money spent on a record represented 
a sunken cost and every whirl on the phonograph brought the per-listen cost of the record down a 
little more. While few record purchasers ever expressed the logic of listening in such baldly 
economistic terms, they certainly knew that their money was gone and that the black discs 
stacked in their parlor had taken its place. Best to listen to each of them as many times as one 
could in order to get one's "money's worth." At the same time that these economic incentives 
were realigning to favor long-term listening, the technology of recording was evolving to 
facilitate the same. In the first decade of the twentieth century, manufacturers began employing 
new harder plastics like celluloid for records and these records lasted substantially longer than 
those of the parlor era. For the first time in history it became possible and even common to 
consume the same musical performance not just once, but hundreds or thousands of times. These 
shifting patterns of consumption, when joined with transformations taking place in the labor of 
record production, encouraged consumers to think of (and interact with) their record collections 
in new ways.  
From Cylinder Makers to Recording Stars 
The new record-duplicating technologies which emerged after 1900 transformed the 
political economy and consumption of phonograph recordings but the new methods also 
contributed to a wide-scale reconfiguration of the labor of recording. Edison, Columbia, Victor 
and other manufacturers of musical records could now produce nearly limitless copies from a 
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single original recording, meaning studio performers need only produce one good "take" of any 
given selection. With the responsibility for mass duplication taken off performers’ shoulders, the 
business of singing for the horn became dramatically less taxing. Anna Case, a soprano who 
made her recording debut in 1914 with the National Phonograph Company later recalled the 
relatively relaxed atmosphere of the studio in those years. “The minute you said ‘oh my, I don’t 
feel I can do it well the next time,’ they’d say, ‘Well, that’s all for today,’ or something like that.” 
Soprano Rosa Ponselle’s recording career began in 1919 for Columbia. Recording sessions, she 
told an interviewer, "didn’t start too early, because I never started too early. The later they started 
for me, the better." Similarly, legendary jazz clarinetist and bandleader Benny Goodman recalled 
of his early recording career in the 1920s that “sometimes if things didn’t come off the way they 
were supposed to right away, we would go home. (Laughs) I mean it wasn’t life or death whether 
we stayed there and made those records or not, we’d just go home and say, ‘We’ll be back 
tomorrow; nothing’s happening today.’”  18
While reliable and efficient record duplication relieved singers and instrumentalists of the 
labor of mass production, it did not eliminate all craft knowledge from the process of recording. 
To begin with, the acoustic recording methods of the day required that performers engage very 
conscientiously with the recording equipment itself. High or loud notes always ran the risk of 
ruining a recording, so singers were forced to turn their heads away from the horn or to even 
move several feet away to prevent this from happening. Conversely, the crude recording 
equipment sometimes did not register low or quiet sounds at all, so performers sometimes had to 
rush forward, almost placing their heads in the machine’s horn to sing in more restrained tones. 
 John Harvith & Susan Edith Harvith (eds.), Edison, Musicians, and the Phonograph: a Century in 18
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To achieve a good recording, then, musicians were forced into constant movement about the 
room. Singer Lotte Lehmann, later recalled that the process "was really like dancing the whole 
time," and characterized it as "very difficult." Singer Rosa Ponselle sang with such intensity that 
the studio prescribed her movements with chalk lines drawn on the studio floor. For high C’s, she 
said, "I’d run way back. It was something!" The recording horn itself proved obtrusive in some 
cases. Violinist Samuel Gardner recalled the days of acoustic recording: "Oh, it was horrible. I’ll 
never forget that. You had to stand right on top of the horn… We had to stand sideways so that 
the sound went into the horn…" For a violinist, however, this presented a new problem as one’s 
elbow always threatened to bump the apparatus, and Gardner recalled that one had to be careful 
not to strike the horn. Violinist Arcadia Birkenholz similarly recalled that the studio staff would 
urge violinists to get as close to the horn as possible, but that "when you did that, sometimes your 
bow or your arm hit the horn, and that ended it—you had to make the record over.”  19
The advent of electrical recording in 1925, however, resulted in another substantial 
reduction in the labor and specialized knowledge required for recording. Microphones used 
electrical impulses to register and transmit sonic information and were therefore much more 
sensitive to the subtleties of musical performance than the old acoustic recording horn. No longer 
was it necessary to belt at top volume to push the recording stylus, nor did performers rush 
frantically across the studio floor in order to control the recording’s dynamics. Singer Franklyn 
Baur registered these changes when he argued that “the invention of the electrical process was of 
greater significance than the average layman realizes. Not only are the finished records 
incomparably better from every standpoint," he argued, "but the strain on the singer is 
 Harvith & Harvith, Edison, Musicians, and the Phonograph, 50, 65-67, 71, 81.19
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immeasurably eased. A record can be made in exactly one-third the time it used to take, and no 
longer is it necessary for us to nearly crack our throats singing into that hated horn…" Electrical 
recording lightened the workload of recording artists but it also reduced the necessity for 
technical competence.  
As recording became more like the musician’s traditional craft of stage performance 
some singers and instrumentalists came to hardly register a difference between the two arts. 
Benny Goodman recalled a studio experience when he began recording in the 1920s. "I don’t 
remember exactly what happened as far as microphones and equipment. We just played, and I 
guess there was a microphone." Orchestra conductor Eugene Ormandy began his recording 
career in the early 1930s after the rise of electric recording. When later asked if he had any say in 
the placement of microphones he recalled "There was no such question then. As a matter of fact, 
I had nothing to say about microphone placement. That’s the producer’s and the engineer’s job." 
Electrical recording intensified the distinction between the technical and musical labor of sound 
recording. As the job of studio performance became disentangled from the technical knowledge 
of the “engineer” it came more to resemble that privileged sphere of human labor known as 
“art.”  20
The changes which took place in the technology of record manufacture after 1900 did not 
just increase the output of music factories. Mass duplication and later electrical recording opened 
the field up to a new class of artist for whom the practice had hitherto made little economic 
sense. Established singers and instrumentalists whose talent and reputations commanded 
substantial performance fees could now consider recording a viable alternative to the stage—at 
 Tim Gracyk and Frank W. Hoffmann, Popular American Recording Pioneers, 1895-1925 (New York: 20
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least occasionally. Through the 1890s, the art and science of cylinder-making had appealed to 
performers who could devote long and arduous hours to the business of making records, 
"unburdened" by the opportunity costs associated with well-paying concert performances. With 
the introduction of molding and stamping techniques after 1900, however, one could commit to 
wax enough song to flood the country and even the world in a single afternoon—and earn a fee 
commensurate with that miracle. One need not spend months in the studio feeding popular 
demand for a hit record nor forego performances in the world’s prestigious opera houses. As time 
went by, one need not even learn much about the recording studio at all but could walk in and 
perform for the microphone, much like how one performed in concert. 
The era of the recording star began in early 1902 when agents of the Victor Talking 
Machine Company’s European subsidiary, the Gramophone Company, attended a performance of 
Baron Franchetti’s opera Germania at Milan’s Teatro La Scala. There they witnessed a 
performance by one of the era’s most promising young tenors—Enrico Caruso—and, impressed 
with the thirty year old opera singer, contracted with him to record ten sides for the company on 
March 18. For this service Caruso was paid £100. The records sold well and in September of that 
year the Gramophone Company published its first Red Label record catalogue, which featured 
selections of high tone art music. The Gramophone Company’s agents soon criss-crossed the 
continent finding and recording respected singers and, occasionally, instrumentalists. Warsaw’s 
Bastia Battistini, Milan’s Fernando De Lucia, Rome’s Alessandro Moreschi, Felia Litvinne and 
Victor Maurel of Paris and the Londoner Charles Santley—all recorded for the company in the 
months to follow. As the phonograph’s role in European art music came to be normalized, the 
most prestigious names of the stage agreed to sing for the Gramophone Company’s recording 
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horn. In 1903 superstar opera singer Francesco Tamagno recorded for the Company, followed in 
1904 by Australian soprano Nellie Melba and, in 1905, by the era’s great diva Adelina Patti.  21
In the United States, interest in art music recordings remained muted at first but in 1903 
Columbia released its new series of Grand Opera Records, featuring selections by Edouard de 
Reszke, Marcella Sembrich, Ernestine Schumann-Heink and others. Victor countered with its 
own art music selections, acquired by the company from the European Gramophone Company 
and now called “Red Seal Records.” Columbia’s first foray into art music proved disastrous. The 
public paid little attention to their $2 records and the company retreated from the market 
conceding it to Victor for several years thereafter. The Red Seal Records, however, proved highly 
successful and by 1912 Victor boasted six hundred selections in its Red Seal Catalog.  22
That operatic singers could now profitably perform for the recording horn, of course, in 
no way dictated that anyone would want them to. Given the era’s enthusiasm for brass band 
selections and "coon songs" there was every reason to leave Caruso on the opera stage where 
European audiences had put him. As it turned out, the impetus to record such material owed 
much to long-standing and long-evolving discourses which valorized opera and symphonic 
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music as components of "high culture." In the eighteenth century Americans understood culture 
in terms defined by the aristocratic gentry, and a close affinity existed between notions of 
"refinement" and the material wealth necessary to express it through ornately-constructed homes, 
ballrooms and expensive silverware. In the nineteenth century, an expanding middle class 
capitalized on increasing opportunities for consumption to lay claim to refinement for 
themselves, and in response, elite arbiters of taste redefined refinement in terms hostile to the 
new upstarts. Refinement could not be bought, they now argued, but must be cultivated through 
long and disinterested pursuit of the beautiful and the tawdry getting-and-spending of the middle 
classes even stood as an obstacle to true refinement. Over the course of the century, the focus on 
internal refinement gave rise to an emphasis on self-cultivation or "culture," terms with long 
association with the growth of the soil. The emphasis remained the same, however: Excellence in 
all things derived from transcending the base and the self-interested. Refinement flouted the 
means-ends logics of the market and of technology and pursued the beautiful for its own sake.   23
The emphasis on transcendence also provided the conceptual glue for a broader, trans-
Atlantic understanding of art, which in its most fully-articulated form joined criticism to German 
idealism. Particularly in the hands of the Romantics, the idea of artistic transcendence had come 
to deny not only commerciality and other aspects of day-to-day existence but even the possibility 
of rational description. Artistry captured absolute, supra-sensible reality, and for that reason, it 
lay beyond human categories of description. Within this schema, music assumed pride of place. 
Because of its non-representational character, it was believed, music best conveyed the abstract 
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truths which lay beyond words and pictures and other corrupted facsimiles of outward reality. 
Furthermore, music most successfully achieved this aim when it was lifted from the historically-
specific contexts of folk practice and placed in the hands of solitary geniuses who concerned 
themselves only with the demands of eternal beauty. Composed musics, then, came to represent 
the apogee of art.   24
In the years after 1900 phonograph manufacturers struggled to transform perceptions of 
their wares from denizens of train depots and "phonograph parlors" to respectable additions to 
the bourgeois home. In order to do this, they capitalized on the existing prestige of art music, and 
it was in this context that the Victor Talking Machine Company offered recordings by Enrico 
Caruso and other art music virtuosi. "High culture" promised to remove the stain of cheap public 
amusements from the phonograph’s reputation, but it also implied (counter to its own non-
commercial ethos) that the purchase of a phonograph was a wise expenditure. Even when 
recordings of the world’s virtuosi failed to produce large profits, then, they still paid massive 
dividends in prestige for the firms which produced them.  
Both are Caruso 
The joining of "high art" and techno-scientific capitalism’ represented to the men of the 
phonograph industry an unambiguous coup in their pursuit for profit, but there was at least one 
serious cultural problem left to resolve. Under the old regime of the genteel tradition—the very 
system of value under which Victor’s appropriation of opera made sense in the first place—
conceptions of art tended to winnow the number of worthwhile books, poems, compositions and 
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paintings. While no reason existed that the canon should not evolve and expand over time, 
Matthew Arnold’s formulation of “the best which has been thought and said” stood as a check to 
that growth and as an obstacle to the inculcation of endless sonic accumulation among 
consumers. Some pioneers in the realm of conspicuous sonic consumption took up the call to 
amass records as early as 1903 but the buying habits of a few well-off “phonograph cranks" do 
not an industry make, and manufacturers of phonographs and records committed their ample 
creative energies to the project of generalizing the record-collecting habit. What they helped to 
create was a horizontal rather than vertical system of aesthetics, one in which new forms of 
artistic value could be discovered, or even manufactured, on a quarterly basis. Rather than 
positioning their wares as the “best,” then, the recording industry increasingly focused on the 
charm, the personality and the idiosyncrasies of their products.  
To do so, however, the companies of the early twentieth century were forced to grapple 
with some thorny ontological problems. To return to an earlier metaphor: if recordings are 
printed texts, then little more can be asked of the printer than that he or she render the 
reproduction as excellently as possible. To the extent that a printing job is done idiosyncratically 
it is usually (though not always) bad, while well-executed printings of a given work are likely to 
be nearly identical. If the recording, however, is understood as an extension of a person—
intimately tied to his or her body, mind and comportment—then free rein is given to novelty. The 
phonograph can become an agent of “personality.”  
To address this problem, record companies mounted increasingly explicit denials of the 
recording’s status as a “copy,” arguing that it represented the performance itself. In 1908 the 
Voice of the Victor informed its dealers that "the mere notes of a musical composition can be 
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passed on from one generation to another through the medium of sheet music, enabling others to 
sing or play it; or they can be reproduced on a piano roll or a music box." With the advent of the 
Victor Phonograph, however, it had become "possible to perpetuate the actual living voice of a 
great singer or the art of a noted musician." Victor was not content to let dealers and the public 
believe that this was a mere rhetorical gesture, and the company consistently emphasized and 
expounded on the difference between a phonographic copy and the real thing, the latter, of 
course, being the purview of Victor alone. "The difference between the Victor and all other 
musical instruments," the Voice argued, "is the difference between an original masterpiece of art 
and a print. The original is the product of a Rubens or Raphael or a Millet, glowing with the 
color and imagery put there by inspired genius. The other is a copy similar to the original." The 
musical performances captured on the company's Red Seal Records were not, the Voice assured 
its readers, analogous to the mass-produced prints of famous paintings. They were analogous to 
the paintings themselves.  25
Sculptures and paintings are material artifacts, evidence of artists’ labor but not 
themselves labor. But musical art, as understood by Victor, its dealers and the public, was 
performance. It was labor—not its material instantiation in paint or clay but evidence of a human 
presence. It would be strange enough to claim that a handful (or a thousand) copies of a painting 
were all originals. To say that a recording presented the actual art of a singer or instrumentalist, 
however, introduced metaphysical implications beyond those of the post-scarcity plastic arts. The 
claims of Victor and its competitors that their recordings represented the actual sounds recorded 
 Voice of the Victor, July, 1908, 8.25
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in their studios strongly suggested that they had managed to capture in wax or shellac something 
fundamentally human. The phonograph companies took this suggestion and ran with it. 
One of the more quotidian manifestations of this tendency was a rhetorical emphasis on 
singers’ breath. The Pathé Frères Company of New York informed prospective customers, for 
example, that with their signature phonograph, the Pathephone, they would experience music "so 
natural that critics have said it should not be called a reproduction, but an actual living 
duplication of the artist’s breathing voice.” Another approach was to claim that the phonograph 
or its records actually had a soul. In 1908 the Victor Talking Machine Company argued that its 
phonograph “is more than a perfect musical instrument—more than a song—more, even than a 
voice. It is the soul of the singer.” Edison’s National Phonograph Company, although generally 
conservative in matters of marketing, also pursued this tack and by 1921 was advertising the 
New Edison Phonograph as "The Phonograph with a Soul.”   26
The Victor Talking Machine Company, however, forwarded another exhilarating 
possibility. Phonographs and records made by Victor conveyed not just the voices, souls or 
breath of recording stars, but the stars themselves. A 1913 Victor advertisement that ran in Good 
Housekeeping, for example, depicted an opulent ballroom scene with well-dressed men and 
women before a Victrola. The host and hostess greet a late-arriving group of guests who turn out 
to be a dozen of Victor's prestigious Red Seal recording artists. “Thanks to the Victrola,” the 
advertisement reads, “they are here to perform." In another Victor advertisement from 1916 a 
couple in evening attire sit before a Victrola in the parlor. Again, they are surrounded by dozens 
Pathé Frères Phonograph Company, “Pathé Pathephone” [advertising pamphlet] (Playback Advertising 26
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of Red Seal recording stars, but the assembled virtuosi now appear as a host of imp-sized 
personages standing about the room. Presumably, their size now facilitates entrance and exit 
from the Victrola's opened doors. The image is captioned "At home with the world's greatest 
artists.”  27
Of Victor’s competitors, Columbia proved most alert to the benefits of this approach and 
they wasted little time in appropriating it for their own ends. An advertisement in the September 
1916 Ladies’ Home Journal informed readers that the Columbia phonograph "presents the artists 
themselves to you—in voice and playing, in charm and temperament, in art and personality.” A 
1920 Columbia advertisement informed readers that with the company’s Grafonola talking 
machine and Columbia Records "right at your fireside you will find such famous exclusive 
Columbia popular artists as Al Jolson, Bert Williams, Frank Crumit, Harry Fox, Marion Harris, 
Nora Bayes, Ted Lewis’ jazz Band and Van and Schenck…" An illustration depicted Santa and 
his reindeer on their way to a home with the aforementioned Columbia recording stars packed 
into his sleigh. Columbia was not alone, however, in following Victor’s lead. A 1917 
advertisement for the Aeolion-Vocalion emphasized to prospective customers both the 
channeling of live artists as well as the phonograph owner’s mastery over these sonic persons. 
"Great masters of the violin," it informed readers, will be "standing ready, instruments in hand, to 
do your bidding…" while "the mighty host of all the world’s best singers [will stand] at your 
door, and only [wait] your behest to enter and pour forth the beauty that is theirs for you and 
yours."  28
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In their most extreme forms, record manufacturers’ advertisements explicitly denied the 
distinction between reality and representation. A Columbia ad in the May 1917 issue of Redbook 
declared “The record played on the Columbia Grafonola is more than a record—it is reality… 
Only one word can truly tell all that ‘Columbia tone’ implies—and that single word is: LIFE!” 
Not surprisingly the Victor Talking Machine Company proved particularly adept at forwarding 
such aggressive ontological claims for its wares. “There is only one great master who paints 
‘Celeste Aida’ in perfect tone colors—and with a soul” Victor informed its sales force. “That 
master is Caruso. And the Victor is Caruso.” A 1919 Victor ad presented a type-written 
“Christmas Message from the World’s Greatest Artists,” listing the names of 24 Red Seal 
recording artists. Alda, Calvé, Elman, Gluck, Melba, Caruso and others could not, unfortunately, 
“be with you on Christmas Day.” But, the ad continued, “they can visit you through the Victrola
—their "other self.’” The most attention-grabbing and hyperbolic version of this argument, 
however appeared in a Victor advertisement from the mid-teens. Enrico Caruso stands, arms 
akimbo, in full costume as Rhadames from the Opera Aida. Next to him is a giant Victrola 
record, helpfully captioned “Victor Record of "Celeste Aida" by Caruso.” In large text the 
advertisement informs readers: “Both are Caruso” before explicating further on the same 
theme: “The Victor Record of Caruso’s voice,” the advertisement insisted, “is just as truly 
Caruso as Caruso himself. It actually is Caruso… Every one of the hundred and six Caruso 
records brings you not only his art, but his personality.” The “Both are Caruso” ads apparently 
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achieved their intended effect because the company employed the trope in advertisements for 
other recording artists, including the famed violinists Mischa Elman and Fritz Kreisler.   29
It is not the case that the phonograph industry unilaterally embraced sonic modernity in 
the years after 1900. In its early years even the eminently forward-looking and imaginative 
Victor Talking Machine Company vacillated between the new discursive dispensation and 
decidedly old-fashioned appeals to the public. In the July 1906 issue of the Voice, for example, 
the Victor Talking Machine Company announced the newest addition to its catalog, the Victor 
Junior Gramophone. The attached illustration featured the seven available Victor models 
arranged in a semi-circle. Spindly black arms and legs stick out from each and burnt-cork faces 
peer out from inside their horns. The Voice imagined the mechanical minstrels' dialogue: 
"TAMBO (Victor III) to BONES (Victor VI)--"Say Bones, who's dat dar li'l chap down dar to 
t'odder end of de line? I never see him before." The Victor VI responded "Dat dar's our li'l new 
end man, Li'l Victor Junior Gramophone. He's new in de bus'ness, but he's bound to make er hit, 
jes de same as we all." This grotesque testimony on behalf of the company’s wares hardly 
conformed to the trends examined in this chapter. Similarly, a 1918 Columbia advertisement 
referred to the company’s Grafonola model phonograph as a “a big, handsome musical friend 
with a voice that is sweet and clear and strong, bringing good cheer to every home he enters. You 
need his cheerful voice in yours.”   30
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Thomas Edison’s National Phonograph Company also never quite subscribed to the 
package of assumptions embedded in sonic modernity. To begin with, Edison himself (to the 
consternation of his lieutenants) continued to insist that phonograph records represented sonic 
texts, and continued to pursue fidelity at the expense of other considerations. By 1911 Victor had 
long since proven the profitability of selling sonic persons rather than sonic texts. In that year, 
however, the inventor wrote to the managing director of the Edison phonograph division in 
Berlin saying that “I propose to depend upon the quality of the records and not on the reputation 
of the singers.” Understandings of sound recording remained, just as they always had been, 
multi-vocal, and record manufacturers and their customers continued to occasionally speak of the 
technology in terms established in the prior century. Still, the general trajectory was fairly 
unambiguous and it traced an arc from mechanistic nineteenth century descriptions of “talking 
machines” to a vitalistic theory of phonographic presence.   31
Conclusion 
This chapter has foregrounded the role of the early phonograph industry in consolidating 
sonic modernity, but this transformation depended as well on the understandings and practices 
cultivated around the phonograph by the consuming public. The durable and privately-owned 
phonograph recordings of the early twentieth century allowed and even encouraged consumers to 
listen to their records over and over, often for years or even decades. The long-term relationships 
listeners cultivated with their records bred an intimacy of their contents. Musicologist Mark 
Katz, has recalled his youthful fascination with a 1951 recording of the piece “Zigeunerweisen,” 
by violinist Jascha Heifetz, a record he listened to “until every nuance of the performance was 
 Harvith & Harvith, Edison, Musicians, and the Phonograph, 3-4.31
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ingrained in my musical memory.” So exacting was his familiarity with the record that Heifetz’s 
mistakes—including an accidentally plucked E string at the the 00:34 mark—became part of the 
piece in his mind. This in spite of his own musical training and his familiarity with the score. “I 
came to expect it,” he writes, “not only when listening to Heifetz’s recording but whenever 
hearing the work, even in concert. In fact, I would be a bit surprised and even disappointed when 
I did not hear that E.”   32
Repeated exposure to musical recordings, however, often led not just to a familiarity, but 
also to intense affective responses. When Edison dealer W.T. Geltz played a recording of “The 
Battle Cry of Freedom,” for one Civil War veteran, he noted that the old man “weeps and great 
hot tears roll down the furrows which the years have laid into his cheeks…His lips again move 
with the prayers that were murmured before the charge, and then… carried forward in the 
irresistible current of the strife, he swears terrible oaths invoking the war god’s vengeance upon 
the heads of his country’s enemies.” Geltz, is aware that the story might read like hyperbolic 
advertising copy and even admits he ran it in the local paper as an “ad.” He attests, however, that 
the events actually took place and that the account is not in the least “over-drawn:” “He actually 
wept, prayed and swore.” He even provides the veterans name— Uncle Dan Frankhouser—to 
lend further credence to the story. In 1908 a Nebraska Edison dealer sold “an old gentleman” a 
phonograph and a parcel of records including the sacred piece “Safe in the Arms of Jesus.” A 
month later the man’s son-in-law informed the dealer that the old man had taken to playing the 
record over and over, “tears running down his cheeks,” saying “I ain’t there boys, I ain’t there; I 
ought to be but I ain’t.” The dealer considered sending out one of the local ministers to talk with 
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the old man, “but on reflection concluded that they had had their chance and the Phonograph was 
doing the work better than they had done it.”   33
Affective response to a sound recording could, and often did, draw listeners bodily into 
the sonic moment. Bandleader and composer Alton Adams remembered his own emotional 
reaction to the recordings of John Philip Sousa when he was a young man in the Virgin Islands, 
recalling “the many hours I spent in rhapsodic ecstasy listening outside the residence of . . . a 
kindred spirit who was playing Sousa marches on his phonograph player.” Those recordings 
“were not mere musical treats to me. They were like manna from on high, feeding a hungry, 
searching musical soul.” Interestingly, after these phonograph concerts Adams often retired to his 
room where he lay on his bed, fantasizing about conducting Sousa’s band. Father of musicologist 
Richard Crawford—no musician himself—enjoyed a similarly imaginative and embodied 
relationship with his musical records. After shutting himself up alone in a room in his home, the 
elder Crawford would often set a record spinning on the turntable so that he could pace about the 
room conducting the invisible ensemble. Though the future musicologist could hear the music 
and see shadows moving through the room’s frosted glass windows, he remained ignorant of his 
father’s hobby until he saw him carry a baton into the room with him one day. The old Yankee 
veteran who visited W.T. Geltz’s phonograph showroom in 1905 listened to a second record that 
day, Harlan and Stanley’s “Marching Through Georgia,” and could not help but join in the march 
to the sea. “Ah!” Geltz recalled in his letter to Edison Phonograph Monthly, “you should see the 
old warrior’s nostrils dilate and his eye take on the fire of battle…His arms swing and his feet 
 Edison Phonograph Monthly, February, 1905, 12; Edison Phonograph Monthly, December, 1903, 12.33
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beat time to the inspiring rhythm of the song while his entire being is aquiver with the thrill 
which soldiers alone can feel.”   34
As anthropologist Alfred Gell pointed out in his 1998 Art and Agency, there exists an 
apparent (and apparently powerful) impulse in human beings to attribute agency to artifacts. 
How much stronger this tendency must be when the actual sources of the object’s agency are 
purposely hidden—when the hundreds or even thousands of human and non-human agents 
responsible for the object’s operations are nowhere to be found? Quite naturally, the consuming 
public fills this agency gap with the only one of those thousands of laborers who he or she knows 
the name of—Kreisler, Patti, or Melba. Journalist A.J. Liebling recalled his childhood 
experiences with the recordings of Enrico Caruso. “Mostly… [Caruso] sang ‘E Lucevan le 
Stelle.’ I can identify it, at fifty years’ distance, by the place where Cavaradossi sobs. Caruso 
sobbed louder than any other tenor, and when he did, my father would say, ‘That’s art. You can 
tell a real artist by touches like that.’” Much of the work of building sonic modernity, then, took 
place in consumers’ homes, and it was a job which Americans generally signed up for 
enthusiastically.   35
The Devil’s advocate, of course, must point out a glaring truth buried in all this 
celebration of consumer sovereignty: At every turn, the kinds of practices cultivated around 
record listening by the consuming public were shaped by the maneuvers of corporate capital. It 
was manufacturers who decided to sell phonographs outright for consumption in the private 
home. It was Victor, Columbia and Edison who undertook to extend the life of the phonograph 
 Katz, Capturing Sound, 18, 67; Edison Phonograph Monthly, February, 1905, 12.34
 David Suisman, Selling Sounds: the Commercial Revolution In American Music (Cambridge, Mass.: 35
Harvard University Press, 2009) 125.
!318
record and make it a long-term member of the consumer’s home. These two decisions alone 
profoundly shaped the kinds of phonograph-listening practices which Americans could enter 
into. Further, our infernal defense attorney would no doubt argue, even if record-listening 
practices had evolved completely independent of the material maneuvers of the Big Three, their 
meanings would be subject to their manipulation. Phonograph corporations molded the 
commercial semiotics of competition and cooperation and dictated the terms on which dealers 
carried their products. They motorized the phonograph, displacing human labor from the optics 
of phonographic playback. They hid the device’s workings from the eye, its mechanical din from 
the ear and created the material circumstances of the “agency gap.” Most importantly, Victor, 
Edison, and Columbia and thousands of their local dealers and distributors filled the public 
sphere with advertisements which shaped what consumers thought and felt about the apparatus in 
their parlor.  
All of these responses, the prosecution admits, are true. Capital is enormously powerful 
in its capacity to shape behavior and meanings, and the untold millions spent by the Big Three to 
shape public thinking certainly attest to their faith in their own influence. Two qualifications, 
however, are in order. The first of these is that consumers did not have to engage in any of these 
practices and as a long train of failed technologies can attest, there are limits to the power of 
corporate prescription. One need not indulge any illusions of complete consumer rationality to 
reject the equally dubious vision of commercial “brainwashing.” Worthless products are 
worthless and while advertising creates consumer demand it seldom does so (notwithstanding the 
occasional pet rock or fidget spinner) ex nihilo.  
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In the hoary cultural history debate between corporate domination and consumer 
sovereignty, then, this chapter takes up a conciliatory, if unsatisfying, position in the middle. 
Everyone is right (or wrong.) There is a sense, however, in which the question of consumer 
versus producer is the wrong one—not because it is not interesting (it is,) and not because it has 
not been productive for past scholars (it has been.) Rather, it is the wrong question because it is 
incomplete. This dissertation has argued that struggles over meaning are not the purview of 
producers and consumers alone, but also that of a third faction—things themselves. When the 
phonograph broke down or performed horribly at a distant exhibition, it damaged the commercial 
prospects of the technology and reinforced conceptions of itself as a “talking machine.” When 
motors refused to run silently they pushed forward the sonic evidence of the phonograph’s 
machine-ness. When the wax used in early cylinder records refused to yield amicably to the 
needs of mass production, it forced reliance on a crude semi-industrial process of reproduction 
incompatible with the semiotics of sonic modernity. At every turn, the phonograph industry’s 
material and discursive projects were subject to a kind of gremlin’s veto. The things which 
consumers and producers believed about sound recording, then, were profoundly shaped by the 
material realities of the technology itself.  
At the same time, there is little reason to believe that the industry aimed, or even could 
have aimed, for sonic modernity itself. Until nearly the eleventh hour of this story, the Big Three 
pursued aims only tangentially tied to the belief that recordings were people. The concealment of 
the phonographic apparatus, originally, came as a kind of byproduct of hardening the technology 
against the vicissitudes of the material world. In order to ensure proper functioning of their 
wares, manufacturers outfitted the phonograph with increasingly robust mechanisms further and 
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further out of reach of tampering and tinkering hands. These machines ran more and more 
(though never perfectly) flawlessly, providing decreasing opportunities for users to ruminate on 
their machine-ness. As the phonograph moved into the home, manufacturers added new reasons 
to old for why the phonograph should conceal its mechanical secrets. The parlor, everyone knew, 
was a space reserved for respite from the wearing realities of the workaday world. If the 
phonograph were to pass muster with the guardians of the domestic sanctuary it would have to 
straighten its act up and become a proper piece of furniture.  
So too did the project of de-mechanizing the phonograph’s sound aim at quarry different 
from sonic modernity. On one hand, the preoccupation with non-mechanical sound stemmed 
from the same impulse that pushed the visual occlusion of the phonograph’s workings: machines 
did not belong in the parlor and neither did their sounds. On the other hand, the impulse to strain 
mechanism from phonographic sound drew from historically deeper attitudes about what 
“sounded good.” Whirrs and clicks, subjects believed, are not music and are, in fact, grating and 
off-putting. On that much early twenty first century and early twentieth century listeners 
generally agree. But however longstanding this sentiment’s appeal to commonsense, it is, in large 
measure, an artifact of historical construction. In the twentieth century composers and musicians 
in the musical avant garde assumed as one of their prime objectives the disruption of easy 
distinctions between music and noise, and unsurprisingly mechanical or “industrial” sounds 
figured prominently in this project. While such explorations have fallen and continue to fall 
outside the scope of public taste, the slow but steady intrusion of other machine noises into 
popular music attests to the historicity of “good sound.” Distortion, reverb, turntablism and a 
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range of other stage and studio techniques demonstrate just how easily the sounds of machines 
themselves can ingratiate themselves with the modern ear.  
Finally, The decision to associate performing stars with recordings owed much more to a 
desire on the part of the Big Three to link the manufacturers’ brands with the prestige of 
European art music. Consistent with that aim, many of Victor’s advertisements drew 
substantially on an older marketing ploy: the endorsement. One 1918 advertisement, for 
example, informed readers that “no master record shall be considered as satisfactory and 
complete and perfect until it has been approved not only by an authorized representative of the 
Victor Company, but also by the artist.” In addition to borrowing from their recording stars’ 
charisma, then, the Big Three sought to enlist these virtuosi as expert witnesses in their field. 
Like physicians endorsing soap, they could assure the public that these recordings satisfied the 
demands of high art. They were not just records of great singers. They were great recordings. 
They represented “quality.”   36
Victor, followed by Columbia and Edison pushed forward their recording stars in an 
attempt to capitalize on longstanding beliefs about art music as quality. Almost immediately, 
however, they became aware that the public’s listening habits encouraged a more thoroughgoing 
kind of anthropomorphization. Phonograph enthusiasts listened to their recordings over and over. 
They learned every jot and tittle of the sonic script and darted around their rooms dancing and 
conducting and singing along with them. Most importantly, they developed close affective 
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relationships with their recordings, feelings which were invariably directed toward the only 
agency left in sight after the industry concealed the machine and human labor of phonographic 
playback. Unforeseen by the industry, listeners began to understand recordings in terms of the 
actual presence of recording stars.  
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CONCLUSION 
In its introduction, this dissertation discussed the wealth of evidence provided in 
historical literature that recorded sound has served as a shaper of American culture and identity. 
This dissertation has concerned itself, first and foremost, with the question “how?” How did the 
phonograph operate as a shaper of individual and collective subjectivities? I have argued 
throughout that the phonograph and its records have operated in ways very similar to any other 
circulating commodity—that what I have called “sonic modernity” shares much (though not 
everything) with Marx’s notion of commodity fetishism. By way of conclusion, I want to push 
this point slightly further to argue that the phonograph did not represent just one more 
opportunity for consumeristic self-fashioning. Rather it offered a dynamic new variation on the 
theme quite unlike anything before it. Recorded sound, like any commodity, has often reinforced 
age-old social distinctions of race, class and region and underwrote projects of empire and 
exclusion, but while the technology thus added a sonic gloss to older categories of difference, the 
novelty of these phonographic effects should not be overstated. Consumer goods have long been 
brought to bear on the project of marking insiders and excluding outsiders. Where recorded 
sound was truly revolutionary, however, was in its capacity to mobilize brand new geographies 
of self and other, which, though never totally independent of older categories of difference could 
not be simplistically reduced to them.  
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One of the first and most important examples of sound recordings’ roles in crystallizing 
new ways of being was the reaction of interwar youth to the circulation of recorded jazz, one 
aspect of which was the explosion of interest in playing jazz. There is evidence that 
phonographic music had already been inspiring Americans to pick up instruments for decades. 
From 1890 to 1910, the period during which coin-slot phonographs entered American life en 
masse, the number of music teachers per capita in the United States increased 25 percent. 
Whatever the initial causes of this early spike in amateur music-making, interest continued to 
grow and by the late 1910s had become closely associated with phonograph listening and jazz.   1
The story of Leon Bismarck Beiderbecke is instructive in this regard. Leon first 
discovered jazz as a teenager in Davenport, Iowa, in 1918 when an older brother brought home a 
handful of records by the Original Dixieland Jazz Band. The sounds of that band (though not the 
“original” expressions of New Orleans jazz by a long shot) captivated the impressionable young 
man who soon secured a cornet and taught himself how to play it—with virtuosity. For the rest of 
his short, rambling and alcohol-soaked life, “Bix” Beiderbecke lived as an archetypal jazzman. 
He ate, breathed and slept jazz and when he died he left a body of his own recordings, some of 
them masterpieces in their own right. Jazz enthusiasts’ relationship to their records could become 
quite intense and listeners often developed loyalty to particular artists. Cornetist Jimmy Maxwell, 
for example, recalled of his early life in San Joaquin Valley, California, that “there wasn’t that 
much jazz coming out to California…but about once a month one Armstrong record would come 
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out and one Duke Ellington record would come out. And some way I would beg, borrow or even 
steal, truthfully, for one of those records.”  2
The enthusiasm for records led some listeners to imagine new identities for themselves as 
active participants in the world of jazz. Bud Freeman, saxophonist and Chicago jazz pioneer 
recounted how the chance discovery of recorded jazz transformed a group of white suburbanites 
into something brand new: a jazz band. 
“There was a soda parlor called the Spoon and Straw that we used to frequent in 1922 
during my sophomore year. It had a little wind-up Victrola and stacks of records and we 
would play them while we had our sodas and shakes. One day we found a record by the 
New Orleans Rhythm Kings in the stack and we put it on, not knowing what kind of band 
we were about to hear. Were we excited by it! We were used to hearing commercial dance 
music, but this sound was something else. We were so excited by that first record that we 
decided that afternoon to become jazz musicians and form our own band, which Dick 
later named the Blue Friars… Little did we know that we were all to become world 
renowned. I picked saxophone, Jimmy McPartland cornet, Dick McPartland banjo, Jim 
Lannigan bass tuba, Frank Teschemacher clarinet, and Dave North piano. The 
McPartlands convinced my father to buy me a saxophone and he took me downtown to 
Lyon and Healy, a music store on Wabash Avenue…” 
The “Austin High Gang,” as this group of white jazzmen came to be known, experience an 
abrupt transformation through phonograph listening. Not only did their consumption of recorded 
sound transform them individually into “jazzmen” but it also brought them together around a 
shared identity as a jazz band. Tellingly, the band’s name also gestured outward, signaling a 
 Katz, Capturing Sound, 81-82; For more on Beiderbecke, see Brendan Wolfe, Finding Bix: the Life And 2
Afterlife of a Jazz Legend (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2017); Jean Pierre Lion, Bix: the 
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connection to the New Orleans Rhythm Kings who sometimes recorded under the name the 
Friar’s Society Orchestra.   3
The sub-culture of jazz fans and musicians which sprung up around the circulation of 
recorded sound is a template which was copied many times over throughout the twentieth 
century. With some variations in emphasis, youth culture has time and again drifted toward semi-
coherent conceptions of the self and collectivity which assume the consumption of recorded 
sound as its primary organizing principle. In the late twentieth century, for example, recorded 
punk rock, heavy metal, and hip-hop provided a sonic spine around which the consumption of 
leather jackets, bondage pants, patches, band t-shirts, baseball caps, jewelry and a million other 
articles of self-fashioning could be organized. Throughout the twentieth century, then, recorded 
 Bud Freeman and Robert Wolf, Crazeology: the Autobiography of a Chicago Jazzman (Urbana: 3
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sounds have often served as a kind of ur-commodity—one which structures the consumption of 
other commodities and which provides direction to the panoply of sub-cultures characteristic of 
late-modern consumer culture.  
On one hand, the efficacy of the phonograph in this regard owed a great deal to its being 
at the right place at the right time. The nineteenth century economic transformations which 
facilitated the explosion in consumer goods (like phonographs) also called into being an army of 
white collared and salaried workers. The necessity of coordinating the activities of massive 
corporate entities required middle-managers, administrators, clerks, typists and others who found 
themselves immersed in interminable and tedious work of the most abstract character. Reports, 
receipts, bills, accounts, letters, telegrams, counting, accounting and every imaginable variety of 
paper-pushing created among this New Middle Class a feeling of “weightlessness,” or 
detachment from material reality. Their consequent search for genuine experience led them from 
medievalism and esotericism, to depth psychology and spiritualism. Ironically, this flight from 
modernity precipitated middle class men and women into a consumeristic “therapeutic ethos” 
even more ethereal and strange than the lives they were trying to escape. Beginning in the 1890s, 
department stores dazzled shoppers and gawkers alike with a new visual language emphasizing 
color, glass and light. They offered a vision of consumption divorced from production, a mythos 
taken up with sometimes stunning skill by the era’s advertising firms.   4
This fin-de-siecle cultural milieu of weightlessness, unreality, escape and consumeristic 
self-searching was the immediate context for the reception of recorded sound. The young men 
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and women born in the years immediately following the turn-of-the-century were primed for a 
lifelong search for the “real,” and it is little surprise that as they came of age they carried that 
search out within the ever-expanding realm of consumption. This general cultural milieu of 
weightlessness, however, represents only one-half of the story, because though the Lost 
Generation and their descendants have certainly busied themselves with a hunt for the “real” it 
leaves to be explained why recorded sound should take a central part in the search. What follows 
is an attempt at an explanation of the power of recorded sound (and implicitly, other media 
forms) within the context of consumer capitalism. It is necessarily abstract. It is also necessarily 
speculative, but, I believe, plausible.  
First, certain of its technological characteristics made the phonograph susceptible to 
construction, not only as media, but as a particularly powerful form of media conveying 
something more essentially human than mere information or texts. Human labor, in all of its 
manifold diversity of purposes and effects, is inherently a time-bound process. The labor poured 
into a more traditional commodity such as a mass-produced chair becomes temporally jumbled. 
Layers of labor (sawing, hammering, gluing, sanding, varnishing) sediment one over the other 
and partially obscure the evidence of human agency back of the commodity. The result is an 
object which represents the culmination of human labor, but which is not human labor itself.  
The wax or shellac sound recording registers the labor of the singer or instrumentalist in a 
way fundamentally different from a chair or even a written text. It stores the “tool-marks” of the 
singer’s labor sequentially across the surface of the commodity. These tool-marks remain largely 
hidden and—without a deliberate effort—will generally not even be noticed by the consuming 
subject. During playback the machine reads these tool-marks sequentially, replicating the 
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original labor and allowing it to unfurl over the course of three minutes like the swinging of a 
hammer or the tilling of a field. That the craftsman’s tool marks are hidden and then sequentially 
and sonically “read” gives the illusion that labor itself (and not just its material product) has been 
brought into the home. This, of course, is an illusion. The recorded cylinder “contains” no time. 
The peculiar characteristics of the cylinder—its registry of musical tool marks—are 
fundamentally spatial as they are arranged across the surface of the purchased commodity. The 
diachronic facet of phonographic playback exists only in the home. It is a property of the 
phonograph itself, which is the actual laborer (in the immediate sense) behind the sounds thus 
emitted into the parlor.  
One final observation, lifted from Marx, is necessary to understand why the (apparent) 
direct consumption of human labor was a revolutionary shift in consumer culture. The entire 
history of consumeristic self-fashioning up to the twentieth century had been anchored in the 
semiotics of purchasable goods and for Marx, much of the power of these goods obtained in their 
passage through the cash nexus. Goods in their pre-modern state, he argues, present men and 
women with specific use values. They do particular things and fulfill specific needs or wants on 
the part of their users. Hoes extricate weeds from fields, potatoes satisfy hunger and so on. It is 
only through the sleight-of-hand of the market that so many hoes can come to “equal” so many 
potatoes. Through cash exchange diverse and incommensurable articles assume a universalistic 
quality called “value,” through which they can be imagined as a discrete sphere of 
commensurable entities. If, as I have argued, sound recordings represent a quantum leap from 
purchasable goods to purchasable labor, then it follows that their passage through the cash nexus 
would represent an equally dramatic escalation of the logics of commodification. The 
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commodification of hats and horses and hay bales had signaled the interchangeability of objects. 
It facilitated and encouraged the acquisition of material articles which were no longer bound to 
specific social contexts but were subject only to the commanding power of value. With recorded 
sound, not only things but human labor itself appeared to pass through the cash nexus. Human 
activity in all its hitherto irreducible and sensuous specificity could now be imagined as 
“commensurable” with every other object or parcel of human activity. Sound recordings, in their 
passage through the market, signaled that something much more closely entwined with the 
human “essence” than the products of man’s labor could be alienated in direct form. Being itself, 
the phonograph seemed to say, could be traded, cast off or plucked from the raging river of 
salable items around you.   5
Sonic modernity evolved over time as a kind of negotiation between producers, 
consumers and phonographs. The industry’s success in capitalizing on sonic modernity stemmed 
neither from its ability to unilaterally impose products and meanings on consumers, nor its 
ability to passively serve a pre-existing consumer demand. Phonographs, listeners and sonic 
modernity were all co-constructed over time by the actions of human and non-human parties. 
Capital’s advantage in the matter lay in its ability to chase cultural logics where they may lead; to 
expend enormous sums of money in the search of the next big thing and to fail over and over 
while searching for it; and most importantly, to leap in front of it and divert it into profitable 
channels once it was discovered. Still, complicated interactions between people, things and signs 
make culture an exceedingly complex and unpredictable sphere of experience, much like an 
economy. 
 Karl Marx, “The Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret,” in The Consumer Society Reader, ed. 5
Martyn Lee (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 10-18.
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Just as people and things continue to frustrate states and corporations in their ambitions to 
engineer the political and economic spheres, so too do they get in the way of the culture industry. 
Sonic modernity was and is a surprise and it fully satisfied no one’s ideal conditions. Its 
ramifying social effects are equally as dynamic and irreducible to any one set of determinants. It 
was the product of millions of negotiations, and as the Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson 
wrote of a much broader sphere of human activity, sonic modernity was “the result of human 
action, but not the execution of any human design.” It is far more interesting than that.  6
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